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Abstract
Ethnicity and Environment: ‘Tribal9 Culture and the State in 
Bangladesh
This thesis investigates the current predicament of the people of Chittagong Hill Tracts 
(CHT) in Bangladesh, a population with significant cultural differentiation from the 
mainstream Bengali population. Dealing with the issues of their survival in the forest and 
their quest for identity, the research explores how their ethnicity and environment are 
intertwined. This is examined in the context of state policies towards non-Bengali ethnic 
minorities in the CHT. The study identifies sources of diversity at the micro level and the 
forces that create conditions for ‘unity in diversity’ at the macro level. One is the assertion 
of ‘self-image’ on the basis of cultural polarity within the confines of a multi-ethnic locality. 
The other is the assertion of ‘collective image’ as unifying forces stemming from the notion 
of shared deprivation and marginalisation generated by conditions of the State and State 
institutions. This ethnographic study is based on two years fieldwork between January 1999 
and December 2000 among three ethnic groups, Marma, Bawm and Tanchanga in 
Banderban district of southern CHT.
The thesis is divided into three main parts. Part one deals with research context, the 
historical development in CHT and the main theoretical issues concerning the relationships 
between ethnicity, social movement and indigenous land rights. The second part looks at 
local perceptions of settlement, locality and village organisation and at the dimensions of 
linguistic identity at both group and collective levels. The third part examines broader 
issues, events and processes concerning ethnic mobilisation around the traditional land use 
system, jhum, and the politics of khas land, based on case materials of how jhum lands are 
leased out to Bengalis. This is followed by analysis of local electoral processes and a 
concluding discussion of ‘ethnic mobilisation’, ‘multi-ethnicity’, and ‘social movements’.
The study promotes a deeper understanding of the multi-ethnic nature of the Bangladeshi 
State and provides a more balanced assessment of the relationship between ethnicity, 
environment, development and the state. It also contributes to the wider anthropology of 
forest-dwelling peoples of South Asia. It challenges the political use of environmentalism 
and anthropological knowledge in national and regional disputes over the control and use of 
natural resources.
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Introduction
This research concerns the people of the Chittagong Hill Tracts1 (CHT) of 
Bangladesh, a population with significant cultural differentiation from the 
mainstream Bengali population. The research explores how the ethnic identity of the 
people of CHT and their environment are intertwined. Dealing with the issues of 
their survival in the forest and their quest for identity, this thesis investigates the 
current predicament of the hill people of CHT.2 This is examined in the context of 
state policies towards non-Bengali minorities in Bangladesh and the control of 
natural resources.
In Bangladesh the relationship between ethnicity and environment is conceived in 
terms of that between ‘tribal’ culture and the State. I thus set this research context 
within the theoretical considerations underpinning the discourses of ethnicity and 
environment. However, because these are very big issues with a huge amount of 
literature surrounding each of them, I focus on land tenure, land use and jhum 
agricultural systems.5 I am aware of the political sensitivity of these issues in 
contemporary Bangladesh. Nonetheless land is a crucially important way of 
researching the relationship between ethnicity and environment. I am also aware of 
potential theoretical links between land, identity and other issues: specifically micro­
politics. As a multidimensional subject, land, thus, becomes the main focus of my 
research.
Land is the platform on which environment and ethnicity have a regular discursive 
interaction. Claims of ethnicity and claims to land are intertwined, suggesting the 
need for a comprehensive understanding of land tenure and land use patterns in the 
CHT. I discuss the issues that emerge concerning the relationship between resource 
use and tenure, political conflict and ‘tribal’ identity in this thesis. In doing so, I
henceforth CHT in this thesis.
2 The eleven ethnic groups who are the original inhabitants of the CHT call themselves collectively as 
Pahari (hill people), there are other terms, such as ’tribal’, Upazati, Jhumma and Adivashi which are 
also interchangeably used to refer to these people, but the connotations and meanings are varied. I 
will discuss this issue of categorisation in details in the proceeding chapters.
3 The characteristic form of swidden agriculture in the CHT (see detail dicussion on swidden
agriculture in Chapter Five).
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highlight the social and political implications of resource use and tenure for the 
construction of collective identity in the CHT. I suggest an analytical approach that 
adequately deals with this relationship in the context of CHT, relating historical 
construction of the environment to political and social movements in this region of 
Bangladesh. Many of the issues related to the emergence of these movements 
revolve around the control and use of land.
The management of land and forest resources, particularly the khas land,5 is a key 
concern in this thesis. I am particularly interested in changing conceptions of 
ecological issues, including the possible use of environmentalism as a political 
instrument. Politicians, environmentalists and policy makers in Bangladesh have 
long associated the cultural and economic practice of the ethnic minorities of CHT 
with deforestation. Deforestation has, for many political reasons, been erroneously 
attributed to the practice of jhum cultivation alone. Unfortunately public perception 
has now come closer to this official position. In fact, with the diminution of the 
forest and comercialisation of land in the hill regions, the sustainability of jhum 
cultivation is becoming untenable. Hence the hallmark of their identity has been 
under continuing external and internal pressure for change.
State policies undertaken in the name of development have also marginalised the hill 
people of CHT from their land, with the result they are becoming increasingly 
landless. This has instilled in them an acute feeling of alienation from successive 
Bengali regimes. The entire CHT region has experienced significant changes in the 
socio-economic and political arena particularly during post-colonial period. The 
eleven ethnic groups who were the sole inhabitants of this region and who once 
enjoyed a greater degree of autonomy now face profound challenges to their distinct 
ways of life.
The above situation gives rise to several possibilities: should the CHT be protected 
from further encroachment by the mainstream Bengali population? As their situation
4Schendel’s (1996) recent comprehensive discussion on this issue opened up new questions 
challenging the contemporary nationality debate in Bangladesh.
5 From the perspective of the state khas land is state owned land but this is problematic for local 
conceptions of land rights and ownership. I will discuss the issue of khas land in more detail in 
Chapter Six.
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changes, will the people of CHT be able to claim stewardship of their land, or will 
their dispossession be sanctioned by their depiction as environmentally destructive 
land-users? How are these changes instigated and articulated, and what are their 
cultural repercussions? What are the strains and tensions within the ethnic groups? 
Does adaptation to the new realities of the CHT bring about a fusion of collective 
ethnic mobilisation?
In its extension, the main research questions addressed in this thesis are: why has 
jhum land become politically and symbolically important for the hill people in their 
construction of a new collective identity? Is the notion of Jhumma ethnicity shared 
by everyone? How do they relate jhum to their everyday life? How does the 
necessity of taking collective action contribute to forging of an overarching Jhumma 
ethnicity, and how does this impact on the cultural orientations of each group of the 
collective? As ethnicity is the politics of difference, in what situations is the 
particular identity operational in the CHT? How do people represent their cultural 
reality to themselves, and to one another, and to the outside world? I return 
repeatedly to these questions and try to answer them in this study.
At the linguistic-political level, it appears that language barriers create the strongest 
basis for cultural difference between hill people and Bengalis and between hill 
groups themselves, which have been concretised by colonial and subsequent state 
policies (Islam 1984; Tripura 1992; Ahamed 1999). In this study, I explore the 
nuances of this very political everyday relationship between language and culture. 
How have the languages been negotiated in complicated political and social inter­
relationships between the groups themselves? How are these language differences 
signified in the lives of the people of CHT?
In this research I look at the CHT culture and society changing through time. The 
research treats ‘culture’ as fluid and politically contested, in contrast to the previous 
studies of the CHT which have been mainly folkloric in character (such as Selina 
1995; Sattar 1975). Unlike these conventional studies, the present ethnographic 
research is thus conceived from a processual point of view with the emphasis upon 
dynamic forces that operate as a mechanism for both distinct cultural boundary 
maintenance as well as collective identity formation. In other words, the study
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identifies sources of diversity at the micro level and the forces that create conditions 
for ‘unity in diversity’ at the macro level. One is the assertion of ‘self-image’ on the 
basis of cultural polarity within the confines of a multi-ethnic locality. The other is 
the assertion of ‘collective image’ as a unifying force stemming from the notion of 
shared deprivation and marginalisation generated by conditions of the State and 
State institutions.
A clearer understanding of this relationship and its local manifestations is formed 
through the use of traditional anthropological fieldwork techniques. Living in a 
multi-ethnic locality, such as Roangchari of Banderban district, I examine how 
Marma, Bawm and Tanchanga ethnic groups are constituted and what are the 
constituting elements of their ethnic identity. The notion of diversity is explored 
through investigating socio-organisational and linguistic aspects of these groups (see 
Part two of the thesis).
The notion of unity is also explored through the study of multi-ethnic relationship 
and the processes of collective identity construction. Against the backdrop of 
exogenous forces and in the face of adverse socio-economic and political realities in 
everyday life how do these diverse ethnic groups emphasise shared identity at 
broader level? It emphasises that construction of Pahari, Jhumma, and Adivhasi is 
the expression of collective ethnic mobilisation on the basis of cultural politics, land 
and resource contestation in the CHT (in Part three). I discuss these dynamic process 
of identity construction and ethnic mobilisation throughout the thesis.
The conflict in the CHT assumes the appearance of a struggle between natives and 
the State for self-determination and control over resources. The thesis addresses the 
relationship between resource use and land tenure, political conflict and ethnic 
identity. It argues that hill people respond to increased marginalisation by forming 
ethnic social movements. The ongoing organised activities of different indigenous 
organisations, such as Vomi Odikhar Committee, Pahari Okka Pari shod, are central 
examples of these processes.
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The study will promote a deeper understanding of the multi-ethnic nature of the 
Bangladeshi State and provide a more balanced assessment of the relationship 
between ethnicity, environment, development and the State. This thesis, of course, 
covers only very limited parts of the present-day situation of Pahari in the CHT. 
Despite these limitations, the study makes a unique contribution to the knowledge of 
ethnic peoples in the CHT, and, more generally, hopes to induce a different kind of 
thinking about the non-Bengali peoples of Bangladesh. I start this with general 
background of CHT.
The General Background of the CHT
The Chittagong Hill Tracts are located in the southeastern part of Bangladesh, 
bordering with India on the north and east, Burma to the south and Chittagong 
district to the west.6 Geographically, as part of the Himalayan range, the region 
comprises numerous hills, forests and river valleys in complete contrast to the rest of 
the low lying alluvial plains of Bangladesh. It occupies a physical area of 5,093 
square miles, constituting ten percent of the total land area of Bangladesh.
According to the Population Census of 2001, the total population of CHT is 
1,325,041 combining both hill people and the Bengali (BBS 2001).
At present the CHT includes three hill districts: Rangamati, Banderban and 
Khagrachari. This hilly area is inhabited by around a dozen ethnic groups or 
communities,7 though there is controversy over the number of ethnic groups in the 
existing literature.8 Chakma, Marma, and Tripura numerically are the dominant 
groups, living mainly in valley areas and practicing both plough and swidden 
agriculture. The smaller groups, such as the Bawm, Khumi, Lusai, Chak, Mru 
occupy the mountain areas and are practicing swidden agriculture - locally known as 
jhum cultivation - alone.
6 See the map of CHT and Bangladesh in Map 1 and 2.
7 By ’ethnic communities’or ’ethnic groups’, a reference has been made here to those people whose 
linguistic and cultural background is different from the mainstream Bangladesh. (This will be 
elaborated upon later).
8 The number of ethnic communities of CHT has been variously mentioned in the literature, for 
example, 8 (Lewin 1869; Hutchinson 1909), 10 ( Bessaignet 1958; Bemot 1959; Roy 1997), 12 
(Schendel 1992; Dewan 1990; Loffler 1990), 13 (Mohsin 1997; Mey 1981), 16 (Selina 1995).
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However, traditionally jhum is the predominant form of subsistence agriculture for 
all the inhabitants of the CHT. The CHT topography and climate makes it 
imperative that the people fall back upon jhum agriculture for their livelihood. Their 
agriculture is mainly oriented towards subsistence, with limited production of cash 
crops. The principal crop is rice with other vegetables, com, lentils, chillis, and 
garlic grown on a smaller scale.
It is important to note that although all these groups share a common mode of 
subsistence, that is jhum, they nonetheless differ from each other in terms of 
religion, language, and social organisation to some extent. All the major religions - 
Buddhism, Hinduism and Christianity - are represented among the people of CHT. 
The Chakma, Marma and Tanchanga are Buddhists; Tripura are Hindus. There are 
smaller groups, such as Mm, Khumi, and Khang, who still have still their own 
animist religion, but some of these animist groups, for example the Lushai, Bawm, 
and Pankhuzi, are increasingly being converted to Christianity by missionaries 
working in the CHT.
Linguistic diversity among the groups is also significant as there are ten different 
languages spoken by eleven ethnic groups along with Bengali and Chittagonian. 
Under racial classifications, the ethnic hill people are generally described as 
belonging to the Mongolian group and closely resemble the people of North-East 
India and Myanmar rather than the Bengali population in Bangladesh.
A conflicting analysis prevails in existing literature in identifying these people in 
terms of their origin and background. Anthropologists (Schendel 1992; Dewan 
1990; Tripura 1993) claim that the CHT is the traditional homeland of “indigenous” 
populations now living there. However, early colonial reports suggest that most of 
the groups inhabiting the CHT migrated to the area during the last four hundred 
years, either from the Arkan (Burma) or the North-east Indian states of Tripura or 
Assam (Lewin 1869; Mackenzie 1884; Hutchinson 1906). Though conflicting 
theories exist, there is no hard evidence in the present body of literature of the pre­
existing population of the CHT. Moreover, it is argued by many recent writers that
According to official statistics the number of ethnic communities is 13 (BBS 2001).
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the CHT people do not have any documented records of their own (Mohsin 1997). 
Therefore, the ethnographic map of the people of CHT remains confused until today.
Contemporary political and historical development in the CHT
The historical development of the CHT has marked it as a unique place within South 
Asia. The area has been the site of much contestation between its inhabitants and the 
state since the colonial period, continuing after the creation of Pakistan and the 
independence of Bangladesh. The CHT has a political history unique within Bengal 
as this region maintained an autonomous status even under pre-colonial Mughal 
Rule. It was first brought under the direct administration of British colonial power in 
1860, when the colonial government made Chittagong Hill Tracts region into a 
separate district and placed it under the administration of a deputy commissioner 
(DC). During this time, the CHT underwent a fundamental change in terms of its 
indigenous autonomous status and resource use. In 1900, the colonial government 
promulgated the CHT Manual outlining detailed rules and regulations for the 
administration of the CHT. The entire CHT was divided into three spheres of 
influence, each of which was placed under an indigenous chief who regulated 
customary matters as well as collected taxes for the colonial state (see the detailed 
discussion of colonial political history and economy on the section two of chapter 
one). However, the hill people remained largely unaffected by these developments, 
since their local status was not altered.
The CHT initially remained immune from the turmoil of the anti-British nationalist 
movement on the Indian sub continent. As soon as the anti-colonial movement 
acquired communal dimensions with the growing divide between the Muslim 
League (Muslim interest in Pakistan) and the Indian National Congress (viewed by 
Muslims as representing Hindu interests despite its secular posture), the hill people 
-95% non-Muslim - unable to identify with the position of the Muslim League 
sought assistance from the secular Congress. Chakma elites approached 
congressional leaders for the merger of CHT with the Indian union and the Marma, 
by contrast, sought a union with Burma (Ahmed 1993; Schendel; Dewan 1991). 
Ultimately the Bengal boundary commission headed by Cyril Radcliffe awarded the
18
CHT to Pakistan suggesting that as "the economic life of the people of CHT depends 
upon East Bengal.. .it would be disastrous for the people themselves to be cut off 
from the East Bengal (Quoting Radcliffe from Mohsin 1997). However, many 
believe that the motivation behind Radcliffe’s award was to compensate Pakistan for 
its losses in the partitioning of Punjab (Ahmed 1993; Barua 2001). As a mark of 
their disagreement with the award made by the Boundary commission’s annexation 
of CHT into Pakistan, the Indian flag was hoisted in Rangamati and the Burmese 
flag in Banderban. On August 21, a week after the partition of sub-continent, the 
Pakistani military took down the flags (Schendel 1996).
The raising of the Indian flag in Rangamati in 1947 marked the hill people as forever 
disloyal to Pakistan. This triggered a series of policies by the Pakistani state 
designed to victimise the people of this area. Therefore, with the constitutional 
developments of Pakistan in 1956, the government dropped the previous designation 
of CHT as a special tribal area, disregarding the hill peoples’ special rights in the 
CHT. It was in the Pakistani period that the Kaptai hydro-electric project (1957-62) 
was built that created a huge lake in the centre of the CHT inundating about 40% of 
the arable valley lands of the district and uprooting one hundred thousand people, 
half of whom migrated to India as refugees. The hill people still regard Kaptai dam 
as their "teardrop" (Mohsin 1997) and view the economic and development policies 
of the Pakistani state in the CHT as having led to widespread displacement and 
disruption of their lives (Soper, 1962; Shendel, 1996).
Politically and economically marginalised within the state of Pakistan, the 
predicaments of the hill people continued even after the independence of Bangladesh 
in 1971. Firstly, the Bangladesh liberation struggle was an intensely nationalistic 
movement and had its genesis in the culture and language of Bengali within the state 
of Pakistan. The CHT, though constituting part of the East Pakistan at that time, was 
never part of this language movement. The Aw ami League, the main champion and 
mouth-piece of the independence movement, failed to appreciate that the political, 
cultural and linguistic distinctiveness of the CHT groups might make it difficult for 
them to identify with a specifically ‘Bengali’ nationalistic movement. The birth of 
the Bangladesh nation-state too thus marked a significant political and cultural 
transformation in the CHT.
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Following independence, as the new state proceeded with its first constitution in 
1972 the hill people led by Manobendra Larma, the lone parliament member from 
the CHT, sought constitutional safeguard for their protection and recognition as a 
separate community by demanding the autonomy of the CHT with its own 
legislature. However, the post-independence Awami League government rejected 
this demand as anti-state and instead invited the hill people to become a part of a 
new nationalist Bengali identity. The 1972 constitution declared Bangladesh to be a 
unitary state and its citizens would be known as Bengali including the country’s 
non-Bengali population. Alarmed at these developments, Manobendra Larma 
formed a political body called Parbattya Chattagram Jana Samhiti Samiti (PCJSS, 
The United People’s Party of CHT) in order to mobilise support for a movement to 
gain autonomy.
At this political and historical juncture, however, following the assassination of 
Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, the first president of independent Bangladesh, in 1975 the 
country as whole was taken under military and quasi-military rule (military generals 
turned civilians) and this phase lasted until 1990. During this period, fundamental 
changes were made in relation to constitutional and political measures taken in the 
name of Bangladeshi nationalism. These not only violated hill people’s traditional 
rights and alienated them from their resources but also eroded the civil rights of the 
country.9 In the CHT, since 1977 the conflict between the people and the State has 
worsened steadily, due to planned migration of Bengali settlers who forcibly settled 
in CHT, military occupation of the CHT and environmental pressures such as 
deforestation, commercialisation of forestry and the development policies of the 
state which are particularly worse in CHT.
This discontent was first reflected in the outbreak of active resistance against the 
State, framing a demand for the recognition of "cultural plurality" and "full 
autonomy of CHT" by the PCJSS (Schendel 1996; Ali 1993). The military 
governments saw these movements as ‘insurgencies’ and a threat to ‘national 
integration and state sovereignty’ (Ali 1993). Thus, the militarisation of the CHT
9 See detailed discussion of Bengali and Bangladeshi nationalism in chapter Seven.
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was a bid to control the ‘insurgency’; obviously resource control was another latent 
agenda (Bertocci 1989; Anti Slavery Society 1984). In the early 1980’s the 
government initiated a settlement programme for Bengali people in the CHT. The 
settlement policy was justified on the ground that CHT constitutes about 10% of the 
land surface of the country and has hardly 1% of the population of the country (Huq 
2000; Chauduri 1991). Between 1979 to 1983 settlement policy brought about 
400,000 Bengali settlers, mostly landless labourers from plain lands (Roy1997).
Many commentators believe that the real motive of the government was to 
“colonise” the CHT by bringing about a demographic shift in the region (Dewan 
1990; Mohsin 1997; Anti-Slavery Society 1984). State policies undertaken in the 
name of development are said to have marginalised the people of CHT from their 
land, turned them into refugees and instilled in them an acute feeling of alienation 
from successive Bengali regimes (Mohsin 1997 Mey 1984). The benefits of resource 
allocation were thus distributed directly to the Bengali in-migrants.
Another dimension of ‘modem’ resource utilisation involved the renewed 
declaration of the Reserve Forests by the previous military rulers. This paved the 
way for the government to legitimise the acquisition of land under jhum cultivation. 
Jhum was completely banned as cultivation practice in the government ‘protected 
forest’ areas. Deforestation has, for political reasons, been erroneously attributed to 
the practice of jhum cultivation alone. Though the policy clearly revealed the motive 
of land encroachment it is ironical that the government blamed jhum cultivation 
solely for soil degradation and deforestation (Ahamed 2002) given, that with the 
diminution of the forest, the sustainability of jhum cultivation was becoming 
untenable. The CHT Commission Report of 1991 suggest that the exploitative nature 
of the Kaptai Dam and the transmigration of the Bengali settlers has caused a 
massive shortage of land in the CHT which was a direct consequence of state 
policies rather than failure of jhum cultivation (see the detailed discussion on jhum 
and land rights in Chapter Six and Seven).
Since 1990, the policy followed by the successive governments has been to 
gradually relieve the indigenous people’s control over their resources so as to benefit 
the Bengali. Land rights have also similarly been usurped; the local people have 
been turned into environmental refugees due to the reality of military oppression.
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During this time, in other parts of Bangladesh, a global policy on environment had 
begun to influence national policies through the work of international and national 
development organisations and NGOs but in the CHT since the outbreak of the 
active resistance against military oppression, this region was turned into an area of 
restricted movement for so-called reasons of national security. Non-nationals were 
excluded from working, residing and even visiting the CHT until the 1997 peace 
treaty was signed between the Bangladesh government and the PCJSS.
By marginalising the CHT from both mainstream politics and the international 
community, the military governments have dealt with the CHT problem 
strategically. During the army rule in CHT (1975-1990) government initiated many 
development programmes for the hill people as a measure to counter the so-called 
‘insurgencies’ in an alternative way. Along with a quota policy for the hill people, 
the government also established some local institutions, such as the Tribal Cultural 
Institutions (TCI) in order to enhance the so-called ‘tribal’ development. Although 
official policy and objectives for establishing TCIs was said to be to preserve the 
upzati (sub-nation) culture and promote the zati (national) level, many local critiques 
argue that the establishment of TCI was part of the government’s wider goals 
(legitimation and justification of military rule and its policies). Since the fall of 
military rule in 1990, however, TCI itself has had to transform in many ways its 
policies and programmes on the issues of indigenous cultural politics in the CHT 
(see detailed discussion of TCI in Chapter Four).
So as with the policies of reserved quota for the ‘tribal’ people introduced in the 
1980s by the military governments with manifold objectives, many commentators 
argued that the primary objectives of the quota policy were to ensure sympathy of 
the ethnic peoples in the CHT against the backdrop of military assault. Secondly, the 
quota system was used as a political tool by military regimes in order to convince 
foreign donor countries by showing responsible efforts for the disadvantaged ‘tribal’ 
in the CHT (Anti-Slavery Society 1984; Mey 1984). However, apart from these 
political objectives the quota system was far more deep-rooted and linked to the 
inherent state policy of divide and rule in the CHT. Even after the fall of the military 
regime in 1990, the quota system remained a vital political instrument of 
government policy in order to manipulate the relationships among ethnic groups.
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From the statist point of view any collective ethnic mobilisation in the CHT is 
perceived as a threat to Bangladesh State sovereignty and territorial integrity. 
Therefore, the introduction of the quota system was in practice part of the state 
policy of ethnic division and manipulation. The way in which the quota system is 
currently operated has been, by and large, a system of playing off conflicting ethnic 
interests against each other leading to an antagonistic relationship between the 
groups. Thus, for example, today’s ethno-naming discourse can also be seen as the 
result of government’s divisive policy on reserved quota system in CHT (See 
Chapter Four).
The post-military civil governments in Bangladesh are no exception to the previous 
rule; in fact it has added certain elements of its own. At the present time the CHT 
remains at the heart of debates about Bangladeshi State sovereignty and identity. 
The relationship between the hill people and plains people has always been variable, 
and their relationship to the CHT within the overarching context of the state more 
so. Today it has become a question of day-to-day survival of the people of CHT, 
both in social, economic and cultural terms. The very hallmark of their hill identity 
has been under continuing external and internal pressure for change. This has led to 
the rise of resistance and the strength of the link between ecology and collective 
identity which has become even more evident in the present politicised scenario. 
Above all else, the shared experiences of deprivation and exploitation and the recent 
struggle against a Bengali-led government have created political awareness among 
the hill people.
This ethnographic study is based on a two years fieldwork between January 1999 
and December 2000 among three ethnic groups, Marma, Bawm and Tanchanga in 
Banderban district of southern CHT.
Outline of the Study
The thesis is formed into three main parts. Part one deals with the research context, 
the historical development in the CHT and the main theoretical and methodological 
issues concerning the relationships between ethnicity and environment. The second 
part looks at local perceptions of settlement, locality and village organisation and at 
the dimensions of linguistic identity at both group and collective levels. The third
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part examines broader issues, events and processes concerning ethnic mobilisation 
around the traditional land use system, jhum, and the politics of khas land, based on 
case materials of how jhum lands are leased out to Bengalis. This is followed by 
analysis of local electoral processes and a concluding discussion of ‘ethnic 
mobilisation’, ‘multi-ethnicity’, and ‘social movement’.
Part One: Reseach Context, Theory and Methods
Followed by a brief introductory discussion of research context and the general 
background of the CHT, Chapter One reviews the literature on ethnicity, social 
movement and indigenous land rights. The chapter is a selective outline of some of 
the theories dealing with these issues, and also brings in ethnographic cases from 
different parts of the world. I also look at historical and contemporary sources on 
CHT in order to highlight the socio-political history of the region and motives of 
colonial and post-colonial regimes in treating CHT as the ‘economic hinterland’ for 
the state. More specifically, the chapter outlines how various measures, economic 
and political policies have been conceived in terms of macro indicators of 
development by the state to benefit the mainstream Bengali without taking into 
account the indigenous character of the CHT. In doing so, I will highlight the social 
and political implications of the resource use and tenure for the construction of 
collective identity in the CHT.
Chapter Two deals with methodological issues and research techniques of this 
ethnographic study. A clear understanding of the relationships between ethnicity, 
environment, ‘tribal’ culture and the state, and its local manifestations is formed 
through the use of traditional anthropological techniques. Two years of fieldwork 
among three ethnic groups, Marma Bawm and Tanchanga in Banderban district of 
southern CHT entailing mundane micro-social interaction elicit the social, cultural 
and political realities of this relationship in the lives of the people. Besides 
participant observation, use of other methods such as key-informants, case studies of 
land disputes, and analysis of local political process have been discussed separately 
with a brief physical, and ecological description of the research setting at the end.
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P art Two: Self-image-Dynamics of Ethnic Group Identity
The second part of the thesis is primarily concerned with the cultural diversity 
aspects of ethnic communities. The main purpose of this part two is to identify the 
sources of internal dynamics in relation to group organisation. Analysis of group 
organisation aims at an understanding of how different ethnic groups are constituted 
at the local level, particularly in a multi-ethnic locality. Understanding of social and 
cultural variations between the groups explains the cultural/ethnic identity of groups. 
In this part, I have thus mainly focused on linguistic and socio-organisational aspects 
of three ethnic groups.
Chapter Three analyses the local perceptions of settlement, locality and village 
organisation among the Marma, Bawm and Tanchanga groups in Roangchari. 
Drawing from the ethnographic materials on settlement pattern, clanship, descent, 
marriage organisation and inheritance practices, I discuss how these socio- 
organisational features become constituting elements of group organisation and a 
mechanism for ethnic boundary maintenance bringing group members together and 
culturally differentiating them from others. I have also explained how these 
differential modes of social organisation10 are produced, practiced, and to some 
extent manipulated in order to reproduce ethnic identity in a multi-ethnic society like 
Roangchari.
This chapter provides an internal dynamics of group organisation. One of the key 
issues that it addresses is how local perception of settlement shapes the localised 
group identity, and what does ‘the locality’ mean socially, culturally, symbolically 
to ethnic groups in the CHT? The other issues I discuss in this chapter are defining 
characteristics of group organisation. In analysing clan, lineage, descent and family 
the chapter explores the relationship between village level organisation and other 
social structural principles. A comparative analysis of marriage organisation reveals 
the question of ethnic endogamy practices which can be viewed as the salient feature 
of boundary maintenance among the groups. Also analysis of customary inheritance
10 In this thesis, I interpret ’mode of social organisation’ to mean both ideological rules and principles 
and their implication and practices.
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is crucial to an understanding of the changing nature of farming practices among the 
groups.
The chapter indicates how differential forms of cultural polarity and diversity 
maintenance are the basic dynamics of multi-ethnic society in the CHT. It compares 
how groups place the importance of ethnic endogamy, bride price, clanship practices 
as elements of distinct group markers in greater ethnic boundary maintenance in 
relation to others.
Chapter Four discusses the dimensions of linguistic identity at both group and 
collective levels. In CHT, among other thing, language can be seen as the idiom of 
cultural politics within groups themselves and with the wider Bengali and 
Bangladesh State. In this chapter, I first discuss ethno- linguistic identity in terms of 
temple language, ethno-naming and development of written scripts. It seems that 
articulation of ethno-linguistic identity through native scripts is influenced by 
various organisational activities in the CHT. This chapter examines how various 
organisational activities are related to ethnic mobilisation in terms of language and 
culture. Particular emphasis is given on why different organisations are engaged in 
these language projects of identity making and how these influence ordinary people.
The chapter also discusses another level of mobilisation. At the broader institutional 
and political level, the diverse linguistic aspects are interpreted as representation of 
‘indigenous’ culture in the CHT. The representation of ‘indigenous’ culture has 
largely been orchestrated in the form of unity within the diversity at institutional 
discourses. In other words, invoking a common ‘indigenous’ culture challenges the 
Bengali culture and regime. In this context, I discuss TCI (Tribal Cutural Institute) 
policies and programs in order to compare the organised institutional activities with 
those of ordinary discourses in the realm of ‘indigenous’ culture.
I conclude the chapter by returning to the issues of language and its relationship to 
the assertion of distinct cultural identity at both group and collective level. The 
underlying theme of the chapter relates to the broader level of ethnic mobilisation. It 
emphasises that in CHT social movements largely revolve around the issue of socio­
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economic marginalisation based on the struggle for land and livelihood but language 
projects supplement this in asserting collective indigenous politics.
Part Three: Collective-image -  Dynamics of Shared Identity
The third part examines broader issues, events and processes concerning ethnic 
mobilisation. The contemporary process of collective identity formation is the main 
theme in this section with various forms and expressions. As I mentioned in part 2, 
ethnic groups exhibit markedly distinct cultural identities in the localised form, but 
at the broader level they collectively face a common problem of survival in mundane 
day to day affairs vis-a-vis the dominant Bengali population and the State. The 
deprivation, exploitation and discrimination made by government functionaries, the 
legal and judicial procedure and land administration system, have created a 
syndrome of collectivism among the ethnic peoples of CHT in opposition to their 
politically dominant Bengali counterpart.
The section looks at the dynamics of collective processes from political, ecological 
and institutional perspectives. It primarily focuses on the socio-economic and 
political implications of the government’s developmental interventions on the ways 
of life of hill people, especially in relation to land and livelihood in the CHT. The 
section identifies the circumstances and conditions under which the diverse ethnic 
groups unite, minimising their differences and the way in which search for a 
common ground on the basis of ‘shared realities of collective problems’.
In this section as a way of exploring connections between Pahari ethnicity and the 
state, and of unpacking the political framework around which environmental and 
‘indigenous’ discourse in the CHT is organised, I focus mainly on two examples.
The first is the practices of jhum (a practice that relates to traditional land use 
throughout the CHT) as an indigenous system of natural resource management. The 
second is the opposition to a controversial khas land lease granted by the Bangladesh 
government to Bengalis. These two related issues are examples of ways in which 
Pahari identity are represented in the regional political context.
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Chapter Five explores the local understanding and perceptions of traditional land 
use system, jhum. It discusses how traditional jhum land use system is intimately 
related to village organisation in the CHT, historically representing a distinct 
character of ‘community value’ combining different groups into a single network of 
social relationship, which I describe as a form of ‘shared environmental identity’. 
The chapter explores this dynamic relationships by addressing the debate on the 
anthropology of common property and state regime. It seems that understanding of 
local land holding is also the key to understanding the wider relationship between 
the people of CHT and the Bangladesh State.
Chapter Six deals with the politics of khas land, based on case materials of how 
jhum lands are leased out to Bengalis. It outlines various political, legal, and 
administrative measures relating to khas land lease policies of the government. The 
chapter examines how institutional discriminations led to a situation where common 
Pahari deprivations can be seen as collective realities manifested in the form of 
ethnic mobilisation. An analysis of protest movements by Vomi Odikhar committee 
against the government land policy translates the processes of mobilisation. This 
chapter will thus indicate a brief note on how control and use of land in the CHT 
form a basis of territoriality that in turn is the basis for collective identity.
Chapter Seven looks at the issue of local political process in the form of election, 
and discusses the general questions of ethnic mobilisation. It presents the Banderban 
puroshava (municipality) election as a case study, and analyses this as a local 
political arena in which various forms and faces of ethnic mobilisation are expressed 
in an explicit manner. I suggest that local elections can be seen as a process of 
collective identity making. The case of the Banderban puroshava election represents 
a theatrical view of CHT where all the issues, including the most salient feature of 
the land issue, become the issues of Pahari mobilisation. The chapter seeks to assess 
the hill people’s experiences of electoral politics in light of the issues of democracy, 
party ideology and hill politics in the CHT.
The final chapter is the follow up of main arguments and ideas with a concluding 
discussion of ‘ethnic mobilisation’, ‘multi-ethnicity’, and ‘social movement’. This 
analysis contributes to the wider anthropology of forest-dwelling peoples of South
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Asia and debates surrounding the political use of environmentalism and 
anthropological knowledge in national and regional disputes over the control and use 
of natural resources.
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Chapter One
Theoretical Considerations on Ethnicity and Environment 
Introduction
I consider the main theoretical issues for this study to be those concerning the 
relationship between ethnicity and environment. In Bangladesh, the relationship 
between ethnicity and environment is conceived in terms of that between ‘tribal’ 
culture and the State. I thus start with a brief literature review of the theoretical 
considerations underpinning the discourses of ethnicity and environment. I suggest 
an analytical approach that adequately deals with this relationship in the context of 
CHT, relating historical construction of the environment to political and social 
movements in this region of Bangladesh.
Many of the issues relating to the emergence of these movements revolve around the 
control and use of land. Land is the platform on which environment and ethnicity 
have a regular discursive interaction. Claims of collective identity/ethnicity and 
claims to land are intertwined. I discuss the issues that emerged concerning the 
relationship between resource use and tenure, political conflict and ‘tribal’ identity. 
In doing so, I highlight the social and political implications of resource use and 
tenure for the construction of collective identity in the CHT.
The construction and manipulation of ethnic identity is one of the obvious themes 
that will arise from this research. However, ethnicity is a slippery subject to deal 
with as it involves notions and claims which are often highly contested. It involves 
both public discourses and representations which are constantly being re-negotiated, 
and intuitive and unarticulated experiences of the self and others as situated within a 
particular ‘ethnic’ discourse or context.11 There are innumerable theories of ethnicity 
and ethnic identification addressed in the anthropological literature which are 
discussed later on from a wider perspective, as a basis for establishing this fact in 
my research.
11 There are several detail discussions on ethnicity, representation, self-image and identity (Hodgson 
2002; Jenkin 1997,1996, Banks 1996; Burnham 1996; Spencer 1990).
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In the context of CHT, ethnicity appears to be an idiom in which political and 
environmental relationships are contested. The conflict in the CHT has assumed the 
appearance of a struggle between ethnic peoples and the dominant Bengali speaking 
state for self-determination and control over resources. One problem with the 
theoretical literature on ethnicity is that it does not deal adequately with the issues of 
resource use and particularly with the symbolic use of agricultural systems as 
collective ethnic identifiers.12 Confronted with the pragmatic realities, the dangers 
and the complexities of life in the CHT, academic debates about the nature of 
ethnicity seem rather abstract. Nevertheless the perspectives on ethnicity which have 
been described as primordialist, instrumentalist, constructivist and Marxist 
illuminate contrasting aspects of ethnicity in the CHT.
I will briefly review these and then also consider the conceptualisation of ethnicity 
within Bangladesh political discourse concerning the CHT. Considering the limited 
helpfulness of theoretical academic discourse about ethnicity and the direct political 
impact of local official perceptions of ‘tribal’ identity, I will then examine a 
different approach, based around social movements in third world contexts which 
has more specific relevance to the CHT.
Ethnicity: Theoretical Perspectives
In recent times the term ethnicity has emerged as a key concept in the writings of 
numerous social scientists including anthropologists. A host of social phenomena, 
for example “tribes”, “races”, “castes”, “ethnic group”, “nation”, are now used to 
represent ethnicity at different levels (Horowitz 1985: 53; Jenkins 1996: 21-24; 
Devalle 1992:4). Indeed as the notion of ‘ethnicity’ expands in the public and 
academic discourse, it has become “a way to signal any category of group identity 
even gender” (Tilley 1997: 498), what Bayart calls the “theatre of ethnicity”(quoting 
from Burnham 1996: 38).
Therefore, ethnicity becomes a keenly contested term generating many debates 
amongst social scientists. Perhaps the most contentious debate has been between
121 am, however, aware of Leach’s exceptional analysis of Kachin political system of Highland 
Burma (1954).
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primordialists and instrumentalists about whether ethnicity or ethnic identity is 
fundamentally a primordial aspect of human existence, almost pre-conscious and 
involuntary, or is orchestrated and manipulated, and susceptible to change at both 
individual and collective levels.13
It was Geertz who defined ethnicity as “primordial attachment” stemming “from 
being bom into a particular religious community, speaking a particular language and 
following particular social practices” (1963: 259). Conceptualisation of ethnicity as 
being the expression of “primordial ties” has become increasingly outmoded, and is 
less prevalent in anthropological writings. Geertz’s model of ethnicity can be seen 
as a symbolic system that provides meaning for those who identify with a particular 
group. My analytical approach to ethnicity in this thesis has nothing in common 
with the primordialist position. Following Burnham’s analysis in this context, I do 
agree that “whilst ethnically defined behaviour is a function of basic, essentially 
universal, human interactional competencies, the cultural differences and 
interpretations of difference on which ethnic demarcations are based are clearly 
subject to historical change and transformation” (1996: 6).
It is thus important to give careful attention to the socio-political processes which 
underlie the development of a society, such as the multi-ethnic CHT, processes 
which are embedded in the locally specific and always changing cultural realities 
which the concept of ethnicity seeks to capture. In the case of CHT, inter-ethnic 
relations can be seen as a dynamic process of negotiation between ‘diversity and 
unity’. At one moment inter-ethnic relationships are manifested in the form of 
collective articulation, while at another level inter-ethnic relations are fundamentally 
affected by variations in the logics of the cultural beliefs and practices of the ethnic 
groups concerned, and by their varying patterns of articulation with structural 
practices.
I emphasise this last point, following Barth’s (1969) influential and almost exclusive 
emphasis on the mechanism of ethnic boundary maintenance. Barth challenges the 
primacy given to culture, seeing culture as an implication or result of long term
13 See Williams 1989; Eriksen 1993; Banks 1996; Jenkins 1996,1997.
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social processes rather than as a “primordial” feature of groups. For him, ethnicity is 
the “social organisation of cultural difference”, furthermore “ethnic groups are 
categories of identification and ascription used by the actors themselves” (Barth 
1969:10). Barth’s key insight into the understanding of ethnic identities is that they 
are not fixed but flexible and fluid depending upon an individual’s behaviour and 
decision making process. A similar theme was developed earlier by Leach (1954) in 
his study of political systems of highland Burma: the “situational variability of 
ethnic identity” (regional appropriateness).
The above arguments lead us to two important conclusions. Firstly, ethnicity cannot 
be attributed to a particular content. “Ethnic categories provide an organisational 
vessel that may be given varying amounts of form and process in different socio­
cultural systems” (Barth 1969: 15). Secondly, analytic focus must be shifted away 
from the cultural content to the boundaries, which define the group from the outside 
world. Therefore, the practical assumption that derives from the Barthian model is 
that rather than looking at the existence of ethnic groups one must explore how such 
groups maintain their distinctiveness.
Barth’s analysis of cultural knowledge and practice of the constituent units of 
ethnically plural societies, such as the CHT, is central. However, Barth’s 
understanding of ethnicity is too single mindedly focused on the questions of 
boundaries. The character of the multi-ethnic society in CHT is more than simply 
locally observable culturally discrete co-residential groups.14 Indeed identity 
construction in the CHT is a process of social negotiation in continuously changing 
relationships between different groups under distinctive social situations. This is a 
result of the fact that the processes of mutual accommodation between the groups 
tend to generate a shared cultural expression. This shared notion evolves under the 
influence of larger scale social formations operating at regional and national levels.
Barth’s model, by and large, fails to relate ethnic groups with other ethnic groups. 
He simply tells us that ethnic groups exist. As Marcus Banks says “Barth’s 
analytical indifference to the state, and to centralised relations of power, produces a
14 This is an issue in relation to later points (the citizenship of Bengali).
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liberal model of ethnic pluralism that has difficulty in dealing with inequalities of 
power and resources” (Banks 1996: 76). Despite such criticism, by breaking with an 
essentially colonial paradigm of “tribe” he paved the way for anthropologists to 
approach ethnic identities in a new light.15
Instrumental perspectives view ethnicity as a purely “political phenomenon”, 
defined by the use made of certain markers for the purposes of political mobilisation 
(Jenkins 1997; Banks 1996; Devalle 1992). A more extreme instrumentalist is 
Abner Cohen. For Cohen ethnicity is functional. The reasons for a group asserting 
and maintaining an ethnic identity are common economic interests and keeping 
‘symbolic capital’ within the boundary it invokes. Cohen dismisses culture even 
more completely than Barth does, arguing that ethnic organisation must serve both 
political ends and satisfy psychological needs for belonging and meaning (Cohen 
1974). In this context, identity formation is analysed in terms of strategic use of 
ethnic attributes or behaviours, with no meaning beyond the pursuit of material or 
political interests. In these analyses ethnic identity is reduced to consumer choice. 
However, this approach fails to explain ethnicity in a way that does justice to its 
enduring strength.
In recent years there have been considerable advances in the study of the identity 
aspect of ethnicity focusing on how ethnic identity may assume fundamental 
importance for the individuals and how attachment and loyalty to ethnic categories 
or groups are maintained (Doja 2000; Cohen 2000; Chan 1998). Notions of shared 
origins are usually crucial for ethnic identity, and interpretations of history are 
therefore important to ideologies seeking to justify and maintain particular ethnic 
identities. This particularly concerns the relationship of ethnicity and state 
formation.
Phil Burnham argues that “although ethnic identity construction may be analysed 
primarily as a reflex of dyadic inter-personal interactions, such interactions are 
typically situated within the broader frameworks of collective discourse, including 
appeals to shared historical knowledge, cultural traditions, legal, political and other
15 However, in some current anthropological circles, even to mention words "ethnic groups" is to 
stand accused of siding with the colonialist anthropology (Burnham 1996: 3).
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rights, and so on. These collective discourses, in turn, serve to articulate ethnic 
categorisations with larger scale processes of political competition, domination and 
resistance which, in the present day, are often played out with reference to the more 
globalising discourses of the modem state system” (1996: 5).
Burnham’s argument in this context suggests that ethnic identity and difference 
become a part and parcel of nationalism. Looking at the literature on ethnicity and 
nationalism, there are varying degrees of emphasis placed on the significance of 
ethnicity and culture in the growth of nationalism. Anthony D. Smith (1986) argues 
that pre-existing ethnic sentiment- symbols, values, myth, and memories - is the 
basis on which the modem nations are constructed. By contrast, Gellner (1983) 
treats nations as modem inventions without such a prior ethnic base - what Benedict 
Anderson (1983) terms an “imagined community”.
Anderson examined the phenomena of nation and nationalism, describing nations as 
“imagined communities...that, regardless of the actual inequality and exploitation 
that may prevail in [them] ...are always conceived of as a deep horizontal 
comradeship” (1983: 15-16). In such ‘imagined’ states, ideology depicts the nation 
state as an all-embracing inter-group collectivity, a “super-community” with no 
internal contradictions (Devalle 1992: 19). However, Anderson’s proposal is not 
adequate to understand those aspects of collective identities that are not 
instrumentally inflated or revived but have been built up in the course of time. 
Anderson basically highlights the nationalism of the dominant community, and 
gives little attention to the subject of ethnicity itself. Jonathan Spencer argues that 
“the study of nationalism poses particular problems for anthropology, not at least 
because nationalism and anthropology share certain concepts and certain 
assumptions; both anthropologists and nationalists have tended to depict a world 
made up of bounded, homogeneous cultures” (1990: 283).
Glazer and Moynihan, though both instrumentalists, saw ethnicity from a different 
viewpoint. According to them, ethnicity is a relatively new phenomenon and a 
product of modernity (Glazer & Moynihan 1975). They argued that nation building 
and modernisation processes have a detrimental effect on ethnic groups and create a 
discourse of ethnicity in its own image. However, they did not mention how the
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notion of ethnic identity in a variety of forms challenges nationalist ideologies in 
many contexts.
This is what Williams (1989) emphasises: ethnicity can only be understood in 
relation to the state and to the question of nationhood. Williams described ethnicity 
as a kind of “lightning rod” which attracts all those who have vested interest in 
promoting and defining the interests of one group as against others. William notes 
that ethnic groups in a society do not exist in isolation, instead, they are overlapping 
groupings whose relationships are defined, not by their relative power or status in 
comparison to one another, but by their position within the state (1989: 407-8).
Based on the study of language politics in North India, Brass argues that “ethnic 
groups in India gain by asserting their corporate identity on the basis of 
commonality of language, religion and region in order to win concessions from the 
state” (Brass in Pieterse 1996: 25-29). Brass’s analysis of ethnicity emphasised the 
purpose rather than content which positions him as an instrumentalist. This 
perspective is perhaps particularly relevant to the new ethnicities which are being 
forged in the CHT.
Thus we find that, in much of the literature that deals with ethnic groups, minorities 
and subordinate groups within larger scale formations, there is a preoccupation with 
pluralism which does not take account of the exploitative and hegemonic nature of 
relationships that exist between ethnic groups and the state, the Bengali State vs the 
hill people of CHT (Mohsin 1997; Dewan 1990).
There is, however, a burgeoning literature that attempts to conceptualise ethnicity as 
a product of colonialism. Whilst reading recent post-colonial literature on the CHT 
it appears that colonialism is now represented as a big political change which 
contributed to the redefinition of ethnicities in the CHT (Schenldel 1992; Tripura 
1992,1993; Mohsin 1997; Dewan 1990). I argue that the impact of colonialism is a 
very significant episode not only for the CHT but equally for Bangladesh itself. 
Therefore ethnic identities have not been created solely by colonialism because 
ethnic discourses are to be formulated with regard to the ‘others’. Both colonial and
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post-colonial realities are a catalyst for the significant ‘other’ in present day identity 
construction in the CHT.
And yet there is another area of anthropological research that has yielded numerous 
analytical insights in the study of ethnicity. In traditional Marxist analysis ethnicity 
and nationality are seen as “masks” that conceal the “identities of social classes” 
(Banks 1996). Critics argue that this approach is only concerned about class struggle 
and is inadequate to deal with the question of national minority oppression, for 
example the case of CHT. However, Marxists like Mamdani (1976) and Hechter 
(1975) consider ethnicity as a form of ideology. They argue that ethnicity does not 
necessarily arise due to socio-cultural differences, rather it is in part a consequence 
of state economic development policy and legal frameworks. It polarises the social 
relationships into a “core and periphery” which is explained in terms of the “social 
base”16 in the African context (Mamdani 1976: 16) Hechter (1975) uses “internal 
colonialism” to explain regionalism in the Celtic fringe, while Devalle (1992) has 
used the same terminology in the examination of socio-economic development in 
the Jharkhand movement in India.
Overall, it seems that the predominant perspectives upon ‘ethnicity’ and ‘ethnic 
identity’ at individual and group level can be applied to certain circumstances, but 
there are too many incongruities for one single theoretical model to be formed.
There has never been no single discourse of ethnicity, rather, there are plurality of 
discourses. Accordingly, in this study, ethnicity will not be translated into a single 
discourse because collective identities do not exist in a pure form but are forged 
with many interwoven elements, some of which I will examine. Moreover, there is 
no neutral ground from which an ethnic identity can be seen as uncontested. The 
complexity of a situation like that in the CHT yields to no single theoretical 
perspective. As Tilley has suggested, “to debate the meaning of ethnicity is one 
thing; to elucidate the motivations that lie behind ethno-politics is another” (1997: 
512).
16 I consider Mamdani’s concept of a social base to be "ethnic or ’tribal’.
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Cultural, ethnic, linguistic and religious factors have often served as markers for the 
construction of ethnic discourse (Levine 1997) or as a source of solidarity or a basis 
for mobilisation at particular historical conjunctures. In this context, ethnicity serves 
as a dependent variable in the process of social formation, not as a product of 
vaguely defined “primordial sentiments”(Geertz 1973). The different faces of 
ethnicity have to be distinguished. In the CHT claims are being made by the hill 
peoples, the settlers, government officials and academics. New ethnicities are being 
asserted and challenged. Some questions that this research hopes to address are as 
follows: what are the connections between the diverse peoples of the CHT? How 
might they be harnessed into new politically effective forms of identity, and how 
might these claims be challenged from within and without?
The ‘Tribes’ of Bangladesh in National Cultural Context
In anthropological literature since the 1970s there has been a noticeable shift in 
terminology from “race” and “tribe” to “ethnicity” and, this is said to have entailed a 
deep transformation in analytical approaches (Eriksen 1993; Banks 1996; Jenkins 
1996). In particular it is related to the growing concern with the nation as a unit of 
analysis and with the incorporation of ethnic groups and categories into states 
(Hettne 1996). Whilst anthropologists had studied ethnicity as a kind of corporate 
social phenomena, which emphasised cultural distinctiveness on the basis of 
“kinship” and “clanship” (Jenkins 1997), there is a shift in reassessing and 
attempting to deconstruct the notion of ethnicity away from fixed categories towards 
process and meaning. Nevertheless, the term “ethnic group” is still regarded with 
some suspicion, particularly in the South Asian context by writers such as Devalle 
(1992) who still believe that social scientists, especially anthropologists have helped 
to prolong a colonial discourse about ‘tribal’ identity, based on kinship and clanship, 
which now serves the interests of the state.17
In fact, there is a disjunction between the theoretical concerns of social scientists and 
the kind of discourse that actually exists on the ground in Bangladesh. Theoreticians 
are working with the issues of definition of ethnicity and its fluidity, but
17 See also ethnicity in Mamdani’s early works as the "social base".
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unfortunately the Bangladeshi state constructs Bengali society and ‘tribal’ people as 
having distinctive, oppositional identities.
Under the colonial period the ‘tribal’ people were constructed as ‘primitive’. This 
has continued in post-independence Bangladesh and India. The post independent 
Bangladesh State categorisation of upazati (sub-nation) has become acceptable 
substitution for ‘tribes’ in official discourse and in reality, this is used in the same 
way as old category of “tribe” (Subba 1992; Tripura 1992; Schendel 1992). There is 
no clear definition of these terms. It is up to the government or state to decide which 
communities are to be called upazati. Generally “backwardness”, “relative isolation” 
and cultural distinctiveness, language (‘tribal’ dialects), religion (animism), 
traditional dress and the practice of jhum (primitive agriculture) are considered when 
specifying a community as upazati (Karlsson 1997: 47; Tripura 1992: 323; Devalle 
1992: 32). I discuss this in Chapter seven.
There is also a continuation of the colonial policy of declaring certain areas as 
“special” and setting up a special type of administration there, for example CHT in 
the case of Bangladesh and Jharkhand in the case of India. Guha (1989) describes 
this view more elaborately by showing how the British formulated the policy of 
special administration for tribal areas in order to prevent “subaltern resistance” and 
to extract resources. By stressing the ‘primitiveness’ ‘isolation’ and ‘backwardness’ 
of the people identified as ‘tribal’, the state narratives denies them both voice and 
agency. I discuss this in relation to legal frameworks and their implementation ‘on 
the ground’ in Chapter five and six.
In British India the original category of “primitive tribes” or “hill tribes” referred to 
the people traditionally living in the forest or hill regions (Tripura 1993; Guha 
1989). Lewin, one of the first colonial ethnographers of the CHT, writes, “among a 
simple people like our hill men there is no... desire (for excessive wealth); their 
nomadic life precludes any greater accumulation of wealth, and they enjoy a perfect 
social equality” (1869: 116). Clearly we can see that the category ‘hill men’ was 
constructed not only to place the people so designated, but also to have them serve 
as objects in a colonial discourse. The Colonial view of ‘hill men’ was also 
influenced by nineteenth century evolutionist’s thinking, as can be seen, for
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example, by Lewin’s reference to Maine’s Ancient Law (ibid: 27-28). Accordingly, 
the category ‘hill men’ was also seen to be at lower stage of cultural evolution 
compared to the people of the plain such as Hindus, Muslims and Bengalis etc. Thus 
the term denotes “cultural inferiority” or “primitive people” in modem 
anthropological sensibilities (Bertocci 1989: 140).
The real legacy of colonialism is that colonialist classificatory schemes continue to 
be meaningful to date throughout the sub-continent. In Bangladesh it is largely 
accepted that the colonial categories of ethnic differentiation that the upazati or 
‘tribal’ people cannot be identified with the Bengalis today or vice-versa. This is 
usually attributed to the British “divide and rule policy” (Tripura 1992). Thus the 
notion ‘tribe’ only exists in relation to the mainstream. Unfortunately, social 
scientists, including anthropologists, have partly contributed to this stereotyping 
discourse. In South Asia the category ‘tribe’ has not developed as a conceptual 
category, independent from administrative practice. Defining the ‘tribes’ is the task 
of government officials according to the criteria mentioned above.
It is important to show an example of these ‘tribalist’18 ideas voiced by Bangladeshi 
authors. Sattar, for example, an influential writer on tribal affairs in Bangladesh, 
asserts that “tribals are as simple, credulous, and jovial folk ...As long as they have 
enough to eat they are not much bothered by worries” (1975: 7). Many recent 
writers, however, treat this as part of a general pattern of ethnocentric ideology that 
legitimizes the penetration and subjugation of indigenous people’s homeland in 
quest of their resources (Schendel, 1992, 2001; Tripura 1992,1993; Dewan 1991a, 
1991b).
Such attitudes towards ethnic minorities are not, of course, unique to Bangladesh. 
Indian anthropologists have remained faithful to the old category of the tribe, as 
Dube’s “tribal ethnicity” and Sinha’s “tribes as ethnic groups” are applied in an 
ambiguous way with reference to the term ethnicity (cited from Devalle 1992: 34). 
The implication is that however problematic the categories ‘tribal’or ‘hill men’ may 
be from an anthropological perspective, it is obvious that they are no longer simply a
18 This discourse may be referred to as ’tribalist’ because of its similarities to the Orientalists 
representation of the ’Orient’ (see Edward Said Orientalism 1979).
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matter of colonial imagination. In Bangladesh, the official culture is actually 
adhering to very old notions of ‘tribal’ people. Bangladeshi law, including the newly 
adopted Hill District Council Bills of 1997 about Chittagong Hill Tracts has actually 
not made that move from tribal to ethnic group. They basically still see them as 
‘tribal’ or upazati (see Article 1 of the Hill Tracts District Council Act 1997), a term 
which underlines the subordinate structural position of ‘tribal’ within the larger 
society.
There is a lack of consonance between the way the social scientists/anthropologists 
think about these issues and the way policy makers, politicians and lawyers are still 
thinking and formulating policy at least institutionally. The spirit of the 1972 
constitution which states “all citizens of Bangladesh are Bengali”, but the non- 
Bengali speaking inhabitants are seen as ‘different’, and that difference is a 
distinction between a mainstream population (Bengali) and upazati. The intention is 
not the recognition of ethnic plurality and equivalence between groups such as 
Bengali, Chakma and Marma etc. There is very little sophistication in the 
categorisation of these notions of identity. Social science may have finely honed 
theories about ethnicity and ethnic identity, but the Bengali legal framework, official 
culture and the political system and everything else is still working with the old 
distinctions; ‘tribal’ versus everything else, ‘outsiders’ versus ‘insiders’.19
Limitations of Ethnicity Theories
Given that the notion of ethnicity provokes such strong reactions and is central to the 
thesis, it is important for me to explain at this point what I mean and what I do not 
mean by this concept. I argue that in the CHT far from being a single ‘tribal’ 
identity, ethnic peoples moved in and out of multiple identities, defining themselves 
at one moment as part of ethnic group and yet another moment as part of broader 
collectivities. The process of broader identity construction appears to receive a boost 
when linked with or in opposition to, strongly institutionalised structures of 
centralised power, such as the state.
19 Many writers like Ahmed, A. (1993), also support this idea.
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Recent anthropological literature suggest that in the present day it is true that the 
process of ethnic identity formation as well as resistance movements take place with 
reference to state structure (Burnham 1996; Hodgson 2002; Gray 1997). Therefore, 
ethnicity is inseparable from the political process structuring the state.
In the above discussion on ethnicity and identity in both abstract analytical and local 
Bangladeshi contexts, one theme that arises is that all identities, both personal and 
collective, are constructed in and through relations of dominance and resistance. I 
want to examine the nuances of this. A major weakness of established views in the 
ethnicity literature, due to its macro-level preoccupations, is the failure to trace 
serious accounts of how identity is asserted in local cultural and environmental 
contexts.
A lot of theories of ethnicity have not really engaged with the way the people use 
and construe resources, nor have they engaged with the legal and institutional 
framework of state-ethnic group or state-tribal relations. Moreover, very few of 
those previous theories of ethnicity have dealt with, or explored, the problem of 
identity formation in relation to natural resources. The purpose of this study is to 
examine the process of ethnic mobilisation based on resource use and resource 
tenure and the way in which it relates to wider communities and implicated in the 
CHT.
Nevertheless, I have reviewed the related anthropological literature and also 
considered them in the conceptualisation of ethnicity from analytical standpoints. In 
explaining the issues of diversity & multi-ethnicity at the local level, I find the 
analytical model of Barth, Burnham, Brass and others helpful in the understanding 
of group dynamics. While for dealing with more critical and broader issues 
involving the process of collective identity, ethnic mobilisation, resistance 
movements, hegemonism, the new social movements theories developed by 
Martinez -Alier, Escobar and subaltern historians, such as Guha, are considered 
more relevant in view of my proposed research goals for part three.
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Alternative Theories of New Social Movement and Collective Identity
The recent literature on new social movements explores ethnicity, identity formation 
and political process in relation to the use and distribution of the local environment 
and resources. The works of Escobar (1992,1996,1997, Alvarez and Escobar 1998), 
Hodgson (2002), Gray (1997), Guha (1983), Ram Guha (1989), Guha & Martinez- 
Alier (1997) Martinez-Alier (1991), Agarwal (1998,1988), and Winzeler (1997) are 
important in this direction because they address social movement issues more 
explicitly.
Their discussions have arisen out of studies of social and political movements 
offering a range of relevant questions about the politics of representations, 
recognition, resources, and rights as these movements engage shifting political and 
economic landscape; national discourses, alliances, and organisations; articulations, 
and the complicated cultural politics of inclusion and exclusion invoked by the term 
indigenous. Studies also explore the pragmatic and political uses by activists and 
communities of the concept of ‘indigenous’, and how the concept has been 
imagined, understood, used and shaped by people in their everyday practices, 
discourses and struggles.
Therefore, in this thesis I am dealing with the literature on social movements 
concerned with indigenous identities and rights. These rights include protection of 
and control over property and possessions (such as territories, resources, and land), 
practices (cultural performances and literatures) and knowledge (cultural, linguistic, 
environmental and agricultural). Although as Edelman (2001) has recently noted 
sociologists and political scientists have long dominated the study of social 
movements, anthropologists, I would argue, have been central to the study of 
indigenous social movements.20
The concept of new social movement has a “qualitative difference” with that of 
earlier movements such as labour movements (Wignaraja 1993: 18-19). These 
contemporary people’s struggles, both cultural and social, are being seen as
20 Important studies on indigenous movements include Gray 1997; Maybury-Lewis 1997; Brosius 
1999a, 1999c, 1999d; Li 2000, 2001.
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apparently “grassroots”, often in Third World context (Gledhill 1994: 179). The new 
literature on social movements is concerned with the way in which social groups are 
formed as a political process, rather than the behaviour of static bounded social 
groups. This would obviously apply to the context of CHT.
Some theoretical works built around the study of social movements make a valuable 
contribution to the understanding of this political process. Escobar, for example, 
points out that “the new social movement theory provides an interesting rethinking 
of collective agency formation” (1992: 412). Since cultural politics becomes the 
politics of social movements, Escobar suggests “culture becomes political when it 
becomes implicated in implicit and explicit struggles for power” (ibid.). Using 
diverse Latin American experiences he argues that certain cultural practices of 
marginal people, such as traditional economic activities, concepts of territory, and 
knowledge of resources are expressed in social movements as alternative “cultural 
identities” in relation to a dominant culture (1997: 203).
Therefore a focus on the politics of culture as a process by which groups construct 
and reconstruct identities for themselves in their struggles and negotiations with 
dominant groups and the state leads us to explore other issues related to it. In most 
of the frontier regions (such as CHT), and in rain forests areas, there has been a 
politics of resources, the environment and representation (Baviskar 2003). A number 
of anthropologists have explored this complex politics of cultural identity, images 
and representation involved when indigenous groups nationally and internationally 
manipulate, project, and homogenise their public images and identities in order to 
seek recognition and demand rights (Conklin 2002; Winzeler 1997).
There is also, of course, a much broader literature on cultural politics (Alvarez et al 
1998; Gupta and Ferguson 1992; Hale 1997; Subba 1999) that informs these studies 
of indigenous social movements. Some anthropologists have also linked work on the 
cultural politics of representation with what has been called the “politics of 
recognition”(Li 2001; Frost 2001). As Li elaborates, recognition is an “act of 
acknowledgement” (2001: 652) by examining the struggles of indigenous activists 
and organisations in order to gain political recognition from the respective nation­
states as “indigenous peoples” in the Indonesian context.
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Moreover, the politics of recognition is closely tied to the politics of political 
representation. Of course, the paradox is that indigenous groups must demand 
recognition from the very nation-states that have historically treated them as second 
class citizens by ignoring their rights, exploiting their resources, and disparaging 
their cultures and identities* such as upazati of CHT in Bangladesh. Others have 
examined the politically strategic, but complex and often contradictory, overlap in 
indigenous rights and environmental agendas (Brosius 1999a; Guha and Martinez- 
Alier 1997).
In the often-overheated contexts of environmental politics, resource development 
and human rights debate, indigeneity is more than a cultured identity. It represents a 
dynamic social process and a contested domain wherein indigeneity can 
circumscribe a political argument, a resource related practice, a shared historical 
experience, and a defining moment in nation-citizen relationships (Von Benda- 
Beckman 1993: 20).
It is also evident from the literature that a key impetus for the emergence of 
indigenous activism on its current scale has been the sustained threats to indigenous 
land, territories, and resources by colonial and post-colonial state interventions. An 
increasing number of anthropologists are exploring indigenous demands for rights 
that extend beyond their territorial resources. These demands hinge on the right to 
self-determination and include the right to determine their own development and to 
control and protect their cultural knowledge and performances, languages, and 
indigenous knowledge (Hodgson 2002; Frost 2001; Nicholas 2000; Escobar 1997).
By linking together issues of representation, recognition, resources, and rights 
through ethnographic case studies, these studies offer a critical, comparative 
perspective on the issues of culture, identity, power, representation and alliances. 
The studies, despite the widely differing dynamics of each area, make evident the 
intersecting politics of representation, recognition, resources, and rights in the 
various regions. This comparative perspective of social movement is crucial in 
forming an understanding of the CHT because indigenous peoples of this region are 
facing a similar situation with the nation state Bangladesh.
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One of the salient aspects of this cultural politics is the organised response emerging 
from it in the form of social movements (Escobar 1996,1992), though I will try to 
show a more nuanced organisation than Escobar’s grand theory. The literature 
focuses on new social movements not only as “political struggles in pursuit of socio­
economic goals, but also as cultural struggles” (Escobar 1992: 397). For Escobar, 
the notion of cultural struggle is a process in which social actors, who are theorised 
as marginal, oppositional, and minority etc., and who are subjected to national 
economic and cultural policies for a long time, are shaped by different meaning and 
practices that come into conflict with the dominant cultural order. In this context, 
Escobar’s analysis of the social movement as “cultural struggle” draws many 
interwoven elements besides economic goals.
The above perspectives are in many respects relevant to the present ethnic 
mobilsation processes in the CHT where land and language issues are intertwined. 
Similarly, Karlsson (1997) in his recent study of Rabhas, an indigenous people in 
Sub-Himalayan Bengal, reveals that Rabha people assert their cultural identity in 
opposition to the dominant Bengali community, and this assertion of identity takes 
forms directly related to their survival and struggle for land, forest or other basic 
resources such as language.
In the Latin American context, some analysts also argue that “Indianness” has 
become more profound in diverse indigenous movements (Gledhill 1994), as 
peasants are continuously engaged in struggles over “indigenous land rights” 
(Wignaraja 1993), and “in the process of challenging the conventional development 
model and the state which has proved unable and/or uninterested in improving their 
lives” (Peet & Watts 1996: 96). In terms of indigenous politics, Beth Conklin (2002) 
explores how Brazilian Indians have shifted their claims to distinct status, and 
therefore rights, from indigenous practice to indigenous knowledge, in part through 
promoting particular representations of Native Amazonian shamans.
Therefore, ideas on social movements as being collectivities organised around 
common concerns and experiences of oppression, as well as being practical 
struggles over livelihood and survival, are what Martinez-Alier (1991) describes as
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the “ecology of the poor”. The specificity of ecological struggles is, however, 
marked by considerations of both political and moral economy, and an ecological 
perspective involves a worldview about the nature and positioning of community in 
relation to it (Peet & Watts 1996). Most of this recent social movement literature 
suggests that the relationship between territory, identity and culture is of paramount 
importance in the discourse of such movements. As it is historically in the making of 
nations, territory is deemed as space for hope and continuation of existence, and in 
an economic sense it is linked with natural resources. The loss of territory is the loss 
of life (Sethi 1993).
Hence social movements can be seen as a process of mobilisation, a strategy of 
constructing diverse identities based on cultural and social, economic and territorial 
rights, a mechanism of the defense of traditional methods of resource exploitation in 
the face of challenges from external forces. They also emphasise preservation of 
local control over the allocation of natural resources and the environment. Yet the 
expression these movements take is moulded not only by specific grievances but 
also by the historical and social context. In some cases, aggrieved groups resort to 
outright collective action, often invoking the language of ethnic and other identities 
which may become reinvigorated in the context of struggles over resources. 
However, a strategy of identity construction may take on different meanings in 
different socio/cultural contexts. Contemporary cultural, and ethnic and collective 
identities are central to this thesis.
In the case of CHT, the story of identity politics seems to be connected to the 
colonial and post-colonial categorisation of their inhabitants as ‘tribal’ or upazati 
and is incorporated into their struggle for self-identification. This category is being 
reified into a cultural identity for the assertion of political claims. Under successive 
colonial and national regimes, the people of CHT have been subjected to different 
classificatory grids (for example ‘tribe’, upazati) in order to map them out as 
colonial/post-colonial subjects, and to depict CHT as a free resource to exploit. 
Today it seems that their assertion of Pahari identity is related to their survival or 
struggle for land and forest on the one hand, and to an organised protest against the 
dominant Bengali community and state for long term deprivations on the other.
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There is a general consensus among the writers on social movements that they take 
place largely among poor, oppressed, marginalised and subordinate people who, at 
some level, share a common culture (Nicholas 1973). Indeed, protest by 
marginalised groups has been analysed conventionally in terms of discrepancies 
rooted in social class or other criteria such as property ownership. A few recent 
studies, however, suggest that it may be useful to conceptualise such activity as 
involving conflicts over access to natural resources and the patterns of natural 
resource exploitation. These studies emphasise the origins, articulations, ideologies 
and form of resolution (legal, political and cultural) of these kinds of socio­
economic conflicts.
Agarwal (1998,1988) highlights gender and domestic politics and struggles around 
the environment, focusing on the way in which poor women experience ecological 
crisis in quite gender-specific ways, and how they have become significant actors in 
ecologically-based movements of resistance. Martinez-Alier (1991) examines the 
implications of local control of resources, and explains how socio-ecological 
movements in the Latin American region are survival imperatives for the poor, 
whose existence is not being assured by the market economy or by the state. His 
research is especially concerned with the social perceptions of, and reactions to, 
episodes of depletion of resources.
Subaltern historians have brought into focus the theme of peasant resistance (Guha 
1983, Ram Guha 1989; Gadgil and Guha 1992,1995). Subaltern studies have as 
their aim the breaking of existing notions of the Indian peasant, and other “fixed” 
subaltern identities like the colonial categories of “untouchable” and ‘tribal’, as 
passive. By focusing on peasant struggles, they attempt to establish an independent 
“subaltern” consciousness experience and practice; recognising the subordinate 
people as a subject in their own right: according to Guha (1983) it is “insurgent 
consciousness”. This suggests that notions of peasant community and subaltern 
consciousness are rather different from conventional anthropological descriptions of 
distinct peoples with distinct culture, which gives space for both continuation and 
change. Moreover, these studies have also tried to bring an ecological dimension to 
tie study of agrarian history and peasant resistance focusing on colonialism and
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commercial forestry (Guha 1989; Gadgil and Guha 1992,1995). This particular 
point is relevant to the understanding of the people of the CHT today.
Focussing on property rights and the micro-politics of access to, and control over, 
resources within the domestic sphere, much of this social movement literature tends 
to be local in its purview. All of these studies try to link political action (whether 
peasant resistance, social movements or organised domestic politics) with power 
relations in relation to the question of resource access, control and identity 
formation.
Nevertheless, Melucci points out that “when studying social movements one should 
not consider them as empirically given, as a unified and consistent object” (1988: 
245-246). Indeed, collective identity is a process of negotiating the continuously 
changing relationships between different social groups under distinctive social 
circumstances (Schiller 1997; Paul 1995; Levine 1997). To address this problem in 
the context of CHT it is pragmatically important to consider Melucci’s distinction 
between ‘latent’ and ‘manifest’ levels of social movements.21
In the CHT, the ongoing autonomy movement based on the notion of territoriality22 
is clearly a visible instance of ethno-politics. On a broader scale, the conflict 
between the people of CHT and the majority Bengali people may be described as 
challenging state rights to land and forest, but at the local level people have different 
notions of this organised collective mobilisation. They have their own conception of 
territory and resource use, a process that involves the invisible networks of everyday 
life; what Melucci terms the “latent” level of any social movement.
Some of the more interesting ideas in this vein derive from the work of Scott (1985) 
on “everyday forms of resistance”. The notion of everyday forms of resistance is 
quite opposite to violent uprisings, often being based on individual mundane 
interests in a non-organised way. Scott’s concept is central, in the context of CHT, to 
uncovering the fabric of social action at the local level, most specifically in the
21 Although, the concept "latent" and "manifest" were originally coined by Sociologist Robert K. 
Merton (1957).
22 The concept "territoriality" is referred here to mention the CHT as the land of hill people.
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villages, where kinship, neighborhood, faction, network and ritual links offer 
multiple avenues and arenas for the assertion and manipulation of identities.
Very recently emphasis has also been given not only to political forms of social 
groupings but also to the way in which claims are made, negotiated and contested. 
For example, Peluso’s (1993) study shows how state power and forest management 
institutions are contested by Indonesian peasants, raising the larger issues of the 
colonial legacy and the coercive pattern of conservation. However, there are lots of 
ways of forming social groupings.
In micro-political anthropological analysis, group formations are defined in terms of 
social actions in which social conflicts are seen as the competitive pursuit of 
collective interest. But it is also the reconstitution of social, cultural or political 
identities (Peet and Watts 1996; Nicholas 1973). Nicholas points out that factions 
largely emerge out of social conflicts. However, a similarity exists between factions 
and movements in a sense that both are formed around the tissue of personal ties, 
common interests and moral ideology.
In the context of identity projects this also implies that the politics lie in the effort to 
create a center and thus fix a particular configuration of identity. In the context of 
CHT the term ‘identity politics’ might be appropriate because the regional identity is 
clearly manifested in the emergence of new vocabulary, Pahari or Jhumma people, 
to refer to all inhabitants of the CHT hills, excluding the Bengali. It highlights the 
Pahari cultural separateness from Bengalis, their shared possession of a Jhumma 
homeland, the CHT, a shared history of oppression and marginalisation, and the 
need to develop an “indigenous cultural model”.23
Therefore the concepts Pahari and Jhumma are being used as unifiers to form new 
social groups to demand self-rule and engage in the struggle to establish a place of 
their own. However, from methodological and empirical point of view, some 
intriguing questions can be raised: how and why is one particular configuration or 
representation selected rather than another? Identities emerge through the struggles
23 For details see Van Schendel, "The invention of Jhumma" (1992).
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that constitute social “fields” or political “arenas”, which may intertwine with 
domestic, local, national, regional or even global realities. How should micro­
politics and its links to bigger systems be understood?
Bailey’s micro-political approach is useful in studying the local politics of social 
groupings in the CHT. Bailey’s (1960, 1969) study of a village of highland Orissa 
(India) illuminates the relations between everyday life and politics at the village 
level, specifically factional politics. Using the metaphor of the “competitive game” 
he argues that an environment may contain rival political structures which compete 
and make up the “political field”, and there are also “arenas” where teams build 
support and subvert their opponents. Competition may move from one arena to 
another, or groups in one arena unite temporarily against a common threat or goal.
Bailey’s concept of the “game of politics” is central in understanding the dynamics 
of political competition among the groups of CHT inhabitants themselves and with 
the wider Bengali society as a whole. Conflicts between local political figures, such 
as headmen, chiefs and national figures and administrators, could be interpreted as 
representing conflicts of power at larger levels between the central government and 
the local authorities over the control of resources. But it is equally important to 
understand the local manifestation of the larger organisations, such as party 
organisations and local elections.
The crucial point is how such structured interventions from outside are received 
locally, how they play in the local political “game”. For example, at the local level, 
recent new alignments are thrown up in the protest against the khas land lease and 
disputes over infra-structural development, cantonment expansion. In this process, 
local leaders often play a crucial role in mobilising local followers. Thus Bailey’s 
micro-political approach is useful because it addresses certain key issues of conflicts 
and interests of different parties at the local level. Another aspect, for example, is an 
analysis of land disputes of khas land and puroshava election is also a study of local 
level politics (see Chapter Six and Seven).
I am positioning my research with the work of this alternative stream of Third World 
and non-metropolitan scholars such as Escobar, Guha and others, working on the
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real issues in the real world as opposed to trying to theorise ethnicity. My intention 
is to study the political process in the CHT: the new laws, new alliances and 
identities, the politics of environment and culture, the effects of government land 
policy, military occupation and the movements of the population. The research thus 
examines, through the micro-level politics of land tenure and resource use, the 
underlying basis of the social movements in the CHT. The issues and realities 
brought by the social movement studies, such as representation, rights, resource, 
land and shared marginalisation and state intervention are all crystallised in the form 
of Pahari movement in CHT. Therefore, the alternative analytical framework I 
consider in this thesis is mainly derived from the literature on indigenous social 
movements.
Environment as Social Context
For the purposes of this study I take issues about ‘the environment’ to refer 
primarily to resource use. As there is an enormous body of literature on the subject 
of environment, I am going to concentrate on the way the environment is conceived, 
defined and constructed from a given historical perspective. Recently, a growing 
number of studies have emphasised that the conceptualisation of the environment is 
a theoretical construct, and one that is determined by the historical context (Guha 
1989; Guha & Gadgil 1992,1995; Guha & Martinez-Alier 1997; Brosius 1999d, 
1999a; Mohsin & Ahmed 1996; Baviskar 1997, 2003; Escobar 1996; Frost 2001; 
Peet & Watt 1996; Karlsson 1997).
Guha and Gadgil (1992) place the environment in a historical perspective, 
describing forestry policy in colonial India and how it led to peasant initiatives like 
the Chipko Movement in the 1960s. “These movements have helped Uttarakhand 
emerge from a position of relative obscurity to one which accurately reflects its 
ecological and cultural importance to the life of the subcontinent.” (Guha 1989: xi). 
It is relevant to look in a similar fashion at the way the environment of the 
Chittagong Hill Tracts has been constructed through its particular economic, social 
and political history.
Historically, the people of CHT have been subjected to colonial, Pakistani and 
Bangladeshi systems of governance. However, whichever rule the people of the
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CHT have been subjected to, the way in which they have been politically defined 
has been related directly to the oppressors’ conception of them. Typically, the CHT 
has been seen in accordance with the political and economic interest of the ruling 
regime as a free resource, inhabited by natives. There has been a changing 
relationship between the hill people and the plains people and both of their 
relationship to the environment and to the overarching context of the state (Mohsin 
& Ahmed 1996).
The issues I expect to address and explore are prevalent in situations where socio­
political change is directly linked to changes in the environment. In this study the 
environment is seen as both a natural resource as well as a social context. In CHT, 
there are two conflicting interests in resource use: one is a system of subsistence 
agriculture, jhum, practised by the hill people (Pahari); the other is the commercial 
exploitation of the environment (forestry, khas lands etc) by the State and the 
dominant Bengali.
Karlsson (1997) has studied a similar situation. His study of the Rabha community 
highlights the construction of identity as a form of subaltern resistance in Sub- 
Himalayan Bengal, perceived as a struggle against the predominant Bengali people. 
This identity also stems from the construction of their environment in terms of a 
traditional land use practice of jhum cultivation; constructed in the face of pressure 
from colonial, national and current international policy towards their forest 
surroundings. The connection between ecology and identity has also been 
established in recent theoretical discussions of resource use and tenure where 
ecology appears as a strategy for the reorganisation of self and group identity, as 
described by Martinez-Alier (1991) and Escobar (1992a, 1992b) for social 
movements in Latin America and other parts of the World.
In the context of CHT, land and its possession have been a source of identity 
construction. The right to use and appropriate CHT land and territory relates to 
diverse collectives in the past, present and future. Historically, Chittagong had been 
an area of contestation between the rulers of Bengal, Arakan and Tripura because of 
its access to the sea and for natural resources (Ishaq 1971: 26). There is very little 
information about the pre-colonial CHT. Historians report that in pre-colonial 
Moghal period (before 1760) the CHT areas were under autonomous self-rule,
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resulting in the maintenance of their indigenous socio-political system (Sirajuddin 
1971; Schendel, 1992).
Although the Moghals left the political structure of the hills undisturbed, changes 
occurred in very subtle ways. For the first time the people of the CHT paid a tax in 
the form of a tribute to an outside power. As the tax was paid in cotton tributes, the 
area was designated as “Kapas Mahal” (land of cotton) (Ishaq 1971;
Sirajuddin 1971). Many believe that the introduction of cotton tributes by Moghal in 
the CHT marked the beginning of the loss of indigenous power (Mohsin 1997, 
Dewan 1990,1991; Roy 2001).
In the perspective of the Moghal environmental construct, the CHT was seen as 
mainly a resource to be exploited in the form of the cotton taxes levied. This area 
was ceded to the East India Company in 1760. The Company continued the policy of 
collecting cotton tribute, with the addition of Bengali middlemen appointed as “the 
agents to collect tributes” (Ishaq 1971: 31). This system exposed the people of CHT 
to exploitation by middlemen who usually collected more cotton than the amount 
they paid to the company (Sirajuddin 1971). But, there was a difference in the taxes 
levied; the form of tribute was changed from kind to cash; from cotton to money 
according to the treaty signed in 1789 (Hutchinson 1906; Mackenzie 1884).
Many authors espouse the view that monetarisation went against the interests of the 
people of the CHT (Mey 1981; Dewan 1990; Mohsin1997; Schendel 1992). In order 
to raise the necessary cash, they became dependent upon Bengali traders to whom 
they sold their products at nominal prices as the traders controlled and manipulated 
the market. This in fact seems to be the beginning of the settlement of ‘outsider’ 
Bengali people from the plains into the Hill Tracts. The environment of exploitation 
was thus established in the CHT.
In 1860 British Colonial policies in the region underwent a fundamental change 
when for the first time in history, direct rule was imposed on the region. The hill and 
forest tracts to the east of Chittagong district were separated to form an 
administrative district in its own right, and officially named as the Chittagong Hill 
Tracts (CHT) (Lewin 1869; Hutchinson 1906; Ishaq 1971; Schendel 1992). The 
separation of the district was essential for the colonial government to consolidate its
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power and authority against potential rebellions in frontier regions, as reported by 
earlier colonial administrators (Lewin 1869; Mackenzie 1884, Hutchinson 1906).
Another aim of the British was to increase its revenue from land and local forest 
produce; protecting its politico-economic interests (Gain 1998; Roy 1992, 2001; 
Dewan 1990). The CHT was divided into three main revenue circles headed by three 
chiefs responsible for tax collection. Taxes were demanded on a territorial basis 
rather than personal followings, as before (Schendel 1992; Mohsin 1997; Tripura 
1992).
Many post-colonial writers claim that the colonial administration sought to impose 
their own notions of “progress” and agricultural “development” upon the jhumia 
(swidden cultivators) (Mohsin 1997: 149). The colonial perception of jhum, the 
characteristic form of agriculture in the CHT, was a primitive method of agriculture. 
As it entails fallow periods, it was considered to be a waste of resources. On the 
other hand, Jhumma perceived jhum as a way of life, based on the conception of 
communal ownership, exchange and sharing and had been in harmony with their 
ecology (Dewan 1990; Roy 1996, Mohsin 1997; Schendel 1992; Tripura 1992). 
Therefore, colonial construction of methods of land use in CHT, or elsewhere in 
India, had a different mission in contrast to traditional local method of jhum. 
Between 1868-71, repeated efforts were made to replace jhum cultivation with 
plough cultivation because this was expected to yield higher revenues and to be less 
‘wasteful’ of timber resources and land. David Gilmartin (2003) in his recent article 
explores differing uses of the term ‘waste’ in late 19th and 20th century British 
irrigation administration in India. He argues that “differing concepts of ‘waste’ point 
towards deep-seated conflicts in British thinking about the relationship between the 
state, nature and the social body of Indus basin society” (2003: 5057).
In the CHT, the colonial state also claimed ownership of all lands in the hills in 
1868, introducing two types of land tenure system: “proprietary right” granted to the 
sedentary plough cultivators together with individual ownership rights, while the 
jhum cultivators were given the right to use the land over which the state retained 
proprietary rights (Roy 1992; Mohsin 1997;Gain 1998, 2001). Recent studies have 
shown that this kind of land entitlement created a contradictory land tenure system, 
undermining the traditional customary right, that is an ‘individualistic system’ as
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opposed to a ‘community system’, and beginning the policy of land alienation (Roy 
1996,1998; Kalindi 2000). Burman (1993) and Furer-Haimendorf (1982) have 
shown how this similar process has affected the Northeast tribal people of India 
under the same conditions.
The other significant change in relation to land and resource exploitation in CHT 
was the development of scientific forestry. In order to begin ‘commercial’ or 
‘scientific’ forestry’, the Indian Forest Reserve Act was passed in 1865. By 1871, 
vast tracts of cultivated jhum land and virgin forests within the CHT were taken over 
by the colonial government and declared as “reserve”, like many other ‘tribal’ 
regions in India (Roy 1992,1997; Mohsin 1997; Ghua 1989; Guha and Gadgil 1992; 
Karlsson 1997). The local people were barred from entering and using the resources 
of these forests in an attempt to protect them. The forest as communal space thus 
became a “commercial venture for the colonial state” (Guha 1989: 56).
Moreover, large tea plantations were established in the hill regions in order to 
generate revenues and meet the tea demand in England (Karlsson 1997; Guha and 
Gadgil 1992). Little consideration was given to the social and cultural values of the 
hill people who were thus marginalised through their exclusion from the forests. I 
will address this issue of jhum and jhum land rights in Chapter five from a 
contemporary local perspective.
Furthermore, for the purpose of administrative structuring, the CHT was declared an 
excluded area in 1900, which was formalised in the CHT regulation of 1900 known 
as the CHT Manual Amended Act 1860 (Ishaq 1971: 253; Shelly 1992; Roy 2001). 
This laid down detailed rules and regulations for the administration of the CHT, 
which were different from the rest of Bengal. The regulation maintained the 
“traditional” institution of chiefs but gave all executive, judiciary and financial 
powers to the District Commissioner (colonial administrator). The manual did not 
have any provision whereby the local people or their representatives could formulate 
rules for themselves.
However, the regulations restricted settlement and ownership of land by non- 
indigenous people (Dewan 1990; Kalindi 2000; Roy 1998). Critics of the regulations 
often demonstrate that colonial administration stemmed the tide of Bengalisation but
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isolated the hill people from the rest of Bengal (Ahmed 1993; Ali 1993). Their 
exclusion kept the CHT away from the rest of India, particularly in a period of 
intense nationalist movements (Schendel 1992; Schendel & Dewan 2001; 
Hassanuzzaman 1991; Mohsin 1997). However, my ethnographic experience in 
CHT suggests a complete opposite picture. Ethnic activists even blame the 
government for not fully implementing the CHT Regulations which for them now 
become the safeguard of hill identity (see the discussion of contemporary debate on 
the CHT Manual in Chapter six).
The colonial construction of the CHT environment, thus, implied a saga of 
exploitation. Policies regarding modernising agriculture and scientific forestry were 
formed and implemented with great care to maximise the revenue gains and reduce 
indigenous peoples’ access to resources. The entire power structure was changed, 
making the State owner of almost all land and leading to land alienation. Control of 
resources had passed from the people to the government or a larger state institution.
After 1947 the CHT, under the direct control of Pakistan, faced the devaluation of its 
high taxation generation potential, but gained instead an alternative importance from 
the intrinsic value of its land (Schendel 1992, 2001; Gain 1998; Mohsin 1997, 2001; 
Kalindi 2000). Land was required to establish the Kaptai Project on the Komafhully 
River. The industrialisation of the economy was also begun with the establishment 
of the Komafhully Paper Mill. The Hill Tracts were supposed to supply the 
pulpwood for making paper reflecting the State’s usage of the forest resources by 
recreating reserve forests. Consequently, the policies adopted by the Pakistani 
regime in the name of ‘national development’ and ‘national integration’ ultimately 
served the interests of Bengalis in East Pakistan (Barua 2001, Dewan 1991;
Schendel 1992, 2001; Tripura 2001; Mohsin 1997; Bertocci 1989).
This developmental activity had dire consequences for the people of CHT, as more 
than 40% of their best cultivable land was submerged under the reservoir of the 
Kaptai Dam along with the displacement of about 100,000 people, who became 
environmental refugees migrating to India (Sopher 1963). Jhum cultivators were the 
worst affected as they were not compensated by the government since they had no 
direct ownership to the land. The paper industry (started in 1953 at Chandraguna in 
CHT) demanded huge amounts of pulpwood to sustain itself, causing intensive
59
deforestation of the region (Sopher 1963,1964). Coincidentally at this time jhum 
cultivation had already been “designated as an unsustainable form of agriculture by 
the State” (Bertocci 1989: 154).
Though the resources of the hills are used in industry, it employed less than 1% of 
the total hill population compared to its earlier commitment that 50% will be 
employed from local hill people (Mohsin and Ahmed 1996). Consequently they 
remained peripheral and marginalised, which sowed the seeds of unrest and 
politicisation of the Hill people. Student protests groups such as Pahari Chatra 
Shamity (Hill Students Association) started the agitation against the Kaptai 
hydroelectric project in 1957 (Chaudhuri 1991). Commentators mentioned that the 
rise of these political platforms meant “a growing consciousness of identity among 
the hill people on one level, and their alienation from Pakistani regimes and 
Bengalis on the other” (Schendel 1992: 158).
The birth of the Bangladesh nation-state marked significant political and cultural 
changes and transformations in the CHT landscape. The Bangladesh State was 
formed in 1971 on the twin bases of culture and territory, emphasising linguistic 
identity (Anisuzzaman 2000). The inhabitants of the CHT were completely excluded 
from this cohesion due to their different cultural and territorial circumstances 
(Hassanuzzaman 1991; Barua 2001; Schendel 1996,2000; Mohsin 1997). This 
discontent was reflected in the outbreak of active resistance against the State, 
framing a demand for the recognition of “cultural plurality” and autonomy 
(Schendel 1996; Ali 1993; Dewan 1991; Chaudhuri 1991). The government saw 
these movements as ‘insurgencies’ and a threat to ‘national integration and state 
sovereignty’ (Ali 1993; Burua 2001). Moreover, this was the time when the 
Bangladesh Government was headed by military dictators. The militarisation of the 
CHT was a bid to control the ‘insurgency’; obviously the resource control was 
another latent agenda (Bertocci 1989; Anti Slavery Society 1984).
Thereafter the government advocated the promotion of Bengali migration to the 
CHT (mostly landless labourers from the plains) as an instrument in changing the 
demographic profile of the area. The settlement policy of 1980s was justified by the 
government on the ground that the CHT constitutes about 10% of the land surface of 
the country, and has hardly 1% of the population of the country (Roy1997; Huq
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2000; Chaudhuri 1991). The benefits of resource allocation were thus distributed 
amongst both the hill people and the Bengali immigrants. Now, in considering the 
CHT, both of these had become interest groups with a major distinction, one of them 
had the cohesion of the cultural and linguistic factors linking it with the rest of 
Bangladesh and the other was culturally and socially differentiated, triggering what 
some writers called an “ethnocide” (Mey 1984; Muhammad 1997; Bodley 1990).
Another dimension of ‘modem’ resource utilisation involved the renewed 
declaration of the Reserve Forests by the previous military rulers. This paved the 
way for the government to legitimise the acquisition of land under jhum cultivation. 
Furthermore, jhum was completely banned as cultivation practice in the Government 
‘protected forest’ areas. Though the policy clearly revealed the motive of land 
encroachment, the project also has detrimental effects on the environment (Roy 
1996, Gain 1995, Tripura 2001). But, it is ironical that the government blames the 
jhum cultivation for soil degradation and deforestation (Ahamed 2001, 2002).
The policy followed by the successive governments has been to gradually relieve the 
indigenous people of control over their resources so as to benefit the State, even at 
the expense of the original area. Thus people of CHT have been marginalised 
causing poverty and environmental degradation. The present Bangladeshi State is no 
exception to the rule; in fact it has added certain elements of its own. “The 
exploitative nature of the Kaptai Dam hydro-electric project and the transmigration 
of the Bengali settlers has caused a massive shortage of land in the CHT which is 
attributable to government policies rather than failure of jhum cultivation as a 
method” (Report of the CHT Commission 1991). Land rights have also similarly 
been usurped; the local people have been turned into environmental refugees leading 
to a situation of military oppression.
During this time, elsewhere in Bangladesh global policy on environment and land 
rights has begun to influence national policy through the work of international and 
national development organisations and NGOs. In the CHT this is not the case.
Since the outbreak of the active resistance against the state military oppression in 
1977 this region has become an area of restricted movement for so-called reasons of 
national security. Non-nationals are excluded from working, residing and even 
visiting the CHT.
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Marginalised from both the mainstream and the international community, today it 
has become a question of day-to-day survival of the people of CHT, both in social, 
economic and cultural terms. This has led to the rise of resistance and the strength of 
the link between ecology and collective identity has become even more evident in 
the present politicised scenario. Above all else, the shared experiences of deprivation 
and exploitation and the recent struggle against a Bengali-led government have 
created political awareness among the hill people.
“The role of unequal power relations in constituting a politicised environment.. .and 
the ways in which conflict over access to environmental resources is linked to 
systems of economic and political control first elaborated during the colonial 
era.. .resulting in increasing marginality and vulnerability of the poor as an outcome 
of such conflict” (Bryant 1997: 87), is not an unique feature of the CHT. It has been 
seen in parts of Brazil, Latin American, and as well as in India, as is evident from 
the works of Escobar (1992, 1996,1997), Martinez-Alier (1991), Hecht and 
Cockbum (1989), Gray (1997), Winzeler, (1997), Guha (1983), Ram Guha (1989) 
Guha and Gadgil (1992,1995) and Baviskar (1997,2003). Collectively they provide 
rich empirical evidence from various regions to show how political struggles, 
economic interests and ecological change come together in the patterns of 
human/environment interaction.
Thus the human construction of the environment of CHT over time has a 
monotonous regularity in terms of exploitation for political ends, the story being 
repeated with every successive regime. The emergence of a collective identity 
among the people of CHT, based on local environmental constructs, is now being 
directed towards the achievement of their own political goals, but the question 
remains to what extent is this collective identity representative of the practices, 
views and interests of all groups in the CHT?
I have thus far discussed the two main theoretical and analytical issues central to my
thesis: the first is ethnicity and its relationship to the real political process as found
in social movements’ theory. I have explained why social movements, in this sense,
are relevant as a better way of looking at ethnicity, ‘tribes’ and their relations to the
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state, rather than mainstream theories on ethnicity and ethnic groups.241 have also 
clarified why it is fair to say that such ideas about ethnicity lead me into this 
alternative social movements line of thought. The second main theoretical issue that 
I have discussed is the environment as social and historical construction and the 
necessity to outline the way this has changed over time. I have shown how the 
environment has been differentially constructed in different social, cultural and 
historical contexts.
In this study, I have, thus, concentrated on the two related strands of contemporary 
discourse with particular resonance in CHT: ethnicity and the environment. I suggest 
that a new anthropological approach can provide the detailed ethnographic analysis 
which need to situate in the complexity of social life with an analytical framework 
which encompasses national and international debate. Before I discuss the 
methodological procedures I now briefly review the ethnographic literature on CHT 
in order to situate this research.
Review and Critique of Existing Ethnographic Literature on CHT
As I have already mentioned, there is a disjuncture between the theoretical concerns 
of social scientists including anthropologists and the kind of discourse that actually 
exists on the ground in Bangladesh to which anthropologists have partly contributed 
in discussing ethnicity. It is, thus, necessary to review the literature of Lewin,
Loffler, Selina, Mohsin, Sattar et al, as most of these scholars have been working 
with the ‘tribe’ model to describe the people of CHT. The Bangladesh State at the 
oatset assumes that the Chakma, Marma, Tripura and others are the people of ‘tribal’ 
cultures. The Bangladesh legal and social policy-makers consequently present a 
p.cture of Bengali and the rest, the non-Bengali ‘tribals’.
Social scientists including anthropologists, even in recent works, for example, by 
Selina (1995), have contributed to this stereotypical discourse. I am going to review 
ths literature because it is clear that some of the social structure and cultural issues 
discussed are going to be relevant to my research. At the same time I am
24 See also Burnham’s (1996) study of northern Cameroonian ethnic group’s relationship with the 
stite.
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nevertheless aware of the potential danger of becoming trapped by adopting a 
similar view of the people of CHT as ‘tribes’. Therefore, I am going to critique these 
literature in terms of the fact that it has itself contributed to the construction and use 
of the term ‘tribe’.
It is important to point out here that the state/tribal distinction has also been central 
to theoretical interpretations in African studies. Recently, however, this stereotyping 
distinction has been questioned by anthropologists. Sharpe (1986) has shown how 
previous ethnographic and historical studies have reinforced the state/tribal 
distinction in northern Nigeria leading to the construction of “mental maps” which 
have greatly influenced local policy and administration.
Nevertheless, the ethnographic literature on CHT that I will review is pragmatically 
useful in understanding various complex issues and giving a handle on issues such 
as clan structure, the alliance system, and the way power is constituted. By looking 
a: these areas the nature of the relationship between group dynamics, social 
organisation and land use system is more easily revealed and explored.
A Brief Review of the Literature 
Colonial Understanding of CHT
There have been very few serious ethnographic studies on the people of CHT. Until 
tte late nineteenth century, travellers’ accounts and ethnographic reports by colonial 
administrators and explorers were the sources of British understanding of the 
inhabitants of the CHT.25 British administrators of the region provided detailed 
accounts of these people, based primarily on government reports, gazetteers, census 
irformation and personal memory.
Much of the literature of that period contains too few ethnographic descriptions to be 
o' use for this discussion. However, I have included the works of some colonial 
administrators such as Lewin and Hutchinson as examples of colonial perspectives
25rhese works include; Lewin (1869,1870), Hunter (1876), Mackenzie (1884), and Hutchinson 
(1906).
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of South Asian ‘tribal’ people which are also central to later debates in the literature. 
Notably after the establishment of direct control over the CHT in 1860, the colonial 
government needed to collect detailed information about the ‘tribal’ people and their 
socio-cultural system because they were looking for the best possible ways to deal 
with them, primarily for administrative purposes.26
These colonial ethnographies, which often focused on the most spectacular ‘savage 
customs’ such as head hunting or human sacrifice, also served to legitimise the 
colonial civilising mission. The most influential of these early ethnographies was 
that of Lewin in 1869. Most of the ethnographic accounts that followed, even up to 
today, draw heavily on his work, either as a base for their own interpretations or as a 
source for criticism.
Post-colonial Understanding
From the nineteen-fifties onwards some European anthropologists, particularly 
French and German (Levi-Strauss 1952; Bessaignet 1958; Bemot 1959; Kauffman 
1962) made some studies on the people of the CHT, specifically the Chakma and 
Marma groups.27 These scholars dealt with diverse features ranging from kinship 
systems, the jhum economy, and oral traditions of the various ‘tribal’ minorities, and 
ethnographic descriptions and identification of ‘tribes’ in terms of their locations, 
numbers, language, etc. The main objectives of these scholars were indeed centred 
on testing a wide body of hypotheses that hold true for many communities in other 
regions.
Bessaignet’s (1958) work entitled Tribesmen of Chittagong Hill Tracts is an 
ethnographic description of the Chakma and Marma people, presenting the way of 
life of these people in the 1950s with no theoretical or analytical frame of reference. 
Bemot (1959), a linguist, published an article that particularly dealt with the various 
facts and aspects of different ‘tribal’ groups, such as language, religion, economy, 
with reference to similarities between peoples living in neighbouring areas. His 
focus, however, was mainly on the linguistic features of the ‘tribal’ population.
26 Another source of information comes from the colonial spying system officers serving in the tribal 
territories reporting back to the Governor (Hunt and Harrison 1980).
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Kauffmann (1962) observed the agriculture of the ‘hill tribes’ particularly jhum 
cultivation, describing the general features such as the type of crops grown, the kind 
of tools used, method of farming etc. Levi-Strauss (1952), on the other hand, 
examined the comparative pattern of marriage systems among the three groups, the 
Chakma, Marma and Kuki. Following a very brief visit to the CHT, he attempted to 
relate these ethnographic facts to his theories on marriage exchange and social 
structure.
All these writers, however, have examined the CHT ‘tribal’ groups as independent 
and isolated units, without ever exploring the process of interaction between them 
and the Bengali plains people that surround them. This aspect of their ethnicity has 
been wholly ignored. Not one study has focused on the impact of colonial and post­
colonial situations in the CHT, and most of these works were done before the 
emergence of Bangladesh. It is obvious that there has not been much economic or 
political analysis of historical change and social transformation in the lives of these 
people, nor much study of their relevance for the contemporary ‘re-ethnicisation of 
social movements’.
In the 1960s, an American geographer, Sopher (1963,1964) began a study of ethnic 
interaction and the environment, interpreting the relationship between hill and plains 
people of Bangladesh as symbiotic. The societies of the plains were said to have 
supplied political and technical culture in order to overcome insecurity caused by the 
raiding ‘hill tribes’. The ‘tribal’ groups in turn exchange their surplus on the market 
of the plains, and this exchange process was deemed symbiotic too. These 
interpretations of hills and plains societies as symbiotic and harmonious clearly 
show both evolutionist and functionalist perspectives.
The socio-political history of the CHT demystifies this theoretical approach 
concerning the relationships between the hill and the plains people. Historically, 
these two populations have been linked by complex networks of exchange and 
barter, which rest on their different lifestyles and modes of exploitation of the
27 Most of these researches, however, have not been translated into English or Bengali.
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environment. Since the colonial period various policies such as the introduction of 
cash crop cultivation, together with the monetarised economy, radically changed 
these links and affected the socio-economic structures of the hill people, as they 
came to be more dependent on the plains people. Over the years, their 
interrelationship has posed problems of interpretation for many observers, as the 
nature of this relationship has become unequal and even exploitative. These studies 
saw political centralisation or integration as the only normal course of development 
in this region of ‘tribal’ belt.
More Recent Studies
Even many recent sources (Sattar 1975; Ahmed 1993; Selina 1995) reinforce the 
stereotype of the ‘tribal’ societies as wild appendices of the hierarchical societies of 
the plains. This is precisely the point where a theory perceiving cultural dichotomies 
(plains vs jungle; civilised vs dark) is supportive of a national State policy that 
favours the majority and marginalises the minority on grounds of inferiority. A 
recent study of the Marma people by Selina, a researcher for the Bangladesh 
Agriculture Research Council, presents a typical example of this ‘ethnocentric’ 
approach. She advocates that the national development strategies should be 
integrated with the strategy for the development of ‘tribal’ communities because, as 
she believes, “they still live in forests with age old primitive tradition, culture and 
beliefs” (1995: 13).
The characterisation of ‘innocent tribal’ for the purposes of development attention of 
the state has had the effect of isolating people of CHT from its wider cultural and 
political context, and of masking the considerable diversity within the region. I 
argue that contrary to the image propagated by prevailing insular, arch-structuralist 
accounts, the ethnic people in CHT is and has always been, actively engaged with 
national and international debates.28
Recently, some local and foreign anthropologists and social scientists have been 
critical of the government’s oppressive policies towards the CHT (Dewan 1990;
28 See detailed discussion on this issue in (Tripura 1992; Schendel 1992, 2001, Mohsin 1997; 
Ahamed 2001).
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Lofflerl990; Schendel 1996, 2000; Tripura 1992; Roy 1992,1996; Ali 1993; Mohsin 
1997, Ahamed 2001). Loffler (1990), having done fieldwork over a period of ten 
years, has written the most detailed ethnography on the Mru people, revealing their 
distinct social organisation, and an enduring practice of jhum cultivation. However, 
Loffler ignores the relationship between the ‘tribal’ people and wider Bengali 
society.
Dewan (1990) studied the CHT from a historical Marxist perspective showing how 
the government policies have periodically marginalised the hill people. His work is 
primarily based on secondary sources, although he spent six months in the field. 
Very recently, another study based on secondary sources (Mohsin 1997) traces the 
development of the Jhumma political movement, again focusing on the 
marginalisation by the Bangladeshi State.
However, Mey and Mey (1978, 1980,1981,1984), in particular, have made a 
significant anthropological contribution to exposing the recent situation in which 
government policy towards ‘tribal’ people is seen as continually eliminating them 
from their land. The government settlement programme of Bengali landless families 
fails to recognise the CHT’s indigenous system of land right and ownership. Thus, 
the government’s position in legal matters regarding land supports the “intruders” 
against the local population. I argue that the concepts of ‘stability’, ‘equilibrium’ 
and ‘symbiosis’ are poorly suited to the conceptualisation of the political situation in 
the CHT.
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The CHT in Ethnographic Details
To locate the hill people geographically is no problem; to locate them ethnically is 
more difficult. In Bangladesh, at official level presently two terms upazati (sub­
nation) and ‘tribal’ are used interchangeably to refer collectively to the various non- 
Bengali ethnic groups of the Hill Tracts. However, ethnic groups collectively call 
themselves as Pahari besides their own ethnic group’s name. There is also a third 
label. The term Jhumma people is preferred by the PCJSS. For the terms Pahari and 
Jhumma have different connotations. A survey of the literature on the aspects of 
ethnographic details provides us with confusing insights into the internal dynamics 
of ethnic groups.
Names and Numbers
As I have mentioned in the introduction, the actual number of ethnic communities in 
CHT is not easily agreed upon in the existing literature. The information suggests 
that listings with different names, divisions or branches of the same group and 
subgroup as separate ethnic groups have contributed to a lot of confusion about the 
number of ethnic groups in CHT. Lewin (1869) classified Doignak, Tangchangya, 
and Sak as sub groups of Chakma. Bemot (1959), however, claimed that they are not 
sub-groups as their lineages and clans do not exhibit any feeling of identity with 
Chakma.30 Levi-Strauss (1952) classified the Bangozi and Pankhu as moieties of the 
“Kuki” group, but recently Loffler (1990) noted that there is no such name as a 
Bangozi group in the CHT. I found the people call themselves as Bawm and deny 
having any genealogical links with “Kukis”.
Language and Ethnicity
Ethnographic knowledge of these peoples’ language groupings is also extremely 
limited. The most recent account available is by Bemot (1959) who classified the 
languages of the hill people as of Tibeto-Burman origin. He also points out that in 
CHT groups have inter-mingled in many cases, so that they can be classified as
291 will discuss these in more detail in Chapter seven, see also the discussion on the subject in 
(Schendel 1992; Tripura 1993).
30 It seems that colonial administrator (perhaps for administrative purposes) attempted to deal with 
these people by distinguishing smaller groups as subgroups of dominant group.
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“ethno-linguistic groups” as they share the same culture and tradition. Khaleque 
(1998), however, differs from the above views regarding the categorisation of the 
language family or branches. Unfortunately, Khaleque’s is not an in-depth 
ethnographic study and provides only limited data. Though overlapping views exist, 
scholars suggest that an analysis of present day distribution of language and dialect 
would reveal the course of historical migration of the hill people from which they 
were supposed to be descended.
In colonial ethnography, race and racial classifications became the dominant mode 
of ordering the ‘tribal’ people where race and language were seen as synonymous. 
For example, Lewin’s (1870) book the Wild Races describes how the ‘hill tribes’ of 
CHT Tibeto-Burman - speaking Mongoloid immigrants have managed to live in 
relative isolation from the societies on the plains. Ethnographers have often assumed 
that groups who speak the same language form a single unit and the unit of language 
can be used as a bond of political and national solidarity (Karlsson 1997). In the 
CHT, this model appears to be paradoxical, as linguistic diversity between ethnic 
groups is widely varied, and the collective ethnic boundary may not be maintained at 
least at a linguistic level.
Thus, many ethnographic questions may be raised in this respect. The term ‘tribe’ as 
it appears in the literature has become an unsatisfactory word to describe the people 
of CHT. Are linguistic groups really the best way to define them? How are their 
different languages being negotiated in complex socio-political inter-relationships 
between the groups, at least in the context of new identity formation? How do 
language differences signify in the lives of the present day hill people of the CHT? I 
am going to answer these questions in Chapter four.
The multi-plurality of religious doctrines of the hill people has often been attractive 
to researchers. Besides the major religions predominant among the larger groups, 
there are smaller groups known as animists who have been increasingly converted to 
Christianity due to missionary activities, as reported by many (Dewan 1990; Mey 
and Mey 1978). However, it may be far too simple to describe minor groups’ 
adoption of Christianity as merely due to missionary activities, since it is the people 
themselves who choose to convert.
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Yet these studies do not tell us why the minor groups choose to become Christians 
and why they do so at this particular juncture in their history. Although this issue 
does not come within the purview of my main ethnographic inquiry, I have 
addressed as a secondary issue of investigation whether Bawm’s (one of my study 
groups) conversion to Christianity is a part of struggle to establish or construct a 
salient new identity. An understanding of the possible connections between 
conversion and changing forest landscape in the CHT lead to other insights into how 
changes of religion can affect everyday life.
Social Organisation
The quality of literature is not particularly good on the issues of social organisation. 
The way these groups are treated in the literature produces some uncertainties 
regarding the nature of political process in terms of labeling ethnic identity. Another 
area that is deficient in the literature is local social organisation of “marriage 
systems”, “lineage”, “clans” and “inheritence”. In this study, it is relevant to the 
understanding of the relationship between social organisation and group dynamics in 
the context of local politics and identity construction (see Chapter Three). In order to 
examine this I have also focused on the interactions taking place vis-a-vis resource 
related issues, such as property rights and land use.
It appears that in the CHT ethnic groups are culturally diverse in terms of religion, 
language and social organisation. The existing literature has focused on the larger 
groups, neglecting many aspects of smaller groups. These ethnographic descriptions, 
however, suggest that multi-ethnic nature of interrelationships that exist among the 
groups is not analogous to the situation found elsewhere in South Asia. Loffler 
rightly pointed out that “within one and the same mouza in the CHT, one may find 
four groups speaking completely different languages, building different types of 
houses, wearing different clothes, believing in different customs and 
religions”(1990: 36). This suggests that ethnographic research undertaken in the 
CHT needs to focus on a micro-social setting.
71
Social and Political Context of Land Tenure and Use
Little field research has been undertaken on real resource use and resource tenure. 
However, some general themes have emerged from the work of geographers, 
linguists and anthropologists are central to the local level research, like this study. I 
summarise these briefly below.
Jhum
It appears from many recent studies that jhum practice is declining. Loffler (1990) 
claims that among the Mru land scarcity is a major problem for jhum cultivation. As 
a result, fallow periods have shortened with subsequently poor yields, and this has 
led to harder livelihoods. Mey (1978,1981), on the basis of a comparative socio­
economic study of eight ethnic groups, argued that there are decisive differences 
between the valley and mountain groups regarding their agricultural practices. Mey 
observes that as the jhum fields are becoming smaller and do not produce sufficient 
food for subsistence, there has been a progressive uptake of plough agriculture in 
valleys. Mey further observes that land is scarce in the valley areas too, as most of 
the Bengali settlers are now settled there and practice plough cultivation. As a result 
the economic situation is bad in general among the hill people.
This suggests that jhum may not be sustainable if the process continues. Though two 
types of farming are visible in the CHT the methods are completely different.
Plough cultivation is usually associated with cash crops whereas jhum agriculture is 
normally subsistence farming. This literature suggests that jhum cultivation could 
never sustain the high density of population which plough agriculture can sustain. 
Good yields are only possible if there is large amount of uncultivated land.
It is often shown that if the population increases, degraded jhum fields appear. This 
is because a continuous increase in population involves an intensification of jhum 
cultivation by shortening the fallow, which reduces soil fertility. The shorter fallow 
periods and poorer soils mean lower yields for the same piece of land. Alternatively, 
in order to maintain the level of production, the cultivated area needs to expand. 
However, larger fields also mean more work; sooner or later the household will not
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have enough manpower to keep up with the weeding Imperata grass being the main 
problem. Consequently, the degraded swidden field is often colonised by Imperata 
grass, which imposes certain kinds of labour constraints. This automatically 
increases female labour because women are typically the people who do the weeding 
(Ruthenberg 1971).
The above analyses erroneously assume that jhum is subject to the same constraints 
as paddy cultivation. In most cases of jhum cultivation there is no need for weeding 
of Imperata grass. Provided the burning is timed correctly when the vegetation is 
dry enough to bum well there is very little weeding to be done. Another situation 
when Imperata grass may become a problem when jhum is practiced more than once 
a season. This may happen if there is not enough labour to open up a new jhum field 
or in case of land pressure. Over-cultivation of the land does not allow regeneration 
of other vegetation, which is, when burnt, essential to produce enough ashes to 
fertilize the soil.
The undermining of jhum by single cash cropping such as in paddy fields has 
deleterious effects on the cultivator’s nutritional status and livelihood as the 
intercropping in jhum traditionally yields a wide range of crops which produce a 
nutritionally balanced diet. One can say that a paddy field is almost an ecological 
desert in some respect. Only in wet rice cultivation there is no intercropping or very 
little intercropping, whereas in jhum system there is the possibility of modifying 
cropping in all sorts of way. For example, one can plant different types of vegetables 
together, beans with dry-rice. So contrary to Mey’s argument, the shift to paddy 
field cultivation does not necessarily result in a much better livelihood or nutrition 
(see Chapter Five for detailed analysis).
Despite the fact that jhum is declining due to various socio-political reasons, the 
tradition of jhum cultivation is nevertheless still perceived as the basis of hill 
people’s cultural identity. In the CHT, there are efforts to uphold a common cultural 
identity. The current political movement of hill people in CHT attempts to forge a 
unified collective identity on the basis of jhum cultivation.
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Although previous research into the CHT has highlighted jhum as a significant issue 
in the formation of cultural identity, little field work has been done on this issue over 
an extended period of time. There is a need to study the hill people in relationship to 
the nation state and the wider political system, but in a way which avoids centre- 
periphery paradigms which render the hill people passive recipients of state policy. 
Neither are there any substantial studies on land tenure and land use. Yet, land is not 
only the resource most critical to hill peoples’ work, livelihood and identity, but is 
also a much competed for scarce resource within Bangladesh.
Ownership and Rights
A contradictory form of ownership rights exists in relation to land tenural system in 
the CHT. There has been a contrast between jhum cultivation and plough 
agriculture, which also entails different concepts of ownership and rights to land. In 
the valleys plough land is leased by the administration and rent is paid according to 
the size of the land (Roy 1992; Mey 1981). The long lease ensures continuity of 
individual ownership and land may be inherited. Land for the jhum cultivators is not 
private property, but is treated by them as “de facto” property of the village 
communities (Loffler 1990: 45). Land is communally owned; every household has 
equal access to the land, there is no idea of buying and selling land.
Many commentators believed that the major difference between plough agriculture 
and jhum is the land tenure system in the CHT (Mohsin 1997). Official attitudes 
towards plough and jhum cultivators seem to show a wider gap as far as land tenure 
system is concerned. Plough cultivators in the valley areas enjoy relatively 
individual ownership (being ‘modem’ in the state/legal sense) whereas jhum 
cultivators have no formal legal rights under their traditional system.
In the official context, land tenure is commonly seen as a set of jural concepts or 
legal rules externally formulated or enforced by political bodies. But it is not as 
simple as it seems; for example, in the CHT households have rights to resources in 
many ways. Such rights may be embodied in deeds, tax valuations and wills under 
the legal jurisdiction of the state, but they also depend on customs relating to 
acquisitions, use and social transmission within the local community as per as jhum
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tenural system is concerned. So, land tenure is a complex and crucial cultural 
phenomenon. There is a variation among the ethnic communities of the CHT in 
terms of land use, holding, transfer and administration at the community level as 
balanced with, and opposed to, the official regulation of the state. In many cases 
these represent a careful adjustment of social rules and practices to ecological 
factors.
It has been suggested that jhurn agriculture correlates with conceptions of collective 
ownership of land. For example a report by the Land and Human Rights 
Commission (1991) states that hill people could only subsist from their fields as part 
of a community, bound in ties of mutual reciprocity. For the jhum cultivators of the 
CHT, land is common property, belonging to the community, kinship groups and 
even members of the spirit world, with individual families exercising the right to use 
the land.
For the state, jhum lands are the government lands. This concept has been subject to 
rationalisation under the colonial and subsequent government’s rule mediated 
through the legal system. Therefore, the balance of legal notions of ownership and 
property with ‘community’ ownership needs to be addressed here. This research 
therefore will look at what both ‘private’ and ‘collective’ ownership might mean 
socially, culturally, legally and politically in the CHT (see Chapter Five).
In the CHT, people have conceptions about land rights as both usufruct and private 
ownership, which are now practised simultaneously. So, how do these two systems, 
the state land ownership and traditional land ownership system, operate? How do 
these system co-exist at the village level. What does land itself mean to the people at 
the local level? Since jhum cultivation has been a symbol of different ethnicity, how 
does the shift to plough cultivation impact upon ethnic status and the territorial 
claims associated with it.
It is important to try and understand the relationship between the macro level 
problems of the CHT and the local level management of competing claims to 
resources. The farming systems in the CHT need to be understood in the context of 
changes, which articulate with local level resource management and state relations.
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The State tends to undermine jhum cultivation because of its mobile nature and 
custodianship. I suggest that jhum representation as ‘indigenous’ and as a system for 
resource management serves a number of different political ends, not all of them 
ecological.
The study examines how people at the local level, by a variety of methods involving 
tenure status, have rights to the land and rights to the harvest and compete for scarce 
resources. The more specific questions are: who owns the land? How is it owned? 
How is land used? To be able to understand the struggle for land, one must grasp the 
sources of livelihood, the people’s strategies, conceptions and practices regarding 
land tenure and land use.
With the increasing scarcity of land in the CHT, a change has taken place in the 
ownership pattern of land. In the past, people were mostly jhum cultivators and 
everyone had access to the land. Today a lot more people are said to be landless and 
sharecroppers. Therefore examining the process of losing and gaining land is 
important to an understanding of the land transfer mechanism. In the immediate 
historical context of the Hill Tracts, how has the conflict itself affected patterns of 
ownership and use of land? Land tenure and land uses are issues of central 
importance to any understanding of the Hill Tracts.
The CHT provides an excellent setting to study the relationship between ethnicity 
and environment, and the formation of collective identity on the basis of local 
culture and the economic & political struggle for survival. Ethnicity also manifests 
itself through new social movements which challenge the state primarily over issues 
of land-use and land tenure.
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Chapter Two 
Methodological Procedures and the Research Setting
Introduction
My aim is to provide an ethnographic account of how resource use in the CHT is 
related to the construction of their identity in the Bangladeshi State political context 
set within the dynamics of local socio-political and economic relations, as discussed 
in the previous chapter. This has entailed identifying and focusing on the two 
primary issues raised by the discussion - that is, ethnicity and environment. I have 
dealt with both of these issues in the preceding chapter, with a centring of the 
research focus on land tenure, land use and issues of social movement.
The aim of this study is clearly broad. Given the variety and complexity of the 
changes that have taken place in the CHT, I have, however, decided not to narrow 
the focus of the study to a particular problem and/or theoretical orientation so as not 
to delimit the scope of the inquiry or pre-judge the importance of the various factors. 
I consider this especially important in light of the fact that very little anthropological 
research has been conducted in the region.
However, in order to have an organisational framework for approaching this subject 
I have made a fundamental decision concerning the structure of the project. This 
decision both limits the scope of the inquiry to a manageable level, and at the same 
time situates the investigation in what I believe is a key concern to which all the 
issues described in the previous chapter are in some way related, that is, to land use, 
tenure and policy of the state. A narrowed focus on the issues of land use, tenure, 
rights and agricultural systems, etc, as a point of entry, has enabled me to address 
wider issues of ethnicity, environment and politics and explore their interaction.
Pragmatically, I have tried specifically to understand how these issues work at the 
local level, as I am going to use it as a means to understand the wider political and 
economic context. Accordingly, the methodology has been planned so as to provide 
me with a wide range of information on everyday life and different situations in the
77
CHT. From theoretical and methodological points of view, in my opinion, most of 
the social science studies on CHT suffer from an exogenous notion as to what 
constitutes the important categories. My aim, therefore, has been to focus on an 
approach that is as close to the social reality of CHT as possible.
My glimpse of social reality is naturally limited, and is to a large degree determined 
by the field situation. I found myself in, the contact I made with individuals and the 
specific events I experienced. I think it is reflected in the way I carried out this 
research and presented the results. I am thoroughly aware that much relevant 
information, which might have provided insights in the issues/questions I studied 
has not been “discovered” and collected. Such information when “found” should be 
incorporated in the analysis. Therefore, throughout the study I have sought to 
formulate my “finding” in such a way that they can be tested and falsified by further 
empirical investigation. I hope that this study might, however, in a small way 
contribute towards greater understanding of the CHT.
However, there are methodological issues which have been at the heart of recent 
debate in anthropological research that need to be addressed here because these 
issues are to a large extent central to my research on CHT.
Methodological Issues of Fieldwork
In recent times, much have been written about the need for new and innovative 
fieldwork methods in anthropology since the reflexive turn of the discipline in the 
1980s. As research interests of anthropologists have changed, so have the types of 
fieldwork that are being undertaken. New contexts for fieldwork and the re- 
evaluation of old theoretical assumptions have widened the anthropological gaze. 
The ideal of long-term fieldwork in a rural location among ‘non-Westem’ peoples 
still exerts a powerful influence on the discipline as the implicit norm for 
ethnographic fieldwork.
However, while fieldwork remains the most significant rite de passage for 
anthropologists and one of the key identifiers of the discipline, there has been little 
discussion of how one goes about doing fieldwork in different kinds of fields and
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what epistemological implications for the discipline different kinds of fieldwork 
have. While traditional methods such as long-term site work and participant 
observation are still valid, they must now complement other innovative methods that 
respond to contemporary epistemological challenges. The very notion of “the field” 
itself may need critical questioning.
The fieldworkers may find themselves being objectified by their informants and may 
find their identity as a researcher challenged. In this context, researchers are facing 
new challenges that need to be addressed. The most common themes and issues 
include: multi-sited fieldwork, fieldwork at home, issues of the fieldworker’s 
position vis-a-vis informants and fieldwork focusing on social and political 
movements.
Doing Research at Home
Doing research in one’s own country or society has been a long-debated issue 
(Jackson 1987; Ellen 1984). Some of the questions raised in this debate apply to 
anthropological research: whether doing research at home automatically allows a 
deeper understanding of the meaning people give to their environments, or whether 
the researcher is instead restricted by a failure to grasp the significance of what may 
appear obvious. Lengthy discussions of these issues with colleagues at UCL prior to 
fieldwork left me reasonably confident that feasible answers could be found.
A most intriguing and contentious issue has been that of my ‘neutrality’ as 
researcher, at least during fieldwork and while writing up the material. Of course, 
this is a general problem, and there are certainly more complex situations. It is 
equally obvious that remaining relatively neutral is not necessarily in contrast with 
being a participant observer and adapting to the cultural model of behaviour specific 
to the people we study through various forms of interaction. However, striking the 
right balance between interaction and detachment can significantly influence our 
acceptance in the field and the level of trust our informants will have with us. 
Acceptance, particularly in my case being a member of the dominant Bengali 
population, constitutes the major single issue to be dealt with. Indeed, it soon
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became clear to me that a series of tests and rites de passage were the price to pay 
for a reasonable form of acceptance.
Positioning Self and the Wider Consideration of the Research in the CHT
Since my childhood, I have witnessed many ups and downs in the situation among 
the Buddhist people around my village in Teknaf, the extreme southeastern part of 
Bangladesh bordering with Burma. This is an area where a tiny Buddhist community 
lives on their ever-ongoing migration to Burma. The social relationship between the 
Bengali and Buddhist people in Teknaf has always contained a sense of insecurity, 
intimidation and fear.
When I joined Chittagong University anthropology department as a lecturer, I met 
many students from the CHT. I have listened to many similar stories about their 
relationships with the Bengali in the CHT. In contrast to the Buddhist community in 
Teknaf, I have also come to know about their on-going movement against the 
Bengali. Subsequently, I made a few visits to CHT particularly in Banderban area, 
and established some initial contacts that naturally guided my anthropological 
venture.31
Thus, I started to formulate my research project on CHT focusing on minority and 
indigenous people’s issues. As land issues, particularly the jhum, have been the issue 
of everyday talk in CHT and ‘public outcry’ in the media, my attention was drawn 
towards the issue in terms of ecology and ethnicity, particularly the ethnic 
mobilisation/social movement among indigenous communities in the CHT. A friend 
of mine at Chittagong University (CU), though, advised me not to get involved with 
such a sensitive subject and I was advised by several colleagues at the university to 
study something on the ‘mainland’.
Being a long-term resident of Chittagong district and a founder member of 
Anthropology Department at University of Chittagong, the PhD research is, 
nevertheless, envisaged as being the start of a prolonged engagement with the
31 It was also the time when I was preparing for my postgraduate study in UK.
80
minority cultures of the Hill Tracts. Qualitative knowledge of these ‘tribal’ cultures 
is imperative if we are to change the hitherto disastrous relationship between the 
‘tribal’ peoples and the Bengali State. It is equally central to a fruitful debate on 
environmental sustainability both in Bangladesh and elsewhere.
However, doing fieldwork in the CHT has always been a sensitive area, particularly 
on ‘indigenous’ issues, due to political tensions. Until 1998 the CHT was a 
“Restricted Area” and no foreigners were allowed to visit without special permission 
from the Military. The situation started to cool down after the signing of the CHT 
peace treaty between the PCJSS32 and the Bangladesh government in December 
1997 ending two decades of bloody conflict. But the years of turmoil and killings 
were still present in people’s minds and relation between the dominant Bengali and 
Pahari remained tense: which I clearly experienced during my fieldwork period.
A year later when I started fieldwork in Banderban in 1999 I was still carrying a 
letter from my supervisor authenticating me as a PhD research student of UCL, and 
also a letter from my university in Bangladesh certifying that I am a staff member of 
the anthropology department in case of any military intervention into my fieldwork. 
During my stay in Banderban, I was often questioned by many government officials 
about my purpose in being there. My answer has been that I want to write a book on 
CHT. My impression is that officials care little about what academics write.
Penetrating the micro-level: acceptance and trust
In spite of the initial enthusiasm of some of my friends in Banderban towards my 
research it was hard to get people to co-operate, and even harder to establish good 
personal relations of trust. Not surprisingly, many local people in Banderban initially 
assumed that I must have been working for the government or other official 
agencies. This is mainly because the vast majority of research on CHT, in recent 
years, is either commissioned by the government or funded by non-governmental 
organisation (NGOs) and development agencies for specific purposes. Many 
educated local elites clearly aware of projects motivated by specific political and
32 The name PCJSS abbreviates "Peoples Solidarity Organisation", previously a guerilla organisation 
of the hill people, now emerged as the regional political party of the CHT.
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military interests were disappointed by studies carried out by some of the Bengali 
authors who, they said, had misunderstood CHT life and culture: occasionally 
referring to books by Satter and Selina.33
In particular, problems soon arose with the PCJSS: behind an appearance of good 
will and acceptance, I could sense suspicion, especially from some leaders, who 
nevertheless later co-operated in my research. Justified as they felt by suspicion 
about my purpose and identity, PCJSS did not seem bothered by the fact that their 
hostility blatantly conflicted with the image of the Bengali, as ‘oppressor’ that 
PCJSS wanted to project. As I shall argue later at length, looking at the broader 
picture of CHT, I have become convinced that such suspicious attitudes and values 
that PCJSS express towards the Bengali are in the nature of the political ideology 
and organisations for many reasons. I have explained in detail the political 
manifestation of PCJSS value in election process (see Chapter Seven).
My relationships with the PCJSS and other organisations, such as Vomi Odhikar 
Committee and Pahari Okka Porishad improved considerably when it became 
accepted that the fieldwork I was doing was truly part of my own independent 
research-project, which I was carrying out in a British University, and that in no way 
was I involved in ‘Bengali politics’ in the CHT, nor was I working on commission 
for foreign agencies. More importantly, my professional identity with the Chittagong 
University was instrumental in my acceptance as researcher of academic interests, as 
some friends and students from the region already knew me in that capacity.
The impression gradually improved significantly over the months when I stayed 
longer, started learning the local languages and became familiar with many aspects 
of ordinary every day life activities in Banderban. I was often invited to political 
activities around organisational programmes. It was also the time when Banderban 
Puroshava (municipality) election was gearing up. One Okka Parishod (.Pahari 
political alliance) leader told me that “ I could be trusted and should feel free to 
attend their meetings for the selection of candidate” (see Chapter Seven). This 
change of attitude was an important step towards acceptance.
33 See Chapter one, for the discussion of this literature.
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A few important steps were significant in this respect. Registering with the Marma 
language course at TCI (Tribal Cultural Institute), staying with a Marma family who 
was an old friend at CU at Uzani para, and recruiting a Marma research assistant - 
all these activities ultimately helped me to earn a good reputation and trust as the 
‘neutral* researcher, and to a large extent, facilitated my acceptance and the co­
operation of the community.
Language Learning
Language learning was a key activity during the first six months of fieldwork. 
Although I was able to use Bangla to communicate in the CHT, and was conversant 
with some dialects spoken there, I wanted to acquire fluency in Marma language via 
participation. From my earlier days of fieldwork I had realised that speaking Bangla 
or Chittagonian34 would not take me far. Most people understand Bangla but women 
especially have difficulties in expressing themselves in it. The Bangla they know is a 
local variant spoken mainly by Chittagonians.
I, therefore, realised that to get a clear view of the very nature of the research issues 
I was dealing with, I must take language training as the first priority. A 
comprehensive grasp of the Marma language in its regional form was thus essential 
to the successful outcome of this study. I decided to learn Marma because this is the 
dominant language, in terms of the numbers of people who spoke it, in Banderban, 
and as I did not have any problem with speaking Tanchanga as it largely similar to 
Chittagonian. However, throughout the fieldwork period I was limited in that I only 
managed to learn a little Bawm (one of the other study groups) for everyday 
communication. Nevertheless, whenever I had difficulties in communicating Bawm 
they easily switched over to either Bangla or Chittagonian.
They also realised that I knew the Chittagonian dialect which most of the ethnic 
groups were, more or less, able to speak as well as Bangla. However, I felt that
34 The local dialect of Chittagong district, which I speak as my home district dialect.
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knowledge of the local dialects would give me a better understanding of the ethnic 
cultures in depth as well facilitating my interaction with ordinary people.
In fact, while my behaviour and way of interacting with people gave me away as an 
outsider, knowledge of the dialects allowed me to understand their observations, 
feelings and jokes about the Bengali. As ordinary people became accustomed to me, 
jhumia, shopkeeper, women, elderly persons and students willingly engaged their 
views with me as they usually do with fellow locals. The nearest village shop in 
Roangchari, for example, where I lived was an interesting place for occasional 
encounters and exchange of gossip and other activities with the ordinary people 
who, while discussing politics of CHT freely expressed their opinions on Bengali 
and the government.
I think that one of the cornerstones in anthropological fieldwork is fluency in the 
native language. People create their world in their own language and if one is 
interested to know these ‘other worlds’ one must take trouble to learn their language. 
Nigel Barley put this nicely in his enjoyable book, The Innocent Anthropologist, 
“The first priority is to find an assistant and to settle down to learning the language. 
The anthropologist’s assistant as a figure seems suspiciously absent from the 
ethnographic account (1986: 44)”.
Keeping this in mind, in the very initial stage of the fieldwork a field assistant was 
employed to work with me directly to enable me to establish myself in the ‘field’. 
My assistant, Masing Newar was not only fluent in Bangla but also enthusiastic 
about the research project. I had not yet managed to learn the Marma language 
sufficiently well, as she had not been my co-worker during my initial periods of 
fieldwork. She helped me a lot in improving Marma as well as other activities, such 
as tape-recording of the informants’ discussion, taking picture, organising informal 
discussion with the informants surrounding activities of elections, rallies and 
indigenous festivals and finally, introducing me to the locals. She was very sociable 
person and her involvement in diversified activities, such as religious, cultural and 
political, helped me gain access to different social circles in Banderban.
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Learning Marma language, staying in U Saw Nue’s household (my Marma host in 
Banderban), and employing a local field assistant helped to build up the 
relationships in the locality in the initial phase of the fieldwork. Without these, it 
would have been impossible for me to switch easily between different arenas, and to 
observe without imposing on the locals.
Initial fieldwork activities
As well as doing language training during this period, I carried out some preliminary 
research at TCI library and public record section of the District Council, relating to 
historical and contextual data to up-date and expand my material. These activities 
were highly informative and productive in terms of personal relations and 
‘acceptance’. For example, I had the full co-operation of the TCI Director and 
Assistant Director, who helped me to settle in Banderban during this preliminary 
period of fieldwork. These persons made me particularly aware of the importance of 
being considered an ‘insider’.
During this time, I also made some preliminary trips to many areas in Banderban 
district in order to locate the final field site. This ethnographic study envisaged two 
years fieldwork between January 1999 and December 2000 among three ethnic 
groups in Banderban district. The advantage of an extended period of fieldwork is 
the possibility of continuously reviewing the findings, developing new questions, 
and finding new traits to follow up. As I am interested in the process of ethnic 
mobilisation, I have had the chance to observe these processes at different levels in 
different situations. These have, for example, been the case in indigenous language 
movement, khas land lease protest and the political processes of election (See 
Chapters, four, seven and eight).
By living in the multi-ethnic locality of Roangchari, I have examined how the 
Marma, Bawm and Tanchanga ethnic groups are organised at both local and broader 
levels. It entails mundane micro-social interactions with participant observation, 
key-informants and case studies of land use, tenure and rights. This also involves 
interactions in election processes, protest rallies and court cases at Banderban.
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Journey to the Roangchari
After six months of language training at TCI and making preliminary trips to many 
upzilla35 in Banderban district, I selected the place for my final field location called 
Roangchari inhabited by mainly Marma, Tanchanga and Bawm ethnic peoples of the 
CHT.36 During fieldwork months I stayed in Roangchari (from October 1999 to 
September 2000). However, during my stay in Roangchari, I also visited Banderban 
to follow up many related events and participating in its activities. The body of my 
data, thus, corresponds to both Roangchari and Banderban but bulk of the 
ethnographic material on three groups was generated from the Roangchari study. 
Therefore, this should be taken as the principle reference of the thesis.
I took up residence in Roangchari in October 1999.1 mainly lived with three 
households but regularly visited others households of the locality on an informal 
basis. In other words, I had three different bases in three villages in Roangchari, but 
Mong Kay Marma’s household was the main base at Rockoywa para. He is the 
relative of U Saw Nue (my host family in Banderban). I met him in U Saw Nue’s 
household when I was doing language training during the early phase of fieldwork. 
For the first time, I visited Roangchari accompanying Mong Kay Marma and made 
other contacts there. He offered the accommodation and food at Roangchari but I 
agreed with paying some monthly payments. Mong Kay Marma’s house is located at 
the heart of Rockoywa para close to Roangchari bazar (market place) and upzilla 
office, where most of the social activities are taken place.
Although Mong Kay Marma’s household was my main base in Roangchari, I had 
two other occasional arrangements: one in the Bawm village of Soanloo para and 
the other one in the Tanchanga village of Bottoli para. In Bottoli para, I mostly 
stayed with Baikash Tanchanga’s household, a primary school teacher of 
Roangchari. I also met him during my language training at TCI. When I finally 
moved to Roangchari, I explained him my intention to know about Tanchanga 
people of Bottoli para. He gladly offered me all kinds of assistance. Whenever I 
stayed in Bottoli para, I stayed with Baikash Tanchanga’s household, sometimes for
35The sub-administrative district unit of Banderban (see Map 2).
36See the detail discussion of the selection field site in the next section.
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a week in a row, sometimes a couple of days. The other arrangement I had in 
Roangchari was in Soanloo para. I frequently stayed in Buting Bawm’s household, 
an ordinary jhum cultivator.
All these arrangements were, however, within close proximity of Rockoywa para, I 
could have stayed all through there. The reasons, I rotated my residence in 
Roangchari was because I did not want to be branded as giving only focus to Marma 
or living with the Marma. Occasional changes of residence between the groups and 
villages provided me an intimate opportunity to building up ‘trusted’ relationship 
with all groups in Roangchari. Later, in the course of time I realised that whenever a 
marriage ceremony or other social occasions in the villages (communities) held I 
was invited to attend.
I think that in order to carry out fieldwork in a multi-ethnic locality one must aware 
of the delicate balance of relationships that persists among the groups, and this 
requires positioning oneself into that direction. Living in Roangchari for a fairly 
long period, I realised that the complex nature of inter-ethnic relationships in CHT is 
only achieved through maintaining a right balance of interactions between the 
researcher and groups. Otherwise, I would have had very different experiences, 
effectively obscuring the multi-ethnic reality. I was intimately attached to three 
different sets of households, Bawm, Marma, and Tanchanga.
In other words, experience of living in three different groups constantly reminded 
me how to maintain correct relationships according to prevailing situation in the 
locality.
While living in multi-ethnic locality, the households I stayed with were rather 
different in the sense that each of the households presented me with interesting 
aspects and transformations of the groups’ worldview. This obviously gave me an 
opportunity to compare the aspects of group organisation. Comparison among them 
brings out the specificity of social organisation and group dynamics in Roangchari 
(see Chapter three).
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In the initial period of fieldwork in Roangchari, however, I was only collecting basic 
ethnographic data on the village setting, distribution and boundaries of households 
and other residential units, mapping out of the locality to give a spatial 
representation of people, where they live and work. This has informed later 
decisions about what questions to ask, how and to whom. Most of my extended 
period of fieldwork has been carried out in Roangchari mainly in the middle part. In 
the beginning and last part, I have also resided in Banderban. While residing in both 
places during the entire period of fieldwork, it was possible to have frequent and 
regular contact with people and events in both Roangchari and Banderban.
A variety of techniques has been used to obtain information for this study, the most 
important being the traditional anthropological technique of fieldwork living among 
the people studied. These techniques include participant observation, key- 
informants, case studies, informal interviews, etc. These techniques have been 
employed in two key phases. Firstly, to gather general background data through 
various activities, and then secondly to formulate detailed accounts of events in the 
lives of various individuals and groups. In the first phase, the use of these techniques 
have been divided into three groups of activities: (a) collection of basic ethnographic 
data, (b) access to material on local understanding of land use and tenure, (c) access 
to data on routine everyday activities. In the second phase, these same techniques 
have been used to put together in-depth case material on events and situations of 
local political processes and review the legal process within and outside Roangchari.
Participant Observation
Without living in the midst of a locality/community for a fairly long period, it would 
have been impossible for me to gain a clear understanding of many factors/ 
relationships that shape and influence people’s everyday life in the CHT. As I have 
suggested earlier, proximity to and involvement in mundane micro-social interaction 
is indispensable to communicating with local people about their social, cultural and 
political realities. Katy Gardner put this point more impressively in her ethnography 
on Sylheti people in Bangladesh “I cannot think of better way of learning about a 
community and the people than living within it and sharing their lives (1995: 18)”.
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A major advantage of the approach of participant observation as a way of obtaining 
information is that one is able to transcend ones own understanding of the categories 
by which a society is ordered. Participant observation and the collection of case 
material on significant individual and situations, thus, have been the methodological 
corollaries to the theoretical approach described above.
Observing local political process and degree of participation
Although many aspects of ethnicity (group organisation) I have recorded from the 
Roangchari deal with local level inter-ethnic relationships, there are also important 
factors operating beyond Roangchari, beyond the village boundary, for which 
observation is an effective option in obtaining information: such as khas land lease 
cases, organised script movements, and political activities (protest rallies and 
election).
The impact of such factors can be observed with participation in order to depict how 
they shape and influence ordinary life in the CHT. Description and analysis of these 
factors are important and relevant for an understanding of the dynamics of what goes 
on inside and outside the locality or groups. I have demonstrated in chapters six and 
seven how the development of such external factors has enormous impact on local 
life and livelihood of the ordinary people of CHT.
However, penetrating the ‘behind-the-scenes’ processes was essential, though, of 
course, there were limits to the extent to which I could ‘participate’. It was important 
to learn quickly what was appropriate to say and what it was wise to ‘ignore’. I 
gradually realised that many of the ‘behind-the-scenes’ events could not become the 
objects of analysis, for there was strong risk of betraying the trust and confidentiality 
I was granted. Yet, participation was immensely important in gaining a general 
understanding of local processes, which would have been otherwise obscure.
It was thus useful to observe and participate in the public performances of the 
different groups’ and organisation’s activities, such as the indigenous language 
movement and TCI activities (Chapter Four), protests by Vomi Odikhar Committee 
(Chapter Six) and the preparation and performance of the electoral campaign
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(Chapter Seven). Especially in the case of Banderban puroshava election, apart from 
various forms of personal relationships, the political alliances between different 
ethnic groups became obvious during the campaign. More generally, the life of the 
Banderban municipal area was imbued with the local election. Ordinary ethnic 
people’s degree of confidence in their political representative (candidate) was 
expressed in every occasion of the Okka Parishod activities. Bengali leadership, too, 
commented on various electoral rhetorics with their candidate in public places. All 
these have an obvious political significance in revealing the ethnic politics in the 
CHT.
During the campaign, I was allowed to participate in the Okka Parishod meetings of 
planning and strategy, and also to accompany their candidate during house 
campaigns. Of course, accompanying the individual candidate in their campaign 
gave me the possibility to observe how they interacted with their potential electors. 
At personal level, moving with Okka Parishod candidate Kessy at election campaign 
I had plenty of time to discuss various issues, after every election meeting he kept 
asking for comments on his speech. The situation became in a sense more intimate 
as the conversation moved from the subject of election to the politics of Pahari- 
Bengali relations.
Fortunately, I had also opportunity to exchange views, news and gossip with the 
Bengali candidate, as he personally knew me since the start of fieldwork in 
Banderban. Interaction with the ‘Bengali camp’ helped me to understand the 
dynamics of agreement and disagreement between the parties around the ‘Bengali’ 
candidate, and various possible deals about the future shape of ruling the Banderban 
puroshava. My personal engagement with Mogib contractor and others in the 
Barishal para as well as U Saw Nue’s father-in-law in Uzani para was a dynamic 
process informing my discussion of whether ‘local election is a process of identity 
making in CHT’ (see Chapter Seven).
Engaging with organisational activities in other arenas, such as the indigenous 
language movement, the Vomi Odikhar rally provided much interesting information 
about broader levels of ethnic mobilisation as it became obvious that an outcome of 
that was going to be central in establishing new political alliances of Pahari.
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Local understandings of agricultural system, land tenure and rights
During fieldwork in Roangchari, I collected routine material on agricultural 
production (jhum), farming techniques, division of labour and household 
relationships. The actual process of gathering this type of data is to generalise a 
picture of ways in which jhum agriculture is used in a day-to-day way. Exploring 
social life by means of the household relationships enabled me to examine the type 
off farming system in CHT, jhum, as it exists and its meaning in day to day activities. 
One of the key considerations was to define and conceptualise the jhum from a local 
perspective. Using jhum as a basic reference point appears to be tactically the most 
efficient means of investigating such a wide range of issues (economic and socio­
political).
During this time, I have also sought access to material on land issues in order to try 
to discover the local understanding of the ‘indigenous’ framework of land use, 
tenure and rights. This involves key-informants, who are knowledgeable of the 
local system. In my ethnographic base in Roangchari, I got to know a group of 
people in all three communities, headman, ordinary elderly persons of Marma, 
Bawm and Tanchanga, whom I visited from time to time. At a later stage, they all 
become my key-informants. They are source of my data on social life in Roangchari. 
I learnt a good deal from them about clan organisation, marriage rules, rituals and 
village jhum organisation. They all provided me with a great deal of detail of 
different aspects of social organisation. Chapter three is based on their account and 
my observation in analysing a comparative framework of group organisation.
These key-informants helped me to discover patterns of land ownership and 
traditional rights at the local level. Key-informants’ accounts thus help to illuminate 
how intergenerational relationships are bound up with rights to resources, 
particularly to jhum land in the CHT. Following key-informants’ accounts and 
analysis of case material, I have described the ‘normative rules’ and ‘rights’ and 
note how these are validated by everyday behaviour in Roangchari: how, at the 
micro-level, the ownership of jhum land is actually regulated. The study of
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indigenous tenurial relations involves investigating settlement pattern, forms of 
authority, distribution of land and the territorial control.
Furthermore, for an understanding of disputes over local patterns of ownership, 
‘common property’, and ‘usufruct rights’, I needed to find out how the jhum 
cultivators in CHT use their natural resources, and how they react to others using 
their resources (see Chapter Five). The recent khas land disputes in CHT provide 
insights because they involve local level politics and reveal how people think about 
ownership and rights. The nature of khas land lease procedures has been carefully 
observed at each level of interactions. Additional information was also obtained 
from the knowledgeable informants, such as local headmen, karbari, and lease 
applicants. Some of the local employees of the district administration assisted me in 
getting useful but confidential information on khas land distribution and inside 
stories of the lease procedures.
In order to understand the dynamics of the issue, informants’ versions have been 
verified through direct observation of the events in their dealing with the officials. 
Informal discussions with Bengali agents, who are contacted for preparation of the 
lease documents, are also conducted. During fieldwork in Banderban, I developed a 
friendly relationship with some of the officials at district and Upzilla levels, who 
happened to be previously senior friends at Chittagong University, and who frankly 
verified the accounts obtained from different quarters.37
As well as following khas land lease disputes at the village and official levels, I 
documented how land ownership in the CHT is regulated through the state legal 
system. By attending the local land court in Banderban I have been able to examine 
how land disputes are solved and who are involved. Analysis of legal disputes via 
attendance at local courts and following up cases involving hill people’s land 
ownership reveals who uses the legal system to their advantage and who disputes 
with whom. This method yields valuable data on how ‘cultural practices’ translate 
under judicial scrutiny (see Chapter Six).
37 For the sake of confidentiality I am not mentioning any concerned names here. The fact that as the 
present research is an academic pursuit they felt that it is necessity to share their views.
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Besides most of this qualitative information I received from individuals belonging to 
different groups, social categories, and organisations. Some of the information from 
the key-informants is also presented in different case studies.
Case Study Material
Once I gained sufficient insights and identified specific issues, I selected a certain 
number of individuals and organisations at both Roangchari and Banderban in terms 
of various considerations established during the course of initial phase of fieldwork. 
Case study and in-depth interview methods have been employed to collect more 
detailed information. This involves a broad range of issues related to both intra- and 
extra-group dynamics and to the wider community in the CHT. Collection of data 
from a wide range of case studies focuses on situations in which a ‘shared collective 
identity’ is asserted as a basis for control of resources.
It should be noted here, however, that the initial phase of fieldwork has strongly 
indicated land as a primary source of strain and contention among the ethnic 
communities, which affects the social relations with the Bengali to an obvious 
degree. The case study methods have been geared to uncover more detail about the 
issue. The detailed analysis of case materials on individuals, situations, and events 
have broadly given me an understanding of the way peoples’ own community 
history is conceived, experienced and how their sense of ‘shared attachment’ to the 
land is manifested.
Case studies on local level institutions, for example, TCI, puroshava election and 
other socio-cultural organisations of the indigenous language movement have been 
useful to understanding everyday micro-politics and other aspects of ethnic 
mobilisation in the CHT. By attending meetings and following different organised 
activities involving political activists and social agents, I collected data on how 
different groups are formed through micro-politics. The detailed case study of the 
oiganised activities records the ways in which ethnic groups are mobilised at both 
local and broader level (see Chapter Five and Seven).
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Im particular, I have made case studies of the personal accounts of my informants 
amd their relations within and outside their groups. Most importantly, case studies 
were conducted in such a way as to encourage inner motivations to emerge. The case 
sltudy method, thus, helped me to collect in-depth information not only on 
informants’ perception of the political arena and their motivations in becoming 
involved in the CHT politics but also on the underlying ideology of their collective 
political actions. I have concentrated on their significant involvement and 
participation in the process of ethnic mobilisation, and on the way in which such 
mobilisation have occurred.
As particular events shaped the unfolding of the dynamics of broader identity 
politics, such as khas land lease, I decided to make some case studies on key figures 
of the ethnic movements/events in order to give the wider picture of the political 
process in the CHT. These case studies were based on several informal discussions 
and were extremely time- consuming, and every single one of these discussions was 
taped and transcribed. Their co-operation at all stages gave me a measure of the 
degree of acceptance I then enjoyed.
Otherwise, it would have been unthinkable to apply the systematic strategies of 
research aimed at acquiring in-depth information. It was obvious that only after 
having established good interactions with groups could I hope to penetrate the inner 
motivations and gain information on the way in which political aspects influenced 
the actors in the process of ethnic mobilisation in CHT. Through the case studies I 
intended to grasp the meanings as well as processes of the changes that are taking 
place among the ethnic groups in CHT.
Of course, this kind of approach to the ‘field’ requires a strong personal commitment 
also on the researcher’s side. As I entered my informant’s private and public lives, I 
had to give way to their curiosity about mine. Kessy’s reply is revealing when I 
asked if I might make a case study of his political activity. He would co-operate, he 
said, because he had observed my behaviour on various occasions. Other informants 
too, though in a more indirect way, also expressed similar attitudes by spontaneously 
discussing with me their family lives, their relationship with children, their
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relationship with other groups within the CHT, and their anxieties about the political 
relationship between Bengali and Pahari.
In order to make informants feel more at ease I used the scheme of the case-study 
technique as a guideline. I did not want my informants to feel that our meetings were 
interviews; this would run contrary to our relationships of intimacy and 
confidentiality established. However, selecting the informants most relevant for my 
research was not an easy task. On the one hand, my study is the politics of ethnicity, 
but on the other hand, it is also of a new form of ethnic mobilisation and collective 
political action. Should I focus on the institutional position of my informants?
Should I go for the ‘reputational approach’ in selecting key informants?38
Indeed, all these aspects were important but as I was interested, above all, in 
studying approaches of ‘new social movement’ and ethnic mobilisation, I decided to 
focus on those individuals who were directly or indirectly involved and expressed 
their attachment to the CHT politics regardless of whether they were members of 
particular ethnic group, political party or organisation.
In additions, I have also carried out some tape recorded informal discussions with 
ordinary key-informants, in the form of case studies, for certain issues relating to 
land, language and political issues, as well as official versions. These individuals 
though not being formally involved in politics nonetheless expressed their 
opposition to government policy in an organised way (see the discussion of Vomi 
Odhikar protest rally in chapter Six). Information from the government officials 
comes from personal interviews. My frequent interactions were with the district 
administration of Banderban and Upzilla office of Roangchari.
Archival work and Census material
At the end of micro-level study in Roangchari, I did some archival work specifically 
relevant to the CHT and to the wider political context in Bangladesh. I reviewed
38 See detailed analysis of case study procedures (Ellen 1984).
39 Masing Newar and I have regularly transcribed and translated the tapes, in most cases the same 
evening or in next morning to have the context fresh in our minds.
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secondary literature produced by all kinds of projects working in the CHT, for 
example, NGO reports and National Development and Forestry Reports, etc. These 
works have been useful to cross-check much of this information with respect to 
historical details in the CHT. I took one census at the end of my fieldwork in 
Roangchari.
The Research Setting
I have, thus far, discussed the methods and specific research techniques that I 
employed in this study. It is now worth discussing briefly the reasons for my choice 
of field site as research setting.
Location for the Research
As mentioned in the previous section, one of the important decisions I made 
regarding the structure of this study was not to limit the scope of investigation to the 
level of a single village. That is, I planned to locate my work around activities 
carried out in a multi-ethnic locality in Banderban district, an important part of the 
CHT. It is, however, necessary to briefly discuss about the term ‘multi-ethnic 
setting’. In this thesis, I use the term ‘setting’ as a unit from a wider consideration of 
my study, not in the sense of a traditional single village study, in order to get a 
comprehensive understanding of inter-ethnic relationship from both local and 
broader perspectives.
So when I use the term ‘setting’ it denotes the composite inhabitants of different 
communities living in separate settlements within a relatively larger size of area 
beyond the village boundary. In practice, however, I also focused on the villages as a 
component part of the ‘setting’ in a process of comparative analysis. Therefore, in 
this context villages are intertwined within the broader area of ‘multi-ethnic’ locality 
of Roangchari ‘setting’.
This is not to say, however, that I have created an artificial boundary on social life 
which stops short at the end of the village, but rather that the village as it exists 
alone and as it relates to the wider region form the central focus of my investigations
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during the course of fieldwork. The characteristics of a particular site, in a multi­
ethnic study such as this, inevitably influence the type of information obtained. This 
is unavoidable, and even the use of a multi-sited study cannot totally overcome this 
problem.
It is widely argued in many ethnographic research guides that specific location 
should be chosen on the basis of representativeness (Ellen 1984). The notion that 
one can find a “representative” village in the CHT, as anywhere else, is false. As I 
have mentioned earlier there are multiple variations among the groups in the CHT, 
in terms of their religion, language and social organisation. However, the area I have 
selected as a ‘research setting’ has experienced each of the major events (dam, 
construction, abolishment of jhum, Bengali migration, military occupation, arm 
conflict between Bangladesh army and PCJSS) affecting the region for the last few 
decades.
Another reason for choosing a field site in the Banderban district of CHT is because 
it is within the same area as the only ethnographic study, of any kind, to have been 
done on Mru - that of Loffler (1990). Loffler’s ethnography of Mru provides 
excellent base-line information because his fieldwork was finished before the 
Bangladesh liberation war in 1971 and the conflict between the ‘tribal’ people the 
state (although his book was published in 1990 with certain updated information).
Loffler’s study is primarily concerned with the relationship between subsistence 
jhum cultivation of Mru on the hill top region and the principle of household 
organisation. As such it gives a detailed set of descriptions of how Mru villages 
conducted their activities around production and the distribution of resources at a 
time when traditional social forms were still dominant. Using Loffler’s analysis, I 
have been able to see how local patterns of resource-use have changed over time in 
response to new situations. In the face of many contemporary changes, it is now 
interesting to see how new processes of group formation are taking place in the 
CHT.
Most of the previous studies on CHT have drawn their conclusions from one village 
of one ethnic group without looking at the multi-ethnic nature of relationship. In my
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study I focused on one larger locality (setting) within which there are three villages 
representing a wide variety of groups. This allowed me to examine in detail the 
nature of cohesion and conflict between the groups and with outsiders. It has also 
created an opportunity for me to investigate the dynamic process of ‘collective 
identity’ among the ethnic groups. In choosing a multi-ethnic site, I have chosen the 
Roangchari as my fieldwork ‘setting’.
Roangchari as multi-ethnic setting
One of the main research objectives of the study was to be based in a multi-ethnic 
setting of CHT for a comprehensive understanding of interethnic relationships. 
Unlike other areas in the CHT, Roangchari is multi-ethnic in many different ways. 
Roangchari is about 13 miles east of Banderban district headquarter (see Map 3). It 
is inhabited by three main ethnic groups, Marma, Bawm and Tanchanga, each 
representing a single village within the ‘setting’. Geographically Roangchari has 
special ecological characteristics of hills, valleys, rivers, and tributaries. The aspect 
of ecological diversity is one of the important components of this study in the sense 
of how ‘hill people’ conceptualise their land, habitat, and resources in everyday life, 
and how they experience the present realities of state regimes in the CHT.
Roangchari is a sub-district administrative headquarters locally known as Upzilla, an 
ideal representation of both ‘official culture’ and hill society. This location is 
relatively close to the city of Banderban, and as such an area where most of the hill 
‘political’ activities are more visible, particularly in the context of ethnic politics in 
the CHT. It is the area from which I have collected the bulk of my data. At the end 
of my fieldwork, I conducted a census which shows that the total population of 
Roangchari is 2439 (including Upzilla government officials).
Among the three ethnic communities, Marma is demographically the dominant 
group followed by Tanchanga and Bawm. The Marma constitutes about 66% of 
Roangchari’s population in comparison to 26% Tanchanga and 7% Bawm 
respectively. The Marma, the second largest ethnic community throughout the CHT, 
are also overwhelmingly concentrated in the southern part of CHT in Banderban 
district, of which Roangchari is a sub administrative area.
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Regardless of ethnic boundary, the jhum is the main subsistence occupation of the 
majority of people in Roangchari. However, there are a number of Marma and 
Tanchanga households engaged in paddy along with the main jhum cultivation. 
Marma and Tanchanga villages are at the valley areas whereas Bawm village is in 
the hill top region. The three villages of Roangchari setting are located over a large 
area separated by Rockoywa roa on the north between Marma and Tanchanga, and 
by the high hills on the south between Marma and Bawm.
Doing fieldwork among them consequently involved a lot of travelling. I spent 
endless hours going from one village to another. The Marma village of Rockoywa 
roa and Tanchanga village of Bottoli pada are close to the main Roangchari- 
Banderban road, but the Bawm village of Soanloo para is three miles away from 
Roangchari Bazar to the hill top region. It is much more difficult to reach 
particularly during rainy seasons when tracks and forest paths become slippery.
Rockoywa Roa (Marma village)
Rockoywa roa is a Marma village. In Marma language, the term roa means village 
or cluster of houses. The Roangchari Rockoywa roa is believed to be two hundred 
years old. The Marma are the oldest inhabitants of the area. Rockoywa roa is one of 
ths villages under study in the Roangchari multi-ethnic setting.
In Rockoywa roa, the total population is 1570 comprising of 310 households. Like 
any other Marma roa in the CHT, Rockoywa roa has also a kayang (temple) with a 
monastery. Apart from being central to religious practices it is the centre where all 
ths social activities of Rockoywa roa inhabitants take place. In the kayang, there is a 
tree, called Roasama, which is believed to be associated with nats (spirits). There 
an many stories attached to this tree among the Marma in Rockoywa roa. The 
ccmmon one is that the evil spirit might cause danger to the entire village if villagers 
dc not worship the tree. A ‘community house’ locally called a sarangghor is also the 
essential part of life in Rockoywa roa situated within the Kayang premises. It is 
used as a daytime meeting place of the villagers; sometimes the headman also uses it 
as the place of dispute settlement.
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Figure 1 Rockoywa roa
The Marma of Rockoywa roa maintain territorial boundaries on ethnic lines with 
other ethnic groups around them. They emphasise residential segregation from other 
groups in Roangchari. I have not encountered any sort of cohabitation with the 
members of other ethnic communities in the Marma settlement of Rockoywa roa.
All the groups in Roangchari setting maintain separate ethnic boundaries on the 
basis of settlement and group identity. Therefore, there are separate villages of 
Marma, Bawm and Tanchanga.
Bottoli Pada (Tanchanga village)
In the Roangchari setting, the Tanchanga village is called Bottoli pada. In 
Tanchanga language, pada is village. According to elderly Tanchanga, the Bottoli 
pada was a deep jungle without any human habitation until mid 1960s. The 
Tanchanga settlement first began in 1963 with a limited number of households 
headed by Shorot Chandra Tanchanga. These first settler Tanchanga people were the 
victims of the Kaptai Dam project. The dam was constructed in 1963 on the upper 
stream of Kamafully river in Rangamati district of CHT displacing ten thousands of 
Chakma, Marma and Tanchanga families as mentioned in Chapter one.
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Figure 2 Bottoli pada
Today the total Tanchanga population in Bottoli pada is 625 comprising household 
numbers of 150. The Tanchanga people in Bottoli pada are dispersed throughout the 
settlement; homesteads are separated from one another by paddy land. Today, the 
larger concentration of Tanchanga populations is found in different parts of CHT 
away from Roangchari namely Ali Kadam, Ruma and Naikhongchari upazilla (sub­
district unit) totaling about 17,000 alone in Banderban district. A large number of 
Tanchanga people also live in Rangamati district of CHT and Cox’s Bazar, the 
extreme Southeastern district of Bangladesh. In Roangchari setting, the Tanchanga 
settlement of Bottoli pada is also a residentially and ethnically segregated village 
with the other two groups around them.
Soanloo Para (Bawm village)
Taking the time chronology of the settlement history of Roangchari, the Marma are 
the oldest inhabitants of the area followed by Tanchanga in 1960s. The Bawm 
settlement of Soanloo Para in Roangchari is recent compared to Marma and 
Tanchanga. The Bawm is one of the smallest ethnic groups in the CHT. The total 
Bawm population is about 7000 throughout the CHT.
The Bawm used to live in the interior region of the CHT in remote clusters of hills 
far off from the Roangchari. The B eng chari, Pankyong, Lung lei, Munlai villages of
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interior areas of Banderban district are the original Bawm settlements. In the last 
decades, the out migration of Bawm people from their old settlements was not a 
voluntary choice, but rather an outcome of the insurgencies and counter insurgencies 
of PCJSS and the Bangladesh army.
In the early 1980s, the Bawm settlements were the main scene of military operation. 
The Bangladesh military, in response to the PCJSS, forced the Bawm people to 
evacuate their early settlements on the grounds that members of the PCJSS were 
able to conduct guerilla operation from their villages. Under such pressure, the 
Bawm had to move out from their original settlements in different directions of the 
Banderban district.
There are now ten Bawm settlements in Banderban districts. The present Bawm 
dwellers of Soanloo para in Roangchari setting represent one of the Bawm 
settlements of immigrated Bawm. Originally there were only seven Bawm families 
in Soanloo para helped by a NGO, called CCDV (Christian Community 
Development Volunteers). The new Bawm settlement was named after Soanloo para 
(village). Soanloo is the name of fruit tree grown in that area {amoloki in Bengali).
At present, the total Bawm population in Soanloo para is 168 in 35 households.
Most of the Bawm inhabitants in Soanloo para have regrouped according to their 
previous ethnic Bawm connections.
The Soanloo para Bawm settlement seemed to be guided by both Bawm community 
and Christianity. They have their own Christian Sunday school, a village regulatory 
body to oversee the everyday affairs of the settlement, a Bawm hostel for the 
students studying at the Roangchari high school level. However, inter-ethnic 
residence pattern is not accepted among the Bawm of Soanloo para. Ethnic group- 
wise residential segregation is strictly followed among the Bawm as found in nearby 
Marma and Tanchanga villages respectively.
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Figure 3 Soanloo para
In summary, all these groups in the Roangchari setting are maintaining separate 
resident settlements according to ethnic identity. For these groups, ethnicity is the 
basis of group organisation in various forms and degrees. I will discuss in detail the 
nature of social organisational features of these groups in the next chapter.
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Chapter Three 
Settlement, Social Organisation and Ethnic Identity
Introduction
This chapter describes the socio-organisational features of the Marma, Bawm and 
Tanchanga people in the Roangchari setting. Drawing from ethnographic material on 
settlement patterns and social organisation, such as clan organisation, descent, 
marriage and inheritance practices, the main purpose of the chapter is to identify the 
internal dynamics of group organisation. Examining group organisation is to 
understand how different ethnic groups are constituted at the local level, particularly 
in a multi-ethnic locality. Understanding of social and cultural variations is 
fundamental to understanding ethnic identity of the groups in CHT.
Analysis of settlement patterns and socio-organisational features reveal how ethnic 
boundaries are maintained between these groups. I argue that the mode of settlement 
pattern, clan organisation, marriage systems and inheritance practices are the 
constituting elements of group organisation and also act as a mechanism for ethnic 
boundary maintenance. The differential rules and practices display distinct ethnic 
markers of Marma, Bawm, and Tanchanga. However, all these aspects of social 
organisation are discussed not as a static system but as a dynamic process in order to 
prepare the ground for understanding interethnic relations among the groups in the 
present day.
The ethnographic literature on CHT is not useful in understanding various complex 
issues of local social organisation of marriage systems, lineage, and clans and the 
way groups are constituted (see Chapter One). The literature produces some 
uncertainties regarding the nature of political process in terms of labelling ‘ethnic 
identity’. The term ‘tribe’ as it appears in the literature has become an unsatisfactory 
word to describe the people of CHT. A common tendency in this literature has been 
to maintain that a single type of homogenous social structure prevails throughout the 
CHT. Therefore, I investigate the nature of local organisations, and the ways in 
which the literature presumes these groups are organised in terms of marriage 
systems, endogamy and exogamy.
105
By looking at these areas, the nature of the relationship between group identity and 
social organisation is more easily revealed as is the way in which groups are 
mobilised for local politics. The chapter particularly examines the practices of social 
organisation by which ethnic identity is constantly produced and reproduced in a 
multi-ethnic society.
Analysing a comparative framework of Marma, Bawm and Tanchanga, the chapter 
addresses a number of ethnographic questions: what is the relationship between local 
level organisation and other social structural principles? What are the most 
important factors which govern local social organisation: clanship, marriage 
alliances or village locality? What are the defining characteristics of village 
organisation? I suggest that internal dynamics of the group organisation vary with 
changes in everyday mundane relations. People talk about kinship, lineage, and clan 
in terms of marriage alliances and inheritance but all these cultural practices are 
becoming elements of distinct group markers in relation to others. All the three 
ethnic groups in Roangchari place importance on greater ethnic boundary 
maintenance.
The main purpose of this chapter is thus to identify how these people are 
maintaining their ethnic identity living in a multi-ethnic setting. More specifically 
how these diverse ethnic groups in Roangchari articulate their ethnic identity in their 
everyday life. The chapter begins with an analysis of settlement pattern and identity.
Settlement and Identity
The section describes the local perceptions of settlement, locality and village 
organisation among the Marma, Bawm and Tanchanga groups in Roangchari. One 
of the key questions arising here is of how local perceptions and attachment to the 
settlement is shaped by group identity. The section examines the relationship 
between place names and ethnic groups. What does place culturally and socially 
mean to the groups?
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It is evident from the findings of the naming of Marma, Bawm and Tanchanga 
settlements in Roangchari that place names are symbolised in localised identities. 
The social and cultural perceptions of the locality are greatly varied among these 
groups in Roangchari. The cultural interpretations of settlement pattern give a 
different perspective to the local understanding of village and group organisation.
Marma
The name of the Marma settlement is generally derived from geographical 
phenomena emphasising characteristic features of the habitat. In CHT, Marma prefer 
to live along banks of the river and streams: as such they are generally identified by 
a local Marma nomenclature Khyong Sa (‘the son’ of the river valleys). In the 
generic sense, the term Khyong Sa is not an ethnic or clan name but the general 
designation of the particular location of a Marma settlement. The underlying 
emphasis in this classification involves where they live, not how are they related by 
blood ties in the settlement.
In the CHT, all the Marma settlements on respective river valleys are known by the 
corresponding name of the rivers. This habitual orientation of Marma has been 
vividly reflected in their daily life. Rivers and streams are of ritual significance in 
many domestic rites. This ‘localised identity’ of the Marma can be seen in relation to 
the settlement pattern of ‘others’.
In Marma nomenclature, there is another term call Taung Sa ( ‘son’ of mountain) 
used to designate peoples who live in the hilltop regions. The Marma notion Taung 
Sa especially classifies the settlements of Mru, Pankhu, Khyang and Bawm, which 
are predominantly located in the mountain region in the CHT. The way in which 
classifications of the settlements are used in Marma appellations reflects a localised 
identity of Marma and others. The geographical distinction between Taung Sa 
(hilltop) and Khyong Sa (streamside) settlements is a cultural construction of 
localised identity. American geographer Sopher (1964) mentions the “regional 
identity” of the ethnic groups in the CHT, perhaps following the Marma 
geographical distinction in terms of settlement pattern.
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Marma classify themselves into many regional groups distinguished from each other 
by the name of the locality, names derived from the rivers around which they 
established their settlements. In the entire CHT region, there are twelve ‘localised 
regional groups’ based on different Marma settlements. These are: Ragre Sa, Plaung 
Sa, Mrofa Sa, Sabkot Sa, Kodoya Sa, Kyowk-pia-Sa, Longada Sa, Kwen-chary-Sa, 
Kog dat-Sa, Palaing Sa, Kolat Sa, Rockoywa Sa. The following main rivers and 
canals are the main source of settlement organisation: Shangu Khyong, Plaung 
Khyong, Ragre Khyong, Rokang. Mata Mohuri Khyong.
Thus, Marma settlements that grew on respective river valleys are known as: Ragre 
Sa, Mrofa Sa, Plaung Sa and Rockoywa Sa. The corresponding meanings for such 
settlements can be described as the lower portion of the Shangu is known to the 
Marma as Ragre Khyong, and residents of both sides of the river are called Ragre 
Sa. Similarly, Mrofa Sa or Mohari Khyong Sa refer to the son of Mata Mohuri 
Khyong- the inhabitants of the south Banderban area. Another Marma localised 
regional group is Plaung Sa related to Plaung Khyong, a mountain stream of the 
northern CHT.
In Roangchari, the Marma people identify themselves as Rockoywa Sa. The name 
Rockoywa is derived from the near by river Rockoy. The Marma nomenclature 
Rockoywa Sa means the son of the Rockoy river. In the broader sense, the 
identification of Rockoywa Sa in Roangchari is the Marma residents of Rockoywa 
roa irrespective of lineage or clan relationship. As Rockoywa Sa the Marma people 
in Roangchari, thus, can be defined as ‘localised regional group’ named after 
geographical location of the river.
This suggests that Marma settlements cannot be described as simply “clan centred”, 
as previously mentioned in the CHT literature (Selina 1995). The Rockoywa Sa is a 
place identity which refers to the regionally of the Marma people of Roangchari. 
This will be further examined in terms of Marma clan organisation. In sum, it can be 
said that settlement pattern and regional identity are interwoven in the context of 
Marma group organisation in the CHT.
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Bawm
The Bawm settlement of Soanloo para in Roangchari is located in the hilltop region 
in contrast to valley settlements of Marma and Tanchanga. The identification of 
settlement among the Bawm has traditionally been depicted by the names of ranges 
and clans. In the case of Soanloo para, settlement identification corresponds to the 
characteristics of the habitat rather than clan name considerations. Soanloo is the 
name of a fruit tree (amoloki in Bengali) implying the characteristics of the 
surrounding forests.
Elderly Bawm in Soanloo para claim that Bawm settlements are organised along 
phun (clan) and the name of the settlement becomes the name of particular phun 
ancestor. Loffler, a German ethnographer, has found similar kind of settlement 
perceptions among the Mru, who also live in the hill top region of Banderban 
district. Loffler points out that “Mru live in hamlets, a small settlement comprising 
of five to twenty households.. .and regard hamlets as belonging to kin” (1990: 139).
However, the present Bawm settlement of Soanloo para is comprised of different 
phuns in contrast to a more traditional notion of village organisation. As I mentioned 
in the previous chapter, the Soanloo para Bawm settlement organisation is a result 
of regrouped settlement in 1980s when the government forced the different Bawm 
villages to move out from their original far interior region of CHT. Thus, in the case 
of present Bawm settlement the characteristics of the habitat become the principle 
basis for the name of the settlement.
In recent times, however, a new phenomenon is also observed among the Bawm in 
terms of identification of settlement name. In Ruma, a southern sub-district of 
Banderban, I have encountered settlements named after the holy Christian shrines 
such as, Bethlehem para (residents of Bethlehem), Hebron para (residents of 
Hebron). In this context, the names of the Bawm settlements are taking new shape 
symbolising Bawm Christian identity instead of phun (clan) identity with naming of 
ancestry or geographical phenomena. Therefore, there has been a shift in the 
perception of naming of the settlement among the Bawm. The changes can be 
interpreted as the impact of the Christianity on Bawm traditional culture.
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Nevertheless, habitual orientation and the identification of Bawm settlement and 
place has always been the mountain region. The Bawm settlement of Soanloo para 
gives altogether a different view than that of Marma and Tanchanga. Each Bawm 
household follows similar pattern of dwelling house and surroundings according to 
their cultural planning. Bawm houses are by-and-large machan types40, which is a 
common pattern across the ethnic communities in the CHT. In Bawm language, 
machan means high platform. Although Bawm follow the same principle of 
constructing machan houses like other communities, the distinct feature is that 
machan are built side by side in order to maintain a face-to-face view leaving a 
uniform courtyard in between. The placing and planning of the dwelling houses in 
the Bawm village seem very different compared to other communities. Their 
attitudes, house construction and settlement pattern on hill top region, express a 
particular set of cultural construction of Bawm identity.
Tanchanga
In Roangchari, the Tanchanga settlement of Bottoli pada was established in valley 
areas near Rockoywa roa when they first moved into this area. In Tanchanga 
language, pada means village. One distinguishing feature about the naming of the 
Tanchanga settlement is that in contrast to Marma, Rockoywa Sa (sons of Rockoy 
river), a location based naming, the Tanchanga highlight their clan ancestry in 
identifying their settlement pattern. The naming of Bottoli (the surroundings of 
Banian tree) signifies a particular history of the founding ancestor of the village, 
who planted the tree when they first settled in the area. Now, the name Bottoli is 
synonymous to the settlement of Tanchanga people in Roangchari.
40 In CHT this type of house construction display a commonality of Pahari culture across the ethnic 
boundary. The dwelling houses are fundamentally conditioned with CHT hill ecology and economic 
activities of the people. All the ethnic communities build their houses on a high platform locally call 
as machan. The houses are rectangular in shape with oval roofing. The bamboo matting platform is 
raised six to eight feet above the ground, and is supported by timber or bamboo posts; the walls are 
made of bamboo slate and the roof is covered with thatched grass. Since the house is built on high 
platform the vacant portion below is used for keeping agricultural tools and appliances, such as looms 
and husking implements. The main entrance of the house is approached by a ladder placed between 
the platform and the ground. Ladders are removed at night so that wild animals, in this hilly region, 
cannot enter the house. The size of the room varies according to the requirement and economic status 
of the family.
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It is also found that some the Tanchanga settlements in the greater Banderban region 
are named after the place of origin prior to their migration. The Tanchanga 
settlement known as Kafasa indicates the place of early residence in Burma’s Kapru 
area long before they migrated to CHT. Thus, the names of the Tanchanga 
settlement express a sense of attachment to the people of their origins.
Notion of Attachment
In each case, a settlement’s name denotes group organisation in Roangchari. 
Geographical distinction in terms of settlement pattern is reflected in cultural 
identity and sense of home among the groups. Marma and Tanchanga settlement is 
largely associated with the valleys. On the other hand, identification of the hamlet 
among the Bawm is by the name of ranges. The cultural perception of settlement, 
thus, explicitly expresses a sense of attachment to people of their own group and to 
the land they inhabit. As a notion, ‘attachment’ to settlement is an important aspect 
in constructing ‘localised’ cultural identity.
Marma prefer to live along banks of the river and stream. As such their perception of 
settlement is attached to river valleys and they inventory or cognitively differentiate 
categories of the hill land habitat: for example, koyongs refers to plains land as 
opposed to taung thaihnang (hill slopes) and taung fa  (up hills) as opposed to taung 
jhui (high land).
In contrast to Bawm, today the Marma and Tanchanga are engaged in paddy 
cultivation along with traditional jhum. However, some of the activities relating to 
paddy cultivation lack indigenous terms in the Marma and Tanchanga languages.
For example, plough cultivation involves use of specific inputs, such as lingual 
(plough), irrigation known as shech, seedling as gala, insecticides and chemical 
fertiliser as kitnashak and sar. In Marma, irrigation is known as lema ri tang re 
which literally means ‘to bring water and pouring into ground’. This does not sound 
like a vocabulary rather a description of an activity in the field.
Asa whole, perception and classification of land in terms of utility and economic 
value among all ethnic groups is different from the Bengali (I elaborate in Chapter
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Five). However, I suggest that local perceptions of settlement and locality are also 
specific to each group forming different village and group organisation. This also 
challenges the common theory that village organisation in CHT is neither stable nor 
permanent because of jhum ‘nomadic life’. Western and local ethnographers paint 
this picture without looking at the local dynamics of how it is actually organised. I 
argue that fluid nature of village organisation is a myth in the CHT.
Amongst all the groups, the notion ‘village’ is always stable but sometimes 
readjusted to the changing realities of jhum practice in the distant area. The practice 
of deserting the village is rare in the CHT. The present Marma Rockoywa roa 
(village) in Roangchari is believed to be two hundred years old. In fact, portraying 
CHT ‘tribal’ people as ‘nomadic’ with unstable village organisation has profound 
implications to their access to rights over the land (see Chapter Five).
Social Organisation
The section deals with social organisational features, such as clanship, kinship, 
descent, household, inheritance practices and marriage organisation of Marma, 
Bawm and Tanchanga in Roangchari. As mentioned earlier, sociological and 
anthropological literature in Bangladesh produced a great deal of confusion in 
describing social organisation of ethnic groups in CHT without any clear definition 
what exactly this means. My ethnographic data on social organisational features 
gives a different perspective suggesting an understanding from the local cultural 
context. The section looks at the dynamics of social organisation and ethnic 
boundary maintenance in the multi-ethnic locality of Roangchari.
Clan Organisation 
Marma Clan Organisation
Social scientists, anthropologists and geographers invariably identified many clans 
among the Marma, presumably following the habitual notion of Marma settlement 
organisation (Bessaignet 1958; Sopher 1964; Selina 1995; Khan 1999). Using 
different analytical tools, the literature maintains that Marma are divided into several
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clans and each clan lives in a particular locality with its members possessing the 
village land (Bessaignet 1958, Bemot 1959). This suggests that Marma villages are 
clan based, and that the clan controls village lands. Recently, Selina (1995) has 
listed about fifteen Marma clans which are said to be independent of each other.41
The way in which Marma clan organisations are interpreted in this literature 
confuses classificatory categories with the local dynamics of how the group is 
organised in an area or locality. My findings do not support the straight application 
of a broad classification of Marma localised groups into clan identification. The 
analysis of Marma settlements suggest that different localised groups have been 
formed after the names of a particular river valley instead of an unknown common 
ancestor or totemic unity (an important criteria for the definition of clan).
In fact, in anthropological literature there are many definitions of clan but a common 
ancestral link is generally considered to be the organising principle of clanship. 
Without having traceable genealogical links a group cannot be identified as clan 
(Loffler 1990; Holy 1996). This dimension of clan organisation has not strictly been 
followed among the Marma in relation to settlement pattern and group organisation. 
As I mentioned in previous section, in the entire CHT region there are twelve 
settlement groups. These are not clan based groups rather localised regional groups.
For example, in Roangchari, at Rockoywa roa level, the localised group Rockoywa 
Sa is split into many lineage segments mainly based on kinship relationship. Talking 
to many elderly Marma of Rockoywa roa, I have encountered two main descent 
groups, namely pube and puri. Tracing back their settlement history and ancestry, it 
is revealed that the two groups are originated from Marma persons puri and pube 
(legendary figures). The pube group was the first settlers of the Rockoywa roa, and 
expanded gradually splitting into different lineage segments. Long after the 
settlement of pube group, puri settled in the Rockoywa roa.
41 These are; Regretsa, Palaingtsa, Marotasa, Kogdasa, Kolatasa, Palowsa, Kwen-charysa etc. 
(Selina 1995: 53). In fact, as I mentioned earlier, these are Marma ’regional groups’ derived their 
names of the nearby river.
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Today these lineage segments are not directly related to each other, as most of them 
do not remember any genealogical link after two or three generations. Many of them 
even do not recognise their ancestral history of puri or pube. They do not have a 
clear-cut idea of clan; they only tell about the patrilineal kin groups of two to three 
generations’ depth. However, many of these lineage groups living in Rockoywa roa 
are not maintaining any territorial segregation within themselves, but reckon their 
descent through separate relatives.
In Rockoywa roa, two groups, puri and pube, are residing together as a single entity 
sharing common village territory. The members of the pube and puri are now 
collectively engaged in socio-economic, religious and political activities in everyday 
life as Rockoywa Sa in Roangchari. Coexistence of several lineage groups in one 
village has become a common feature in almost every Marma settlement.
Thus, at the local level, these localised Marma groups are organised in a particular 
settlement on the basis of different lineage segments rather than having a traceable 
common clan ancestry. Therefore, the role of one such ‘clan’ over one village in 
possessing village land has in fact become non-existent today. In dealing with the 
other groups in Roangchari, particularly with the Bawm and Tanchanga, all the 
lineage segments constituting the Rockoywa Sa together assert their primary identity 
as being Marma, disregarding their other differences.
This is also reflected in their personal naming. Today both at personal and group 
levels, taking an ethno-name has become a new dimension to group affiliation and 
assertion of ethnic identity. This has been an expression of a distinct ethnic 
boundary maintenance in relation to others. In the case of Marma, they do not bear 
any clan identity as part of personal names as practiced among the Bawm (see 
below). The element of ethno-naming can be seen as process of both socio-political 
and cultural identity making (I explain this perspective in detail in Chapter Four).
Bawm Clan Organisation
Of the three communities under study, the operation of clan organisation is most 
pervasively prevalent among the Bawm. Among the Bawm of Banderban, on the
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whole, there are two principle phuns (clans) namely Sunthela and the Panghawi. 
Each of the two major phuns, however, split into several smaller phun segments.
Table 1-A summary of the splinter phuns
Sunthela Zahau, Zattang, Chin Zah, Lawn Chew, Cheurek, Rung Be, Siarlawn 
Sando, Tenu, Bawiting, Thilum, Vandir, Lawnsins, Laitall, Cheulai 
Dawitling, Haubeng, Tongir, Lalnam, Thlua thang, Milai, Maram 
Thangta, Ruallens, Khenglant, Lihang, Aineh, Laikens
Panghawi Sailuk, Palang, Rakha, Satek, Rapichai, Sakhawng, Tipiling, Samthang, 
Thamgming, Sangla, Komlau, Shahu, Pawngking, Lingtawang, Nakaw 
Amlai, Tangthing, Buiting, Demrong, Talaksa, Mihi, Charang 
Khualring, Sangthing, Rempeehe, Mitau, Ichia, Kongtwa
This table is basec on consultations of Bawm clan genealogy as well as information from
aged Bawm informants in Soanloo para and Banderban.
Each of the splinter phun is formed by tracing ancestry to a common founder and is 
named after the ancestor. Among the Bawm, the phun ancestors are mythically 
considered as persons who showed the potentials of leadership in crisis or in big 
game hunting. This implies that, once upon a time, clan leaders would have ruled 
over members of the clan. In the present day, however, clan leaders no longer lead 
the clans, as headman/karbari have taken over many political functions of the clan. 
Yet clan membership is still more important for the Bawm as everyone takes a clan 
name and someone with the same clan name is considered to be a close relative. The 
Bawm regard someone with the name of the same phun (clan) as belonging to the 
same taksa (flesh) or thlah (descendent) or rualsia (relatives).
In Roangchari the Bawm settlement of Soanloo para is not residentially segregated 
strictly on phun or clan basis. The entire Bawm para comprises of different phuns. 
Among the Bawm inhabitants in Soanloo para, I have encountered fourteen of the 
splinter phun segments of the two principle phuns. These are: Thamgming,
Lawnsins, Bawiting, Charang, Maram, Buiting, Shahu, Milai, Palang, Haubeng, 
Lawn Chew, Nakaw, Amlai, Komlau. These phun names are derived from the 
common ancestor of the past, though they are now reunited in Soanloo para from 
divergent directions of CHT.
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The Bawm residents of Soanloo para differ from the Marma and Tanchanga in 
terms of maintaining clan identification and distinct ancestral roots. Among the 
Bawm, the emphasis on phun centred identity allows identification of each Bawm 
individual in terms of phun as well as the greater Bawm ethnic identity. For 
example, one of my informants is Zir Khung Shahu Bawm, which is a combination 
of the three identities. The Zir Khung is the first name; the second part Shahu 
denotes his phun name; and the last part is a Bawm ethno-name. Emphasis on self- 
image is centred around taking phun name which serves the mechanism of tracing 
ancestry of each Bawm individual.
However, in practice phun identification carries no differentiation in Bawm 
everyday life at broader ethnic level. Cohabitation of members of divergent phun, 
such as, Shahu, Amlai, at Soanloo para settlement does not disrupt the Bawm ethnic 
unity at the broader level. In many ways members of the Bawm community in 
Soanloo para display a greater solidarity highlighting the common Bawm ethnic 
identity.
As a smaller ethnic group Bawm is a very closed society and people increasingly 
tend to live together. In recent years, economic hardship and land scarcity even 
forced them to get much closer. In case of any crisis or in need of help there is a 
feeling that someone else of their own is around them. They are more 
accommodating to other Bawm migrants in relation to settlement in Soanloo para. 
The general perception is that if any Bawm wishes to settle in Soanloo para, they 
will be generally welcomed, even though they belonging to a different phun (clan). 
They have their own Christian Sunday school, a village regulatory body to oversee 
the everyday domestic affairs of the settlement, and a Bawm student hostel. 
Collective wellbeing of the community is the main value of the settlement.
In the present political context of CHT, the identification of Bawm as an ethnic 
group is crucial. It can be manipulated as a vehicle to assert political identity as a 
group. It maintains their status as Bawm ethnic entity within the broader context of 
‘sUte-tribal’ relations on the one hand, and also justifies their cultural distinctiveness 
in relation to others on the other hand.
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Tanchanga Clan Organisation
There are many contested theories in the literature as to whether Chakma and 
Tanchanga are two separate ethnic entities or a single ethnic group (Lewin 1869; 
Bemot 1959, Bessaignet 1958). Linguist Bemot and other earlier ethnographers 
seeing some linguistic resemblance conclude that Tanchanga is actually an offshoot 
of Chakma. These studies, however, do not tell us of any genealogical relationship 
between these two groups. Without substantive historical research, it is difficult to 
judge whether these two groups had any clear link in the past.
In Roangchari, Tanchanga inhabitants of Bottoli pada regard themselves as an ethnic 
group. They do not exhibit any feelings of relatedness with the Chakma but rather 
assert their own ethnicity as Tanchanga. They claim that their lineages and clans are 
distinct from the Chakma. Anil and Proashoannan Kumar Tanchanga, officials of the 
Tanchanga Welfare Association, told me that “in the past Chakma did not want 
Tanchanga to be treated as a separate ethnic group as they would have lost their 
dominant position in terms of numbers in the CHT. It is not an issue now; we are 
accepted as separate ethnic group-as Tanchanga- both in official and public 
domains”.
According to elderly Tanchanga informants in Bottoli pada, the Tanchanga people 
are organized along gosa lines. Tanchanga clans are indigenously referred to as 
gosa. There are said to be twelve gosas among the Tanchanga, but at present they 
can only identify six gosas residing in the CHT, and others are claimed to be living 
in Burma. The gosas living in CHT are: Mo gosa, Karba gosa, Donna gosa, Mongla 
gosa, Malong gosa and Lang gosa.
In Roangchari area, I have found most of the Tanchanga residents at Bottoli pada 
predominantly belong to Mo gosa, with only a few families claiming to be members 
of Malong gosa. The present Tanchanga populations of Bottoli pada are not all 
descended from early settlers in 1960s. Some of the Tanchanga families migrated to 
this settlement from different parts of the CHT in later times. Elderly Tanchanga in 
Bottoli pada told me that in the past intermixture of gosa within the same village
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was rare. Today I have observed that this pattern of Tanchanga settlements has been 
changed in many ways. For example, a newly established small Tanchanga 
settlement of bhaga mura para near Banderban town consists of only twenty 
families with several gosa identifications.
The general pattern of gosa organisation among the Tanchanga people suggests that 
these are formed on the basis of kin ties, marriage organisation, and distinctive dress 
pattern. This gosa identity is only maintained at the local individual level in relation 
to other gosa. For example, gosa commonality is expressed in the use of female 
dress with a distinct head cover and colour of the lower part, locally called a pinon. 
In case of the members of Mo gosa, females invariably wear a head cover named 
khobong showing a distinct style and colour.
Although the majority of the Bottoli pada inhabitants belong to Mo gosa they 
collectively emphasise a greater Tanchanga identity distinctive from the other two 
ethnic groups in Roangchari. In other words, though Tanchanga people are 
organised along gosa lines at the personal level, but at the broader level of group 
organisation Tanchanga people do not use their gosa name as part of their proper 
name unlike Bawm. Every Tanchanga individual, as a whole, is using the greater 
Tanchanga ethnic name as part of their personal name to signify a separate ethnic 
group. This again can be seen as part of ‘naming politics’ in the context of identity 
formation in the CHT.
Descent, Family and Household Organisation
All the groups in CHT show a well-developed patrilineal descent ideology coupled 
with principles of internal genealogical ranking expressed in inheritance and 
succession. My kinship data shows the underlying rules of patrilineal descent among 
the Marma, Bawm and Tanchanga are reflected in terminological systems.42 But 
whilst patrilineality as a shared rule is prevalent among these groups, there are 
notable differences and variations in many aspects of social organisation such as: 
degree of male and female status and authority, rights and privileges among the heirs
421 have done an comprehensive analysis of Marma, Bawm and Tanchanga kinship terminologies but 
space does not permit me to present them here in detail.
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relating to inheritance practices, rules and practices of marital alliances, post-marital 
residence and practices of dowry/bride price.
In this section, I examine each of these aspects of social organisation from a 
comparative perspective in order to understand the dynamics of group organisation. 
The section begins with the descent and household organisation.
Marma Descent Organisation
All three ethnic communities are basically patrilineal. However, there are some 
exceptions observed among the Marma compared to the other two communities as 
far as their kinship terms are concerned. Among the Marma, whilst descent is 
reckoned through the male line,43 one of the most recurrent issues that consistently 
appear in the literature is whether Marma follow the character of matriliny. Selina 
(1995), a sociologist, has noticed the influence of matriarchal character among the 
Marma. Most of the questions relating to this, by and large, seem to be raised in 
terms of inheritance and post-marital residence practices. My ethnographic data does 
not validate this hypothesis.
One of the problems with these interpretations is the lack of in-depth analysis of 
other aspects of social organisational feature, producing a kind of ‘floating 
ethnography’. It is, indeed, true that among the Marma, women’s role in the 
domestic domain is very significant. Although descent is explicitly expressed 
through the male line, Marma woman enjoy a substantial degree of authority in 
terms of privileges of inheritance of property44 and decision-making at the 
household.
At the Marma household level, I have noticed all the domestic activities are done on 
the basis of mutual discussion and joint efforts between husband and wife. For
43 There are three well-defined categories of terms for identifying the members of the patrilineal 
cfecent from ego-centered perspective involving siblings, parallel cousins and cross cousins of ego’s 
generation as well as the parental and succeeding generation. This implies that among the Marma the 
emphasis on lineage at both ego’s and father’s level express patrilineal line. According to the Marma 
knship data, it can be said that Marma descent system is a variant type of unilineal descent system. 
This is further clear from the discussion of marriage organisation.
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example, in the case of husband’s death, the sole responsibility rests on the wife in 
maintaining all domestic affairs such as management of land and other properties. 
Marma women, as mother and wife, have a greater degree of freedom, privileges 
and rights compared to Bawm and Tanchanga women.
The most important element among these is the matrilocal residence without any 
social stigma attached to it. Unlike other patrilineal groups within and outside CHT, 
such as Bawm, Tanchanga and Bengali, Marma are exceptional in accepting a 
daughter’s husband as a member of the household. Among the Bengali, this practice 
is predominantly seen as lowering the social status for the husband. In the case of 
the Marma, the post-marital residence rule has been relaxed keeping the descent rule 
unchanged in the vital area of marital alliances.
In actuality, what I have observed among the Marma is that if a couple are endowed 
with only one daughter, the patrilineal descent rule of Marma is subordinated to a 
form of ‘matrilocality’ where the daughter’s husband moves to the residence of his 
in- laws. This Marma practice differs from both Bawm and Tanchanga. Perhaps, 
researchers have confused residence with the matrilineal. In fact, both patrilocal and 
matrilocal residence patterns are prevalent among the Marma.
Family or Household
The concept of family and household is one of the salient characteristics that is 
embedded in social life of all ethnic communities in CHT. Exploring social life by 
means of the ‘household’ enables us to examine the types of farming system and 
social organisation in the CHT as they exist in meaningful day-to-day activities. One 
of the key considerations is to define and conceptualise the ‘household’ from local 
perspectives.
In CHT, as far as traditional jhum practices are concerned, one must understand the 
dynamics of household organisation. There is a strong correlation between the 
household organisation, marriage and access to jhum land. For example, traditionally 
one of the criteria considered for access to jhum common land is to establish an
441 have discussed this point elaborately in the inheritance section.
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independent household. Until marriageable age children live with the parents, and 
contribute to the father’s jhum as part of the common workforce. The independent 
household is established only after marriage. Household organisation is, therefore, a 
dynamic process of social organisation in relation to access to jhum land in the CHT. 
(I discuss this point in the discussion of customary donga system in Chapter Five).
As household organisation is an important institution in every day life of ethnic 
communities, particularly in the context of farming systems, jhum, I argue that 
continuity of household organisation is related to the practices of land use and 
livelihood of the groups and group organisation in the CHT. However, from the 
Western point of view it is rather ambiguous to conceptualise and define family and 
household in the local context of social organisation.
Oeingsa: family or household or, a conceptual ambiguity
The most important unit of Marma social organisation is the oeingsa. However, the 
way Marma define their oeingsa organisation is quite different from Western 
conception of family. Neither family nor the Bengali notion of paribar, which 
usually refers to father-mother-children unit, fully conveys the connotations of the 
Marma term oeingsa. When I asked about the Bengali word paribar, some Marma 
people count their sons and daughters living in other villages as part of the oeingsa, 
and others only count those that live with them.
Therefore, the way oeingsa is defined among the Marma has various crosscutting 
aspects between kin and non-kin, between sharing or not sharing food. Marma often 
say even distant members of the lineage can be included as members of oeingsa as 
long as they eat from the same cooking pot and share economic activities. However, 
sons residing even in part of the same house but cooking separately are not 
considered to be member of oeingsa. In this sense, the notion oeingsa does not fit 
into the Bengali conception of paribar (family). Thus, among the Marma, oeingsa is 
not only a unit of biological reproduction, but also a unit of economic co-operation 
and assistance.
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In fact, the Marma word oeingsa is more closely rendered by household than family. 
The term oeingsa can be used as a rough translation of the notion “household” 
because oeingsa is as socio-economic unit of household organisation (Netting 1993). 
Oeingsa has also a special significance in relation to subsistence activities at the roa 
level as mentioned before. In CHT, as the oeingsa, not the individuals, is the 
recognised member unit of roa organisation. In other words, individuals are socially 
accepted as members of an oeingsa in the roa. For example, in Roangchari, Marma 
are referred by their status to the oeingsa, i.e., the father of such and such oeingsa.
The chief characteristic of oeingsa is of its continuity over time, as each oeingsa is, 
by and large, linked to others in a considerable amount of institutional and social 
interaction within the domain of roa organisation in Roangchari. It is, perhaps, for 
that reason why one is invariably given the number of oeingsa in the roa rather than 
individuals when one inquires about the actual population of the village.
The household census data suggests Marma oeingsa characteristics in Rockoywa roa 
are of two types. According to size, the most common form of oeingsa is a 
household with one married couple and their children at an average size of four 
members. It is the smallest size of oeingsa and all members reside in the same 
residence. There are also large oeingsa, like an extended household, comprising of a 
married couple, their children and an elderly parent, also some distant relatives 
ranging between eight to ten members.
However, it is noticeable that such large oeingsa are relatively unstable due to 
scarcity of land and the difficult livelihood situation of recent times. In Rockoywa 
roa, large oeingsa nowadays are frequently changing shape, as the head of the 
oeingsa is unable to provide secure subsistence and livelihood for all members. This 
leads to the development of smaller oeingsa as the dominant type. The smaller 
oeingsa are generally created from the main oeingsa after the marriage of sons.
Among the Marma, these households are viewed as the ‘branch households’ of the 
main oeingsa. Often, these houses are established within the vicinity of the main 
household, sometimes even a part of main house. The way in which the main 
oeingsa is linked to the branch oeingsa demonstrates a feature of an extended
122
oeingsa group co-operation’ in the Rockoywa roa. The relationship between main 
and branch oeingsa ties is viewed as common membership to the main oeingsa.
This relationship is conceived as the relationship between the parent and child. 
Members of the extended oeingsa group help each other and co-operate during 
critical situations. At times of sickness, bad harvest, and labour shortage, members 
of the extended oeingsa group turn out to be a group with effective economic 
cooperation. For example, when a new branch oeingsa is not immediately given the 
allotment of common jhum land for subsistence it has to rely on the main oeingsa 
for a share of jhum land for cultivation.
As every day ritual, I have seen, members of branch oeingsa do not touch or eat 
their morning meal before they first send a portion of it to the parents at the main 
oeingsa. It is also a mandatory ritual that first fruits or crops must be offered to head 
of the main oeingsa. Among the Marma, oeingsa organisation is thus a distinctive 
feature of group organisation linked by economic, social and ritual co-operation.
Bawm Descent Organisation
As has been reflected in their kinship terminological system, Bawm also observe 
patrilineality like other two groups. Their genealogy is traced along the male line. In 
Soanloo para my Bawm informants told me that the sons belonging to the father’s 
phun and daughters after marriage are conceived of members of husband’s phun 
instead of father’s phun. This perception is, in fact, well reflected in their customary 
system of inheritance practices where daughters are not entitled to inherit any 
parental ‘property’ (I will discuss this point in the next section). Nevertheless, 
Bawm women retain their phun names as a symbol of original phun identity after 
marriage.
Patrilocality is also the dominant cultural practices with respect to post-marital 
residence pattern among the Bawm. Girls after marriage leave their parental 
household to live with husband’s household. As a whole, in Bawm community 
females are less advantaged than male in terms of access to parental possessions, as 
far as their cultural rules are concerned, a rule in opposition to Marma.
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However, recently, the common trend observed among the Bawm is towards 
individualistic values in terms of adopting a nuclear family structured compare to 
other communities. This transition can be seen as the influence of Christianity.
Tanchanga Descent Organisation
Similar to Marma and Bawm, Tanchanga also trace their descent strictly through 
patrilineal line. However, the Tanchanga people, as whole, can be seen as one of the 
most rigid patriarchal group in the CHT. In contrast to what has been observed in 
Marma, the Tanchanga male members enjoy and exercise the absolute authority in 
every sphere of life. In Tanchanga community, the social position of female is 
perceived not as equal as male. This is clearly manifested in their inheritance 
practices and pattern of guti (lineage) attachment after marriage.
Firstly, there is a common perception that through life cycle process when girl get 
married finishes her natal relations with parent’s guti. In other words, daughters 
remain with father’s guti until their marriage but lose the privilege of father’s guti 
membership after marriage, and are identified with their husband’s guti. Therefore, 
they must reside with husband’s guti, which is, in turn, their own family and guti.
Secondly, the post-marital residence practice is solely patrilocal among the 
Tanchanga. Matrilocality that practiced among the Marma is socially disapproved 
and looked down upon among the Tanchanga. Similar to Bengali conception of ghor 
zamaf5 the Tanchanga view of matrilocal residence pattern is disgraceful for a 
husband because he will be treated as having inferior status compared to the 
husbands who reside in their natal house. So, post-marital residence is an important 
aspect of expressing male authority among the Tanchanga. Tanchanga women told 
me that they do not want their husband to live in their parent’s residence.
Evidently there is variation in the conception of family types, male and female 
authority, and post-marital residentiality among the Marma, Bawm and Tanchanga. 
Although these variations can be seen as ethnic “stereotypes” but in reality it reflects
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distinct markers of boundary maintenance in multi-ethnic locality. In the next 
section, I discuss the differential inheritance practices.
Inheritance Practices
Analysis of inheritance practices among Marina, Bawm and Tanchanga is crucial to 
understanding social and cultural values which, in turn, form the foundation of 
ethnicity. Ideally, all the ethnic groups in Roangchari are patrilineal but inheritance 
practices are not the same as far as their local practices are concerned. In the CHT, 
however, these variations must be understood in both the historical and local cultural 
contexts.
As mentioned above, traditionally all the ethnic groups in CHT were solely 
dependent on jhum cultivation, as such the notion of private ownership and 
inheritance of land was unknown and inconceivable. The concept of private 
ownership of land among the ethnic communities in CHT apparently appeared only 
after the introduction of plough cultivation in the valley areas during the colonial 
period. Therefore, the process of inheritance in landed property in CHT is relatively 
a recent phenomenon. I discuss this issue more elaborately in Chapter Five.
However, the pace of this development did not take place uniformly among ethnic 
groups in CHT. Even today ethnic groups, such as Mru, Khumi, Pankhu and Bawm 
of Banderban district still do not have possession of ‘private land’ nor have any 
elaborate system of inheritance rules.46 The elaborate system of inheritance with 
regard to landed property is only visible among the Chakma, Marina, Tanchanga and 
Tripura, who have adopted plough cultivation in the valleys along with traditional 
jhum cultivation.
With regard to jhum common land, there are still no individual heirs whatsoever.
The headman or karbari decides the allotment of jhum plots in usual customary 
manner; households have no permanent ownership of these plots. Therefore, one 
needs to be mindful here that the present system of property ownership and
45 In Bengali culture ghor zamai is thought of not as a ’husband’ rather a ’house husband’ .
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inheritance rights in CHT is both historical and local cultural construct. Yet every 
ethnic group, in one way or another, follows some customs for handing movable and 
unmovable properties such as, livestock, house, ornaments, dress, and household 
elements, from generation to generation. There is a wide degree of cultural 
variations in these practices across ethnic lines.
Marma Inheritance Practices
The present Marma inheritance practices have a distinct historical background. In 
Rockoywa roa, elderly Marma told me that customarily Marma have specific rules 
of inheritance for movable and unmovable properties except land. They also claim 
that Marma rules of inheritance in relation to land and other properties is by and 
large adopted from the Burmese family and inheritance law locally known as 
Somohada.
Today, in practice, Somohada understanding is mainly attached to cultural and 
religious identity of Marma ethnicity. As Somohada contains the descriptions of 
family values, marriage customs and system of property distribution among the heirs 
according to Buddhist faith and culture, for Marma, this has become an imbued 
regalatory principle of Marma social life. My personal engagement and participation 
in Somohada practices at Rockoywa roa enable me to draw a local level reality of 
hov Somohada has been institutionalised among the Marma. In other words, how 
Sonohada has become part of Marma ‘cultural assets’ in relation to group identity.
The Roangchari headman, Mong La Sin Marma is the one who often uses the 
Sonohada in dealing with inheritance matters and other social affairs. In an informal 
conversation, I asked him why Somohada is such an important thing to Marma.
Mcng La Sin Marma explains,
Somohada is an integral part of Marma people in CHT. Many cultural and 
religious elements of Marma, such as family values, marriage custom, and 
rules of property distribution among the heirs are all guided by the 
Somohada.
46 See for further information, the detail analysis of Mru inheritance, Loffler (1990).
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However, in practice, it is really the kayang, the Marma temple, which gives 
institutional shape of Somohada practices in Marma community. In day-to-day 
activities, the Marma community, as whole, revolves around the kayang culture, 
which guides Marma social and religious life in many ways. As most of the vantes 
(priest of kayang) are trained in Buddhism in the Arakan district of Burma, when 
they come back they apply the same cultural principles that they have observed in 
Burma. Moreover, they are the people who deliver Buddhist teaching in Burmese 
language in the kayang. So, their knowledge of Somohada has become the ‘cultural 
asset’ in guiding Marma people with certain family values, inheritance practices and 
religious code. 47
My Marma host in Rockoywa village, Mong Kay Marma, a peon (office assistant) of 
Roangchari, describes his understanding of Somohada,
Amgra manu kesho boge na somohada. Jaiga jamir baheapre headman ja 
bolia ta sonie ar kyang vante jane (We don’t know about Somohada. If we 
have any problem regarding land and others we go to headman and the 
vante) (field notes dairy 17 January 2000, own translation from Chittagong 
dialect).
This ordinary view suggests that Somohada has been a ‘social and cultural property’ 
of few such as the headman, vante, and elderly Marma. In reality, the headman, 
vante and elderly Marma all appeared to be the key players in regulating Somohada 
cultural practice among the Marma. In fact, whatever reasons, the Somohada has 
become the symbol of Marma social, cultural and religious life.
In the following, I discuss present Marma practice of Somohada. This analysis also 
reveals how Marma customary system of inheritance is undergoing changes through 
Bangladesh legal and judicial process. Talking to many Marma informants, men and 
women, and subsequently verifying with elderly people an elaborate description of 
Marma inheritance practices was collected from different sources in Roangchari and 
Banderban.
471 have discussed dimensions of Marma linguistic and religious identity in Chapter Four.
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It reveals that rules of inheritance practices are the most important aspect of Marma 
social life as it occupies the distinctive socio-organisational feature compared to 
other communities in CHT. Although Marma basically follow patrilineality, 
inheritance practices are not restricted to males only. Both males and females are 
entitled to inherit property. In Marma language, ‘property’ is termed as ingthong. 
Ingthong is considered as hereditary properties of the household and classified into 
two main types: movable and immovable. Immovable ingthong are land, houses and 
trees whereas movable ingthong includes agricultural implements, domestic animals, 
weaving appliances, ornaments and clothing etc. According to Somohada, Marma 
follow a principle of succession that emphasises the distribution of both movable 
and unmovable properties in the following maimer:
After the death of a parent, children are entitled to inherit all the hereditary 
properties including both movable and non-movable but there is a variation between 
their father’s and mother’s belongings. A sharp distinction is observed between iokia 
wain (male goods) and min ma wain (female goods). According to customary 
inheritance practices, house, cattle and agricultural implements, are considered as 
iokia wain (the property of the male household head) that can only be inherited by 
sons. On the other hand, female dresses, ornaments, pigs, spinning and weaving 
equipment, belong to the domain of female property as min ma wain, thus heritable 
by the daughters only.
According to Somohada practices paddy land is distributed equally between sons 
and daughters but among the sons’ portion, properties are not equally distributed if 
there are more than one. Usually the first-born son is the main heir. There is a ratio 
of succession of sons’ property: 50% of the inherited landed property goes to the 
elder son and other sons share the remaining 50% . However, the daughter’s share of 
the property are equally distributed among them. Besides an equal share of parental 
landed property women have also a greater role in managing their husband’s 
property.
In the case of a husband’s death, landed property remains with the custody of the 
deceased man’s wife for her entire lifetime. She is socially the legal caretaker of the 
landed property meeting all the domestic needs of the household. Such landed
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property is only passed down to heirs after her death. This is one of the most 
distinctive characteristics of Marma society in relation to female property rights.
Changes o f Somohada and legal system o f inheritance
In recent years, there have been significant changes in relation to traditional Marma 
inheritance practices in legal setting. The changes were brought in accordance with 
the existing Bengali Muslim inheritance law, which outlines the succession 
procedures as 2:1 among the sons and daughters, i.e., one-third of landed property is 
given to the daughters as opposed to brother. It is complete contrast to Marma 
Somohada inheritance practices.
Therefore, the changes in the customary inheritance practices to landed property, as 
an integrational policy of the state, favours the male authority denying the local 
customary practices. There has been profound impact on social relationships in 
Marma everyday life. In the Marma community women are considered as equal as 
men in relation to inheritance practices and marital status. This Marma cultural 
aspect has been ignored in the government legal inheritance system. There are now 
many disputes arising due to conflicting interpretation of Somohada relating to 
inheritance matters in the legal setting.
In Roangchari, I have attended one of these inheritance dispute settlement cases. The 
following case reveals the local level reality of the Somohada practices and the 
impact of new legal provisions in relation to inheritance disputes. The case was an 
inheritance dispute over a piece of paddy land in Rockoywa roa between the heirs of 
late Lafiisu Marma. The dispute began, when Lafusu Marma’s only son occupied 
two acres of paddy land after his death. Later, two married daughters of Lafusu 
Marma claimed their share of paddy lands that were now in possession of their 
brother. This brother only agreed to give one-fourth of the lands to his sisters as per 
legal provisions. On the other hand, his sisters claim that according to traditional 
Somohada practice daughters are entitled to an equal share of their father’s landed 
property. Consequently the sisters brought the issue to the Roangchari headman.
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The dispute settlement meeting was arranged at the headman’s house. There were 
only six people present, including myself, the headman, the local karbari, two 
elderly Marma and the vante other than the two conflicting parties. The vante had 
brought the Somohada book with him. Initially there was a long conversation 
between the vante and the headman about the different rules of Somohada in relation 
to proportionate property distribution among the heirs. We were simply silent 
observers. Then after long discussion with conflicting parties, the final verdict came 
out in favour of the sister’s being entitled to half of the lands. The way the whole 
process of dispute settlement was done simply by describing the Somohada rules for 
the proportionate shares between brothers and sisters. The brother looked unhappy 
over the verdict.
After the meeting when I asked headman whether either party could go to the court 
if they are not satisfied with his verdict. He replied “anyone could go to the court but 
there is no family or inheritance law for the Buddhist people in Bangladesh. 
Somohada is not recognised in the court setting. They generally follow the legal 
rules of inheritance practice of the Bengali Muslim”. During my fieldwork, 
however, I did not have any opportunity to observe this matter in the court setting. 
Although talking to bureaucrats at the district administration I have come to know 
that there were few instances of ‘tribal’ appeal cases that were done in accordance 
with the existing law.
Nowadays the Marma, on the whole , are confronting with various political, social 
and legal conflicting interpretations of Somohada inheritance practices. Most of the 
Marma residents in Roangchari, however, prefer their traditional system of 
Somohada inheritance. Somohada, for them, is a symbol of Marma ethnic identity.
Bawm Inheritance Practices
The inheritance practices among the Bawm need to be understood in the context of 
their long enduring jhum subsistence activities. As I mentioned earlier, Bawm 
people are, by and large, jhum cultivators - in the sole means of livelihood unlike the 
other two ethnic groups in Roangchari. The question of inheritance in land is not 
conceivable as far as their customary practices are concerned. However, the Bawm
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customary practices provide succession rules on parental properties in the form of 
movable and unmovable items like Marma. Among the Bawm, household assets are 
movable and the dwelling house is unmovable.
Therefore, inheritance law is very simple in nature among the Bawm compare to 
Marma and Tanchanga. According to inheritance practices, the female descendents 
(daughters) are not entitled to inherit any paternal property. The youngest son 
succeeds the parental house. The other elder sons have only share of the parental 
assets, such as livestock, gun and other household’s items. On the other hand, the 
daughters only receive mother’s personal possession such as ornaments, dresses etc, 
as practiced among the Marma.
Among the Bawm, this system of inheritance practices makes sense when it is 
judged from the post marital residence pattern. Each son from the highest 
successively establishes own household immediately after marriage, and the 
youngest son remains in the parental house unit he gets married. It is the youngest 
son who takes care of aged parents in the absence of other family members. Under 
such circumstances the Bawm succession law favours the youngest son to be the 
inheritor of the parental house ultimogeniture. This is distinctively a different feature 
of inheritance practices compare to the other two groups, Marma and Tanchanga.
Tanchanga Inheritance Practices
As I have mentioned in earlier section, all ethnic communities in CHT are 
traditionally jhum cultivators. There was as such no idea of private ownership to the 
land. The notion of inheritance to the landed property has thus largely been in 
practice since the introduction of plough cultivation. In Roangchari, the Tanchanga 
along with Marma, now practice both jhum and plough cultivation. They now have 
an elaborate system of inheritance to the landed and other properties.
According to Tanchanga inheritance practices, only sons are customarily entitled to 
inherit paternal properties that include bhoy (land), livestock and household assets. 
Unlike Marma, however, Tanchanga succession only goes to sons in equal 
proportion. On the other hand, daughters are completely deprived of any such rights.
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Among the Tanchanga, women have no rights either over husband or father’s 
property. However, if a father wishes to give some property to daughters, a verbal 
declaration has to be made before the elderly people.
The verbal declaration about property distribution is another aspect of customary 
practices of inheritance among the Tanchanga. It is a very well honoured custom 
that the male household head makes a verbal statement before village elders about 
the proportion of the property to be handed over to daughters, who are not legal 
successors. Such verbal desires concerning the distribution of properties are viewed 
as socially binding. Among Tanchanga, the violation of such a statement is believed 
to be an act of sin, which will bring disaster and curse for the violator.
Other distinctive inheritance practices among the Tanchanga are as follows:
In case of the death of a married son without any children prior to his father’s death, 
his share of heritable property will be passed on to his other surviving brothers 
instead of his wife. If a woman gets divorce during pregnancy, and subsequently the 
newborn child is a son, he would eventually be the heir of his parental property. This 
suggests that Tanchanga inheritance practices are, by and large, gender biased in 
favour of the male sex compare to Marma and Bawm.
Marriage Organisation
Marriage organisation, in general, is seen as one of the important element of social 
organisation among all ethnic groups in CHT in terms of maintaining group identity 
and livelihood situation. As mentioned above, a person whether Marma, Bawm or 
Tanchanga, could only attain the right to cultivation jhum common lands once he 
gets married and establishes a separate household.48 It has long been a customary 
practice that before marriage one has to work with the parents on the plots allotted to 
the father’s household. So, in this context, marriage organisation is considered one 
of the important criteria in relation to access to jhum lands and livelihood in CHT. 
There are various social and cultural values attached to marriage organisation among 
ethnic communities.
48 Of course, there are instances of temporary arrangements: parents might allow the son to cultivate 
some plots of the households until he gets a similar allotment from the karbari.
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Ethnic endogamy is the common form of marriage practices among all ethnic 
communities in Roangchari. This can be viewed as the salient feature of ethnic 
boundary maintenance in the CHT. I suggest that marriage as a social institution is 
of central importance to ethnic communities. It plays a significant role in 
establishing and maintaining ethnic boundaries on the one hand, and facilitating the 
fusion process that leads to greater intra-group cohesion on the other. This is 
especially true for the complex set of customs relating to the marriage practices.
Data collected on the marriage customs of three ethnic groups demonstrates that 
proper marital practice is an integral part of maintaining and perpetuating a ‘pure’ 
ethnic identity.
In this section, I discuss differential practices attached to each group, such as Marma 
lasonbuiya, Bawm thaihu, and Tanchanga sanga mela, in order to see the internal 
dynamics of group formation.
Marma Marriage Organisation
The Marma word for marriage is lasonbuiye. There are various considerations 
attached to lasonbuiye among the Marma. Lasonbuiye is seen as the social 
recognition of a man and women having legitimate sexual relations and is 
considered as a process to become a full member of the community. The other 
important consideration is lasonbuiye would bring descendents who can look after 
parents, when they become old, as well as household property.
In CHT, monogamy is the most common practice among all ethnic groups including 
Marma. There are two different forms of marriage (lasonbuiye) commonly practiced 
in Marma. These are Niongkia (marriage by negotiations) and Kheerohnejecho (love 
marriage or marriage by elopement). Rituals and other ceremonies associated with 
them are similar in both cases. Niongkia is a form of marriage, which is normally 
held through a series of negotiations at the parental level, a kind of arranged 
marriage. When boy and girl attain marriageable age their parents spread such 
information through verbal communication within and outside the Marma 
settlement.
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A matchmaker, locally call mitachera, brings back and forth the information 
between the parents of a probable couple. Sometimes relatives are also involved in 
this process. There are many rituals involved in Niongkia marriage arrangement in 
terms of sending and accepting proposal between two families. Once this process is 
over, the Niongkia marriage is organised with a feast called lasong. Lasong is the 
main ritual feast associated with lasonbuiye and has a very special significance.
The other type of marriage is kheerohnejecho what Bengali refers to as ‘love 
marriage’. Kheerohnejecho is a recognised form of marriage among the Marma. As I 
have mentioned in earlier section, Marma women enjoy a degree of freedom 
compared to others in many spheres of social life, such as inheritance, post-marital 
residential preference and choice of husband. Many young girls that I talked to both 
in Banderban and Roangchari had chosen their own bridegroom. Their parents are 
aware about it and this is socially accepted. In Banderban and Roangchari, I have 
seen that it is almost an everyday ritual after finishing a day’s work for young 
people, girls and boys, to get dressed up and go out in the evening. This sort of free 
mixing is unusual among other communities in the CHT. For the Bengali, it is 
simply a ‘social crime’.
In Marma community, kheerohnejecho is a socially recognised form of marriage. 
There are many instances when young people often elope to get married due to a 
lack of the parent’s consent but eventually have been accepted by offering symbolic 
ritual feast lasong. However, the practice of dowry that is strictly followed by 
Bengalis is totally absent among the Marma. The symbolic ceremonial feast lasong 
is central to Marma marriage organisation.
The offering of ceremonial feast lasong is in many ways an indispensable part of 
asserting Marma-ness. Lasong ensures social recognition and approval of the newly 
married couple within the Marma community. It is also socially and culturally 
accepted that without offering this ritual feast by Marma groom, a bride would not 
enjoy the status of wife in the community. Moreover, in Marma community a 
marriage without offering lasong makes their children’s marriage also questionable. 
Thus, lasong is a vital cornerstone of marriage organisation among the Marma.
134
However, there are specific cultural rules with regard to Marma marriage 
organisation. In general, these can be summed up as follows: Marma strictly prohibit 
marriage within the members of a patrilineage. In other words, a male Marma cannot 
marry his parallel and cross cousins on the paternal side. Since members of the 
patrilineage regard themselves as a source of common blood, so marriage with them 
is equated to marriage with one’s own family members. Thus it is restricted by the 
descent exogamy, i.e., the husband and wife come from different descent groups.
Matrilateral cross cousin marriage is widely practiced and preferred among the 
Marma. The preference for cross-cousin marriage may be an easy way to maintain 
solidarity among the descent groups. However, marriage with maternal parallel 
cousin i.e. mother’s sister daughter (akugri) is forbidden. The male members can 
only marry cross cousins on the maternal side.
Although Marma are basically patrilineal, some of the characteristics related to 
inheritance and marriage rules are complex and ambiguous. As we have seen, with 
the fate of father’s property and mother’s property in inheritance practices, Marma 
also consider daughters as source of mother and sons are father’s blood. Thus in the 
context of marriage rules, female Marma can only marry her male cross cousin on 
the fathers side as opposed to parallel or cross-cousins of mother’s side. Diagraml 
illustrates this principle:
Diagram 1 - Marma Marriage Custom
[ fz  fzh  fb] f b w  f ] | m  m b w  [ m b  MZH I MZ
O = A A = O A = O O = A A = O
| fzd | f z s  | f b d FBS | m b s  | m b d  | m zs 1 MZD
O L^  o L^ L\ %i A O A 0 1
merri(m) yofa(m) am5hgti(m) akugri(m) E G O \ /  EGO merri(mf yofa(m) amigri(m) akugri(m)
romah(f) khoo(f) amengri(fT''''tuaaungri(f) (A) (B) rojpduf) khoo(f) amigri(f) mongri(f)
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For A (male ego), marriages with parallel and cross cousins on the paternal side is 
prohibited but preferred to marriages with cross-cousins of the maternal side, i.e., 
mother’s brother daughter (yofa). For B (female ego), maternal cross cousin i.e., 
mother brother’s son (meri) is prohibited but father sister’s son (kooh) is prescribed.
In practice, Marma marriage rules emphasise descent exogamy for marital alliances 
between two groups, but only the cross cousins, not the parallel cousins. Marriages 
with parallel cousins are viewed as the extension of the siblings having same blood 
ties while cross cousins are not related by blood, because they belong to different 
descent groups. In fact, ethnic endogamy and descent exogamy co-exist and go hand 
in hand in the Marma society.
However, in practice, rules of descent exogamy marriage seem flexible, not as rigid 
as in theory, particularly in case of kheerohnejecho (love marriage). Among the 
Marma, this is, to some extent, tolerated within the descent group. This indicates 
flexibility in marriage rules that may allow Marma to maintain renewed alliances 
within the group. This could also be interpreted as a political mechanism to control 
members of the descent groups.49 This irregular marriage practice may give an 
opportunity for the groups to establish their old relations on the one hand, and also 
to uphold broader group cohesion within context of Marma ethnicity on the other. 
In other words, marriage is commonly enforced within the Marma ethnic group- 
ethnic endogamy at the cost of abandoning the full rigour of descent exogamy.
In fact, the politics of ‘community culture* is clearly expressed in the case of inter­
ethnic marriage. In everyday practice, Marma, as an ethnic group, are less tolerant 
towards the element of inter-ethnic marriage. In other words, inter-ethnic marriage is 
seen as a threat to Marma ethnic identity. Among Marma, in the case of inter-ethnic 
marriage involves punitive actions such as denial of property inheritance rights as 
well as social ostracism if it happens to be with the Bengali in particular. During my 
fieldwork in Roangchari, I have not come across a single instance of inter-ethnic 
marriage either within the ethnic communities themselves or with the Bengalis.
49 For example, Friedman (1975) analyses similar point in context of Kachin exchange system and the
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However, in Banderban town I knew of a couple of instances of inter-ethnic 
marriage. The story of Monir and Me Ma Nue (pseudonyms), a Bengali-Marma 
couple tells us the reality of inter-ethnic marriage in the CHT. I met Me Ma Nue in 
Banderban TCI (Tribal Cultural Institute) when I was taking Marma language course 
at initial stage of my fieldwork. Me Ma Nue is a part time language instructor at TCI 
and mother of two children. Her husband, Monir, is a reporter on a local Bengali 
newspaper.
During my fieldwork period I developed a good friendly relationship with this 
family. They explained to me their marriage experiences of how they had escaped 
from Banderban fleeing to Chittagong town in a frightening, tense and insecure 
situation. Me Ma Nue explains:
Because of marrying a Bengali man, I had to suffer a lot. Immediately after 
the marriage my everyday life was miserable; anywhere I went I experienced 
verbal abuse in the street, work place, everywhere. Socially, I was rejected 
by my family and relatives. Whenever I went to Uzani para, my father‘s 
village, everybody I knew would just turn around.
The couple now live in a rented house at Magistrate Colony, away from the 
overwhelming Marma village Uzani para, after returning to Banderban about five 
years living in Monir‘s parental village of Comilla district. Since the birth of their 
first son three years ago Me Ma Nue for the first time visited her parental home at 
Uzani para. The relation with her parent‘s family is now becoming easier as two of 
their children frequently stay with the grand father. However, Me Ma Nue still feels 
that because of this marriage her father has lost social reputation and prestige in the 
community where their marriage is looked down upon.
The social life of Monir and Me Ma Nue‘s family seemed to be confined within a 
closed friendship circle. I think, by and large, inter-ethnic marriage is still 
considered as disrespectful to the community as well as endangering ethnic 
solidarity, not only among the Marma but all ethnic groups in the CHT. In many 
cases, inter-ethnic marriage is conceived as one of the important factors in the
articulation of alliance and descent.
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constitution of multi-ethnic society, for example in Cameroon (Burnham 1997). 
However, this is not the case in CHT.
Bawm Marriage Organisation
The Bawm of Soanloo para in Roangchari also adhere to the exclusive practice of 
ethnic endogamy. Marriages with members of other ethnic groups are culturally 
taboo. The underlying emphasis is the maintenance of the enduring character of 
ethnic distinctiveness. However, within the group they strictly follow phun (clan) 
exogamy. Each phun is an exogamous unit. So, in theory, a Bawm man cannot 
marry a woman of the same phun. Bawm believe that phun members are related by 
blood signified by phun name. For example, with a phun name of shahu a man can 
not marry a shahu woman, he must find a woman from other phun, such as sailuk, 
amlai etc.
In Soanloo para, one of my Bawm informants, Zirkhung Shahu Bawm, told me that 
in the past Bawm marriages between the phuns were affected by notion of misia 
(unclean). In Bawm language the term misia is used for people with whom you 
never eat or sleep, a kind of lower status phun. This indicates that in the past Bawm 
were divided into high and low ranking clans, with further differentiation by 
marriage restrictions and ceremonial differences. Loffler (1990) with reference to 
Mru social organisation has indicated such hierarchical social relations of high and 
low ranking clans.
However, Loffler‘s interpretations on these issues are not clear whether “high- 
ranking” and “low-ranking” clan refers to clans or castes or a local combination of 
both at village level. It is also not clear whether a ‘caste-model’ is being placed on 
top of the lineage/descent organisation. At present, this is not the case in Bawm 
community. In the face of new social situations, such as Christianity, resettlement, 
hardship and continuous loss of jhum lands, the Bawm community, as a whole, has 
undergone a change. Conceptions of high-ranking clan and low-ranking clan no 
longer exist among the Bawm.
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Zirkhung Shahu Bawm admits that after conversion to Christianity the misia custom 
no longer exists among the Bawm. This suggests that phun relationships have been 
revised in Bawm society. This, perhaps, helps to reduce the tension among the 
marriageable men and women by the restricted marriage rules in Bawm community. 
Phun exogamy is now a common form of marriage practice among the Bawm.
Among the Bawm, there are specific cultural rules existing in relation to organising 
competing groups for the exchange of women based primarily on the distinction of 
descent. The specific marital rules prescribed as customs among the Bawm are as 
follows:
Parallel cousin marriage, irrespective of lineage differences, consanguineal or 
affinal, is totally forbidden. This implies that a Bawm man (male ego) cannot marry 
his father’s brother’s daughter (FBD) for lineage unity, and mother’s sister’s 
daughter (MZD) for non-lineage parallel cousin. Similarly, a Bawm woman (female 
ego) can neither marry her mother’s sister’s son (MZS), nor her father’s sister son 
(FZS), similar to Marma rules. Therefore, there is only provision of ‘preferential 
cross-cousin marriage’, but with restriction of following descent rules, i.e., male ego 
can marry cross-cousin only on his non-lineage side, mother’s brother’s daughter 
(MBD) but not the cross-cousin of father’s side, father’s sister’s daughter (FZD). 
Diagram2 illustrates the Bawm marriage custom.
Diagram 2 -  Bawm Marriage Custom
MBW
MBD MZD
O A O A A
(patefanu) (patepa) ^fcrtejanu) (patepa) EGO
A D  A O
(nupa) upas mack) (nupe) nute snack)
The Bawm marriage rules suggest prohibition within the lineage line is socially 
enforced but lineage exogamy is generally prescribed. This also means that cross­
cousins are ideally the marriageable partner while parallel-cousin marriage is 
prohibited. The Bawm regards cross cousin as the preferential mate indigenously
139
call thaihu, the mother’s brother daughter (pupa’s mack). The thaihu marriage is 
commonly prevalent among the Bawm and has a significant ritual value in the 
marriage relationship.
For example, in case of thaihu marriage a special feast is arranged in honour of the 
bridegroom’s kin. While the married cross cousins are restricted from participation, 
only the bachelor cross cousins have the privilege to be special guests. This ritual 
feast is considered towards the purpose of selecting ‘would-be’ partners. In this 
respect, Bawm places very distinct cultural value on ritual associated with thaihu 
marriage. This can also be seen as a mechanism of perpetuating traditional cultural 
rules as well as maintaining group solidarity. In Bawm society, the underlying 
significance of thaihu marriage has a social meaning.
Among the Bawm, marriage is predominantly patrilocal and bride price must be 
paid. Bride price has different social implications in many societies. It is the most 
distinctive feature of Bawm marriage custom, locally call as mun. This is, in many 
respects, represents cultural identity of the Bawm. Since marriages are arranged by 
the parents in Bawm community, custom emphasises on a prefixing brideprice to be 
offered to the bride’s family. The amount of brideprice varies with the economic 
conditions of the bridegroom. The bride price, mun, is justified by the fact that the 
rearing of the daughter in the parent family incurred maternal strenuous investment 
conceived as ‘milk price’. But, mum goes to both parents of the daughter.
However, recently, the nature of customary mun (bride price) has been changed in 
order to cope with the economic reality of the Bawm in CHT. Many local residents 
of Soanloo para told me that there were instances of discontent about the 
increasingly high demands of mun. In view of these growing discontents, the Bawm 
social council enacted a law named Bawm Phung Dan (The Bawm customary law of 
mun) in order to keep the bride price within limits. Now, the bride price is fixed at 
three thousand taka.
According to Bawm Phung Dan, if marriage breaks up because of the husband, his 
family cannot claim the mun back. On the other hand the wife’s parents are 
customarily bound to return the mun if she is found guilty. Thus, Bawm cultural
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practice of mun in relation to marriage organisation express a distinctive feature of 
Bawm ethnicity, in contrast to Marma and Tanchanga.
Tanchanga Marriage Organisation
With regard to marriage organisation, the custom that is socially and culturally 
valued among Tanchanga is the marriage arranged by parents accompanied with a 
ritual feast. The Tanchanga locally call such marriage custom sanga mela. Likewise 
Marma and Bawm, the Tanchanga also maintain sanga mela within the broader 
Tanchanga ethnic group, i.e., ethnic endogamy. However, within the group, 
Tanchanga emphasise different cultural rules in relation to marriage organisation.
Among Tanchanga, paternal parallel cousins, such as father’s brother daughter 
(FBD) are strictly prohibited to marry because this is considered to be the lineage of 
father. On the other hand, parallel cousins on the mother side i.e. mother sister’s 
daughter (MZD), is allowed. Tanchanga view that mother’s sister daughter (MZD) 
belongs to different guti from which male ego’s guti (lineage) is not traced. This is 
also true for the cross-cousin marriage. A Tanchanga man can marry cross-cousins 
on both sides i.e. father’s sister’s daughter (FZD), mother’s brother’s daughter 
(MBD) on the similar ground of guti affiliation.
Thus approval of maternal parallel cousin marriage is exceptional in Tanchanga 
community, not observed either in Marma or Bawm. A sharp difference in marriage 
customs is found among Marma, Bawm and Tanchanga. Marma and Bawm offer a 
more rigid and restricted type of marriage rules. Parallel-cousin marriage is strictly 
prohibited at both lineal and non-lineal sides while cross-cousin marriage occurs 
outside one’s own lineage.
Tanchanga marriage rules, on the other hand, are more flexible. Tanchanga man is 
only restricted to marry a parallel cousin of his own guti i, e. father’s brother’s 
daughter (FBD). On the other hand, he can marry corresponding parallel cousin of 
mother’s side, i.e., mother’s sister’s daughter (MZD). Thus, marriage rules allow 
either side of the cross-cousins, mother’s brother’s daughter (MBD) and father’s 
sister’s daughter (FZD). The Diagram 3 illustrates the Tanchanga marriage custom.
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Diagram 3 - A Tanchanga Marriage
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Tanchanga Marriage practices are allowed parallel and cross cousin marriage of both 
lineage and non-lineage group. These marriage rules can also be seen as the 
distinctive feature of Tanchanga ethnic unity maintenance.
Figure 4 A Tanchanga sanga mela (wedding ceremony)
Among the Tanchanga, marriage is, according to custom, held by dowry practice 
that involves money, ornaments and clothes etc. In the case of divorce the husband 
is supposed to return the dowry received at the time of marriage. In practice, 
however, like the other two groups, divorce is rare among the Tanchanga. I did not 
see any divorce cases during my fieldwork period in Roangchari. There is also a 
striking similarity between Marma and Tanchanga with regard to arrangement of a 
ceremonial feast during marriage. Tanchanga call this ritual feast mella which is of
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significant social value in Tanchanga community. It is a common practice that 
nonconformity of this ritual feast would lead to social boycotting in death ritual 
associated with cremation. This indicates that the marriage feast offered by the 
bride’s side is an indispensable part of Tanchanga culture.
In sum, it appears that in the CHT ethnic groups are culturally diverse in terms of 
social organisation. Marma Bawm and Tanchanga display marked differences in 
clan organisation, descent and household organisation, inheritance, and marriage 
custom. A comparative table can be shown here on the basis of diversity of the 
social organisational feature of three ethnic groups in Roangchari.
Table 2-Comparative Framework of Marma, Bawm and Tanchanga Social 
Organisation
Parameters Marma Bawm Tanchanga
History of 
settlement
Early settlers 
(oldest)
Last settlers 
(1985)
Late settlers 
(1962)
Nature of 
settlement
Settlement in plain Settlement on hill top Settlement in 
plain
Clanship No clanship Clan centred Clanship
Descent rule Patrilineal Patrilineal Patrilineal
Household
Structure
Semi-extended Nuclear Extended
Degree of male 
and female 
authority and 
position
Higher status for 
women
Lower status for 
women Male centred 
relation
Absolute male 
dominated
Marriage rule Restricted cross 
cousin marriage, 
No parallel cousin 
marriage
Restrictive cross 
cousin marriage, 
No parallel cousin 
marriage
Flexible cross 
cousin marriage, 
Parallel cousin 
marriage is 
prescribed
Post- marital 
residence
Both patrilocal and 
matrilocal (bilocal)
Neo local Only patrilocal 
(unilocal)
Rules of 
inheritance
Elder son’s share is 
high,
Female inheritance is 
recognised on equal 
basis
Young son inherits 
parental house,
No female 
inheritance
All sons inherit 
equally,
No female 
inheritance
Dowry/Bride
price
No dowry and 
Brideprice,
Social feast lasong is 
recommended
Practices of bride 
price,
No dowry
Dowry Practices, 
No brideprice, 
mela (feast) is 
recommended
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Conclusion
To understanding the social organisation of the three ethnic groups from a 
comparative perspective is to form an understanding of inter-ethnic relationships in 
the CHT. I argue that differential forms of cultural polarity and diversity 
maintenance provide the basic dynamics of very nature of the multi-ethnic society in 
CHIT. As mentioned above, all the three ethnic groups under study trace descent 
patirilinealy, but they have varied types of clan organisations, kinship relations, 
inheritance and marriage organisation - the distinct markers of each community. 
These distinctive organisational features maintain as group boundary between each 
of them in their locality.
I argue that the way in which the social organisational features are maintained in 
every day life of Marma, Bawm and Tanchanga people in Roangchari is an 
expression of ethnic cultural identity. Of course, identities are constructed -  they are 
not pre-given absolutes. It is important to deconstruct identity in the context of CHT 
because these groups are not neatly bounded ‘tribes’ but actually part of the much 
bigger political field.
Today, for example, clanship is of less significance among the groups. In recent 
times, membership of an ethno-linguistic group has been seen as a basic element in 
the group identity project in CHT. I suggest that taking ethno-name as a membership 
of an ethno-linguistic group is a key factor to ethnic identity construction. In the 
CHT, the first question to be addressed to a stranger is which ethnic groups do you 
belong to, rather than which clan do you belong to? This point has, I think, been 
made clear in my account of clan and identity.
In a multi-ethnic area like CHT where different ethnic groups have a competing 
relationship with each other on the one hand, but on the other hand they have a 
collective identity in relation to their antagonistic relationship with the dominant 
Bengali. Clanship, marriage organisation, and other social organisational aspects, in 
this context, have limited significance beyond the local ethnic domain. As Marma, 
Bawm, Tanchanga and other communities in CHT are increasingly incorporated into 
the broader framework of the region, nation and state, social organisational features
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in many ways have been defined and redefined in the discourse of ethnic and 
collective identity.
In other words, traditional forms of social organisation have not been abandoned by 
the groups themselves, but many of these have instead been modified in the context 
of rapid socio-cultural changes in the CHT. In fact over the years, each and every 
ethnic group has undergone an internal and external process of change. The degree 
of changes, however, varied across the groups and each community has experienced 
it in a dissimilar way to others.
For example, Christianity has had a profound impact on Bawm. Among the Bawm, 
previous clan relationships as high and low rankings are no longer in existence. The 
mode of behaviour has changed significantly. Once a rice beer producing group, it 
has been completely transformed into a non-drinking community, abandoning the 
drinking habit as socially and religiously immoral. Life styles, such as clothing (the 
adoption of trousers, skirts), and music (for example, the guitar), have been the new 
outlook of Bawm identity compared to other common ethnic dress in CHT. The 
customary bride price has also changed into a new form.
Marma have already adapted to Burmese Somohada inheritance practices, and there 
are also changes in customary practices of inheritance under Bengali legal and 
judicial procedures. In case of livelihood situations, there are also changes in social 
organisation as the Bawm community is relying on day labourers due to scarcity of 
jhum lands. Marma and Tanchanga have adapted to the paddy land cultivation along 
with jhum. In view of these contemporary changes, it would be misleading to 
describe ethnic groups as being fixed bounded categories, as is often characterised in 
the literature on CHT (Loffler 1990; Selina 1995).
I argue that as organising principles, clanship, kinship and marriage organisation are 
symbolically important to group formation at the level of local politics. These 
aspects are still fundamental to the cultural boundary maintenance as ethnic groups, 
such as Marma Tanchanga and Bawm in the CHT. At the broader level, however, 
these internal aspects of socio-organisational features of group identity are
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politically unimportant in relation to collective mobilisation. In this process, political 
and economic marginalisation is seen as the ‘shared deprivation’ of collective 
identity.
At present, in the CHT, smaller groups join with larger groups to form a bigger 
category of hill people because of the political and material advantages involved. 
This could be explained as the fluidity of group identity in the CHT. The notion of 
‘shared deprivation’ potentially provides the vehicle through which a broader level 
ethnic collective mobilisation is achieved. This mobilisation is reflected in the range 
of vocabulary regarding broader ethnic identification such as Pahari, Jhumma, 
Adivashi and so on. The construction of these categories is influenced by the wider 
political context. I discuss this dimension of collective identity construction with 
different layers and meaning in the third part of the thesis.
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Chapter Four 
Culture Becomes Politics, Politics Becomes Culture 
Language and Identity in CHT
Introduction
The main theme I wish to elaborate in this chapter is the linguistic dimension of 
ethnicity. In the CHT, language forms a dynamic element in the discourse of 
boundary-making and ethnic construction. There is a constant interplay in the 
construction of linguistic identity both at micro and macro level. Therefore, among 
other things, language can be seen as the idiom of cultural politics within multi­
ethnic milieu in the CHT as well as with wider Bengali and the Bangladesh State. In 
this chapter I will discuss different dimensions of linguistic identity construction at 
individual, group and collective level mainly focusing on the Marma, Bawm and 
Tanchanga in Banderban.
In the previous chapter I have discussed how settlement, clan, and marriage 
organisations are the elements of ethnic boundary maintenance bringing group 
members together and culturally differentiating others. I have explained how 
differential modes of social organisation are produced, practised, and to some extent 
manipulated in order to reproduce ethnic identity in a multi-ethnic locality like 
Roangchari. Although I suggest that marriage and clan organisation are very 
important elements in terms of group membership, they have very limited 
significance beyond local levels. I argue that ethnic groups in the CHT are 
increasingly engaged in wider forms of relationships among themselves and with the 
State. Language and linguistic elements are becoming the basis for group 
identification within multi-ethnic relationships.
Indeed, membership of an ethno-linguistic group is the key to identification of 
ethnicity in the CHT. This can be seen in the forms of temple language, ethno- 
naming,50 and development of written scripts. The way in which linguistic identity is 
articulated among the groups demonstrates a form of ethno- cultural mobilisation in 
the CHT. The development of written scripts in particular becomes the source and
50An ethno-name is used here to denote the widespread habit of people taking the name of their ethnic
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central focus of this linguistic identity. I argue that the articulation of linguistic 
identity through native scripts is reinforced and influenced by various organisational 
activities. These organisational activities in terms of language and cultural 
development can be seen as a process of ‘ethno-linguistic mobilisation’.
However, there are different levels of mobilisations in the CHT. At the micro level, 
construction or invention of native scripts by different ethnic groups is not only the 
development of language but it is also the assertion of one’s cultural identity in order 
to maintain diversity within multi-ethnic politics. At a broader macro level, the 
diverse linguistic and cultural elements are interpreted as a unifying whole in a quest 
for the indigenous representation, such as in TCI (Tribal Cultural Institute) activities. 
In other words, linguistic mobilisation takes another form when reified into 
institutional representation at the macro level in order to symbolise the discourse of 
‘indigenous culture’. In this context, culture and politics are intertwined.
Therefore, one must be aware of the shifting and fluid nature of contested identity 
construction in the CHT. I argue that there is no common single language that can 
unify diverse ethnic groups into a single unit or assert collective identity. However, 
it is also a matter of interpretation because the notion of cultural representation is 
always manifested in articulation.51 In the CHT, among other things, a group’s 
linguistic identity project can be used as a template for mobilising political discourse 
of indigenous culture.
The TCI representation of indigenous culture has largely been symbolised and 
orchestrated in the discourse of ‘unity within diversity’. In this metaphor, the diverse 
ethnic language projects can be seen as a source of unity in order to produce broader 
cultural politics in the CHT. In other words, construction of a common indigenous 
culture is in fact a challenge to the present Bengali regime and culture. To explain
|roup and co-opting it with their personal and family name.
In recent times, there is a growing tendency among ethnic peoples in CHT to think of themselves 
in ethnic term and cultural senses as the member of more pluralistic society. For example to refer to 
the ethnic diversity in CHT local politicians and writers employ a new a metaphor "ten flowers in one 
garden". Flowers symbolise the multi-ethnic nature of CHT and the garden represents the unity 
within diversity.
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this dynamic process I use Escobar’s (1992) phrase “politics becomes culture, 
culture becomes politics”.
In this chapter, I will first map out the ethno-linguistic background of ethnic 
communities, particularly Marma, Bawm and Tanchanga to illustrate the underlying 
basis of multi-ethnic and multi-lingual society in the CHT. Within this perspective, I 
will show how ordinary people articulate ethno-linguistic identity in their everyday 
life. I then turn to the organisational discourses of linguistic identity construction. 
The socio-cultural organisations, such as the Tanchanga Kyllan Shaongshod, Bawm 
Socio-cultural Organisation, Marma Society all strive to mobilise their respective 
ethnic communities by developing language and culture. I will examine these 
organisational activities how they are related to ethnic mobilisation. One particular 
importance of this inquiry is to locate how these language projects influence 
ordinary people.
Finally I will discuss TCI policies in order to compare organised discourses 
generated by institutional activities with ordinary people’s reactions particularly in 
the realm of indigenous culture. I end the section with a note on the terrain of 
subaltern mobilisation in the CHT, and discuss the relation between 
language/culture-based ethnic mobilisation and resource-based movements of 
collective identity. Although the two largely overlap there is a clear shift towards the 
latter. In the context of CHT, the social movement largely revolves around the issue 
of socio-economic marginalisation based on the struggle for land and livelihood, 
which I will discuss in succeeding chapters. However, I suggest that the 
linguistic/cultural project supplement this as a vehicle for broader level indigenous 
collective mobilisation.
I conclude the chapter with a discussion of linguistic identity within the context of 
multi-ethnic relationships. The underlying theme of the chapter, however, relates to 
the broader level ethnic mobilisation. First, I begin the discussion with a background 
analysis of linguistic map in the CHT.
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Ethno-linguistic map of CHT
Anthropologists and linguists consider language as the mirror of a society because it 
represents all objective realities and cognitive categories of a given culture (Cheater 
& Hopa 1997; Kuipers 1998; Rahman 1999). This perspective suggests that 
understanding of language and linguistic elements are also understandings of the 
cultural identity of an ethno-linguistic group. In the context of CHT, however, I find 
that ethno-linguistic knowledge of the groups is extremely limited as far as 
ethnographic literature is concerned. A research gap is particularly wide in the 
context of the historical relationships between various languages.
However, an inquiry into this line is not within the purview of this present study 
since it requires a purely different kind of investigation. Yet it is deemed useful to 
provide a brief diachronic account of the languages of Marina, Bawm and 
Tanchanga in relation to different proto-languages or ancestral languages (with the 
broader level) with which they are related (see the Appendix 1). An analysis of 
present day distribution of languages and dialects in the CHT reveals an inherent 
linguistic diversity that prevails among the ethnic groups who co-habit in the region, 
as well their historical relationships in terms of constituting multi-ethnic society.
Status of Marina, Bawm and Tanchanga Languages/dialect
Of the three groups under study, the Marma and Bawm have writing alphabets while 
the dialect of Tanchanga has operated until now only at the oral level (as a spoken 
language). The name of the Marma is suggestive of their connection to Burma. The 
origin of the word ‘Marma’ is by no means certain but it is generally held that the 
word owes its origin to Myanmar, a term which designates Burma. U Tun Pru 
Marma (1994) notes that Burmese natives identify themselves as Mirma.
According to local legends the forefathers of the present Bhomang king of 
Banderban ruled over the Pegu region of Burma in 16th century and family members 
of the Bhomong king are the descended from ruling dynasty of Pegu (see also U Tun 
Pru 1994). The Marma people in Banderban are in favour of regarding themselves as 
major component of the Burmese population and claim that in the past their
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ancestors migrated from Burma and later settled in the CHT. They show religious 
and cultural affinity with the Burmese, and believe that the term Marma is derived 
from word myanmar implying historical root of Burma. It suggests that similarities 
between languages of Marma and Burmese are attribution of past historical unity. 
Thus the present Marma language is written with a Burmese alphabetic system, 
which is locally called Marma jha.
As far as the Bawm are concerned, there are various legends in support of the origin 
of the term Bawm. According to one version, the word Bawm literally means coop 
or basket or container. The term Bawm is attributed to them because of their habit of 
carrying basket. The manners and customs of the Bawm people support this version 
of claim. A number of Bawm writer also note that ‘man of the basket* is the same 
group of people living in upper Burma called Chin by the Burmese. ‘Chin’ means 
‘basket’ in Burmese (Vumsom 1974; Shahu & Pardo 1998).
However, the term ‘Bawm’ has been variously rendered by colonial administrators 
in the CHT and reproduced confusingly in later ethnographic and historical 
literature. Lewin (1869) and Hutchinson (1909) described the Bawm as Banjogi. 
According to Hutchinson the name Banjogi is derived from ban “a forest” and jagi 
“wanderer” (notably both ban and jagi are Bengali word). Pierre Bessaignet (1958) 
described Bangugis are almost same with the Pankhoos in customs, habits and 
religion. The only two main differences are that the men folk bind their hair in the 
front and do not shape their forehead. Lucian Bemot (1959) accounted that the 
meaning of the name Banjogi was unknown to his informants and the Marma called 
them langge and the Bengali kuki. This was the way to know the Bawm as 
‘wanderer tribe’ by the outsiders.
The Bawm people, however, call themselves as Bawm. For better understanding, 
both the terms, Langge and Kuki, are vague in designation. Traditionally the Bengali 
people generally call to the Bawm, Pankhua, and Lushai in the CHT ‘Kuki’, who 
have more affinities with the Chin-Kuki-Mizo people, commonly known as Zo 
people in the hilly region of North-east India and Burma (Vumson 1988). Recently 
Shahu & Pardo (1998) in their booklet pointed out that Bawm maintain a common 
legend that they originated from a cave called chinlung, believed to be located in the
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Chin Hills. They claim that Bawm is one of the small groups like Zahau, Sunlhala 
Lakhers and Haka in the Falan region of the Chin Hills but all of them belong to the 
Chin group.
Consulting Bawm missionary chronicles they mentioned that the Bawm, in a larger 
group moved from the Chin Hill of Haka and Falan area towards the Sangu of CHT 
around 1810. Subsequently they spread out over different parts of the CHT such as 
Sangu, Painda, Tarasa, Rokhong Hills and the hill regions of Saichal, Sajek and 
Barkal. This source of information about the Bawm is valuable because they are the 
first Bawm to document historical roots and migration of the Bawm people in the 
CHT. Their accounts are valuable not only for detail and careful treatment of 
information by combining their own observations with considerable number of 
elderly Bawm but also for the reconstruction of history in terms of social and 
cultural relationship between Bawm and other neighbouring groups.
Their analysis suggest that there is a historical relationship between Bawm and other 
Chin groups in terms of linguistic similarity, and later particularly adoption of 
Roman scripts for a common lingua franca. In the first quarter of the 20th century 
when Roman writing system was introduced among converted Chin groups by the 
missionaries they prepared a dictionary called A Grammar and Dictionary of the 
Duhlien Dialect (Shahu & Pardo 1998). The Duhlien dialect of Lusai, Pawi, Lai, 
Bawm and Lakher groups are almost similar to one another because of their origin to 
Tibeto-Burman sub-family of Kuki-Chin group. The Duhlien dialect is considered to 
be the lingua franca of the Zo people. It is now a written language in Mizoram and 
among the Bawm in the CHT.
Since 1930 the Bawm have had a writing system mainly for missionary purposes. 
The Bawm alphabet system has been designed after the Roman one. At present 
about 80% Bawm can read and write in their language. Children are taught Bawm 
language in the Sunday school. Since 1977 they have had the Bible and Bawm Dan 
Bu (Bawm Customary Law) printed in Bawm. An anglicised writing system and 
values have had a profound impact on the Bawm traditional life style. This has been 
revealing the way elderly Bawm still count five days of the v/eek-thai (tomorrow), 
kip (the day after tomorrow), thiam (the day after that), kam (the day after that) and
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lawi (the day after that). They have twelve months and each named after nature, 
festivities, and jhum.
In contrast to Marma and Bawm, the Tanchanga dialect bears a close resemblance 
with the Chakma dialect and Chittagonian dialect (regional variety of Bengali 
language). In view of linguistic similarity between Tanchanga and Chittagonian 
dialects it would be incorrect to assume that Tanchanga have migrated from the 
westwards plain lands of Bengal. In fact, Tanchanga people are said to have settled 
in the CHT migrating from eastwards neighbouring Arakan region of Burma. 
According to accounts of Lewin (1869) and Bemot (1959), Tanchanga is the sub­
tribe of Chakma.
However, Tanchanga people in Banderban deny this fact and identify themselves as 
Tanchanga and Dainyak. They claim that some segments of their population are still 
found in different pockets of Arakan, who call themselves as Dainyak. Today 
Tanchanga relate their ancestry with Dainyak to assert their separateness from the 
Chakma. The legendary and mythical beliefs of Tanchanga only support a view that 
Dainyak formed the military force of Chakma king in the past (Bir Kumer 
Tanchanga 1998). From such evidence one can draw a tentative conclusion that 
Tanchanga were aboriginal of Arakan and CHT area.
Linguistically Tanchanga dialect is linked to the Indo-Aryan language group of 
broader Indo-European language family. Of the three communities under study, until 
today Tanchanga have no written alphabets for their language. It operates as oral 
dialect. A section of Tanchanga, nonetheless, emphasise that they have a restricted 
literary tradition of written script, called tallek, used by shamans and boddyas (local 
medicine man or healers). They claim that the tallek scripts contain secret magic 
formulas for curing people from physical ailments having spirit possession.
Ordinary Tanchanga, however, have no knowledge or understanding about this 
tallek. In a recent article, Bir Kumer Tanchanga (1998) suggests that talleks are the 
traditional scripts of Tanchanga. Such claims, however, could not be validated with 
empirical proof. However, a written scripture named gojen lamma contains various 
ballads (gits) or proverbs are also said to be source of Tanchanga alphabets. At
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present, a strong sentiment prevails among the Tanchanga to devise an alphabet 
system for their language. The TCI is providing the necessary stimulus towards this 
end.
Outlining this short description of ethno-linguistic background of these groups, I 
address some of the intriguing ethnographic questions in relation to language and 
identity of present day CHT: what do language differences signify in the everyday 
lives of ordinary people? How are their different languages being negotiated in 
complex multi-ethnic relationships, particularly in the context of new identity 
formation?
In order to answer these questions, I begin with a discussion of how ethno-linguistic 
boundary maintenance plays a crucial role in everyday life among ethnic groups in 
CHT. I explain the question of ethno-linguistic identity based on two related as well 
as complementary ethnographic examples. First, I describe how language use in the 
temple reinforces the ethno-linguistic identity among ethnic groups in the CHT. 
Secondly, how usage of an ethno-name as part of a personal name is becoming a 
public discourse in the form of linguistic identity construction.
Language of Temple, Language of Identity
As I mentioned earlier, language is perceived as an essential trait of ethno-linguistic 
affiliation among ethnic groups in the CHT. The importance of language in defining 
Marma, Bawm and Tanchanga as an ethnic group is relevant, not simply in order to 
establish a criterion of definition but as a resource to organise, create and maintain a 
myth of common cultural origin. Speaking the same language represents the 
similarity in customs, particularly linguistic similarities, which reinforces the 
dimension of ethnicity and very sense of unity of the group. In the CHT speaking the 
same language is also a process of ethnicisation and reproduction of ethno-linguistic 
identity.
Social relationship of the groups is manifested in linguistic terms the way in which 
they interact with each other in day-to-day life. There are various ways in which 
linguistic attachment crosscuts other dimensions of ethnicity. Both Marma and
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Tanchanga are Buddhist by religion and ritual beliefs52 but Buddhist Marma and 
Buddhist Tanchanga are practically organised in ethno-linguistic terms. The ethnic 
terms Marma and Tanchanga exclusively refer to ethno-linguistic groups linked to 
the name of the languages. They identify their cultural differences based on 
languages rather than religious similarities. Marma and Tanchanga have separate 
lcayangs (temples) of their own. This is not due to the fact that they have differences 
in the observance of religious and ritual rites, nor that there are other practical 
reasons to have separate village kayang for infra-structural factors, such as long 
distances or bad communication. In fact, Roangchari temples are situated within the 
close proximity to both Marma and Tanchanga villages but known to locals as 
Marma and Tanchanga kayang. In Banderban, there are even Tanchanga families 
living next door to the Uzani para Marma kayang.
Yet these Buddhist kayangs, in religious term, are symbolically places of worship 
for any Buddhist. But in reality these places are culturally conditioned with ethno- 
linguistic criteria of the group. Only Marma people go to Marma kayang and 
Tanchanga people go to Tanchanga kayang. However, one should not become 
confused by the idea that Marma and Tanchanga are religiously segregated 
community in terms of observing public rituals in Buddhism. They do share, 
perform and participate in many common activities like viccu (priest) cremation 
ceremony, zadi (pagoda) erection worship and so on. In everyday mundane life, 
however, Tanchanga and Marma have their own way of practising and justifying 
Buddhism more in a cultural way. It is rather linguistic practice which dictates the 
religious unity of the group.
During my fieldwork in Roangchari, Bottoli para Tanchanga kayang had no viccu 
for three months. An assistant viccu of Noapotong Tanchanga kayang (neighbouring 
kayang of some eight to ten miles away from Roangchari) was discharging religious
52 Buddhism is the major religion in the CHT. Numerically dominant groups like the Chakma, Marma 
and Tanchanga are all Buddhist.
53 A zadi occupies an important place in the religious life of the Buddhist followers in the CHT. Zadi 
symbolises the corporal relics of Buddha and his disciples. Zadi is like a dome based on a circular 
base but pyramidal end because of a gradually tapering outline resulting from gradually receding disc 
of umbrella at the top. At the time of its construction a big worship is held in which large number of 
Buddhists irrespective of ethnic groups participate. On the occasion of its erection worship is 
signified to paying homage to lord Buddha.
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functions on an irregular basis as requested by the kayang committee until a new 
viccu was found to take over the charge. However, many ordinary Tanchanga, who 
are regular kayang visitors, were agonisingly disappointed about the departure of the 
old viccu and the problem of practising day-to-day religious activities. I was told 
that the old viccu left for another kayang in Rangamati because of his uneasiness 
with local kayang committee. Many of these angry elderly told me that old viccu’s 
departure was an outcome of his awareness that there was not sufficient financial 
support to refurbish the old kayang, which has a thatched roof and is in very fragile 
condition. They felt uncertain about the whole situation and were agonisingly fed up 
with the committee. Among them I spoke to, told me that it was shame for the 
Tanchanga people in Roangchari to live with a broken kayang and without a viccu.
Despite persistent difficulties in day-to-day rituals and religions,54 however, I hardly 
noticed any Tanchanga elderly visiting to nearby Rockoywa para Marma kayang, 
which is believed to be the oldest kayang in the entire Banderban region. I was 
curious about what really deterred them from going to Marma kayang.551 wondered 
whether there were any strange personal or community feelings or other socio­
cultural factors that influenced both these Buddhist communities, in religious terms, 
to set them apart.
As elderly people have difficulties in routine religious practices, I asked Sharod 
Chandra Tanchanga (aged 70) why he would not go to Marma kayang, which is only 
half a mile away from Bottoli para. He replied in a rather collective fashion, placing 
linguistic elements of the community over religious attachment:
Our religion is not different from the Marma but there is only one difference. 
It is pratonna (prayers) and it is conducted in Tanchanga language. We feel 
different during viccu’s sermon in Tanchanga language, which unite us to 
think it is for the Tanchanga.... [] We do not understand what Marma viccu 
says to the devotees when giving panch shil56 and in other ritual cases. Only
54 Day to day rituals involves many things, for example, food purification through serving viccu, 
panchshill observance and others.
This happened to be an ambiguous element out of my own experience and engagement with the 
Bengali notion of religiosity. Both Hindu and Muslim communities, in spite of their caste and sects 
boundary, still go along with performing many rituals and religious activities in common place as 
common worship entity. In the case of Marma and Tanchanga this seemed to be different.
56 The literary meaning of Panchachil is the five commands of self-restriction and it is believed to be 
one of the main principles in Buddhism which has to be done through the viccu to rectify self.
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Marma can understand this. Marma viccu even does not talk in Bangla. So if 
you don’t understand pratana why should you go there?
Thus, what elderly Sharod Tanchanga tells us here is that it is not the kayang or 
Buddhism itself as an ideology making everyday community, it is rather linguistic 
practice in the temple which creates a sense of ethno-linguistic belonging/identity 
among the Tanchanga. Shorad Tanchanga’s account can be illustrated as the 
construction of ethno-linguistic identity. This also suggests that practicality of the 
language use in the kayang is a bonding factor rather than religious segregation. 
Therefore I argue that the language of the temple is not simply the language of 
religion it is also the language of identity.
The same dimension can also be seen among other groups in the CHT. The way 
Marma people articulate the practice of Buddhism, in many ways, is an expression 
of Marma-ness embedded in Marma language and Burmese culture. It is conceivable 
that Marma as the second largest ethnic group have established religious institutions 
and symbols, such as the kayang, pali tool (religious school) and zadi, to signify 
their Buddhist identity in the CHT. These religious establishments, however, 
represent for the Marma the opportunity to articulate their linguistic and cultural 
Marma-ness as Buddhist. For other Buddhist groups, in order to participate or 
perform Buddhist rituals in this institutional setting of Banderban one has to follow 
the medium of Marma language as the language of religion. During my stay in 
Banderban I observed many public Buddhists rituals which profoundly 
demonstrated Marma-ness more in a linguistic way.
I argue that for the Marma and Tanchanga people in the CHT Buddhism, as an 
ideological practice of religiosity, does not create a sense of shared ‘religious 
community’; it is rather articulated in an ethno-linguistic way. So as with other 
communities in the CHT, among the Bawm, for example, Christianity has shaped 
their lifestyle in many ways but they still express their common identification with 
the Bawn language. The Bawm language has been the iconic feature of Bawm 
identity, including the practices of Christianity.
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Marma, Bawm and Tanchanga ethno-names are much more embedded in self- 
identity as ethno-linguistic group based on language rather than religious or other 
affiliations. But the articulation of ethno-linguistic boundary is also assertion of 
political identity of the group in the context of multi-ethnic relationship in CHT. The 
following example clearly reveals taking up an ethno-name as part of personal name 
is another way of asserting ethno-linguistic identity in the CHT. Through the 
following ethnographic example I will show how the articulation of a group name as 
part of a personal name not only justifies attachment to an ethno-linguistic group but 
also serves as an emblem of political identity in everyday relationships between the 
groups.
Ethno-names and Group Identity
Names and naming are central to the modem projects of identity construction among 
ethnic groups in the CHT similar to many South and Southeast Asian so-called 
“tribal” peoples.57 These identity projects vary in nature and situation relating to 
both local level ethnic mobilisation and broader level collective identification 
against the state and others form of external forces. In the CHT, the 
institutionalisation and personification of ethno-names are of great importance in 
ethnic and political contexts. Personal naming is one of the dimensions in which an 
ethno-linguistic identity is articulated not only as the index of group affiliation but 
also the criteria of determining politics of multi-ethnic relationships.
Ethnicising personal names is a fairly new phenomenon among the ethnic groups in 
the CHT. In Roangchari I encountered many ordinary Marma, Bawm and 
Tanchanga elderly people who quite recently did not have any ethno-names as part 
of their proper name but are using them now.58 Land and other past historical 
documents do not confirm their inherent possession of ethno-names. Even today
57 See Winzer (1997) for more information on the discussion of the "Orang Asil" of Malaysia and 
Karlsson (1997) for Rabba people in Northeast India.
58 However, members of Marma and Chakma royal familiy still do not take ethno-names and use the 
colonial title of talukder, dewan, khisha,chowdhury, larma and so on. These titles are the attributions 
of royalty and directly related to the notion of traditional local powers connected with the landed 
aristocracy in the CHT. In the past they also thought of the agents of higher authority. For examples, 
the titles: talukdar and dewan among the Chakma were given by the Mughal as to the revenue 
collectors of the empire in Bengal.
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among the Marma, for instance, in private lifecycle rituals such as in naming 
ceremony babies are ceremoniously given the traditional Marma cognomens rather 
than ethno-names. As a general practice, a child’s name is to be chosen in 
accordance with the phones of the day on which he or she is bom. As Marma phones 
are assigned for a particular day of the week it is within this limit any name is 
chosen. For example, Chotoy Pm Marma was bom on Tuesday and cha is taken as 
the first letter of his birthday. The following table indicates how the Marma names 
are selected.
Table 3-Marma Naming Days
Days Phones
Monday ka, kha, ga, gha, and na
Tuesday Cha, chha, ja, jha, and na
Wednesday ta, tha, da, dha, and na
Thursday pa, pha, ba, bha, and ma
Friday la, wa
Saturday ya, tha, and ha
Sunday A
Source: Show Yeo, Chatoy Pru, Mung kuyo Sin of Roangchari and Banderban.
A is only assigned to Sunday. It is combination with other vowels changes to the 
sound of the word.
Among the Marma cognomens denotes position of the person within the siblings. A 
boy is addressed maung which literally means brother; nowadays it becomes part of 
a personal name (e.g. Maung Thin Han). Elder son or daughter use ‘AU’ before and 
after their personal name, for example, Aung Thazan Marma, Aung Pm Maram,
59 However, it is difficult to check whether people are differently named on the birth certificate. The 
majority of Bangladeshi do have a birth certificates. There is of course an official policy of providing 
birth certificates if a baby is bom in hospital or in the private clinics. But only educated urban people 
bother about this. Rural Bangladesh is mostly outside of this discourse. As a result the exact age of an 
individual is not an easy matter unless one keeps a record of one’s own.
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Why does it matter for them to take ethno-names as part of their personal names in 
public life? There are number of reasons which underscores the necessity of having 
one’s ethno-name.
I observed when children start school they are registered with their ethno-names. 
Possibly their parents’ envisaged future entitlements to higher education and other 
sectors of reserve seats on the basis of ethno-names.60 Registration of an ethno-name 
in school is important because officially it ensures the child’s group/ethnic 
identification in all public examination certificates starting from the age of fourteen. 
For ethnic groups in the CHT, documentation is crucial not only as a record to be a 
member of particular ethnic group but also to be used for the validation of one’s 
social entitlements.
One of my informants Mong Kayo Chin Marma, an assistant of Roangchari Upzilla 
office, told me that his son could not take the opportunity to study in medical college 
because of his mistake. When his son was registered in school he did not use Marma 
ethno-name as part of his personal name. As a result his son was recorded Okayo 
Chin in all public examination certificates. Mong Kayo Chin ensured authentication 
of his group status as Marma from the local headman in order to support his son’s 
case. However, the Health Ministry, which deals with the medical education in 
Bangladesh, refused to accept his application on the ground that his son’s title did 
not correspond neither with Marma nor with any other groups. Mong Kayo Chin and 
his son now use the Marma ethno-names as part of their personal name so as to 
avoid further discrimination.
This is one of the reasons, among many other, why ordinary people like Mong Kayo 
Chin Marma publicly take or use ethno-names in day-to-day activities. Usage of an 
ethno-name has now become routine in order for individuals to assert their group 
identity in official and everyday life. But the ethno-naming discourse can also be 
seen as the result of government’s divisive policy on CHT. The reserved quota 
system for ‘tribal’ people of CHT is a glaring example of this.
60 In the present government policy there are upazati quotas in educational institutions and in certain 
jobs for the people of CHT. However, one must produce his/her tribal identification to qualify for 
this.
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Reservations of places in educational institutions and reserved quota for jobs were 
initially introduced in the 1980s by the military governments in Bangladesh with 
manifold objectives. Many commentators argued that primary objectives of the 
quota policy were to ensure sympathy from the ordinary ethnic peoples in the CHT 
against the backdrop of military assault in the 1980s. Secondly, the quota system 
was used as a political tool by military regimes in order to convince foreign donor 
countries by showing responsible efforts for the disadvantaged‘tribal’ in the CHT 
(For further discussion of the quota system, see Anti-Slavery Society 1984; Mey, 
1984).
However, apart from this general political objectives the ideological motive behind 
this quota system was far more deep rooted and linked to the inherent state policy of 
divide and rule in the CHT. Even after the fall of the military regime in Bangladesh 
in 1990, the quota system remained a vital political instrument of government policy 
in order to manipulate relationships between ethnic groups. From the statist point of 
view any collective ethnic mobilisation in the CHT is perceived as a threat to 
Bangladesh State sovereignty and territorial integrity.
Therefore, the introduction of the quota system was, in practice, part of the state 
policy of ethnic division and manipulation. The way in which the quota system is 
currently operated has been, by and large, a system of conflicting ethnic interests 
leading to an antagonistic relationship between the groups. The common official 
category of upazati (tribal) quota though, in principle, adopted to accommodate all 
ethnic groups in the CHT it is in fact practically monopolised by relatively 
advantaged groups. Smaller groups find themselves disadvantaged and under 
represented in the present quota system.
Some Tanchanga and Bawm students of Chittagong University,61 who are far less in 
numbers in higher education, have shown resentment about present quota policy in 
public Universities. At present, there are ten to fifteen reserved seats for the upazati 
students in each University but these are not proportionately classified for the
61 They do not want me to mention their names in this thesis for fear that it may create uneasy
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specific group. As a result, numerically dominant groups like Marma and Chakma, 
who are relatively advanced in education and well connected compare to other 
smaller groups, take full advantages of these facilities. The Bawm and Tanchanga 
students complain that the quota system in educational institutions has not properly 
addressed the issue of proportional composition of ethnic groups in the CHT. 
Consequently minor groups have an unequal position to access to higher education. 
These resentments can clearly be read as reflections of group interests and the very 
nature of multi-ethnic relationships in the CHT.
Hence the government policy of reserved quotas in educational institutions and jobs 
though in theory designed for the protection of marginalised and 
disadvantaged‘tribaT people of CHT, in practice the policy lead to an uneasy 
relation between the groups. The official quota system is inextricably linked to 
instigating group politics in such a decisive way that ethno-naming becomes central 
to conflicting interests of the group. Taking an ethno-name, in this context, is not 
only an overt expression of one’s ethnic political identity, also an assertion of 
legitimacy for the appropriation of a group’s rights and opportunities. The 
implications of this quota policy have largely been a policy of systematisation of 
ethnic rifts among the groups in the CHT.
Many local people feel that number of reserved places in educational institutions is 
exceedingly low given the number of students that apply for the university
ff)admission each year. There are even complaints that many Pahari students who 
are eligible on merit basis are forcibly admitted under the quota system. Similarly, 
the number of jobs under the reserved quota is very low and there are even 
difficulties in access to proper information regarding these quota jobs for Pahar.
Despite these critiques on quota policy, the ethno-name is largely seen as a symbol 
of group representation in the CHT, particularly in official dealings. In many 
instances I saw people could not obtain Esthai Shonad Potra (permanent residency
relations with Marma and Chakma students in the University.
62 Referring from Devasish Roy’s speech on International Mother Language Day in Banderban TCI.
63 Referring from the leaflets of Pahari Chtra Porishod-hill student’s body of CHT.
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certificate) because of not having ethno-names as part of their personal names. The 
Esthai Shonad Potra is issued by the Deputy Commissioner as an authenticated 
proof of one’s ‘tribal’ group identity as well permanent residency in the CHT. 
Officially the Esthai Shonad Potra is the most important document for ethnic groups 
because it provides not only vital information of one’s primary group identification, 
can also be used for many other purposes such as proof of eligibility for land lease, 
contesting election and obtaining quota opportunities. Therefore, in order to claim 
permanent inhabitants of the CHT one must procure the Esthai Shonad Potra from 
the DC. For the ethnic groups ethno-name criteria is considered as standard official 
practice to issue an Esthai Shonad Potra. In many respects, this certification, 
however, becomes a tool of government political and legal manoeuvring on the 
issues of land lease in the CHT.64
In Banderban a group of Marma people told me that they were advised by the 
district revenue officer to use their ethnic names as part of their names to avoid any 
misunderstandings. They were annoyed by this, saying that they ought to have the 
right to choose whatever names they preferred. They argued that Marma people are 
distinguished and known by their traditional cognomens. There is no need to be 
identified according to new official political groupings; it is rather a cultural matter. 
Opposing views, however, exist among the few urban educated Marma and they are 
closely related to Marma royal family.
In fact, most of the ordinary Marma I talked to preferred to take Marma ethnic name 
as an essential marker of their identity. They are generally conscious of keeping the 
Marma ethno-name as part of their personal name. I asked the present Roangchari 
union Parisad65 chairman, why he would prefer to take Marma ethnic name as others 
feel uncomfortable using this. He replied to me that “it is important for the Marma to 
be identified as separate ethnic group with the ethno-name, particularly in relation to 
other groups in the CHT. In an ethnically plural situation like in the CHT each group 
maintains its own marker. An ethno-name is one of these”. Therefore for any 
ordinary Marma like him, the ethno-name is a distinct cultural as well as political 
identity signifying a greater bond of Marmaness as opposed to others.
64 I will discuss this point in relation to khas land lease in Chapter Six.
65 A smaller administrative unit within the sub-district Upzilla.
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As I mentioned earlier, ethno-naming is also a new dimension to Bawm and 
Tanchanga ethnicity. Traditionally, personal proper naming of Bawm only contains 
phun (clan) identity which allows Bawm individuals to identify his phun affiliation 
and distinguish them with others phun. Today everyone uses Bawm ethno-name as 
for Bawm identification along with phun identity (see Chapter three). One of my 
Bawm informant Zir Khung Shahu Bawm told me that when he was a child he did 
not have a Bawm ethno-name as part of his personal name, only the phun name. He 
started using the Bawm ethno-name as title much later. He thinks that “this gives a 
sense of belonging to the Bawm community and a feeling of making a Bawm 
cultural identity, and also useful to identify the Bawm from others communities in 
the CHT”.
Among the Bawm ethno-name, in this sense, has been a vehicle to assert political 
identity in the CHT. For them, this ensures and justifies their cultural and ethnic 
distinctiveness as a Bawm entity in relation to others groups on one hand and the 
broader context of ‘state-tribal’ relations on the other. This motivation among the 
groups in general has been inflicted through the very nature of multi-ethnic relations 
and the state politics in the CHT. I will return this point in the later section of this 
chapter.
In the case of Tanchanga, despite their gosa (clan) segmentation, they collectively 
emphasise their greater Tanchanga identity. They do not take any gosa name as part 
of their proper name unlike the Bawm. Today every Tanchanga takes a greater 
Tanchanga ethnic name as part of their personal name to signify a separate ethnic 
group as a whole. Thus the politics of ethnic naming can be seen as part of a broader 
identity formation in the CHT.
It appears from the above discussion that the discourse of ethno-naming is more than 
identifying one’s ethnic affiliation, it is also a politics of representation and group 
interests. I argue that there are many reasons for usage of ethno-names in the CHT. 
Using an ethno-name is linked to and influenced by many socio-economic and 
cultural factors. Firstly, taking ethno-name as part of personal name is one way of 
expressing ethno-linguistic identity because in the present political context of multi­
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ethnic relationship in the CHT each ethnic group tends to maintain its own cultural 
identity. Taking up an ethno-name in this sense is an overt expression of zati 
porichai (national identity) in cultural terms. From the political point of view, the 
ethno-name also serves the purpose of individual’s rights and entitlements as the 
member of a particular ethnic group.
Individuals and ethnic groups, as a whole, employ ethno-names in order to assert 
group cultural identity as well succeeding material interests available for the groups. 
In every day life, usage of an ethno-name as part of personal name, particularly in 
the official matters, is influenced by the Bengali administrative discourse of ‘naming 
politics’. Every single government policy in the CHT, from the distribution of 
development relief to certification of local residency, is by and large directed 
towards the divisive group identification. For that reason alone, affiliation to a 
particular ethnic group is crucial to identity politics in the CHT. I, therefore, suggest 
that ethno-naming can be seen as a process of socio-political as well as cultural 
identity making.
I argue that taking up an ethno-name is apparently a matter of ‘public discourse’. I 
am calling this public discourse because it involves individuals acting as an ethno- 
linguistic group competing with others in the everyday public arena, such as for 
jobs, quotas, and in the political representation of local bodies in a manner of 
contested plural ethnic politics in the CHT. However, I also suggest that individual 
perceptions of ethno-linguistic identity have largely been influenced by organised 
community mobilisation. Individuals are motivated by socio-cultural organisational 
activities within the arena of linguistic revivalism. The development of written 
scripts and language appeared to be the symbolic capital to these organised 
discourses. The work led by TCI and different socio-cultural organisations aim to 
adopt new alphabets, develop old language scripts, and develop projects of 
‘standardised modem languages’ is central to this discourse.
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The Development of an Alphabet as the Politics of Cultural Identity
Besides ethno-naming, the development of an alphabet and standardisation of 
written language is another crucial aspect in the discourse of cultural identity 
construction in the CHT. Among other thing, the socio-cultural organisations of 
different ethnic groups come to play a key role in this discourse of linguistic identity 
project. Each and every ethnic community has organised themselves into socio­
cultural associations emphasising strong community bonds and welfare issues. One 
common denominator which is at work in these organised discourses is that 
languages and dialects must be developed in written form as with other ‘modem 
languages’ in the CHT and in relation to Bengali.
The Marma Society, the Tanchanga Kayllan Shongshod (the Tanchanga Welfare 
Organisation), The Bawm Socio-cultural Association and the Tripura Shongshod are 
the key organisations actively engaged in the language projects at community level. 
At the institutional level, the TCI has also elaborate programmes of language 
development and are closely working with these organisations. Almost every ethnic 
community now has a project of either written language development or alphabet 
invention. I would rather like to describe this situation a sort of ‘scripts movement’ 
in the CHT.
In order to unfold the dynamics of ‘script movement’ I begin the discussion with the 
important ethnographic question: why do they emphasise so much on written form 
of language in relation to identity? I grapple with the question in the remaining 
section of this chapter. First, by analysing the organised discourses of scripts and 
standardised language movements within the wider political landscape in the CHT. 
In this section, I explain some of the actions and programmes of these organised 
movements through activists’ perspectives in order to reveal why alphabet and 
written form of language are so imperative for the ethnic groups in the CHT. 
However, within the purview of this study, I limit my discussion on three ethnic 
communities, Marma, Bawm and Tripura. I elaborate upon a Tanchanga language 
convention organised by the Tanchanga Kayllan Shongshod as a case of point.
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In the following paragraphs, I present these organised discourses of scripts and 
language movements through the discussions and interviews I had with some key 
activists and leaders of different socio-cultural organisations in Banderban who are 
actively engaged in the development of new alphabets and standardisation of 
languages. Here, I present a carefully edited version of the translated transcripts. 
They all used the Bengali language while talking to me about their language 
development.
The Marma Society
The Marma Society is a socio-cultural organisation of Marma people based in 
Banderban. The Society is perceived as the community organisation and speaks for 
the Marma people in a manner of structuring social and cultural life, and is 
represented by respected Marma elders. The aims and functions of this organisation 
are diverse from the celebration of traditional festivals to welfare activities but the 
main concern of this organisation is about the education, language and cultural 
development of Marma. Khuka Master, a part-time Marma language instructor at 
TCI and a key player of Marma language development programme in Banderban, 
describes Marma language crucial to Marma Identity.
We are Marma by name. We cannot read and write our own language. How 
can we claim to be Marma zati (nation) without knowing our history, culture 
and language? How can one be a Marma without recognising Marma ja  
(alphabets)? Marma language is very rich. To be a proper Marma one must 
be able to read and write Marma language.
He further adds about the necessity of Marma language development.
Marma have long tradition of running pali school (religious school) at kyang 
(temple) but they only teach how to read tripitak (religious books) in order to 
understand and perform Buddhism. Burmese type religious teaching in kyang 
is not suitable for the Marma children because they are unable to learn 
‘standard’ Marma reading and writing, Marma history and culture. Children 
are not able to learn Marma either in the school because the medium of 
instruction is Bengali. In the present school curriculum there is nothing about 
the CHT or the Marma history and culture. Due to this our children struggle 
linguistically, culturally and academically from very beginning.
[...] It is our moral duty to do something for future generation otherwise 
Marma language and culture will not survive. For the sake of Marma zati 
(nation) we must develop Marma as modem language. Our children must
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learn their history and culture through their own language. We have been 
working for the development of Marma language and culture with the help of 
Marma society and the TCI. We have recently published a book entitled 
“Marma shikaa” (Marma learning) and are preparing Marma language books 
with the topics of Marma history and culture in the CHT. We demand that 
the medium of instruction at least at the primary level should be Marma so 
that our children can grasp two languages, Marma and Bengali, quickly.
[...] Introduction of Marma language courses by TCI for the young and older 
people has been significant for Marma zati unnati (nation-building). The TCI 
initially started these courses in Banderban municipality area but afterwards 
there have been positive responses from the Marma people across the 
Banderban. Parents are now very keen for their children to learn ‘standard’ 
Marma realising that without knowing their own language and culture they 
are nothing! At the moment, there are two more such courses for the children 
outside Banderban, one in Roangchari and the other one in Roma. Even the 
TCI’s afternoon adult class is attracting different categories of people: 
housewives, service holders, and ordinary Marma. Everyone is happy to 
write and read their language, history and discover their roots. They can also 
read their religious book properly.
Chotoy Marma, a committee member of Marma society and local musician famous 
for his Marma shangri song (New Year’s song), also puts similar views:
We know that Rakhain of Arkanese-Barmese speak a language almost 
similar to the Marma but the way we speak is different from them. There are 
differences in punctuation and meanings between this two. We have to try to 
develop Marma language based on what people speak in daily life in the 
CHT. Although even everybody speaks Marma but mostly elderly people 
know how to read and write Marma particularly those who received 
education in Burma. Even the TCI officials could not read and write Marma 
until recently. We Marma in Banderban want to make a new ‘standard 
language’ which people can read and write easily. After all it is the main 
thing for Marma to be Marma.
From both Khuka master and Chotoy Marma’s account it is evident that there is a 
strong sense of need to learn the standard Marma. Development of the modem 
Marma language, in this context, is turned into a sense of belonging for the Marma 
community.
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The Bawm Socio-cultural Organisation
Like the Marma society, the Bawm socio-cultural organisation is also an 
organisation that is engaged in Bawm social welfare activities, and is also 
represented by elderly Bawm. But the way the Bawm socio-cultural organisation 
operates and acts express a collective voice of the entire Bawm community in the 
CHT. Since the adoption of Christianity in the 1930s, among other things, the Bawm 
socio-cultural organisation has been active in the development of Bawm customary 
law and writing system. The Bawm socio-cultural organisation had already accepted 
Roman scripts as the medium of Bawm writing and subsequently Bawm religious 
and language books were written with this. As mentioned earlier, the Roman script 
was introduced largely through the work of Christian missionaries and is already 
taking shape in their literature and other written communication.
Since the entire Bawm ethnic group in the CHT had already been converted to 
Christianity there was reportedly no opposition to the adoption of Roman script. The 
decision was turned out to be spontaneous. I was told that the whole Bawm 
community came out in support of the Roman script since they did not have any sort 
of written medium of communication. More importantly Bawm language was used 
as vehicle to spreading the Christianity, which has had a profound impact on Bawm 
social life in terms of marriage customs, mode of behaviour and so on, as I 
mentioned in chapter three. However, one cannot deny the importance of the 
adoption of Roman script in their assertion to Bawm distinct cultural identity.
Chaplong Bawm, a member of Bawm socio-cultural organisation and a resident of 
Soanloo para, asserted that,
Bawm language is our mother language; we all speak Bawm. The Bawm did 
not have written scripts but the Bawm socio- cultural association with the 
help of missionaries adopted the Roman alphabet for the Bawm language. 
Now with the help of TCI we are running Bawm language courses for 
children in different Bawm villages. It is important for the Bawm to learn 
their language, history and culture. Without the written language and history 
nobody will recognise who we are (Amder porichai zanbe na)l
Again from the Bawm perspective, the Bengali word prochai (identity) here implies 
the identity based on the language rather than anything else.
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Tripura Shongshod
Tripura is one of the ethnic groups in the CHT but was not in the focus of my study. 
However, I briefly include it here in relation to the discussion of linguistic identity. 
Like Tanchanga, Tripura is another group which currently does not have an alphabet 
for written language . However, it is not clear which form of script they are going to 
accept. Among the Tripura, a tense debate is going on at present whether to accept 
Bengali or Roman scripts. In Banderban area where the majority of Christian 
Tripura are concentrated the Roman alphabet as the medium of written language is 
the most popular, whereas Hindu Tripura in the Northern CHT are bargaining for the 
Bengali alphabet. There has so far still been no consensus among the Tripura 
community in the CHT.
Dan Dhua Tripura, Secretary of Tripura Shonshod told me that this script debate is 
part of wider debate, which is going on for sometimes now among the Christian 
Tripura and Hindu Tripura in the Indian State of Tripura. Frustratingly he admitted 
that this put Tripura community far behind compared to other groups in the CHT in 
terms of social and cultural development. As an activist of Tripura language 
development Dan Dhua Tripura notes that,
The debate should be stopped for the sake of Tripura language development.
We have heard that in India, Tripura have lot of problems with the Bengali.
In the CHT we are facing similar situations. We have to preserve and
develop our language and culture from the Bengali.
Similar feelings were also echoed in a newspaper article written by Prashanta 
Tripura, a local anthropologist, “the debate over Bengali or Roman scripts would not 
bring any fruitful results to Tripura community. The more the debate is prolonged 
the more the Tripura will suffer. It is time for the Tripura to quickly solve this 
problem whatever form we accept for the long-term Tripura desire to be fulfilled” 
(Protom Alo, 3 November 1999). Tripura perspectives also offer here a discourse in 
which development of alphabet is linked to the development of Tripura community.
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Tanchanga Language Convention and Having an Alphabet of One’s Own
In 2000, the Tanchanga Kayllan Shonshod, the socio-cultural organisation of 
Tanchanga, organised a language convention in Banderban, with an explicit aim to 
establish Tanchanga alphabet and written form of language. The mission was 
described as more urgent in the wake of ‘indigenous’ language movements (mother 
tongue) in the CHT.
I was one of the participants in this convention. I travelled to Banderban from 
Roangchari in a hired mini-bus along with twenty-five Tanchanga delegates. 
Roangchari delegation comprises of students, elderly and some activists but most of 
these voices are considered to be ‘politically conscious’ section of Tanchanga 
society. Tanchanga delegations from other parts of the CHT had already arrived by 
the time we reached the convention venue at Banderban Town Hall. Perhaps three 
hundred peoples were filling the Banderban Town Hall.
Outside the Town Hall tea was being served for the initial refreshment and the 
launch has been prepared in nearby Tanchanga household by a group of Tanchanga 
volunteers. With meeting and greeting each other, the convention was finally started 
one hour late from the initial time at 10 a.m. in the morning. The speakers were 
well-known Tanchanga leaders and some cultural personalities, who sat on the stage 
with the convener Proshonna Tanchanga. I recorded the entire meeting but I am 
presenting here the edited and translated versions.
Shaktipad Tanchanga, the secretary of the Tanchanga Kayllan Shonshod, opened the 
convention and welcomed all the representatives after a Tanchanga patriotic song 
sung by children urging the Tanchanga to unite and be alert and awake within the 
heart (hidyai) and mind (/non). The floor was then given to the Ashaprodip 
Tanchanga, a primary school teacher from Lama,66 who was presented as one of the 
oldest educated Tanchanga, and who spoke in Tanchanga mixed with Bengali.
Where other communities are becoming more developed (unatir dike 
jachhae), we are moving in the opposite direction. In order to change this
66 A sub-district unit -south of Banderban.
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situation Tanchanga have to get organised as one people. We know nothing 
about our origin. When I present myself to an outsider as Tanchanga, people 
always ask Tanchanga kil Tanchaga kun zatil (What is Tanchanga, what is 
Tanchanga nation?). Sometimes people think we are Chakma. We must 
support the development of Tanchanga language. A Tanchanga alphabet is 
necessary for writing books on Tanchanga history and culture. When people 
hear about our history and language, they will understand how rich is 
Tanchanga kriti o sanskriti (culture).67
After him an elderly Tanchanga karbari from Roangchari was given the floor.
Here I give a direct translated transcript of the beginning of his speech:
When we got this invitation, we have to come because this is so important to 
us. It is for the Tanchanga language. We are bom of Tanchanga blood {Mogo 
sharie Tanchanga rokto). Our grand fathers, fathers, and uncles are all 
Tanchanga. We are bom of Tanchanga but we do not have any plan to 
develop our language and culture (vasha-kristi-achar). We are now aware of 
the rights we have in our life. I hope that Tanchanga Kayllan Shongshod can 
be a way forward for our Tanchanga Somaj (society). We have to think about 
our young Tanchanga generation. We suffered a lot due to our ignorance 
about education and overall situation in the CHT. To be able to advance 
Tanchanga zati we have to develop Tanchanga language and culture and 
educate our people.
The secretary then gave the microphone to Bir Kumar Tanchanga, a promoter and 
expert of Tanchanga language writing a lesson book using the Tanchanga alphabet. 
He opened his discussion with a joke in Bengali “I will speak neither Bengali nor 
Chittagonian”. Here I focus on the Bir Kumar’s own speech in Tanchanga.
We do not have Tanchanga scripts at the moment. Bikas Tanchanga wrote a 
Tanchanga primary lesson book with Bengali alphabet but we do not agree 
with this. This is similar to the Chakma. People always try to mix up 
Tanchanga with the Chakma. Recently Shopraya Chakma has written a book 
called Chakma jati hitihas (History of Chakma nation) and he mentioned that 
Tanchanga is one of the clan of Chakma, but this is wrong. There are lots of 
differences between the Chakma and Tanchanga languages. Although it 
sounds similar, there are distinct differences in pronunciation and articulation 
of the word. Differences in language, dress and other spheres of life events 
indicate that we Tanchanga are different from the Chakma living side by 
side.
67 In Bengali sanskriti, is used for culture but kristi is often used in relation to folk culture. Sanskriti 
is more commonly used to refer to high learned culture.
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[...] Tanchanga Kayllan Shongshad is working on a project to write a 
Tanchanga book based on the Tanchanga traditional alphabet. Tanchanga 
alphabet is the bond of Tanchanga people. Tanchanga Kayllan Songshod is 
trying to collect cultural and linguistic terms in order to form a common 
written standard for Tanchanga language.
Bir Kumar Tanchanga demonstrated how important it is for the Tanchanga to have a 
written language for the sake of their history and identity. Speaking in Tanchanga he 
directly pinpointed the need of standardised Tanchanga language, describing it as 
the sanio-kosh (nerve centre) of the community.
I will come back to this discussion a little later but first I present the presidential 
speech by Proshonan Kumar Tanchanga, which was more than one hour long and 
indeed the centrepiece of the convention capturing the full attention of the audience. 
Proshonan started by expressing his gratitude for giving the honour to organise the 
historic language convention for the Tanchanga zati (cultural sense) and gratefulness 
to the participants for showing a keen interest in working for the language and 
culture of ‘new blooming’ Tanchanga. I will give a longer excerpt from my 
transcripts of his speech.
We are all Tanchanga here and many of us here could read, write and speak 
Bengali but we do not know how to read and write our own Tanchanga 
language. We are expert on other languages but not in our own language. 
Some people even introduce themselves saying that they have lost their 
language. We all feel very ashamed of to say our problem is language and we 
do not have any bomammala (alphabet).
[...] We have our own history and tradition (krishti) but now every thing 
belonging to us has been sold to others [not mentioning the Chakma] due to 
lack of education and written language. We have to face this type of problem 
since we have forgotten and continue forgetting our own history, our vasha 
(language) and culture. Still there is no clear decision how to write our 
vasha. TCI has been trying for a long time to get a bomommala (alphabet) 
book but we could not do it because of our differences whether we accept the 
Chakma, Bengali or we should have our own bronamala.”
[...] Never say we have no language. It is language that is the best of every 
civilisation. Language is the basic property of the Tanchanga. We have our 
spoken language; we have our story; we must be proud of it and preserve it. 
We start collecting this information from the elders. It is very urgent because 
the old men and women who know much about our history, tradition and 
language will die soon then we will know nothing. They know our git (song), 
and puti (ballad). Our old people particularly women know skills how to
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weave the Tanchanga traditional cloths with the right colour and the 
handicraft skills. These are very important for the development of Tanchanga 
language, which tells our shanskritik poricho (cultural identity).
[...] The importance of having written Tanchanga language is crucial to the 
Tanchanga identity. The right way is to develop our Tanchanga Bomammala 
first so that we can defend our traditional culture in a distinctive way. It is 
now of great demand for the Tanchanga people to learn how to write and 
read the Tanchanga language. If the government introduce indigenous 
language in school level, we must have our language books that will bring 
the opportunity for the educated Tanchanga to be employed in the school. 
From Tanchanga shonshod it is possible to demand Tanchanga language 
teachers in Tanchanga dominated primary schools. We have an 
unemployment problem among our educated boys and girls. We have to be 
Tanchanga to shoulder the responsibility for our future somaj (society). The 
Bawm, Marma and other communities are rising steadily because they work 
for their language and culture through community organisations.
Turning to the specific reason for setting up a committee for writing a Tanchanga 
Bronnamala book he emphasised that final decision has to be reached after 
reviewing the book by Tanchanga Shongshod for adoption. He concluded the speech 
by expressing thanks to those who are working for writing the Tanchanga 
Bomanmal book and who are willing to collect the vocabulary, and personally hope 
that Tanchanga will be gaining self-respected jati morzada through the development 
of written language.
Discussion
Let me just round off my presentation of the convention speeches with some brief 
comments on the speakers before analysing the discussion of the whole section.
Both the karbari and the teacher quoted above, who are known to be promoter of the 
Tanchanga kristi, point out that language is central to the Tanchanga identity. Bir 
Kumer Tanchanga, the local expert of Tanchanga, even refers to language as the 
“nerve centre” of Tanchanga people. But the key figure of the convention,
Proshonan Tanchanga goes further by saying that Tanchanga educated people living 
without a written language of their own makes little difference even if they are 
expert in other languages, such as Bengali, English, Chakma, Marma and so on. 
Besides language, he also mentions things like their common origin, history, dress, 
and the art of weaving, as signifiers to distinct Tanchanga cultural identity. More
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importantly he brings the dimension of political economy in the discourse of 
language development. The economic benefits to the development of written 
Tanchanga language can be seen, in this context, as opportunity to Tanchanga 
mobilisation.
What this convention reveals is that every speaker’s message strongly conveys the 
importance of a written language which is not only be the indicator of Tanchanga 
cultural identity but also socially and politically places them in an advantaged 
position in relation to others groups in the CHT. What we see here is similarity 
between Tanchanga leaders and other key players of various ethnic organisations in 
the same discourse of language development in terms of identity construction.
Let us return to the discussions of socio-organisational activities. In these 
discussions there were many related topics that came up but central to these were 
language, culture and identity. Raising demand for the use of their own language, 
instead of Bengali or others at school level, is explicitly an assertion of ethno- 
linguistic identity. All the organisations mentioned above function basically in the 
field of socio-cultural arena-to provide the cultural content, the ethos of identity of 
the group. These organisations have introduced a new type of nationalist discourse. 
As it is very much clear from the leaders’ speeches, conversations and in interviews 
that above all a nation needs a language of its own with advanced form. Without a 
printed language you are nothing, it is the main message that all the key players in 
this discourse want to convey what Benedict Anderson (1983) might call “imagined 
community”, i.e. print nationalism. For Anderson, in modem times, print technology 
can be a powerful tool for languages, creating a possibility of a new form of 
imagined community. However, from the statist perspective Spencer notes that the 
forces of the state have a great responsibility for the reproduction and control of 
‘national culture’ “ in replacing local vernaculars with homogenous print language 
and thus creating new experiences of time and community” (1990: 287).
In the context of CHT, however, one may question whether all the voices heard in 
this discussion present an elitist discourse. Of course it is true that all the informants 
are educated and represent the ‘conscious voices’ of the respective ethnic group in 
some respect. Not only do they speak different languages, economically and socially
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they also inhabit relatively different worlds from most of their “co-ethnics”. The 
whole issue of language and status may seem to be largely irrelevant to those who 
live in the remote hilly areas.
But this is not the case in the CHT. The elite construction of linguistic and cultural 
politics are interwoven with everyday interests of the group and in many ways 
internalised by the ordinary discourse. A common perception among ordinary people 
is that these socio-cultural organisations are the property of the community.
Ordinary people speak of these organisations in the idiom of property possession, it 
is ‘ours’; ‘our’ interests are looked after through this organisation.
Because these organised discourses are not plainly cultural and linguistic alone, it 
also represents the politics of group identity, multi-ethnicity and broader collective 
representation. During my discussions with many of these activists it was pointed 
out that “we all are Pahari and we all are Marma, Chakma, Tanchanga and Bawm”. 
This perspective leads us to another discourse of how this negotiating identity 
overlaps in every day reality in CHT. I will deal with this issue in the next section.
In this section I address the issue of why there is an urgent need of asserting ethnic 
cultural identity in linguistic terms, particularly in the form of written language.
The urgency of such linguistic identity projects must be understood in relation to 
present political and economic realities in the CHT. As I mentioned earlier, the 
development of an alphabet or of a standardised language is not only symbolic of 
allegiance to the cultural identity of the group, but also the politics of recognition 
and representation within the context of multi-ethnic relationships in the CHT.
Since the signing of the peace treaty between the PCJSS and Bangladesh 
government in 1997, there have been a rallying cry among local activists, 
community leaders as well as national and international NGOs to introduce 
‘indigenous language’ as a medium of instruction in the primary schools levels in 
the CHT (at least).68 However, introduction of the mother language as medium of 
instruction is not an easy task in the CHT because of plurality of languages. The
68 In fact, this demand was adopted as one of the objective of the peace accord implementation (see 
the 1997 Peace Accord).
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situation looks even more complicated with regard to written forms of languages. As 
we have already seen whilst some dialects exist only in spoken form, others have 
proper written alphabets.
A common indigenous language is essential as a means of communication. At the 
moment there are no written forms of languages other than Marma and Bawm, 
which could be used as a medium of instruction. Therefore, if the government 
decides to introduce the mother tongue as the medium of instruction then it has to be 
either Marma or Bawm. As the second largest spoken language, Marma would be 
the likely case. And if it happens to be so, it would be difficult for other groups to 
refuse the Marma language instead of Bengali. That means they will again fall back 
to the same dilemma.
For those who do not have written forms of languages such as Chakma, Tripura, 
Tanchanga and Mru, they demonstrate a strong sense of insecurity and reservation, 
and fear of losing their distinctive cultural identity if the indigenous language 
scheme is introduced at the school level in the form of an other’s language. Among 
these groups, there have been growing concerns that their language will never be 
recognised as a ‘modem language’ under official categorisation. For them, the 
development of an alphabet is not only an articulation of their distinct identity but 
also the politics of equality and representation within the context of multi-ethnic 
relationship in the CHT.
Envisaging group interests and recognition in the broader spectrum of indigenous 
language project, ethnic communities feel the urgency to develop an alphabet in 
order to introduce a written form of language. There are also economic dimensions 
relating to these language politics. As is revealed from Proshonan Tanchanga’s 
speech, the introduction of the mother language in schools means more teachers’ 
posts, which would be a window of opportunity for the unemployed educated youths 
of the community. Failure to develop an alphabet for the written language will miss 
out on their economic opportunity. The ordinary people thus spontaneously receive 
the economic impetus of the discourse advocated by activists. This awareness can be 
translated as the ‘politics of cultural revivalism’ with the core project development 
of an alphabet among other things.
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However, there is no singular form of ideas and practices in relation to a cultural 
revivalism project among the ethnic groups in the CHT. Although language appears 
to be one of the salient features of ethnicity there are many interwoven elements 
relating to ‘cultural revivalism’. All this takes another shape when language and 
cultural identity packages are redefined and interpreted in institutional discourse in 
the context of broader ‘indigenous’ culture and Pahari identity.
The development of scripts is also the politics of asserting distinct cultural and 
political identity in relation to Bengali and the state. Understanding of this scripts 
movement is linked to understanding the other related issues such as land, resource 
and Pahari identity. This broader perspective can be seen through the prism of TCI 
activities and programmes. In the following section, I discuss the way Marma, 
Bawm and Tanchanga produce language as a form of cultural representation, but at 
the same time TCI present these diverse languages as an ‘indigenous culture’ in 
different ways. I argue that this institutional discourse is an attempt to gain control 
over the lives and livelihood of Pahari, as marginalised people in the CHT. In this 
project language and culture becomes a way of life.
Upazati Shanskritik Institutes
Upazati Shanskritik Institutes (Tribal Cultural Institutes-TCI) are locally based 
government funded organisations established during army rule in Bangladesh 
(between the period of 1975-1990) in order to enhance ‘tribal’ cultural development 
in the CHT.69 As far as TCI policy document (official memorandum) is concerned 
the main objective is to establish these Shanskritik Institutes in order to preserve and 
promote the upazati shanskriti (tribal culture) in CHT up to the ‘national level’ (see 
TCI memorandum), accepting the notion that upazati shanskrit is inferior to Bengali 
culture. At present, there are three such institutes in the greater CHT region, 
Rangamati, Banderban and Khagrachari districts respectively. In this section, 
however, my discussion is limited to the Banderban Upazati Shanskritik Institute 
only. During my fieldwork I was initially affiliated with the Banderban TCI mainly 
for language training but over the period I spent a substantial amount of time
178
engaging in its various activities related to various language and cultural programs. 
TCI activities and programs are significantly important because they provide an 
alternative institutional discourse as opposed to ‘tribal’ culture shaping a new 
meaning and politics of indigenousness, commonality, and identity making.
The official line is that these institutes function as autonomous bodies run by the 
local people themselves and are able to work out their own plans and programs for 
the social and cultural development of ethnic groups in the CHT. The structure of 
the institute itself is very significant in its intention to develop a new ‘cultural 
regime’. There is at least one cultural officer from each group dealing with specific 
activities of that group. In this way it represents all ethnic groups in the CHT. 
However, as a state funded organisation like any other government department, TCI 
is placed under the cultural ministry, and has to follow the government’s guidelines 
as well. As a result, there is always a tension between the official and local 
approaches to the social and cultural development and representation of so-called 
‘tribal’ culture in the CHT. The way in which ‘tribal’ culture is defined and 
interpreted in this institutional setting offers a contested discourse which is largely 
expressed in TCI activities and programs.
There are two trends of meaning construction and symbolism with regard to the 
notion of ‘tribal’ culture. The first trend, the official cultural policy project is that the 
CHT ‘tribal’ culture is a sort of aesthetic thing which needs to be preserved for its 
own sake (see TCI memorandum). The development and promotion of ‘tribed’ 
culture in this context is linked to the idea of commodification and objectification. 
This has been manifested in different forms of government-sponsored programs 
such as presentation of ‘tribal’ cultural parties for the VIPs70 while visiting the CHT. 
The naming of the TCI itself is a reflection of this perspective.
Many local activists I talked to, both professional and ordinary people, generally 
welcomed the establishment of cultural institutes in the CHT as what they call “a 
move in the right direction to enhance the development of indigenous people’s 
language and culture”(Mamano Marma, a local NGO worker). But, many of them
69 It is important to note here that it is same time when the quota policy was also introduced.
70 In Bangladesh, VIPs (very important personalities) are the people who are either government 
Ministers, MPs and high-level civil and military officials.
179
were not happy to have their cultural institute called upazati or ‘tribal’ institute. 
District Council Chairman Kay Shala Marma even jokingly told me “if we are called 
upazati then the people who came to live here from the plain land should be called 
apozati” (The literal meaning of apozati in Bengali is ‘corrupt nation’). The term 
upazati is not only derogatory to the local activists’, TCI officials also express their 
dissatisfaction about using this. They told me that they are unable to do anything 
with the change of naming, as it is entirely up to the government decision. These are 
a few examples of how they react to the upazati notion in the CHT.
Why bother about the term? It is important here to consider the meaning and 
applications of the word. In Bangladesh, the notion ‘tribe’ is very problematic not 
only for the lack of a good definition, but perhaps more importantly because of its 
negative connotations. Ellen Bal writes, “to most people in Bangladesh, it refers to 
totally different people who are more or less isolated from mainstream society. 
Moreover, they are considered more primitive, less developed, childlike, naive, and 
close to the nature” (1999: 4). This perspective suggests how the ‘tribal’ or upazati 
are generally perceived in Bangladesh. I argue that terms and their connotations not 
only refer to ways of thinking but also to ways of acting, such as naming of the TCI. 
This can be seen as the statist view of ‘tribal’ culture. For the TCI officials and other 
local activists the word is too ‘racist’, disparaging and paternalistic. Today their 
dissatisfaction and anger are expressed in an alternative trend of meaning 
construction.
The alternative trend, which is supported by local activists and TCI, is inclined to 
see cultural and linguistic diversity of CHT as historically specific and unique 
displaying a common ‘indigenous culture’, a discourse that resists the dominant 
Bengali culture. They generally refer themselves collectively as Pahari, or Adivashi
71(indigenous peoples) or Jhumma (swidden cultivators) as terms of self-reference, 
rather than ‘tribal’ and upazati. They eschew terms which suggest primitive or 
uncivilized.
71 See the discussion of upazati in Chapter Seven.
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This new trend advocates cultural revivalism through the invention of alphabets, 
celebrating common festivals, and the common struggle for life and livelihood of the 
Pahari people in the CHT land. This translates CHT culture as ‘indigenous Pahari 
culture’, a sort of way of life that challenges the dominant official discourse in 
political terms. So, on the one side, there is an idea that ‘tribal’ culture is something 
different from politics, it only carries aesthetic value. On the other hand it is directly 
linked to politics. It is thus interesting to see how the TCI as a cultural institution 
engages in local and official discourse representing the so-called ‘tribal’ culture. I 
examine Banderban TCI activities, particularly its language and cultural programs as 
a case in point.
As far as TCI language and cultural projects are concerned they pursue the local 
perspective of indigenous Pahari culture negotiating official discourse in subtle 
way. First, from the TCI point of view, it is the question of the survival of the 
institution. After all, as they see it, it is the institution of the local people, and a 
centre of creating awareness about their culture and identity, and a platform of 
building up wider opinion about the common problems in the CHT. But as a state 
funded organisation they are also obliged to follow the government guidelines and 
regulations with regard to policy framework.
So, whilst on paper, TCI policy does to some extent accommodate the official 
projection of ‘tribal culture as aesthetic expression, this is manifested through some 
of its activities and it is mostly designed to secure resource flow. For example, the 
objectification of ‘tribal’ culture was expressed in one of its’ project proposals 
prepared for the Cultural Ministry for the construction of eleven model ethnic 
houses. I was partly involved in helping drawing up the project proposal with them. 
The Ministry eventually accepted the project; construction of the model houses was 
finished by December 2000 and they are now on display.
I argue that representation of ‘tribal’ people by TCI has partly been shaped by the 
dominant criteria for an acceptable project proposal as well as by tourism. In 
practice, however, TCI presentation of this project takes different perspectives to 
show local diversity as a distinctive feature of life in the CHT. From both TCI and 
official points of view, the house construction project can be defined as hegemonic
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forms in order to achieve more control over the interpretation of ‘tribal’ culture. It is 
in that sense that a tension explicitly and implicitly exists between meaning and 
action between culture and politics.
There is a constant movement between the modalities of cultural representation. At 
the individual and group level, linguistic and cultural objectification aims at gaining 
representation within the context of multi-ethnicity. But, at the broader macro level, 
collective representation such as in the institutional discourse of TCI, cultural and 
linguistic diversity embodies a lived way of life: the shared experiences of being a 
disadvantaged and marginalised people of CHT. At the same time elements from 
regional, national, transnational organisations and mass media are fed into each 
others’ discourses in a common struggle to gain control over CHT resources. The 
TCI approach to the cultural representation of CHT is to foreground indigenous 
Pahari subjectivity in Bangladesh.
TCI Policy and Activities of Indigenous Culture
The way that the language, culture and history of different ethnic groups are defined, 
interpreted, and are to some extent being revived by the TCI is instrumental in the 
construction of a common ‘indigenous culture’. The representation of ‘indigenous 
culture’ by TCI has largely been symbolised and orchestrated in the discourse of 
‘unity within diversity’. In the following discussion, the celebration of Mother 
Language Day, International Indigenous Day, the Baishabi festival, and Mother 
Tongue Language courses all can be seen as part of this broader cultural project 
being played out in a quest for indigenous representation.
At the institutional level, the linguistic plurality of different ethnic groups is being 
interpreted not as a fragmented entity but rather seen as source of larger unity as 
‘indigenous’ culture in the CHT. The policy of the development of a variety of 
native scripts suggests that these are unique and indigenous to CHT and different 
from the Bengali. The TCI discourse of ‘indigenous’ culture is not simply articulated 
in cultural terms, it also includes other aspects of hill life and livelihood in the CHT. 
The political and other activists take this notion further in relation to the broader 
level of collective mobilisation and identity construction.
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With regard to TCI policy and programmes, it is important to note here that in the 
last decade especially during the autonomy movement, the TCI had undergone a 
more radical organisation with its various social and political agenda (see for 
example, publications like jhum prada). During this time some of the TCI research 
officers also attended workshops on the indigenous rights movement organised by 
international and local NGOs. Picking up information on other indigenous 
movements in South Asia and others part of the world, they learnt how to organise 
their own workshops and projects on CHT issues.
Most of the TCI activities now focus on community projects related to language and 
culture. Besides routine celebration of common festivals, such as Baishabi, and 
publications of the local journal jhum parda, they are organising some small 
meetings and discussions related to CHT issues: from language and history to 
customary land rights etc. These ventures are supported by local ethnic political 
activists, local NGOs, such as Hondong, Green hill, Taoymour and the youth 
generation. This provides an opportunity for TCI to form a group consisting of 
different ethnic communities echoing a singular voice of common CHT culture.
One of the features that struck me in spending time with the TCI was the hard work 
involved in making a broader ‘indigenous, identity. This work involved organising 
language courses and cultural events and mobilising local leaders and NGO circuit 
people. The research and cultural officers of TCI, for example, spent a lot of time 
visiting academics, cultural activists, and knocking on doors of the various agencies, 
such as the socio-cultural organisations of different ethnic groups, and local NGOs 
in Banderban 72to make their programs successful.
All these activities are dedicated to form a unity of experience out of different ethnic 
and cultural diversity in which symbolic and material aspects are impossible to 
separate. All of them are cultural by definition; all of them are necessarily political 
in the sense that they are part of a way of life lived in the shadow of discrimination, 
exploitation and marginalisation. The TCI activities thus are based on unity
72 Some of these local NGOs, such as Hondong, Toyomor, are using local indigenous names.
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experiences embody a collective whole to produce indigenous representations in 
relation to the State. In the following paragraphs I cite two examples of this sort of 
cultural unity experience of indigenous representation undertaken by the TCI in 
which I participated. Apart from local traditional festivals, TCI celebrates two 
international events with great festivity, the Mother Language Day and the World 
Indigenous Day.
The Mother Language Day
In Bangladesh, the newly named Mother Language Day by UNESCO is historically 
known as the Ekoshe. The Ekoshe is the language movement of 21st February in 
1952 led by Bengali students for the recognition of Bengali as the state language of 
Pakistan. Six students were killed in the protest movement against the declaration of 
Urdu as the official state language of Pakistan.73 Since 1952 the Ekoshe has been a 
secular ritual and considered the most important national day in Bangladesh as well 
as Bengali speaking people across the world.74 Ekoshe is also thought as the root of 
Bengali nationalism and the birth of the nation-state of Bangladesh.
In 1999, UNESCO symbolically declared the Ekoshe as the day of “World Mother 
Language day” in order to recognise the importance of the mother tongue as well as 
to respect the diversity of languages throughout the world. The UNESCO 
declaration has certainly brought a new meaning and dimension to the discourse of 
indigenous language programs in the CHT. Since 1999, TCI has been celebrating the 
World Mother Language Day as part of its yearly activities. The TCI celebration of 
old Ekoshe with renewed emphasis on Mother Language Day has potential political 
and cultural implications in the construction of ‘indigenous’ identity through 
language and culture.
For TCI, Mother Language Day is the global recognition of local rights to 
indigenous language and culture. It is not only the symbolic recognition of all 
mother tongues in the world by an international body like UNESCO but also the 
right to learn and pursue the knowledge through their language. TCI interpretation of
73 For the language movement, see Anisuzzaman (2000).
74 Even in the West Bengal Ekoshe is celebrated symbolically as the day of struggle to establish 
Bengali language.
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Mother Language Day thus synchronises with the global recognition into a local 
context giving new meaning to indigenous language activities in the CHT. TCI 
celebration of Mother Language Day is particularly focused on addressing 
indigenous education and languages of Pahari. As part of the Mother Language Day 
celebration, TCI organises a panel discussion, a poster exhibition of different 
alphabets, and publishes a special leaflet covering language issues in the CHT. Two 
of the discussion meetings I attended in 1999 and 2000, had the title: “Mother 
Language Day: the Importance of Indigenous Languages in the CHT” (my 
translation from Bengali titles).
In both the occasions, TCI draws the speakers from almost every ethnic community 
representing elderly leaders, politicians, students, cultural personalities, and NGO 
people. TCI Mother Language Day discussion can be seen as the creation of an 
alternative ‘indigenous* discourse with an active engagement and participation of 
plural ethnic representation on the common issues such as language development.
Some of the speakers had never had this kind of experience before but others are 
already aware and engaged in different forms of hill politics. I know some of them 
are representatives of socio-cultural organisations, mentioned earlier. All the 
speakers talked about their past and present in the CHT: some talked about their 
jhum life and others talked about their common festivals like Baishabi and Raj 
punnah arguing a common ‘indigenous’ culture. However, the main discussion point 
was how their language is suffering from the dominant Bengali culture.
Both TCI officials and local speakers voiced the common reasons for the 
educational backwardness in the CHT. There are mainly three factors which, as they 
see, are problematic to the development and progress of the Pahari people. These 
are curriculum and contents of the education, medium of instruction and staffing in 
the school. A speaker commented on the present curriculum that it has no relation 
with their life and community environment in the CHT and thus does hardly enthuse 
Pahari children. He goes further saying, “most Bengali boys and girls have never 
seen a hill or a mountain whereas for a Pahari boy and girl jhum is a life”. They 
argue that CHT life is not reflected in the curriculum and thus has social and 
psychological impacts on the development of the Pahari children in the CHT.
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Others argued that not withstanding the present curriculum being difficult to 
internalise by the Pahari, if the medium of instruction was their mother tongue the 
situation could most probably be improved. They relate the poor enrolments, poor 
attendance and massive drop out rates in the CHT,75 to the consequences of the 
medium of instruction and poverty. The young learners do not comprehend the texts 
and instructions in the classroom mostly given by Bengali teachers. Therefore, they 
suggest that the Bengali medium of instruction in the CHT rather blocks their 
movement to later stages. Among the speakers, there is a general consensus that they 
all share a similar experience of disadvantaged positions in government offices, 
educational institutes and in court settings where ordinary Pahari rely on Bengali 
interpreters. I will describe this situation in detail relating to khas land lease in 
Chapter Six.
In Bangladesh, it is evidently common that the way public institutions function 
through Bengali linguistic terms evoke an antagonistic feeling of cultural difference 
among ethnic minorities in the CHT. In 1999, in a parliamentary debate when an MP 
from the CHT asked the Education Minister whether “there is any government 
programme for the introduction of mother tongues as medium of instruction in the 
CHT”. The Education Minister replied “ the CHT is an integral part of the country 
and its connection with other parts of the country must necessarily be intimate and it 
is possible only through Bengali language” (The Daily Star, 25th August 1999). 
Thus, from the statist perspective, the medium of instruction in indigenous language 
is a question of political sovereignty of the country.
The state’s attitudes are obviously bound to create a sense of being in a 
disadvantaged position and a feeling of isolation among the ethnic groups. In this 
process, indigenous marginal identity is articulated as opposed to broader Bengali. 
As is revealed in the Mother Language discussions and TCI publications, the main 
message is the recognition of CHT languages as ‘indigenous, language, and the 
introduction of them as a medium of instruction in the school level. This 
mobilisation has been influenced by the UNESCO declaration of Ekoshe as the
75 It is fact that Banderban has the highest dropout and lowest literacy rates in the country 
(BBS2001).
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Mother Language Day. In this context, TCI sponsored indigenous language 
programs can be seen as a strategy to put pressure on state policy towards accepting 
linguistic diversity according to the UNESCO principle of mother language 
education.
The TCI celebration of Mother Language Day thus serves twin purposes. Firstly to 
make a. sense of commonality across the ethnic community on the basis of an idea 
that every language in the CHT needs to be developed as part of a ‘indigenous’ 
language regime. Secondly, these diverse linguistic and cultural elements can also be 
turned Into a broader social movement on the basis of ‘indigenous’ culture.
From this ‘indigenous’ construction what TCI is trying to argue is that CHT peoples 
are the people who have their own distinctive languages, history and culture, and 
therefore they have the right to their homeland. They are different from Bengali; 
they are other Bangladeshi. In other words, you can speak Marma, Bawm or 
Tanchanga and you can be Christian and Buddhist but you are still Pahari. Thus, for 
TCI development of indigenous culture is also a process of collective mobilisation.
Indigenous People’s Day
Since the UN declaration of the “World Indigenous People’s Day”, there has been a 
renewed growing sense of belonging among different ethnic minorities in 
Bangladesh. The TCI also celebrate this World Indigenous Day with great festivity 
every year on the 9th of August. For the celebration of World Indigenous Day in 
2000, TCI organised a discussion meeting like the Mother Language Day. TCI 
invited local speakers comprising of teachers, public representatives, political 
activists, NGO personalities, and students, who are mainly pro-active in hill politics. 
I was also a participant in the meeting.
In the discussion, all the speakers echoed the CHT as a place of ‘indigenous’ peoples 
with unique culture diversity in relation to the dominant Bengali. The TCI director 
in his opening speech even mentioned “we all belong to different religions, speak 
different languages but we all share the same culture of CHT; we share the same 
situation in the CHT as indigenous people. If someone asks me I say I am Marma
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and I am Pahari”. A Bawm even speaker puts this: Amra Akk Baganer Dosh Fol 
(we are ten flowers in one garden - my translation). These views of ‘commonality 
and diversity’ can obviously be seen in the context of ‘unity within diversity’ in the 
CHT.
Without going into details of the Indigenous Day programs and activities, I argue 
that the way in which TCI structure their discourse and represent ‘indigenous 
culture’ is basically the construction of broader community with distinct history, 
language and culture, and a homeland of Pahari in the CHT. From one point of 
view, celebration of Mother Language Day and Indigenous People’s Day are purely 
symbolic. Yet, from another point of view, they provide a common platform for 
Pahari to actively engage and work together on one project ‘multi-ethnicity as unity 
in the CHT*. This affects inter-ethnic relationships in different ways. One of these 
effects is that ethnic groups locate themselves in relation to each other and to the 
CHT as whole. They share similar values and inhabit common territory. This is in 
fact central to common indigenous identity creating a sense of shared engagement.
In this construction they also focus on general social problems such as poverty, 
marginalisation, and land dispossession that affected their lives as indigenous 
Pahari as a whole in the CHT. ‘Indigenous culture, in this context, is not simply an 
aesthetic expression and style, as perceived by the government, but also an 
experience of discrimination. For TCI a common indigenous culture is paramount in 
the CHT. It is evidently clear from many of its activities, such as promotion and 
campaign for indigenous languages and their introduction in the CHT.
The TCI celebration of Mother Language Day and Indigenous People’s Day also 
provides the link with many other organisations working on similar agendas. Parallel 
to the TCI, in recent times there are a number of organisations that are already in this 
arena of ‘indigenous’ politics who assert a common voice through collectivisation of 
the CHT issues. For example, the forum for the CHT students studying in different 
colleges and universities is named after as Pahari Chatra Parishod (Hill Student 
Union). Membership to this organisation is open to all hill students of different 
ethnic groups in the CHT, except the Bengali (see more discussion on this issue in 
Chapter seven). Within and outside CHT, they are actively engaged in organising
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rallies, seminars on CHT issues such as discriminatory state policy, military 
oppression and so on. Another organisation called Adivashi Vomi Odhikar 
Shongrokkon Committee (Indigenous Land Rights Committee) has also been formed 
with multi-ethnic representation in order to mobilise Pahari against government 
land lease and jhum indigenous land rights in the CHT.
Therefore, I argue that the ethnicisation of CHT politics in indigenous terms gives a 
new dimension to the ‘state -tribal’ relationship in Bangladesh. The notion ‘tribal’ is 
reified into a new meaning of Pahari with renewed emphasis on regionally and 
territoriality based on cultural and ecological distinctiveness of CHT. In this context, 
the term ‘indigenous’ people displays the notion of united hill people as Pahari - the 
original inhabitants and guardian of CHT lands. This can also be seen as a 
representation of ‘indigenous culture’ as a particular cultural attachment to the CHT. 
I take here another example of how TCI organise a common cultural festival in order 
to form a collective ‘indigenous culture’.
Baishabi as Collective Festival
The term Baishabi is a newly constructed term by TCI for the New Year festival in 
the CHT. Baishabi is a abbreviated term (in short) from the names of different ethnic 
groups’ New Year festivals: ‘BA/’ from Baisu of Tripura, ‘SA’ from Sangrai of 
Marma and ‘BI’ from Bijhu of Chakma. The TCI redefinition of the New Year 
festival as Baishabi in a new manner has had a monumental impact in the 
construction of the collective festival in the CHT.
Traditionally, the New Year celebration is considered one of the main festivals, both 
in a cultural and religious sense, among all ethnic communities in the CHT. 
However, every community has their own way of New Year celebration involving 
religious, rituals and cultural festivities. In some communities, the celebration lasts 
for one or two days while in others it continues for a few days. For example, the 
Marma people call it as Sangrai pwe and regard this as the most important annual 
event of Marma social life. They believe that prayers to Buddha on this occasion 
will be blessed with good fortune throughout the year. A major part of Marma 
celebration involves religious rituals. The Sangrai lasts for three days. The first day
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of the celebration is termed as Sangari akaneh. The highlights of Sangari akaneh are 
cleaning the kayang and yearly ritual bath of Buddha idols in the nearby river with 
large procession of viccus (monks) and ordinary Marma.
Men and women are expected to participate in this ritual as obligatory community 
work. They decorate kayang and offer donations to the monks. On this day coloured 
pieces of clothes are also offered to wrap up Buddha idols as part of Sangrai 
celebration. The second day is termed as Sangrai alenoh. On the day there are 
special prayers held. They take oaths of panchachil and light the candles in the 
kayang. Men and women wear traditional Marma costumes76 and attend the kayang 
service. Every Marma household prepares special food called suaing and this is also 
distributed to viccu in the kayang. Besides religious and ritual activities, there are 
also cultural parts of this celebration among the Marma. The most communal and 
cultural part of this event is held on the last day of the Sangrai. It is called Relengpo 
(water festival) and is mainly participated by youths. One of the Relengpo that I 
observed in Banderban seemed to me like a game. In an open field a big pandal 
(stage) is made and two large wooden boats full of water are placed on it. A group of 
boys and girls stand face-to-face holding each of the boats. Boys and girls then start 
throwing water at each other until the water is finished. The boats are again filled 
with water and another group of boys and girls play in the same way.
1 WATKH FKSTNAL- [I
Figure 5 TCI Water Fstival 2000 (Banderban)
76 Marma ritual dresses are generally beautiful in terms of colour and design. Men wear longy made 
of cotton or silk. The longy reaches from the waist to below the knees. Marma men also wear close- 
fitting coats called parakha engyi over the shirt, buttonned at the throat. Marma women wear silk 
thami below the waist with a blouse called an engyi at the top.
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Among the Marma, traditionally the water festival is significant event for the youths 
because the event is specifically organised in order to choose the prospective partner 
within the community. Although nowadays it is very rare to happen in this way but 
symbolically it carries a social meaning to the Marma as part of Sangrai festival. 
Marma believe that Relengpo wash away their agonies, sorrows, misfortunes, and 
unhappiness of the previous year and brings hope of starting a fresh life in the New 
Year.
There are also similar kinds of rituals attached to the Tanchanga, Tripura and 
Chakma. However, the Bawm as a Christian community now celebrate 1st January 
as their New Year festival but participate in Baishsbi with other communities in the 
CHT. In recent years, the TCI has been celebrating this New Year festival as 
collective Baishabi. The TCI role of making this festival a collective festival is 
significant. The TCI activities of Baishabi celebration involve a Baishabi cultural 
show participated by different ethnic groups, writing Baishabi songs, and Baishabi 
publications. These are all making this occasion to be a common festival of Pahari 
in the CHT. TCI activities can be seen as another way of constructing collective 
identity through collective festival.
Here, for example, I discuss a cultural evening of Baishabi 2000 organised by the 
TCI. With participation of many cultural and musical artists from different ethnic 
communities, it was a gathering of Pahari. The event drew mostly a local crowd of 
youths. It was an important statement of identity. The Marma puangera, Bawm 
bamboo dances and Tanchanga gyngoli all blended through evocation and enactment 
in the realm of the TCI construction of indigenous culture. It was in fact a creation 
of a public place for Pahari identity.
Like the Mother Language Day and Indigenous Day meetings, the Baishabi event 
brought ethnic groups together-located them in relation to each other in the CHT and 
engaged them in a common festival through the very actively blending embodied 
mode of music and dancing. Many of these dances and songs are particularly related 
to hill life and jhum cultivation. I argue that the Baishabi cultural evening is an 
expressive statement of collective form. The split between culture and politics does 
not work when the event is seen as part of a lived ‘indigenous culture’. The new
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emphasis on the traditional New Year celebration as Baishabi by the TCI reinforced 
a collective ‘indigenous culture’.
As collective festival, it is attractive and revealing to the Pahari people. As Aung 
Chaloo Marma, a local resident of Banderban, puts it: “one can see with all 
linguistic diversity coming together embodied in one people singing, dancing and 
expressing their shared joy and feeling”. For the TCI, music and dances of Marma, 
Tanchanga and Bawm in Baishabi cultural event is related to the world of CHT. 
Therefore, representational meaning of these music and dances are inseparable and 
linked to the common indigenous culture of CHT embodied in people’s life and 
experiences. In this discourse, it is not ethnic communities singing different songs in 
different languages, wearing different traditional dresses with specific ethnic styles, 
it is rather a Pahari person telling ‘others’ to respect them as they share a common 
indigenous culture.
So as TCI Baishabi edition of jhum parada (in Bengali), published in 2000 which 
covered the topics: “Rights of the Pahari in CHT”, “Our History and Traditions”,
“Pahari Shaiskritf\ The outline of the publication articulates everything is 
connected with each other with a continuous historical tread of the CHT suggest a 
telescopic version of Pahari history. Pahari identity is being built here on a 
perceived continuity of shared history living in the CHT. But, this also can be seen 
as Pahari cultural resistance, as land rights and mother language issue. It is 
important to note here that anything and everything is not relevant to this 
construction of identity but only something which appeals to the commonality as 
relevant to their local and collective situations and experiences, and their practical 
engagement with the Bengali and Bangladesh State. In the case of TCI, the 
relationship between indigenous culture and Pahari identity in CHT is both the 
representation and the lived experiences. The TCI is clearly constructing a cultural 
identity as lived reality, a way of being in and experiencing the CHT in a 
disadvantaged way.
Promoting the idea of common ‘indigenous’ culture, TCI policies and activities, in 
fact, speak for a broader level of collective mobilisation, similar to the political 
mobilisation of Pahari which challenges the dominant Bengali culture. Economic
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deprivation, marginalisation and land dispossession are important issues in this 
broader level of mobilisation but the issues of cultural identity have been brought to 
the political agenda in a new way. The TCI articulation of ‘indigenous culture’ does 
not simply speak the linguistic aspects of ethnic groups, it also includes other 
aspects of the people’s life and livelihood in the CHT. Cultural and ecological 
distinctiveness from mainstream Bengali becomes the essence of indigenousness or 
Pahariness. Expressions of this broader collective identity process can also be seen 
in other areas such as land, election and local politics. I will discuss these in the 
succeeding chapters.
Concluding Remarks: A Garden with Many Flowers
In the beginning sections of this chapter, I discussed the process of linguistic identity 
construction of Marma, Tanchanga, Bawm on the basis of written language. The 
logic behind this is very straightforward. Language is the base of culture and the 
culture is the base of peoplehood. Or to put it the other way around, without a 
language of one’s own there is no culture, and hence there can be no people/nation. 
Developing modem languages is therefore the highest priority for the promoters of 
new “script movement”. It appears that with the work of TCI and other cultural 
organisations, a new type of movement is taking shape among the ethnic 
communities in the CHT.
The people of CHT have never been so aware of their collective identity as they are 
today. Today they call themselves Pahari. They are proud of being Pahari rather 
than ‘tribal’ or upazati. They have undergone many changes in recent years and now 
realise that differences within are part and parcel of their common reality. That 
reality brings them into another stage of broader co-operation as the original 
inhabitants share a historical past in the CHT. This signifies and justifies the idea 
that the notion of diversity and unity can go hand in hand. As a Bawm speaker in the 
Indigenous Day discussion puts it “isn’t a garden is much more beautiful when you 
grow more than one types of flower?”
I argue that ethno-linguistic groups such as Marma, Bawm Tanchanga have several 
options open to them: they may join with other ethnic groups to define themselves as
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Pahari or indigenous people, in broader collective terms, in order to mobilise jointly 
and to seek stronger alliances against the Bengali and the state. Or, they may also 
identify themselves in order to organise collective mobilisation based on the notion 
of jhum cultivation as disadvantaged groups in the CHT. I will discuss this in the 
next chapter.
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Chapter Five 
Jhum as Shared Identity
Introduction
Land tenure and land uses are issues of central importance to any understanding of 
CHT. In recent times, all the issues related to conflict between the local inhabitants 
of the CHT and the state revolved around the control of land and use of land. The 
competing claims of rights and ownership over CHT land has largely been expressed 
in ‘shared identity and autonomy’ of the hill people vis-a-vis the ‘sovereignty and 
legality’ of the state. Jhum, the traditional subsistence activities in the CHT, has 
become the main focus of this conflict (see Chapter One). An understanding of jhum 
land holding and land use is, therefore, the key to understanding wider relationships 
between the people of CHT and the state in the contemporary debate on indigenous 
land rights and collective identity.77
In analysing the competing claims of rights and ownership over CHT land and 
resource this chapter explores local understandings and perceptions of ‘traditional’ 
land use, particularly the jhum, within the framework of traditional-jural versus 
politico-legal relations. Engaging with the debate on the anthropology of “common 
property”, “legal pluralism”, and “state regime” (Guha & Martinez Alier 1997; 
Burnham 2000; Von Benda-Beckmann 1993; Sharpe 1998; Abramson and 
Theodossopoulos 2000), it mainly addresses the question of ‘indigenous shared 
identity’ in terms of land rights and land use practice among the hill people in CHT.
In the anthropological literature the notion of “shared identity” is generally 
conceptualised in terms of common language, religion, history and kinship (Hollup 
2000; Levine 1997). However, recently anthropologists have increasingly written 
about the concept “shared identity” in terms of indigenous land rights and land use 
(Hodgson 2002; Escobar and Alverez 1998; Baviskar 1997, 2003; Mrinal Miri 
1993). Among the diverse forest dwelling peoples in the regions of South Asia,
77 See for the contemporary debate on "indigenous land rights" Roy (2000b, 1998,1992), Gain (2000, 
1998), on "collective identity" Mohsin (1997, 2000), Schendel (2000,1996, 1992), Tripura (1993, 
2000) and Dewan (1991a).
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Africa and Latin America, the notion “shared identity” has been an expression of 
ethnic mobilisation in their struggle against the state.78
Among the hill people in the CHT, contemporary political processes demonstrate 
that claims of shared identity and claims to traditional land rights are intertwined. I 
argue that the assertion of jhum as a shared collective identity is about the control 
and use of CHT land, which in turn is the basis for territoriality at a broader level of 
Pahari construction.79 Construction of Pahari identity through the collective ethnic 
marker jhum has a special meaning, significance and social value. The very notion 
of jhum provides a perspective that indigenous land rights and collective ownership 
is actually an identification of Pahari. In other words, rights to CHT land are all 
encompassing. That is, they are expressed in a value of shared experience with 
ethnic groups standing as ‘co-owners’.
One fundamental issue that arises here is that in the CHT, the question of jhum land 
rights as historical continuity is central to understanding of present Pahari shared 
identity. Jhum land use is a unique social relationship among the peoples of CHT. 
For them Jhum  is an expression of cultural unity and autonomy: what Myers call a 
“shared relatedness” (Myers 1989:15). In this context, jhum land rights enter into a 
system of indigenous collective rights negotiating their ethnic relationship into a 
shared possession of CHT land.
In recent years, among academics and activists, concepts of territory, traditional 
practice of jhum, forest resources, the meaning of development and the question of 
identity are the most concurrent issues of political development in the CHT (Mohsin 
1997, 2000; Roy 1997,1998, 2000; Schendel 1992,1996, 2000, 2001; Ahamed 
2002, 2001,2000,1998; Tripura 1993, 2000; Gain 1998, 2000; Dewan 1990,1991). 
The choice of these “cultural differences”, to use Burnham’s term (1997), has been 
articulated as issues of Pahari politics in relation to the dominant Bengali group and 
the Bangladesh state, and is influenced by various social, historical and political 
factors, as discussed in Chapter One.
78 See the discussion of social movement in Chapter One.
79 The literal meaning of Pahari may vary. The connotation of Pahari reads here as the collectivities 
of diverse indigenous inhabitants of CHT. The notion Pahari identity is discussed elaborately in the 
fom of political process in Chapter Seven.
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In this construction, the relationship between territory and culture is of paramount 
importance for the Pahari in the CHT. The articulation of territory as place for the 
Pahari and the right to continuation of CHT culture has been orchestrated in many 
organisational activities such as Vomi Odikhar Committee (IndigenousLand Rights) 
and Pahari Okka Parishod (Hill people’s United Forum).80 In this organisational 
discourse, the loss of territory is linked to loss of identity. The notion of territoriality 
here represents a political dimension but it is also an economic concept to the extent 
that it is linked to the forest resources of CHT. Activists, thus, assert identity to be 
based on a set of cultural practices, believed to be characteristics of Pahari culture: 
practice of jhum, local knowledge of forest and land use.
Like many other ‘tribal’ or peasant movements in South Asia (Guha 1989), the 
notion of territoriality is, therefore, a new dimension for the Pahari, particularly in 
their political struggle over CHT land.811 argue that the right to a territory - as an 
ecological, productive and cultural space - is now a political demand in CHT. This 
demand is fostered by collective mobilisation, what Escobar (1996) terms “potential 
reterritorialisation”. In this context, the notion territory is also a question of identity 
in the form of ‘indigenous land rights’, particularly jhum rights in the CHT. It is, 
thus, necessary to understand the relationship between the macro level problems of 
the Hill Tracts and the local level management of competing claims to land 
resources. The jhum farming systems in CHT need to be understood in the context of 
changes which articulate competing claims of local indigenous land rights and state 
relations.
In this chapter, I examine the dynamics of land use and land tenure at the micro 
level, in particular how hill people characterise their jhum land tenure and use. To 
understand the complexity of jhum land tenure, knowledge of the land use patterns is 
also important. There have always been functional links between land tenure and 
land use. It has been suggested that a particular land-use pattern requires particular
80 Organisational activities are discussed as ethnographic examples in the next chapters.
8‘There are some interesting studies on similar issues, see for indigenous peoples and land struggles 
in Malaysia (Winzeler 1997), for tribal land struggle in India (Furer-Haimendorf 1982).
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tenurial rights (Netting 1993); therefore land use, by and large, determines land 
tenure.
I suggest that there is a complex interplay between jhum tenurial rights, shared 
values and village organisation. The use of traditional jhum land in CHT historically 
represents a unique character of ‘communal value’ bounding the entire village 
community82 socially, culturally and economically into a single network of 
relationships which can be interpreted as a form of shared identity. In understanding 
the dynamics of jhum land use and shared identity, in this chapter, I focus on the 
local conceptions of land use, tenure and rights, and how local people value the jhum 
lands in terms of utility and survival. I would like to begin the discussion by 
defining the jhum from a local perspective, and explore the way in which shared 
social relationships is expressed in jhum organisation.
Defining Jhum
As mentioned in the main introduction, the economy of CHT is mainly land based. 
Traditionally its inhabitants were predominantly engaged in subsistence agriculture 
locally known as jhum, a characteristic form of agriculture in the CHT, which is 
referred to as “swidden”, “slash and bum” or “shifting cultivation” in the literature 
(Peters & Neuenschwander 1988). In the CHT, the term jhum has popularly been 
used by all ethnic communities as the general name for swidden agriculture. Yet 
each ethnic group in CHT has its own corresponding terms in their language for this 
subsistence agriculture: ya among the Marma, lao among the Bawm and jhum 
among the Tanchanga and Chakma. In this thesis, I use the emic term jhum for 
subsistence swidden agriculture as a way of life and livelihood of diverse ethnic 
peoples in the CHT, what Spencer calls “collective agriculture” (1990: 286).
Jhum is a system of agriculture whereby the jhumia 83 (as community) cultivate a 
number of fields in rotation.84 In CHT jhum is carried out predominantly on the hill
82 The term ’village community’ here primarily refers to members of a village, who shares village 
common lands as the domain of subsistence activities. In this sense, the term has also a territorial 
significance in relation to access to village land.
83 The term jhumia here I mean only to refer to exclusively jhum cultivators in the CHT. However, 
there is another term Jhumma has been used mainly by activists in the context of identity politics 
(see the discussion of this term in Chapter Seven).
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slopes. According to this method, jhum cultivators select a slope of hill land 
preferably covered with bamboo in the month of January and February. The jhumia 
then cut all the vegetation and trees (only the lower branches of large trees). The 
jhum plot is left for the cut vegetation to dry up in the sun. After a few weeks, 
depending on the weather, jhumia decide to set fire to the thoroughly dried 
vegetation before the first monsoon which normally begins in April-May. The 
burning reduces the cut shrubs to ashes. Jhum cultivators then spread the ash as 
fertiliser on the jhum plot keeping humus on the land. No manure or pesticides are 
used apart from ash.
The jhumia then wait for the rains. With the onset of the first rains sowing begins on 
the softened jhum lands. The mixed seeds of rice and various species of fruit and 
vegetables, melon, millet, pumpkin, yam, maize, oil seeds, ginger, sesame, and 
cotton, are ‘dibbled’85 into the ground at fairly even intervals. The time of the 
harvest varies from crop to crop. The different crops ripen at different times: the 
maize ripens at the middle of July; melons, vegetables and rice are harvested in 
September and October, and cotton and sesame in November and December. 
Bananas, if planted, are left for harvesting in the second year.
The ways in which processes of jhum cultivation are organised also exhibit a ‘shared 
community’ relationship. The selection of land for jhum cultivation is reached 
communally by the households in the village. All processes of clearing and burning 
are done communally. A whole household’s labour and sometimes an entire village 
are engaged in the cultivation process. Field preparation is normally done by 
household labour but occasionally with the help of a “mutual aid group”, a group of 
five or six households working together during planting, who are not necessarily 
related by kinship. However, weeding under jhum, which is the most tedious task, is 
not done through the mutual aid group. It is normally done by individual
84 This is done in order to enable fields to regain their fertility during a fallow period that varies from 
about ten to fifteen years, depending on the land-man-ratio. The ideal fallow period is considered 
minimum ten years or longer (Ruthenburg 1971). In the CHT, however, the fallow period has 
recently been reduced to as short as three to five years due to various factors reported in many studies
(Huq 2000:14; Roy 1997; Mey 1978b).
85 In the CHT, jhum cultivators dibble their lands but never hoe it so that the soil in sloping tropical 
lands does not run off during heavy monsoon downpours.
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households. The young plants have to be weeded constantly as they come to 
maturity, and again have to be guarded against the depredations of wild pigs, 
parrots, deer, monkeys, parrots and rats. It is usually men who cut the jhum  for the 
whole village. The women and children are responsible for weeding, tending and 
harvesting along with men.
Figure 6 A Marma woman weeding in the jhum field in Roangchari
In fact, such agricultural activities are not exclusively unique to CHT, it is one of the 
farming systems practised in many parts of the world, particularly among the small- 
scale societies of South and Southeast Asian regions. However, various researchers’ 
uncritical use of various terms and concepts relating to this agricultural practice, 
especially the notion shifting cultivation, apparently create some ambiguity and 
misconceptions, at least in the Bangladeshi context. Leading writers on the subject 
point out that shifting cultivation is a widespread form of land use in the hilly region
o z
of so-called tribal belt. I think this kind of proposition has profound political and 
cultural implications on the lives of the peoples concerned.
One of the direct implications of uncritical adoption of the terms, without looking at 
specific local reality, is linking it to the statist notion that the method is an ‘evil 
cultural practice’, as backward and nomadic. In many cases, these terms and notions
86 See detailed discussion of swidden agriculture, Fernades (1993), Mahaparata (1993), Nicolaisen 
(1997), Sing (2002).
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are used as justification for the state political regime bringing in a “desired legal 
charm” (Von Benda-Beckman 1993:116), to deny the traditional rights of the locals. 
Therefore, terminological sensitivity is crucial particularly where subsistence 
agricultural practice is linked to cultural identity and indigenous land rights vis-a-vis 
the state.
For example, as far as Bangladesh state policy is concerned, jhum agricultural 
practice is seen as an unscientific method and mobile livelihood. The Bangladesh 
state authorities describe ‘tribals’ of CHT as the nomadic people who are constantly 
on the move to find new lands to bum for cultivation.87 The basis for this myth can 
be ascribed in some measure to jhum cultivation, as jhumia households rotate the 
jhum according to the methods of land use and soil conservation (I discuss this point 
later in this chapter). In statist interpretation, the concept ‘nomadism’ is directly 
linked to undermine the collective land rights of the jhumia in the CHT by adopting 
the ‘shifting’ perspective of jhum.
The British, while making the move from jhum to plough, had widely used the 
notions of ‘primitivism’ and ‘backwardness’ of the hill people in South Asia who 
needed to be ‘settled’ (Guha 1989; Guha and Gadgil 1992, 1995; Karlson 1997; 
Mohsin 1997). This was in fact an imposition of a colonial notion of “progress” and 
agricultural “development” upon the jhumia. The colonial authority asserted that 
jhum is a primitive method of agriculture because it entails long fallow periods 
which were considered to be wasteful of resources. An interesting discussion by 
Guha illustrates how the issues of jhum were dealt in the colonial state with the 
process of forest reservation. Quoting Baden-Powell, one of the chief architects of 
the British forest laws in India, he shows that “shifting cultivators could claim no 
property rights or legal rights to the forest” (Guha and Gadgil 1995: 56).
In post-colonial state regimes, particularly in present day Bangladesh, the state 
reproduces the same notions associated with jhum cultivation and nomadism in order 
to deny the customary land rights of tribal people by implicating their lack of land 
titles or permanent settlement. In primary school text books in Bangladesh, the
87 See Bangladesh Government land use policy and forest plan in relation to development
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culture of upazati (tribal) has been depicted as zazabor ziban (nomad people), who 
are dependent on jhum cultivation. In Bengali, the notion zazabor means lack of 
permanent settlement - a shifting mobile life. It implies that since they are not 
permanent settlers, they have no right to claim ownership of the land.
The existing CHT literature also suggests a persistent ambiguity in relation to village 
organisation. Historians have often pointed out that village organisation in the CHT 
is neither stable nor permanent; rather it is only in existence for a span of fifteen to 
twenty years (Sirajuddin 1971; Khan 1999). Their argument is put forward on the 
ground that, as tribal people engaged in jhum cultivation for which one constantly 
requires new lands to open, once an old field is exhausted from excessive 
cultivation. As a result, the whole village or settlement moves in search of new 
cultivated lands. This analysis projects the mobile nature of jhumia life which is, in 
turn, one of the main reason for the fall and rise of village organisation in the CHT.
This is completely a mistaken idea and indeed a misrepresentation of jhum and 
jhumia in the context of CHT. In fact, this perception of jhumia people has profound 
political implications in their access to and rights over CHT lands. The present 
official discourse of land use and land management policy in CHT has largely been 
influenced by this model.
However, portraying jhumia as nomadic people because of their jhum cultivation is 
misleading. Jhum cultivation is of course a rotational agriculture method but, 
contrary to widely held views, homes and settlements are stationary. Although the 
search for a suitable piece of jhum land might take them to a very considerable 
distance from the original village, jhumia always maintain a permanent-home base 
in the natal village. As early as during colonial times, R. H. Hutchinson describes:
The very great majority of villages are permanent and have occupied their 
present site for a very large number of years. Take Banderban for instance, 
this is the largest of the hill villages and its population is entirely jhumia, but 
it has occupied its present site for more than 80 years and will continue to do 
so. The same may be said for all the principal villages (1906: 51-54).
programmes in the CHT, in Haque (2002), Ahamed (2002, 2001,1998, 1994), Khisa (2002). 
The socio-political implications of the term upazati is discussed in detail in Chapter Seven.
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Exactly eighty-four years later, the German anthropologist Loffler expresses a 
similar view on the issue of stable village organisation in CHT. He describes, “in 
general hamlets remain in the place for decades, although inhabitants may well 
change” (1990:61). As I observed during my fieldwork, on the jhum  plot a jhumia 
household often builds a temporary bamboo hut, locally called moinghor (jhum 
house) by the Marma. However, the correlation between moinghor and permanent 
settlement depends on the distance between the field and the village.
Among the Marma settlements in Roangchari, I have seen some part of households 
(only jhum  workforce) move into the moinghor during the cultivation period due to 
the long distance between jhum  field and permanent village. Households with a 
shorter distance travel each day from their village to the jhum  fields. Sometimes two 
or three households join together in a form of ‘mutual aid group’ in order to help 
each other on co-operative basis in field activities, which allow them to organise 
their relatively longer distant jhum  fields from the village. Only at the peak time, 
during sowing and harvesting, do they erect a moinghor and stay for the time being. 
The moinghor is abandoned together with the jhum after the principal crop rice has 
been taken and jhumia return to their villages. What is significant here is that 
invariably the moinghor do not have the plan of permanent houses.
Figure 7 A Marma jhumia family in Roangchari in their moinghor
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So, in practice, the question of deserting the village does not arise. Whenever 
official statements all too easily characterise the hill dwellers of CHT as nomads, 
they paint a false picture. The interlocked hypothesis of jhum cultivation and 
nomadic nature of jhumia life simply does not apply, at least in the present context 
of CHT. This theory should be discarded altogether.
The notion of nomadism does not fit into the dynamics of jhum organisation in the 
CHT. State authorities adopt this notion in view of characterising jhum with other 
non-settled traditional economic activities, such as hunting and gathering, which can 
be attributed to so-called nomadism. This, in fact, has no relevance to jhum 
cultivation in CHT. In the case of CHT, the state policy simply accepts these notions 
for their own justification to linking the component of nomadism and non-settled 
traditional activities to deny the land rights of jhumia. This has become, perhaps, the 
common way of handling the jhum cultivators.
I argue that the non-settled traditional subsistence activities in no way diminishes the 
rights of the indigenous peoples to their traditional lands, and all these traditional 
economic activities are in strict conformity with the indigenous custom and usages.89 
In particular, jhum activities in CHT are always practised with recognised territorial 
boundaries, such as mouza (an area of several village localities) (Ahamed 2002; 
Kalindi 2000; Roy 1998,1997). In all cases where I made enquiries during my 
fieldwork in Roangchari regarding jhum, land rights appeared to be inalienable with 
customary territorial boundarirs. For example, if villagers of one mouza permanently 
move to another mouza under a different headman, they forfeit their land rights in 
the previous toykhong (jhum area) - the domain of mouza headmen, according to 
dhango customary system. I will discuss details of customary jhum land rights in 
later sections.
Mainstream social scientists and government officials often put forward a theory that 
jhumia move their sites simply because of having exhausted the fertility of the slope 
of a hill and they go on to destroy another forest (Mustafa 2002; Haque 2002).
891 will discuss this aspect of customary rights in the following sections. See also the discussion of 
customary rights and traditions, and subsistence activities in Fernandes (1993), Mahapatra (1993), 
Faroogue (1998).
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Reading this literature one indeed comes across underlying assumptions that state 
control is motivated by the need for protecting the forest against uncontrolled 
destruction by the local jhumia. In view of the state regime, jhum cultivation is 
regarded as a ‘social evil* that devastates the forest causing deforestation, soil 
erosion;, and so on. This is clearly a dubious attitude towards the traditional practice 
of jhum  if the local level reality is considered.
There is a common failure among sceptics in realising that the technology of jhum 
cultivation requires a long fallow period and that fallowing in such circumstances 
amounts to letting the jungle grow up again on once-cleared land. In many cases, the 
distinction between jhum lands and the forest commons in the CHT are merely a 
transitory phase. On the one hand, these forest lands are rotationally cropped for 
jhum. On the other, these jhum lands themselves in the course of time are left for 
fallow for several years after each jhum crop, whereby they naturally regenerate 
themselves into a forest again within a number of years. Thus, in the CHT the same 
lands are both forest and jhum lands depending upon the use of the land at any given 
time.90 It is generally assumed that when land is fallowed in this way it is 
abandoned, i.e. that land rights are given up. This also suggests that lands of a 
village common jhum site are simply the lands under cultivation at any one time.
At present, however, the practical reality in CHT is that in many cases, village jhum 
sites are now being abandoned due to the government’s policy of leasing to private 
individuals and the government’s department. As in the case of Roangchari, some of 
the Soanloo para (village) jhum site had to be abandoned due to the establishment of 
a military firing training centre. Given the present situation, some villages have their 
jhum sites for a fairly long period of time, maintaining cyclical jhum cultivation 
within the site whilst others have to find new sites for the cultivation as previous 
lands are taken away by the government. Therefore, today actual jhum sites of the 
village are not necessarily fixed but the houses of the village location are fixed. The 
most common practice for the villagers is to move their jhum to another site of the 
mouza boundary but still reside in the same village.
90 The issue is more elaborately discussed in the use of toykhong lands in the following section.
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Thus, in the case of CHT, the above analysis suggests that jhumia live in permanent 
settlements and rotate the use of a fixed number of fields. Of course, there are some 
regions where the entire village moves to a new locality once the fields in one 
locality are exhausted. Authors refer to the former process as “rotational agriculture” 
and the later as “shifting cultivation” (Peters & Neuenschwander 1988). 
Anthropologists, who have studied this subsistence cultivation from an ethnographic 
perspective, prefer to use the more neutral term “swidden farming” (Dove 1988; 
Burnham 2000; Sharpe 1998). I argue that although swidden agricultural practice 
may exhibit unifying themes spanning cultural, temporal and geographical 
boundaries, it may differ greatly in terms of land use practice and local level 
political realities (situation) from place to place and people to people.
In the case of CHT, despite land scarcity and many other constraints, the traditional 
jhum cultivation is still an integral part of the way of life and is considered as the 
“cornerstone of indigenous culture” (Kalindi 2000: 7). It is, however, very 
complicated when someone asks where this agricultural practice is actually carried 
out, as there are so many competing claims of ownership and rights by different state 
departments. In recent years, the questions of jhum land use and tenurial rights has 
become the crux of all the troubles between the Pahari and Bengali because land is 
not only the resource most critical to hill peoples’ work, livelihood and identity, but 
also a much competed scarce resource within Bangladesh. Pahari claim that their 
most important possession is their common jhum lands which is communally owned 
and managed. On the other hand, for the state it is considered to be the ‘state 
property’.
Competing Conceptions of Land Use and Tenure: Jhum as Contested 
Domain
Before going into detail about the local level understanding and perceptions of land 
use and land tenure, it is important to discuss the contemporary context of land 
holdings and land rights in CHT. This enables us to understand how in everyday life 
people by a variety of methods involving tenure rights to the land and rights to the 
jhum compete with the statist perspective. At present there is a dualistic framework 
of land rights and ownership in CHT: customary and state. First, an analysis of land
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use and tenurial arrangement within the framework state-legal system is outlined 
below with references to the 1900 Regulation.91
Private rights and Usufruct rights
Under the present state system land holding and land tenure operate on two lines as 
far as official land policies are concerned in Bangladesh. The first type is the private 
right in land, particularly in the valley areas where lands are normally used for 
plough cultivation and other activities. The second is the usufruct right - a right to 
use the land over which the state retains proprietary rights (exclusive rights). These 
are mostly hilly lands - lands not demarcated as Reserve Forest, lands that are not 
settled or leased out in the name of any private individual or corporate body - 
regarded as khas lands. That is, state lands, managed under district administration 
and which the Forest Department categorises as “unclassed forest lands” for 
purposes of forest extraction and export.92
In actual practice, however, these are the common jhum lands of jhumia. Local 
jhumia claim that these are the lands where they have been doing traditional jhum 
activities for centuries, and thus have collective rights to these lands and its 
resources by virtue of their common ownership of the areas based upon customs and 
usage. I will discuss the local understanding of collective ownership and customary 
land rights as opposed to the statist perspective a little later.
To return to the discussion of state categorisation of land titles, the government does 
not formally recognise the rights of the jhumia on the common lands as a collective
91 The 1900 Regulations, popularly known as the Chittagong Hill Tracts Manual, were promulgated 
by the British authorities in January 1900 and came into effect later in the same year (Act 1 of 1990). 
The CHT Manual laid down details rules and regulations, general, judicial, land and revenue, for the 
administration of the CHT. Some of the key features of the Manual: (1) The CHT became an 
excluded or non-regulatory area compared to the plain districts. (2) Rule 34 of the regulation 
restricted possession of any land by outsiders (non-indigenous) in CHT. (3) Under the regulation 
1900, the CHT was divided into three revenue circles - the Chakma, the Mong and the Bhomong. 
Many commentators claim that the CHT regulation functions in a manner of constitutional legal 
instrument for the CHT. They argue that it provided limited self-government to the hill people and 
recognised as the homeland for the indigenous people (Roy 2000; Gain 2000; Kalindi 2000). (See the 
detailed discussion of the 1900 regulations and its legal and political implications relating to khas 
land in Chapter Six).
92 See also for detailed discussions on state land classifications, Kalindi (2000: 30-33), Roy (1992, 
1998), Gain (1998).
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right. Under state categories, these common lands are state lands. Land in the first 
category bears deeds and titles, and is known as registered land which is transferable 
and inheritable since the introduction of 1900 Regulations. The Rule 34(11) of the 
Regulation stated that “a tenant directly under government shall have permanent and 
heritable rights in the land for which he pays rent” (Page 17).
These rights were given to farmers who undertook plough cultivation with a clearly 
demarcated piece of land. In the case of such privately held lands there is no 
distinction between the CHT and the plain districts in Bangladesh. To obtain 
proprietary rights for plough lands in CHT, however, one has to formally register it 
with the Deputy Commissioner’s (DC’s) office in contrast to the Land Department 
as in other parts of Bangladesh.93
All these flat lands suitable for plough cultivation are under permanent ownership. 
However, given the natural condition and steep slopes of the CHT, the amount of 
this type of land is negligible. There have been no land surveys whatsoever in CHT 
after independence. According to the most widely cited forestal land survey report in 
1966, conducted by a Canadian company, only 3.1% of the CHT lands (about 5,200 
sq. miles of total area) are suitable for plough agriculture (Forestal Forestry and 
Engineering International Limited, “Chittagong Hill Tracts: Soil and Land Use 
Survey” (1964-1966), quoting from Gain 1998; Roy 1998). These lands are 
officially classified into three categories depending on the soil fertility and 
productivity. The classification of lands into first class, second class and third class 
relates to the number of crops per annum. Lands that can be used for two crops 
grown annually are categorised as first class and those lands that yield only one crop 
a year are called second class land. Low-lying marshlands fall into the third class
94category.
For all other hilly lands, there are two broad categories in CHT: Reserve Forest (RF) 
under the management of the Forest Department and Unclassed State Forests (USF)
93 See for further information, an interesting discussion of land administration in CHT by Roy (2000).
94 Based on personal interviews with landowners and perusal of official communications on the 
subject.
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administered by District administration. According to the Forestal Land Survey 
Report in 1964, “In addition to the RF, the CHT amounting to 3,850 sq. miles of 
Unclassed forests” (quoting from Gain 2000; Roy 1994, 2000). Historically, jhum is 
the dominant farming practice in many parts of the USF lands and is still practised 
under the traditional mouza boundary of headman, although officially there is no 
classification for jhum lands. The government policy on this land is that ownership 
is retained by the state and jhum cultivators are only given the rights to cultivate as 
“usufruct”.95
However, as I mentioned earlier, USF are in practice regarded as the commons of 
the jhumia that includes village jhum common and settlement areas. Initially, during 
the British period, the USF were divided into mouzas under the headmen who were 
formally vested with the responsibility of managing and protecting these forests. 
More recently, however, since 1989 the government has redefined USF as khas 
lands (lands that no individual has any claims). Under the new categorisation of 
khas, these lands are now increasingly leased out to private persons in the name of 
baggan (horticulture) development.
This system requires an individual to secure necessary entitlement for specified 
period under a lease directly from the government. This new system now falls within 
the judicial regime of private property rights.96 With the present changing policies, 
in reality it is now easily understandable that the area of the USF is far less than the 
amount mentioned by the Forestal Survey in 1966.
In CHT, from the statist perspective, we have thus seen that there is a contrast 
between jhum cultivation and plough agriculture, which also entails a different 
conception of ownership and rights to land. Farmers cultivating the lands at the river 
valleys and on the lower terraces are provided with land titles. Holders of land titles 
have the full right to legally transfer lands to anyone which ensures the continuity of 
individuals’ ownership to land and is inheritable. In contrast, land for the jhum
95 Analysis of the state ownership has also been documented in number of studies: Huq (2000), Roy
(2000), Shelly (1992), Mohsin (1997).
96 I will discuss the operation of khas land regime as an ethnographic case study in the next chapter.
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cultivators is not private or common property; it is seen as the property of the state. 
Jhum cultivators are only allowed to practice their traditional farming by paying 
jhum tax through the headmen.
Even the nature and concept applied to the revenue collection of these lands suggest 
different types of ownership rights. The amount of taxes varies according to types of 
the lands being realised in differential taxing concepts and institutions. For the 
plough lands, rent is paid according to the size of the land. The rent for plough lands 
per acre is payable directly to governmental administration and is given with proper 
revenue receipt. The rate is still fixed low compared to jhum lands, Taka 3, 2, and 1 
for first, second and third class of land per acre respectively. On the other hand, 
jhum tax is collected on the basis of households, not for a particular plot or size of 
plot. In 2000, a rate of Tk.8 per household was fixed for the jhum cultivators.97
Variations in tax terminology relating to plough lands and jhum lands are thus 
significantly meaningful in terms of ownership of the land. The term rent is referred 
to the plough land whereas jhum tax is referred to as a capitation tax. Capitation tax 
also sometimes referred to as dao tax (dao or bill-hook is the main tool in jhum 
cultivation). This is, perhaps, the continuation of colonial taxation policy in which 
rent for the plough lands was kept low to attract jhumia to plough cultivation while 
jhum cultivation was discouraged by taxing more.98 At the present time, however, 
this differential taxing policy has been interpreted in relation to land title-holders 
and non title-holders, particularly in the context of jhum tax. This differential system 
implies that jhumia have no ownership rights on the land as they only pay a 
capitation tax for jhum to the state through the headmen, not for the land.
97 Conversation with ADC (Revenue) of Banderban, also verifying with the locals. There was even 
discussion about further raising of jhum tax from Tk.8 to 12 during rajpunnah festival (Tax collection 
ceremony) in 2000 suggested by a Deputy Commissioner of Banderban.
98 Jhum taxing was a very elaborate business for colonial authority in realising maximum revenues. 
Rule 41(3) says "every jhumia family lives in one mouza and jhum in another mouza shall pay an 
additional tax to the headman of the mouza in which it jhums, who locally calls as parkulias 
(outsider)". Thus colonial jhum taxing was not only design to extract more revenues also directed 
towards sedentarise jhumia into the village and mouza level. See for the details of colonial jhum 
taxing in other region of India (Karlsson 1997).
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It appears that contradictory official perspectives seem to be posing many problems 
relative to land tenure for the jhum cultivators. Although the official attitude equally 
applies to the hill peoples of CHT in general, there has been a wider gap between the 
plough and jhum cultivators as fair as state tenurial system is concerned. Plough 
cultivators enjoy individual ownership in the state/legal sense whereas jhum 
cultivators have no formal legal rights, considered ‘nomadic’ with traditional land 
use practice. Under the present government policy in Bangladesh, in many respects, 
there is no sure legal basis for the ownership of jhum lands by the traditional jhumia 
community despite the current popularity of the notion of “community 
management” with the rhetoric of development programmes (Tripura 2000; Gain 
2000; Ahamed 2001, 2000). There are no corresponding notions of ‘communal’ or 
‘indigenous lands’ in contemporary land management systems in the CHT.
Therefore, anyone, as did I, could assume that in the CHT, people have conceptions 
about land rights as both usufruct and private ownership, which are now practised 
simultaneously. Many studies (Mohsin 1997; Mey & Mey 1980,1981) even suggest 
that these concepts have been subject to rationalisation under the colonial and 
subsequent government’s rule mediated through the headman system, as there are 
many households in the CHT now practising both jhum and plough cultivation, and 
which therefore balance legal notions of ownership and property with community 
ownership.
During my fieldwork, however, I tried to investigate these intriguing issues from the 
local perspective: what these statist and collective ownership mean socially, 
culturally, and legally to the Marma, Bawm and Tanchanga people in Roangchari, 
and what does the CHT land itself mean to the hill people in general? In the 
following section I explain the local understanding and perception of collective land 
rights at the micro level dealing with present indigenous forms of jhum land use and 
tenure rights under headman-karbari system as well as outlining the traditional 
normative customary model.
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Jhum Collective Rights and Ownership
There is a wide variation between the statist conception of usufruct and the local 
perspective of collective rights in terms of jhum use, land holding and administration 
at the village community level as opposed to the official regulations. From the statist 
perspective, jhum usufruct rights are commonly seen as a set of jural concepts or 
legal rules formulated by political bodies of the state. Such rights are only embodied 
in jhum tax valuations under the legal jurisdiction of the state. From the local 
perspective in CHT, however, jhum land tenure is a complex socio-economic and 
cultural phenomenon.
In contrast to state categorisation of jhum as usufruct rights, local conceptions of 
jhum rights and holdings are not held in the same sense. Local jhumia, across ethnic 
groups in Roangchari, assert that they have their own traditional way of defining 
customary rights to jhum which for them are the ‘de facto property’ of the village. 
They claim that jhum land is common property, belonging to the village community 
and even members of the spirit world, with individual households exercising only 
the right to use the land. The concept of property as understood by the statist 
perspective today, focusing on the individuals who have formal written document of 
the ownership of land and pay tax on it, is not of property in that sense. For the 
jhumia, whose life is centred primarily on land and forest resources, it is a 
community resource; this is common property of the village; individuals have rights 
of use over it. In other words, every villager has a collective right to cultivate a plot 
through being a member of the village.
Mahapatra, an anthropologist examining different land rights from an Indian 
perspective describes, “collective rights usually refers to the rights which is 
exercised by a group. ...Such rights are commonly referred to as communal rights.
.. .Communal rights may be exclusive rights of ownership or right to control and 
manage resources apart from the right to use or usufruct” (1993: 53). From this 
perspective, for the jhumia in the CHT, the common lands are those which belong to 
a village with shared rights of access by the villagers. Forest and jhum lands are 
included within this category of village and mouza commons, and are the common 
property of jhumia with equal rights of access, use and extraction.
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This suggests that jhum agriculture correlates with conceptions of collective 
ownership of land, and local jhumia could only subsist from their fields as part of a 
village community, bound in ties of mutual reciprocity. The concept of collective 
ownership for the jhumia is thus inextricably linked to traditional jhum occupation, 
with the land and its resources providing the enabling environment for subsistence 
activities. Amongst almost all the ethnic groups in CHT, prior to opening jhum 
fields and before harvesting, some form of ritual or ceremony is performed to 
appease the spirits and to ask for the good luck for the crops in jhum." They believe 
that the land belongs to the village community, is theirs to use for the duration of 
their lives, and must be preserved for future generations. In this sense, ownership 
and possession are cumulative rights, and those lands that are identified as common 
lands are accessible to the entire village. Therefore the western concept like usufruct 
does not have the same connotations in indigenous conceptions of customary rights 
in the CHT.
Households have the rights to land use depending on customs and rituals relating to 
acquisitions, use and social transmission within the village community. Loffler, 
studied the Mru for almost ten years, another group outside my study area, and states 
that “a kind of unwritten law of land ownership exists among the Mm. Land is 
communally owned; every household has equal access to the land, there is no idea of 
buying and selling land” (1990: 45). Loffler’s ethnography, however, does not 
elaborate what is actually meant by community ownership. As I mentioned before, 
collective ownership in CHT must be understood within the framework of jhum and 
village organisation. It is based on custom and usages, is held in village or mouza 
common, and is regulated by the indigenous institution as collective rights.
In the CHT today the traditional collective rights and indigenous institution are 
conceived of by most inhabitants in Roangchari as inseparable and refer to the 
customary procedures of jhum land use and tenurial practice under native authority 
of headman-karbari system. Among the elderly Marma whom I talked with believe 
that the British colonial system, in many ways, codified the local customs through
99 The traditional Tanchanga method is to sacrifice a chicken before jhum cut. Marma sacrifice a pig
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the headman system and adopted in the CHT Manual. The CHT Manual is still held 
in fond regard by the local hill people, who resent the national legal code, which is 
based on the statist legal conceptions.
According to the present indigenous system, which has been operational since the 
colonial times, ideally common collective rights can be categorised at three levels: 
village level, mouza level, and the CHT level. Firstly, at the village level, the village 
community as a whole is jointly responsible for the use, management and control of 
the lands surrounding their village, which is a village common. As head of the 
village, the karbari has responsibility to allocate jhum lands for the villagers in 
consultation with the headman, who is the mouza head. Access to village common 
lands, however, is not limited to descent or lineage groups. For example, in 
Rockoywa para in Roangchari, ethnic groups can be differentiated by different 
lineages and clans, but there is no “principle lineage’’ which provides the 
karbari!headmen to be the legitimate authority of the village, as observed by Leach 
in the context of Kachin society in Burma (1954: 116). In Roangchari, every 
household of the village, irrespective of ethnic background, as a whole has 
cultivation rights, rights of jhum, that are clearly defined in terms of landmarks, such 
as streams, mountain tops, prominent trees and so on. In this conception, the village 
common has a territorial significance.
Secondly, at the mouza level (above the village), a number of villages are grouped 
together on the basis of territorial boundary under the authority of headman. There 
are 365 such mouzas at present in the CHT. Within the mouza territory each village 
has wider access to the mouza common lands beyond the village common as resident 
of the mouza. The headman is responsible for distributing the mouza common lands 
to different villagers through village karbari and for collecting jhum tax. Today in 
practice, in one way or another, village commons and mouza commons are 
overlapping and intertwined in the fact that village commons are the smaller units of 
bigger mouza commons.
before harvesting the jhum.
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In many cases, village commons are not always close to the village settlement due to 
the non-availability of jhum lands resulting from multiple causes. As I mentioned 
earlier, these mouza commons are increasingly made RF by the Forest Department, 
and leased to the individuals as khas lands. Thus, households practically find jhum 
allotments far away from the village within the larger mouza boundary. In the CHT, 
therefore, village common can also be seen as the mouza common. Today, in present 
day reality, this common jhum lands is managed by the indigenous authority of 
headmen-karbari at both village and mouza level.
Thirdly, at the circle levels (above the mouza), chiefs are responsible for their 
territories including revenue collection and land claims matters, such as the 
boundary disputes between the mouza commons and other social matters. In case 
any dispute arises, at first the matter is placed before the karbari/headman, 
sometimes also involving an informal council of elders at village or mouza level.
The dispute matters only go to circle chiefs if conflict between the two headmen or 
mouzas is locked with serious local repercussions. Dispute resolution within the 
mandate of the indigenous administration is adopted in the 1900 regulations. Since 
colonial times, the indigenous modalities for land allocation have been governed by 
customary practices and usage, the village community, as whole, decide upon the 
modalities for land use and conservation (fallow) in consultation with karbari and 
headmen. This includes the identification of certain areas as common lands, e.g. 
forests surrounding areas of the village accessible to villagers for jhum.
I suggest, therefore, that even within the framework of present indigenous 
institutions, the jhumia have their shared rights individually and collectively to use 
the jhum common lands. The concept of ‘shared use’ is significant in this context. 
Although individual households have exclusive rights to specific areas of the 
immediate surrounding of village common, the village community as a whole shares 
the rights of access and to use these lands as the collective property of the entire 
village or mouza. Individual land rights include the rights to a particular jhum, rights 
to land for a home, rights to extract resources including forest produce on the 
common lands.
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However, one has to be mindful that once a specific allocation is no longer in use or 
occupation by an individual household, i.e. an old jhum, the land reverts to the 
village community. Therefore, although individual land rights in the form of 
household rights do exist in the CHT, in the ultimate analysis it is the jhumia (as 
community) who have the inherent collective rights in common lands according to 
the custom and usage. It is the village community who collectively owns the lands, 
with individuals having specific rights of use and possession.
Moreover, within these indigenous modalities, jhumia are also paying jhum tax since 
the adoption of 1900 Regulations [Rule 42(4)]. An annual tax is paid for the right to 
jhum , collected by the headman, who enters the details in a register called jhum tazi. 
The particulars included in the tazi are the name of the household head, names of 
households’ members, whether they are doing jhum that year or not, and the details 
of the jhum. Every year the jhum tazi (list of jhumias) has to be submitted by each 
headman to the chief. The chief, after verification of the lists, forwards a copy to the 
Deputy Commissioner certifying the persons who are exempted from the payment of 
the jhum tax, widows, bachelors, shamans, etc. On the basis of this list the headman 
collects jhum tax.100 There is also the practice of parkulya (outsider) whereby a 
jhumia household paid the tax in full to the mouza where they actually cultivated a 
jhum, usually the neighbouring one known as mouza parkulya.101
Thus, I suggest that within the present indigenous modalities the customary right to 
jhum is formally recognised in the CHT Manual, and taxes are paid for the exercise 
of such rights. There is no formal lease required for jhum, although all the relevant 
information is duly recorded in the tazi which is sent to the chief every year, and is 
updated on a regular basis. This means that in the CHT the rights to use the jhum 
common lands over which jhumia have customary rights under the head authority at 
the village, mouza and circle level. Hence for the jhumia, it is the indigenous 
institution of headmen-karbari through which one can get access to village or mouza 
common lands. In other words, customarily within the indigenous institution the
100 According to the Manual, the jhum tax was Rs. 6.00 per jhumia, and apportioned using by 
following formula: chief Rs. 2.50; headman Rs. 2.25; and Rs. 1.25 to government. Today this 
remains applicable theory and the government still share same portion of jhum tax with higher rate.
101 This practice is also recognised in the CHT Manual see the Rule 42 (3).
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jhumia’s right to jhum has been ensured on mouza or village common lands, which 
for them is collectively owned by the village community.
The argument put forward by the state administration, following the discourse of 
usufruct rights, that jhum taxation system is based on the person not on the land is 
mainly argued with reference to the capitation tax that is levied on the jhumia 
through the traditional authority of mouza headmen. The state authority stresses that 
the indigenous institution is limited to the people only and does not extend to the 
lands. This theory, however, totally ignores the indigenous conceptions of land 
rights in the CHT. The principle of jhum land tenure is almost wholly misunderstood 
by the government officials, and most of their statements are quite misleading too.
The articulation of the official culture has always been that the jhumia lacks fixed 
rights to land due to their mobile traditional life. As already mentioned, Bangladesh 
land administration continues to follow British colonial conceptions in which all 
lands are considered as state lands. Burnham calls this situation “vacant and without 
master”, and therefore that land falls within the “domain of the state” (2000: 37). As 
Burnham has argued in his recent article which reviews the implications of the 
concept of state land in the colonial and postcolonial laws of Cameroon, such legal 
theories have the pragmatic aim of facilitating acquisition of local communities’ 
land through nullification of traditional conceptions of the land tenure. Burnham’s 
point is important in understanding the present debate between the State vs. 
indigenous land rights in the CHT.
In Bangladesh, proponents of indigenous lands rights composed of radical social 
scientists, law practitioners, political activists, from the pluralist and common 
property approach to tenure in CHT, describe the statist argument as “legal 
gymnastics” (Mohsin 1997; Gain 1998; Muhammad 1997; Jahangir 1979; Roy 
1998, 2000; Schendel 1996, 2000; Tripura 1993). According to this school of 
thought, the Bengali elite, civil and military bureaucracy continue to use the concept 
of the state as guardian of all lands for their own interests and their clients, 
combined with the idea that private ownership should be the basic concept for 
allocating the lands in the CHT. They suggest that it will only be in instituting an
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effective “legal pluralism”102 especially in recognising the local customary rights in 
their jhum lands for equitable management in the CHT. Roy, an indigenous legal 
expert from the CHT, particularly highlighted that “although the British claimed 
total sovereignty over the lands through the CHT Manual the chiefs and headmen 
are ensured with the territorial boundaries, recognising the customary practice of 
land use and rights” (Roy 1998: 13).
Following the above arguments, it is therefore a common failure to realise from the 
statist perspective that the collection of jhum tax, among other things, is restricted to 
the territorial limits of the mouza/circle boundary. I argue that in fact Jhumia are 
liable for the jhum tax to the indigenous authority wherein is located the jhum plot, 
indicating the territorial dimension of the tax. In addition, customarily there is still 
general exemption of priests, shamans, widows and the sick people under the 
premise that it is difficult for them to use, manage and cultivate sufficient lands for
103jhum. In this context, jhum tax is tied up to the exercise of their rights to jhum, 
including the rights of being exempted from this. Therefore, the source of the jhum 
tax indicates that the very payment of taxes in the CHT originally occurred from a 
right in land per se and the indigenous system itself based on the territorial 
jurisdiction. From this point of view one can conclude that the conceptual 
framework of land rights of the jhumia is inextricably linked to the land itself.
The normative model of customary land use practice also confirms that territoriality 
is an inherent part of the indigenous system. The elderly Marma people in 
Roangchari assert that the present indigenous system is the outcome of historical 
continuity under the British. I have recorded details of traditional Marma customary 
land management system, jhum land uses and tenure rights, and village authority, 
which in many ways has now been shaped by the present headman-karbari system. 
During my fieldwork in Roangchari engaging physically in jhum activities and 
talking to the local jhumia I observed that there is still a close functional link 
between the village organisation and jhum land management within the framework 
of headman-karbari system practised among all the ethnic communities. In the
102 Benda-Beckman (1993) and Burnham (2000) used the term "legal pluralism" in reference to 
traditional customs and laws under the statist legal system. Nicola Frost also describes the term 
"adat" (local customary law) in the context of Maluku, Indonesia (2001: 2).
218
following section, I discuss in detail the traditional notions of village community, 
common lands and indigenous institutions from the local level perception and 
understanding.
Traditional Indigenous Institution of Roaza-Piancy as Present Headman- 
Karbari
Elderly Marma narratives state that the Marma word roa means big village (a 
domain of several villages) which also strictly denotes the houses of the village and 
the land (lay) which it controls within the surrounding area. A traditional leader 
called roaza was the head of roa. The traditional hierarchical leadership under the 
authority of roaza was also a small group of village leaders representing the smaller 
villages within the roa known as piancy. The villagers in the roa on consideration of 
maturity and strong qualities of leadership selected both the functionaries of roaza 
and piancy.
The present mouza structure is somewhat similar to that of previous roa. Until the 
early days of colonial time this traditional roaza-piancy system was said to be the 
basic structure of roa authority. Many elderly Marma, who are the oldest inhabitants 
of Roangchari, assert that there has been continuity between the titleholders of 
roaza-piancy and the headman-karbari in terms of village authority and toykhong 
organisation (jhum area). They still see the headman as their roaza and the mouza 
commons as their toykhong. Their perceptions of jhum land use are closely bound 
with this indigenous authority.
Eighty years old, Mong La Sing Marma, the present headman of Roangchari, whose 
father was also a headman, has long experience of the British, Pakistani and 
Bangladesh periods. In his view traditional land use pattern under roaza-piancy in 
the past is not different from the present headmen-karbari system. He told me that 
traditional roaza-piancy system of roa organisation was replaced by the present 
headman-karbari system corresponding with the mouza boundary, and formalised 
through 1900 regulations with changes in two respects. Firstly, the British 
introduced headmen-karbari as hereditary titles whereas rouza-piancy leadership
103 This aspect has formally adopted in the 1900 regulation (Rule 34).
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was vested in personal attributes recognised by the members of the village 
community. Secondly, the major change was brought in the functions of headmen 
who were empowered with jhum tax collection from the mouza.104
Despite structural changes in the leaderships of roaza-piancy to headman-karbari in 
colonial times, Mong La Sing Marma claim that jhum land use under indigenous 
institution, to a large extent, remained the same. The way in which members of the 
roa customarily exercised their right in the use of toykhong (jhum area), in similar 
manner today mouza residents under the headman-karbari use the mouza commons. 
Other elderly Marma informants also corroborate how this traditional toykhong 
practice is still operational relating to jhum land use in CHT.
Local Conceptions of Land Use and Tenure - The Customary Practices of 
Toykhong
The literary meaning of the Marma word toykhong is jhum area but in a structural 
sense it has a political character. It is perceived by the Marma as the domain of roa 
under the rouza, where jhum activities are organised by the members of roa 
community. In this sense toykhong has a territorial significance in relation to jhum 
rights - customary jhum common lands of the roa.
According to the traditional practices, jhum hills of the region are grouped under 
different roazas known as toykhong (jhum area). Villagers and roazas collectively 
decide boundaries between the toykhongs, not by any written deeds. Customarily 
toykhong boundaries between the roazas are demarcated after known geographic 
features, such as a stream, river or tree. Therefore, one toykhong can be separated 
from the other by a visibly recognisable geographical feature. Every hill within a 
toykhong bears a name commonly known to the village community such as phakhu 
tong, pakhu hill, mora ziri, mon ziri, and shokna ziri, currently practised in present 
day Roangchari mouza. Such names are derived from local conceptions of toykhong 
boundaries following geographical peculiarities, for example, a spring coming down 
through a hill, a dried up stream, a running stream and a narrow stream etc. These
104 Many academics, however, suggest that "indirect rule" in CHT was governed by the colonial 
economic interests (Mohsin 1997: 89).
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local perceptions can be seen as cognitive boundary maintenance of the toykhong 
territory of the roa.
Today the concept toykhong is not exactly maintained in the same traditional sense 
due to number of reasons, as I mentioned earlier. At the present day CHT, jhum 
common lands are not exclusively confined to a one single area or village. For 
example, most of the hilly lands in close proximity to Rockoywa or Soanloo para in 
Roangchari are either leased out to individuals or turned into a reservation for the 
Forest Department. They can also be in the process of acquisition by other 
government establishments. Jhumia are not finding jhum fields in the same area. 
Instead they have to choose their jhum fields far away from the village. In this new 
situation, as jhumia are moving towards different directions within the broader 
mouza territory, the traditional roa toykhong system is not exactly maintained in that 
sense. It is now, more or less, becoming tied up with mouza boundary under the 
headman. Roa toykhong, in that respect, has gradually been ceded to the greater 
mouza system.
The headmen and karbari, however, are still distributing the jhum lands to mouza or 
village households according to traditional practice of the toykhong system. Today 
among the jhumia in Roangchari, toykhong boundary maintenance is followed in 
relation to mouza jhum commons between the headmen. Although mouza common 
lands are now officially categorised as USF or khas lands, the local perceptions 
attached to roa toykhong is still vital to their traditional use and rights of these lands 
as jhum commons. The customary traditional practices emphasise that within the 
toykhong households are free to choose jhum site with a collective consensus of their 
respective roaza. It is the same way mouza commons are now used by the villagers 
under the headmen.
Investigation into households’ rights over toykhong reveals an intricate operation of 
customary practices in the CHT, relating to jhum land use by the members of village 
community. The gogha and dhango customary practices demonstrate how 
household’s rights and community rights are intertwined in the use of toykhong.
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Gogha Customary Rights (Household Rights) in Toykhong
In the past, customarily, management of toykhong was vested upon roaza. It was the 
responsibilities of the roaza who looked after the toykhong and allocated the jhum 
plots to every household in the roa. Although roaza, as the roa head, had a 
traditional authority over the domain of toykhong land, in fact, the allocation of jhum 
land was decided at a meeting of all household heads in the roa. The roaza was 
responsible for the arrangement of such meeting but the decision of toykhong jhum 
land distribution was required to come from a consensus of all households. In case 
of any disputes, the roaza, also involving a council of elders, resolved internal 
matters. Dispute resolutions were mostly settled in consensus among the village 
community. So, in this sense, customarily toykhong jhum distribution processes are 
communal in nature as it is done through the consultation of all villagers. Today, 
under the headman-karbari, mouza commons are used in a similar way by the local 
jhumia of Roangchari.
When a household selects a hill slope, as a mark of possession an upper portion of 
tree is cut and lower is kept on the ground of the jhum plot, which symbolises the 
newly selected jhum, locally known as gogha by the Marma. No other households of 
the village attempt to occupy this piece of jhum site already cultivated or selected by 
a villager. Boundaries of these jhum plots are marked with forked sticks, and other 
villagers respect them as per normative customary rules. Traditionally there are no 
formal deeds or legal titles required for the possession of gogha. The headman, also 
involving the karbari and other elderly members of the village community, 
generally solves the disputes over gogha boundaries, and if required further, matters 
are taken to the chief at the circle level.
The general principal of toykhong jhum field allotment among the households is 
flexible. The distribution of jhum field size is considered on the basis of a 
household’s size. In other words, the size of the jhum field is proportionately higher 
for the bigger household so that food supplies from the bigger jhum ensures secure 
livelihood for the households. Furthermore, the criteria of measuring size of the 
jhum field is not the size of the land, it is rather quantity of rice seed. The size of the 
jhum field is measured for each household on the basis of quantity of seeds planted
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(for example one ari (twelve kg) of rice produces a hundred aris of rice 
approximately). Therefore, per annum consumption of rice by a household is taken 
consideration for what amount of seeds is required to be sown.105 This suggests that 
right to jhum  is related to basic needs of household’s subsistence in terms of 
toykhong land use management.
This rationale of customary jhum  field distribution is, thus, not only adjusted with 
equity and livelihood measure but also ensures a better way of land use, depending 
on the size of household’s labour force in order to operate the jhum. Households, 
which do not have enough work forces, are helped by others to prepare already 
selected jhum  fields. In case the household’s size increases overtime, the 
headman/karbari readjusts the previously allotted gogha jhum sites through an 
additional allotments in accordance with its need. In such a situation, the 
household’s head fixes a marker using an “x” sign on the head of a bamboo pool on 
the new jhum  site chosen within the toykhong. Other villagers customarily accept 
this as special re-adjustment of toykhong supporting households in need.
Figure 8 Gogha possession in jhum toykhong
105 It is important to note here that in the CHT rice is the main staple food.
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In this process, gogha rights over toykhong are not only a right but also a way of life 
and livelihood. The relationship between possession, use and occupation of 
toykhong land by the households is expressed in gogha rights. The gogha right is the 
right to utilise the toykhong lands which one is not the owner. In fact, there is a 
complex interplay between the gogha and dhango rights in terms of toykhong land 
ownership.
Dhango-Common Rights to Toykhong
Since toykhong land is maintained by joint ownership of the village community, it 
does not actually allow or pass by inheritance between the generations. However, 
gogha right, as part of collective rights, is being ensured as the member of village 
community. In other words, every household in the village has a legal right, in 
customary sense, to cultivate a share of toykhong land, which is allotted to them. No 
household, however, is allowed to own the plots individually because customarily 
ownership of toykhong land belongs to the village or mouza.
In each year every household of the village has an equal right to have access to a 
certain area of jhum field within the toykhong. Usually, in practice, each household 
possesses minimally eight to ten different jhum fields for their subsistence over a 
period of time. In this way, each household keeps the jhum fields under gogha 
possession simultaneously for some time until one abandons his claims. This system 
of gogha possession over various jhum field sites by the household is known 
indigenously as dhango.
In the CHT, however, dhango practice over toykhong lands must be understood 
within the dynamics of jhum rotational agriculture. In fact, a mouza common lands 
or toykhong is much bigger than the lands actually being cultivated in each year. 
Villagers normally rotate their jhum fields within the toykhong boundary. The whole 
area of toykhong is divided into several small sections; some of them are cultivated 
in a particular year while others are kept for future use depending on the 
requirements of the total households in the village. Each year every household is 
allocated a piece of jhum land from the selected area of toykhong - decided for the 
cultivation in that particular year. In fact, many households maintain some gogha
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possessions in previous jhum sites with some crops still standing or fallowed for 
regeneration. In this process of allocation and rotation, over a period of time 
households have a number of gogha possessions in different jhum field sites within 
the toykhong boundary, which is collectively known as dhango for a household.
In this context, at any given point in time, the toykhong is always under possession 
of household’s dhango sites. For example, if a toykhong contains thirty households 
altogether, it implies that there will be thirty dhangos, i.e. the numbers of dhango is 
equal to the total numbers of households in the village. So, in this process 
household’s right over toykhong lands appears to be inalienable. Customarily, even 
in the death of a household’s head, other members of the household have rights over 
that dhango. Members of the deceased household exercise the dhango rights already 
established before the death of the household head. Therefore, the dhango remains 
effective, valid, and inalienable.
Ownership is more intrinsic here. Dhango rights and possession are embedded in a 
different doctrine as opposed to usufruct. I argue that dhango use and occupation are 
articulated in a highly distinctive body of “social habit”(William 1986: 105). 
Although permanent ownership of a particular plot in toykhong jhum land is not 
possible by the household due to yearly field rotation. However, there is a common 
tendency that households always try to maintain the same allotment of plots that 
they have already previously cultivated. The reason households prefer to return to 
the same section of cultivated area after the year’s cycle is because the plots are 
familiar to the households. More importantly, during the first cultivation households 
might have planted some trees over which they claim a kind of household’s rights.
However, in practice, this could not always be achieved since adjustments and 
readjustments have to be made on consideration of demographic changes, such as 
increases or decreases of household membership, formation of new households, or 
households’ migration to other villages, and so forth. Thus, the customary practices 
of toykhong land use and rights entail two vital aspects: first, the toykhong typically 
belongs to the village, i.e. property of the village. Only members of the village 
community have exclusive access to toykhong lands. Secondly, a household’s gogha 
and dhango possession are inherently intertwined with the common customary rights
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in the use of toykhong. The normative practices of gogha and dhango rights over 
toykhong lands provide a perspective on customary collective rights and ownership 
in the CHT.
Moreover, the ways in which toykhong lands are used also provide a territorial 
conception of mouza commons in the CHT. The question of ‘nomadism’ and 
abandoning jhum is a myth in this respect. There is always an argument put forward 
by the state regime that the way jhum agriculture is fallowed diminishes the question 
of permanent land rights. It is generally assumed that land rights are given up. The 
customary toykhong land use practices shows that this is not the case. According to 
dhango customary practice, all the marked jhum field sites under gogha possession 
are not in use at the same time but there are rotations annually between chosen fields 
within toykhong boundary. In other words, for example, each household minimally 
keeps several jhum fields having gogha possession simultaneously but only one field 
is used in a year and the rest remains unused for regeneration until the rotation is 
completed. As a result, each household could follow the longer period of rotation 
between the chosen jhum fields. In the past, this rotational system provided a longer 
fallowing period extending to a minimum ten years interval of each site. This 
ensured maximum output of yields and adequate supply of subsistence for the whole 
year.
In a year’s cycle, as normal practice, households move from one jhum site to another 
in order to allow regeneration and this can not be seen as abandoning the land. Jhum 
land is generally cultivated for two successive years; the plot is then allowed to 
remain fallow for seven to eight years before the same plot is cultivated again. The 
local practices of jhum in this way suggest that rationality of land use exists in terms 
of resource conservation. The jhumia, as community, demonstrate the responsibility 
of toykhong management. For example, when mouza or toykhong common lands 
show sign of soil exhaustion and deterioration indicating the need for regeneration 
period, the jhumia collectively take the decision to leave the area untouched for a 
determinate period. In this way, fallow jhum accommodate a period of regeneration 
of essential soil materials and vegetation. This represents a careful adjustment of 
social rules and practices to ecological factors.
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Therefore, it is clear that the ways in which jhum are categorised in official-legal 
discourse contradict local jhumia perspectives in terms of their livelihood and as 
ways of life. The indigenous jhumia notions of land and its classification also reveal 
an alternative discourse to the statist interpretation of jhum. This addresses the 
general principles of jhum cultivation in the CHT and the dynamics of jhum and 
jhumia.
Dynamics ofjhum  and jhumia
Local jhumia of Roangchari, across ethnic groups, place a practical value on hill 
lands in terms of utility, crop yield and sustainability of jhum subsistence activities. 
Such views primarily derive from their long-term attachment and engagement with 
the jhum as a way of life and livelihood. Among the jhumia, Marma, Bawm and 
Tanchanga in Roangchari have local knowledge of hill soil texture in terms of 
suitability for jhum cultivation. They can differentiate hill slopes in terms of 
productivity and non-productivity. All the hills varying in sizes and altitudes are not 
equally productive for the jhum. Judged from the criteria of higher productivity local 
jhumia are able to select appropriate jhum sites.
In terms of suitability, jhumia distinguishes two types of hills. Hills with very high 
and sharp steep slopes, locally called kyiot-t (pyramidal shape) in Marma, are 
considered unsuitable for the better jhum yields because ash is washed down quickly 
after the rainfall and there is very little water retention in the soil. The types of hill 
which are preferred for ideal jhum are called pa boya. Pa boya hills are curved in 
shape and with gentle slopes which allows burnt ash to stay after the rainfall, and its 
soil texture normally retains a higher water content. Therefore, jhum on pa boya hills 
is considered much more productive.
Furthermore, in their conceptions, jhumia also distinguish hill lands into two 
contrasting categories: yea and lay (in Marma). Yea lands are those hill slopes that 
are covered by natural vegetation particularly with bamboo brakes of certain species. 
Lay lands are the hill slopes with little vegetation. Yea is mostly preferred for the 
jhum because after the clearance (slash and burning the vegetation) it is enriched 
with organic ashes that permit high productivity for multi-cropping. On the other
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hand, lay lands are avoided because they are covered with only sungrass (Imperata 
arundinacea) which after burning is likely to have little humus for the jhum. Hills 
with very large trees are avoided because they usually involve hard labour to fell.
These local perceptions of suitable jhum illustrate traditional indigenous land use 
practices and attachments to particular social and cultural values. Such knowledge 
seems to be tenable and empirically meaningful when their land use practices are 
taken into consideration with their everyday livelihood situation. Jhumia identify 
each segments of season in terms of changes of jhum activities round the year. They 
recognise four types of seasons corresponding with particular activities involved in 
the jhum. For example, in Bawm terms, four implies the period for preparation of 
jhum, which takes place before the rainy season. Thai follows after the four when 
actual jhum is cultivated during the rainy season. The mango relates to collection of 
jhum products from the field, while bosic corresponds to clearing of forest and 
burning, which takes place in the winter. This suggests that for jhumia land and 
living are inseparable in the CHT.
Measuring Mm
Among the jhumia in three groups, there is a common cultural conception about 
measuring the jhum field in the CHT. The amount of seedlings annually used for 
cultivation is primarily considered as a unit in measuring the size of jhum fields. Roy 
has pointed out that “the average size of jhum plot is about one hectare” (1997: 23). 
Jhumia in Roangchari, however, do not use these units of hector or acres in 
measuring the jhum fields. Jhumia often say that ‘this year they are going to 
cultivate certain amount of ari oi jhum\ which means the size of land is measured 
by the amount of rice seedling. The central concern here is the amount of seed being 
planted, rather than the size of area that is cultivated. It indicates that for the jhumia, 
the term jhum not only mean land, as generally perceived by the outsiders, but also 
means a variety of crops crucially important for their livelihood. Thus, undermining 
of jhum not only denies their rights to use the lands, but also has deleterious effects 
on their livelihood, as intercropping in jhum traditionally yields a wide range of 
crops that provides a balanced food supply.
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In this sense, the indigenous notion of jhum measurement is quite opposite to plough 
agriculture in which the size of land is the unit for measuring paddy cultivation each 
year. In other words, how many acres of land a farmer normally cultivates. These 
different notions of land measurement certainly bring up the issues of different 
cultural and social perceptions of agricultural practices. The local perception of jhum 
and jami (meaning “paddy land” in Bengali) further exemplify this. The following 
paragraphs illustrate how the local inhabitants historically valued jhum and jami in 
terms of their livelihood situation.
Among the present inhabitants of Roangchari with whom I talked, there is a 
common understanding that until recently jhum is the most valued resource for the 
hill people in terms of providing an adequate food supply in the CHT. A senior 
elderly Marma gives the following account of how a jhumia family had gained 
sufficient subsistence from the jhum:
In earlier days, during British time we had no problem for jhum. There were 
many jhum common lands around our village. A medium size jhum normally 
produced sufficient supply for a big household. In an average jhum, 
particularly with bamboo vegetation, if we would sow one ari of rice seeds 
(a unit of 12 kg quantity normally made of cane or wood), we could harvest 
about 150 to 200 ari (1800 kg to 2400 kg) of rice (discussion with Solha Pru 
Marma, 19th July 2000).
Similarly, another elderly Tanchanga of Botolli para describes:
In the past, we did not undertake any strenuous labour for ploughing wet 
lands only to get a half of the yields compared to the jhum. We get 
everything from the jhum: rice, cotton, vegetable etc. When plain lands were 
at our disposal around Rockoywa para, we were less inclined to use them for 
many disadvantages. Plough cultivation requires various use materials such 
as plough, cattle, water, and fertiliser, which are not required for the jhum. 
Jhum is simply da land (discussion with Haradon Tanchanga, 15th July 
2000).
The Mamma and Tanchanga perspectives here tell us that historically jhum is the 
most valuable resource and way of livelihood for the jhumia in the CHT. These 
narratives also reveal that in earlier times, given the abundance of jhum fields, there 
was no need for jhumia to search jhum fields outside their toykhong. Such necessity 
only arose when land scarcity became acute as a result of deliberate state policies on
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jhum lands in the CHT. Mong La Sing Marma, the headman of Roangchari, states 
that,
The competition for jhum land was virtually non-existent. Jhumia had 
enjoyed the full autonomy of choosing any appropriate jhum within the 
toykhong. Jhum was the only means of livelihood. Now sowing one ari of 
jhum, jhumia only can expect 50 to 70 art Jhum alone does not provide 
basic necessities for survival. Now many jhumia in Roangchari search for 
valley lands for plough cultivation to supplement their yearly deficits of food 
supply.
Thus, these views evidently suggest that only in recent years have there been serious 
shortage of jhum fields in the CHT. As a result, the rotational cycle of jhum 
fallowing has sharply reduced. Many recent studies highlight that jhum fields are 
becoming smaller and are unable to produce sufficient food for subsistence. Mey & 
Mey (1978,1980,1981), on the basis of a comparative socio-economic study of 
eight ethnic groups in CHT observed that land scarcity is very acute not only for the 
jhum in the hilly region but in the valley areas too, where most of the Bengali 
settlers are now settled. As a result, the economic situation is generally bad among 
the hill people.
However, in statist perspective unsustainability of jhum is always interpreted as the 
result of land shortage and increases of jhumia population in the CHT. In reality, this 
is not the case, as the CHT Commission report states/* the transmigration of the 
Bengali settlers has caused a massive shortage of land in the CHT which is 
attributed by government policies rather than failure of jhum cultivation as a 
method” (The CHT Commission Report 1991). Consequently, with increasing land 
scarcity, a change is taking place not only in livelihood situation but also in jhum 
land ownership. Today, the process of landlessness and dispossession are shaping a 
new meaning for the jhumia in their construction of broader hill people’s cultural 
identity. In the next chapter, I discuss the politics of khas land lease and its local 
responses in the form of ethnic mobilisation.
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Conclusion: Jhum  as shared identity
The findings of traditional customary practices of jhum provide a perspective of 
shared perception of resource use and collective tenure in the CHT. The dynamics of 
jhum organisation demonstrate a shared value embedded in the life of ethnic 
communities in the CHT. A basic element of this shared value is the notion of co­
operation in the jhum. For example, distribution of jhum plots on the basis of 
household size and including new households as equal sharer to the common 
toykhong can be seen as co-ownership displaying a sense of shared value and ethos. 
Co-operation between households, in the form of a mutual aid groups, during 
harvesting and showing time is about continual negotiation of their shared 
relationships in traditional land use practices, connecting every households to 
maintain common jhum toykhong.
From the local jhumia perspective, I argue that rights to jhum is not simply linked to 
a size of lands. Rather it is also a livelihood, a way of life. The jhum land they use is 
part of village and mouza commons and is measured by a household’s need as a 
member of the village community. In this context, there is a functional link between 
jhum land tenure, use and livelihood. In the CHT, the notions of collective and 
individual rights must be understood from local conceptions of tenurial rights. 
Amena Mohsin, in her recent book on CHT, explains that “communal ownership of 
land and resources in CHT constitute the cores of their economics as well as cultural 
values in terms of sharing and exchange” (1997: 78).106
I argue that such an ethos and values are embedded in jhum land use practice. They 
provide a negotiating element in the production of a common Pahari identity in the 
form of present indigenous land rights movement in the CHT. The relationships 
among the ethnic groups, in this context, are not defined in terms of given rules of 
kinship or clan. Instead this relationship must be understood in terms of a variety of 
social processes, such as land use and rights and indigenous institutions - what 
Abramson calls the “environmental context of shared identity” (2000: 9).
106 A detailed account of hill economy has also been documented in earlier studies Mackenzie (1884), 
Hutchinson (1906). For more recent account see Bassaignet (1958).
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In the CHT, the cultural relationship between jhum and jhumia can appropriately be 
conceived of with the local perceptions of collective land rights and ownership - a 
conception that is better translated as one of the enduring identification of Pahari 
relationships to CHT land. In the political discourse of Pahari mobilisation, jhum 
thus becomes an idiom of collective identity as it provides the basis to constitute a 
larger unity defined by a common value of shared cultural relatedness. In fact this 
cultural values are ultimately convertible to political support of collective ethnic 
mobilisation, in political terms, as Pahari or indigenous peoples of CHT.
The symbolic use of jhum as collective ethnic marker by Vomi Odikhar Committee 
and other organisations in the CHT is therefore a useful mechanism because as a 
common mode of agriculture jhum represents a notion of shared identity among the 
diverse ethnic peoples in the CHT. It also represents a common sense of belonging 
with shared history of deprivation and marginalisation by the state, which forms a 
common ground of unity (Frost 2001; Gray 1997; Hodgson 2002). The current 
ethnic mobilisation of hill people as Pahari is an attempt to forge a unified 
collective identity on the basis of jhum. Their current predicaments of land 
dispossession by various state interventions, such as reserve forests, Bengali 
settlements, established of military base, and khas land lease-all produce a renewed 
sense of shared collective deprivation among ethnic communities in the CHT. In the 
next chapter, I will discuss khas land lease procedures as an ethnographic case in 
order to show how these measures have been an enormous impact on local 
customary rights of the jhumia.
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Chapter Six 
The politics o f khas land
Introduction
This chapter discusses various contemporary political and legal processes in relation 
to khas land operation in the CHT. In the previous chapter I discussed the 
complexity of competing claims of jhum rights and ownership between the 
indigenous people of CHT and the state. I also outlined the nature of present khas 
land regime in the CHT. This chapter demonstrates how the government’s khas land 
policy, through the commercialisation and privatisation of jhum common lands, 
effects the traditional land rights and livelihood of the jhumia. Based on 
ethnographic case studies, it particularly examines the processes through which khas 
land is leased to individuals by various institutional measures, such as the 1900 
Regulations, and how this process has been a significant influence on interpretation 
and reinterpretation of the multi-ethnic relationships among the diverse ethnic 
groups in the CHT. I suggest that the political, social and economic implications of 
khas land lease policy not only created a new social configuration resulting in 
landlessness and land dispossession but also lead to a politics of ethnic mobilisation 
based on shared deprivation among the various ethnic groups in the CHT.
The notion of shared deprivations can be interpreted here as a sense of collective 
realities faced by all ethnic groups in the CHT. These collective realities are 
manifested in various forms through new identity formation and protest movements. 
The range of vocabularies, such as ‘indigenous people’, Jhumma, Pahari can be 
seen as part of the broader identity construction against State policy. The 
construction of Pahari identity on the basis of indigenous land rights has been the 
idiom of political struggle, a vehicle of resistance to government khas land policy, 
and a means to make political demands for special rights to the CHT lands.
Social movement theorists have emphasised that the construction of collective 
identities is an essential feature of contemporary struggles over land and resources 
by many marginalised peoples.107 In the context of CHT, I argue that the khas land
107 See the discussion of Escobar (1992,1996,1997), Martinez Alier (1991,1997), eta l and others in 
Chapter One.
233
issue emerges as the most salient feature of collective identity construction among 
the diverse ethnic groups in the region. In recent times, all the issues relating to 
conflict between local inhabitants of the CHT and the State revolve around the 
control and use of land. The notion of ‘common land’ formulates the elements of 
social, cultural and political realities of CHT into a negotiating identity. For 
example, the protest movement by Vomi Odikhar Shongrokkon Committee 
(Committee for the Protection of Forest and Land Rights in the CHT) against the 
government khas land lease, can be seen as resistance to State land policy in CHT. 
The defence of jhum as cultural practice is thus a question of indigenous land rights, 
and the politics of Pahari mobilisation.
Having engaged in the discourse of khas land regime in the CHT for a fairly long 
time, it is becoming clear from my findings that the process of khas bondobasti 
(lease settlement) is intricately interrelated with the privatisation of jhum (common 
lands) through plural legal complexities in the CHT. Thus, it calls for a 
comprehensive understanding of the khas bondobasti in order to unveil the 
underlying dynamics of how this marginalizes and deprives the ordinary Pahari. 
Before I go in detail into the discussion of different mechanisms and procedures of 
khas land lease, it is necessary to describe the definition of khas land in the CHT.
Definition and Conceptualization of Khas Land
As I mentioned in the previous chapter, according to official-legal definition all 
lands that are not owned by deeds or titles, such as plough lands are classified as 
khas lands or ‘state owned lands’. In other words, lands not demarcated as reserve, 
protected forests or those that are not settled or leased out in the name of any private 
individuals or corporate body are regarded as khas lands by the Administration. In 
practice, these are the jhum lands used by the jhumia on the basis of traditional 
‘customary rights’ (see Chapter Five). From the statist perspective, all the hill lands 
in CHT belong to the State; 'tribal' people are only given usufruct rights. In this 
context, lands traditionally used by the jhumia's come under the khas land system 
because, for the state, jhumia do not possess any ‘legal’ entitlement to the lands. 
Therefore, what the government defines as khas land, in practice is regarded by 
jhumia as their traditional jhum lands.
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For the jhumia, this is a common property based on the notion of customary 
collective rights, and it belongs to the village community. I suggest that the roots of 
these contested discourses are linked to the claims of ownership, rights and practices 
of the CHT lands. The statist conception of khas land contradicts local jhum notions 
of land ownership and rights. The present Bangladesh government’s legal 
framework ignores the indigenous notion of jhum customary rights. The official- 
legal justification of redefining jhum lands under khas land category can be 
interpreted from the following considerations:
Firstly, jhum destroys the forest in CHT. Secondly, as jhumia are nomads they have 
no personal attachment to the land, and because of at the absence of permanent 
rights they take little care of the land. Therefore, if the jhumia are given permanent 
lease through a kabiliat (a lease deed), they might be interested in proper land use 
for horticulture, homestead gardening, and other plantation economies instead of the 
jhum. The khas land lease policy is therefore beneficial to the local jhumia as well as 
forest development in the CHT through private initiatives.
The aims of government khas land lease policy are thus towards privatisation of the 
jhum lands in the name of baggan (forest) development, which creates a potential 
for distribution of CHT lands to the Bengali. To achieve these key objectives the 
present khas land regime in the CHT outlines the legal procedures required in order 
to establish government’s absolute control over the jhum lands. The legal 
procedures, particularly the 1900 Regulations are an important issue from both the 
statist and local perspectives in relation to khas land lease in the CHT. The following 
section discusses the 1900 Regulations and khas land.
The 1900 Regulations and Khas Land
The 1900 Regulations, popularly known as the Chittagong Hill Tracts Manual, have 
been instrumental in many contemporary debates on the issue of indigenous land 
rights, cultural identity, autonomy and the constitutional legality between the Pahari 
and the state of Bangladesh. The significance of the 1900 regulations for the current 
study is related to land issues, particularly khas land in recent times.
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From the Pahari point of view, the CHT Manual is thought to be the main legal 
instrument for the administration of the CHT. The CHT Manual provides the legal, 
political and cultural safeguard in recognising the Pahari as indigenous people and 
restricting outsiders from the plains to the CHT. For them, it represents hill people’s 
rights over CHT land, particularly their customary land rights. Thus, the CHT 
Manual becomes a political and symbolic instrument for the Pahari social activists 
in their indigenous social movements. Contrary to this local perception, the statist 
views suggest that the CHT Manual is only operational under the provisions of the 
national constitution. In recent years, therefore, in order to maintain ‘operationality’ 
the successive governments made several amendments to the 1900 Regulations for 
various political reasons. The present khas land lease policy is one of the 
amendments towards this operational end.
It is thus important to outline the basic features of the 1900 Regulations and the 
manner in which they are being reified into a new political meaning in the 
representation of indigenous land rights and Pahari identity on the one hand, and the 
government’s politics of khas land lease on the other. Recent literature on CHT 
carefully ignores the contemporary local understanding and perception of the 1900 
Regulations in the context of crucial issues such as khas land, and suggests that the 
CHT manual is simply a historical colonial document (Ahmed 1993; Shelly 1992). 
The following section highlights some of the current debates on the applicability of 
the 1900 Regulations within the context of changing political realities in the CHT: 
(a) what are relationships between the 1900 Regulations and khas land lease? (b) 
what are the socio-economic and cultural implications of the amendments to the 
1900 Regulations? I begin with a brief discussion of the main features of the 1900 
regulations.
The Main Features of the 1900 Regulations in Relation to Land and 
Administration
As I mentioned in the previous chapter, the British Colonial government enacted 
various rules and regulations for the administration of the CHT since its 
incorporation into the colonial state in 1860. The 1900 regulations, comprising a
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package of rules including judicial, legal and administrative measures, came into 
effect as the principle “regulatory instrument”108 of the CHT in May 1900 (The CHT 
Manual; Roy 1998).
Under the Regulations a policy of ‘indirect rule’ was pursued through the 
restructuring of indigenous institutions. Article 40 of the Regulations outlined the 
administrative structure of the CHT. The main feature of this administrative policy 
was to demarcate the territorial boundaries of the chiefdoms. The British divided the 
CHT into three circles: the Mong circle in the north under the Mong Chief, the 
Chakma circle in the centre under the Chakma Chief and the Bhomong circle in the 
south under the Bhomong Chief. Each Chief was made responsible for the collection 
of revenues and vested with the power of looking after internal affairs such as land 
disputes and other social matters of the circles.
These circles were further divided into mouzas, a cluster of villages with a territorial 
boundary under a headman, and each village within the mouza was represented by a 
karbari (the village head). They were awarded the responsibility of settling petty 
criminal and civil cases in addition to their main function of revenue collection from 
the traditional jhum. The CHT Manual maintained the traditional institutions of 
roaza-piancy village authority into the headman-karbari system in terms of jhum 
common land distribution to villagers (see Chapter Five).
However, one major change brought in through the regulations was the introduction 
of district administration with significant state power parallel to traditional 
institutions. In other words, the 1900 Regulations maintained a modified form of 
‘indirect rule’ in the CHT. On the one hand, the indigenous institutions were allowed 
to regulate traditional affairs, such as common jhum land management and dispute 
settlement through the ‘tribal’ court. On the other, indigenous institutions were liable 
to pay annual taxes to the district administration for their traditional jhum 
agricultural practices.
108 Devashish Roy (1998) explained the 1900 regulations as "regulatory law" because it sought to 
regulate already existing rights and privileges of the hill people in relation to traditional institutions 
and customary land rights. In this respect, the aim of this regulation is to protect the rights and 
interests of the hill people, their custom and practices, and thus preserving their cultural identities.
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Critiques of the regulations argued that although the regulations maintained the 
traditional institutions all executive powers, judiciary and financial, were vested 
upon the Deputy Commissioner (DC) (Shelly 1992; Mohsin 1997). Amena Mohsin 
explained that “the Manual apparently adopted as administrative principles for the 
CHT based on the local system of indigenous institutions but under the new system 
real authority lay with the DC and the local chiefs and headmen were virtually 
turned into merely the tax collectors of the state” (sic) (1997: 34-35).
I argue that there are many implications of the 1900 Regulations in terms of linking 
indigenous institutions with the district administration but the regulations also 
enshrined the new order of multi-ethnic relationships in the CHT. Firstly, the 
integration of diverse ethnic groups into a single hierarchical system of chief- 
headman-karbari in order to ensure jhum revenue collection and traditional land 
management practices had, in fact, developed a common perception of indigenous 
local system. Secondly, its continuation for the last hundred years in the face of 
many changing realities, amongst all ethnic groups in the CHT, has gradually 
instilled in them a sense of shared traditional institutions of Pahari compared to the 
mainstream Bengali society and culture.
However, the implications of the CHT Manual must be understood within the 
present political context: the way in which the 1900 Regulations are interpreted and 
reinterpreted in the discourse of Pahari identity construction and state relationship. 
The significance and priority of 1900 Regulations must be understood in political 
terms, particularly in the context of indigenous land rights and Pahari mobilisation 
in the CHT. For the Pahari, the CHT Manual provides the basic framework of the 
indigenous system in the CHT. It is generally seen as a legal protection and 
safeguard of their distinct culture and land rights.
The most important element of the Regulations, which has been the source of 
cultural, legal and political, battles between the Pahari and the official regime in 
Bangladesh is the definition of indigenous status and special rights to CHT lands. 
Rule 52 of the 1900 Regulations specifically states:
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No person other than Chakma, Mogh or a member of any hill tribe 
indigenous to the Chittagong Hill Tracts, the Lushai hills, the Arakan hill 
tracts or the state of Tripura shall enter or reside within the Chittagong Hill 
Tracts unless he is in possession of a permit granted by the Deputy 
Commissioner.
The terminological references of “indigenous” hill man and “indigenous” tribe man 
are interchangeably used in different sections of the regulations, recognising the 
indigenous status of the hill people in the CHT. Rule 4 of the Regulations reiterates 
that “a Chakma, Mog (Marma) or member of any tribe is indigenous to the CHT”. 
Rule 52 further recognises the special status of the region by underlining that 
“henceforth the Hill Tracts shall be declared an excluded area”.
The above provisions of the 1900 Regulations, particularly relating to indigenous 
status and land rights, are considered important sources of cultural and political 
autonomy of Pahari in the CHT. For them, the Regulations restricted possession of 
CHT lands by outsiders and laid down stringent conditions for the Bengalis to 
occupy lands in the CHT. Proponents of the indigenous land rights movement 
mentioned that “the 1900 regulation is a charter of autonomy as it provided adequate 
protection to the rights of the hill people in the CHT” (Kalindi 2000: 4). Thus, for 
the Pahari, the provisions of the CHT Manual provide special claims regarding the 
issues of land rights, territoriality, and indigenous identity.
From the statist perspective, however, these provisions are contradictory to the 
constitution of Bangladesh as it restricts “citizen rights”, and is a “denial of state 
sovereignty” over the CHT land (sic.) (Shelly 1992). From this statist viewpoint, the 
Regulations merely served as an instrument for colonial administration to isolate 
‘tribal’ people from the Bengali. In this current debate concerning the issues of 
indigenous land rights vis-a-vis constitutional legality, the CHT Manual has 
emerged as the main source of legal, political and cultural battle between the Pahari 
and the State. In the following paragraphs I discuss contemporary local Pahari and 
official perceptions of the CHT Manual, i.e. the way in which the 1900 Regulations 
are interpreted in the present political discourse.
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Pahari Perceptions of the CHT Manual
The general Pahari perception of the CHT Manual is concerned with tthe 
safeguarding of their special rights, privileges and indigenous identity. There is a 
common impression among the ordinary Pahari, whom I spoke to both in 
Roangchari and Banderban, that the CHT Manual ensured traditional land rights of 
the jhumia. They had no problems of jhum under the indigenous authority, and no 
instances of widespread dispossession of jhum lands to outsiders. There was also a 
firm statement that migration from the plain districts was checked through the 1900 
Regulations. Their life and livelihood in relation to access to jhum lands were not as 
difficult as they face today.109
Similarly, proponents of common property regime and activists of the indigenous 
land rights movement also claimed that the CHT Manual maintained “indigenous 
institutions” of the hill people. The hill people enjoyed a wide degree of 
independence and protection from the intrusion of Bengali settlers under the 1900 
Regulations (Kalindi 2000; Roy 2000). Roy, a prominent local writer on the land 
issues, argued that “Rule 34 of the Regulations ensured the special rights and status 
of hill people by declaring the CHT as an indigenous area (2000: 15). Thus, it is 
generally perceived among political activists that the 1900 Regulations provided a 
kind of autonomy for the hill people. The British policy of 1900 Regulations was to 
protect the CHT as an “indigenous area” and to prevent outsiders from settling and 
owning lands, particularly restricting the dominant Bengali. The ordinary Pahari 
also widely hold a view that the 1900 Regulations are a symbol as well as a 
safeguard of their political, economic and cultural autonomy in the CHT.
Today the firm Pahari adherence to the CHT Manual is mainly reflected in its 
recognition of the hill tracts as homeland for the indigenous peoples. The concept 
“indigenous” stated in the CHT Manual has become the concept of “self- 
identification” as an essential element of identity construction in the current hill 
politics. Following the guidelines of international organisations, such as the
109 These are the summarised discussions extracted from the conversations I had with some local 
Marma, Bawm and Tanchanga inhabitants in Roangchari and Banderban about the 1900 regulations.
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International Labour Organisation (ILO)110 the construction of Pahari identity as 
indigenous people of the CHT is about social and political movements against the 
present state policy on CHT jhum common lands. For the Pahari, the 1900 
Regulations serve not only as source of rights, a special safeguard to CHT lands, it 
also challenges the legality of the present Bengali settlers in the CHT.
In the present context of Pahari political mobilisation, the CHT Manual can no 
longer be seen as a ‘colonial document’ it has become a political and legal manifesto 
of indigenous land rights and identity in the CHT. Recently political activists and 
organisations such as PCJSS, Vomi Odikhar Committee and Pahari Okka Parishod 
have invoked this historic document as part of their campaign for indigenous rights 
in the CHT (see also Chapter Seven). Among other things, one of the main demands 
in the recently signed peace treaty111 between the PCJSS and Bangladesh 
Government is the implementation and retention of the original 1900 Regulations. 
The other demands are autonomy for the CHT, continuation of indigenous 
institutions, and the constitutional provisions against the amendments of the 
regulations.112 The question of retaining the 1900 Regulations and protecting them 
from future changes is crucial for the Pahari. It not only forms the basis of Pahari 
mobilisation in terms of indigenous land rights but also challenges the presence of 
Bengali settlers and non-resident khas lease holders in the CHT.
The ongoing political development suggests that the 1900 Regulations have gained 
new impetus into the current social and political climate, particularly in the 
discourse of land rights, indigenous identity and the autonomy of the CHT.
Bangladesh Legal-official Perceptions of the CHT Manual
The Bangladesh official-legal position with regard to the CHT Manual has been 
rather ambiguous. In recent years, there has been a dubious role in complying with 
the CHT Manual as far as government legal-policy framework is concerned. From
110 ILO Conventions (169) state that "self-identification as indigenous or tribal shall be regarded as 
fundamental criteria for determining the groups to which the provisions of convention apply (Article 
1(2), (cited from Kalindi 2000).
111 After twenty years of armed conflict between shanti bhahini (the paramilitary wing of PCJSS) and 
the Bangladesh military, a peace treaty was signed in 1997.
112 The CHT Peace Treaty of December 1997, clause no. 1-4.
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the statist perspective, government officials accept that some of the provisions of the 
1900 Regulations are contradictory to the National Constitution and only operational 
with the necessary amendments.113 Along with this official line, many commentators 
and ‘experts’ on CHT also put forward the idea that the 1900 Regulations deny the 
citizen rights. A singular argument is made in relation to the CHT Manual that “it is 
the constitutional right for any citizen of Bangladesh to live anywhere in the 
country” (Shelly 1992; Ahmed 1993). Section 36 of the Constitution is always the 
point of reference,
Subject to any reasonable restrictions imposed by law in the public interest, 
every citizen shall have the right to move freely throughout Bangladesh, to 
reside and settle in any place therein and to leave and re-enter Bangladesh 
(Quoting from Shelly, 1992: 36).
Citing these constitutional provisions, Shelly, an ex-bureaucrat turned consultant, in 
his recent book, The Untold Story of the CHT, suggests that “restrictions on the 
settlement of non-residents are legally impossible under the constitutional provision, 
...and thus the 1900 Regulations are no longer in force in that context ” (1992: 72). 
Aftab Ahmed, a political scientist, even expresses fmstration at the continued 
reliance on the “colonial document” which, for him, was “strategic to British goals, 
not benevolent to Bangladesh state” (1993: 41). There is a common understanding 
among the bureaucrats, rightwing politicians and some academics in Bangladesh that 
the 1900 Regulation served the purpose of colonial authority in politically dividing 
the ‘tribal’people from the Bengali. This perspective suggests that the 1900 
Regulations should not be maintained as law in the CHT affairs.
Amena Mohsin, a professor and expert on the CHT issue, though she does not hold 
such an extreme view, however, in her recent book The Politics o f Nationalism, 
writes that “the continuation of 1900 Regulations in administering the CHT is bound 
to segregate the hill people economically and politically from rest of the 
country”(1997: 93). I disagree with Mohsin’s view in the sense that her political 
analysis on this “historical document” is only reflected in examining the discourses 
of broader Bengali nationalist movement against the Pakistani regime in 1971. 
Mohsin totally ignores the present dynamics of hill politics, particularly the way in
113 Talking to the DC, Banderban and UNO, Sadar Upzilla.
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which hill people now redefine the 1900 Regulations in their recent movement 
around indigenous land rights and identity in relation to Bengali and the State.
From the statist perspective, in fact, a common logic is put forward that the 1900 
Regulations can only be applied with subsequent amendments enacted them to it. 
However, looking at the amendments that so far have been enacted since Pakistani 
times, one certainly gets an impression of the motives and intentions of State 
regimes and why they are so inclined towards these amendment provisions. The 
amendments to the 1900 Regulations especially the recent ones are directly linked to 
the dispossession of jhum land of the Pahari, and set as the regulatory mechanism of 
the state to implement khas land lease policy in the CHT. For the Pahari, thus, the 
amendments to the CHT Manual are about shifting their rights over CHT lands to 
the Bengali, affecting social, economic and cultural life, and putting them in a 
marginalised position. The retention and implementation of the original 1900 
Regulations has now become a political demand and the symbol of legal instrument 
in their indigenous movement. A discussion of the amendments’ provisions to the 
CHT Manual is thus crucial in unfolding the ‘legal gymnastics’ in relation to present 
khas land policy in the CHT.
Amendments of the CHT Manual
The first major changes to the CHT Manual were made under Pakistani rule in 1964. 
The constitutional development in Pakistan took away the special status of the CHT 
as an “excluded area” and redefined it as a “tribal area” within the purview of the 
legislature of the country (Mohsin 1997:46). The political and legal ramifications of 
this shift were considerable. The CHT was no longer to be officially designated as a 
separate homeland for the ‘indigenous people’ as it was under its previous
i
designation as an “excluded area”. Although the recognition of its distinctiveness as 
‘tribal’ region was given under the new designation most of the provisions and 
privileges which guaranteed the special status of the local people under “excluded 
area” were modified in various measures. The first major amendment to the CHT 
Manual is widely believed to have been facilitating the Bengali access to the CHT.
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Commentators emphasise that the constitutional changes were brought about against 
the backdrop of the Kaptai Dam, which caused severe dislocation and distress 
among the hill people and resulted in stiff local resistance against the state. In the 
wake of local resistance, the Pakistani state authority made amendments to the CHT 
Manual in order to facilitate Bengali migration in CHT by abolishing the “ excluded 
area” status (Barua 2001; Kalindi 2000). Until 1964, there were restrictions on 
settling by non-hill men in the “excluded region”. Therefore, the changes to the CHT 
Manual, in practical terms, enabled the Bengalis to enter and acquire land in the hill 
tracts.
After the independence of Bangladesh in 1971, two more important amendments to 
the 1900 Regulations were brought in. The amendments of 1979 and 1989 are too 
lengthy to discuss fully but it is appropriate to highlight some of the main features as 
they are directly related to present khas land settlement in the CHT. The 
amendments of 1979 brought about significant changes in matters of land settlement 
in the CHT. Under the amendments to Rule 34 of the 1900 Regulations,114 the DC is 
empowered to settle up to one hundred acres of hilly lands (Unclassed State Forests 
or khas lands) with the family of hill or ‘non-hill men’ residents. The amendment (b- 
I) reads:
Land for plantation and other purposes may be settled with a person of hill or 
non-hill men residents by the DC from 25 acres to 100 acres. Settlement of 
lands to the deserving cases exceeding 100 acres shall be made with 
consultation of the higher authorities of the Ministry.115
A definition of “non-hill man resident” was also incorporated in the amendment to 
Rule 34. “Non-hill men resident” means a person who has a house in the CHT for at 
least fifteen years or a house with agricultural lands settled by the DC (The CHT 
Regulations, amendment March 1979). The notion “non-hill men resident” is a new 
conception in relation to land settlement in the CHT. The amendments of 1979 and 
thereafter are directly linked to the interests of “non-hill men residents”, i.e. Bengali
114 The original Rule 34 stated "all lands held for cultivation on lease from the government are 
subjected to condition that every person residing and cultivating within a circle to the jurisdiction of 
its chief, and the lands cannot be sublet or transferred without the consent of the Commissioner" 
(Regulation I of 1900).
115 See the amendments to Rule 34 of 1900 regulations in March 1979, District Gazetteer, 
Government of Bangladesh.
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to take advantage of the CHT land settlements. More significantly the amendments 
of 1979 can be seen as the reinforcement of state power in the form of an official- 
legal regime to control the CHT lands undermining privileges of the hill people 
granted by the original 1900 Regulations.
The 1979 amendments also awarded the DC, the central government representative 
of the district, a power to regulate, restrict, transfer and acquire the “government 
land” (ikhas lands) that he no longer requires any prior sanction for settling hill lands 
of certain quantity for plantation and other purposes for the ‘deserving cases in the 
name of proper land use. This has obviously provided a leverage to state authority to 
curtail whatever rights are left to the hill people, in the interests of the “non-hill 
men”. It remains unexplained, however, what are the criteria for the selection of 
‘deserving cases’. It seems that the ‘deserving case’ formula simply serves as a 
mechanism to legalise the official policy on granting leases to the influential 
Bengalis. I will discuss the politics of ‘deserving cases’ in the khas lands 
beneficiaries section. The 1979 amendments firmly laid the basis for abuse of jhum 
lands in the hands of outsiders who could trade with the military and local 
administration in the CHT.
Another important aspect of the 1979 amendments is that all land settlements must 
be concluded in the form of a lease deed prescribed by the government authority. 
Amendment (I) to Rule 34 reads “A lease holder shall have permanent rights in the 
lands for which he pays rent”. The amendments necessarily facilitated the process of 
bringing jhum common lands (unclassed state forest lands) under the private regime 
of khas land lease. According to present official policy, khas land lease is open for 
both hill and non-hill men but in reality it is a complex process for the ordinary 
Pahari. I will discuss the complexity of khas land lease procedures in the later 
section. However, it raises a question that why jhum cultivators suddenly needed 
lease deeds (official tenancy rights) for their common lands.
The answer is self-explanatory in the very mechanism of khas land lease. It seems 
that amendments and the so-called government khas land policy are directly linked.
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The khas land lease policy has had serious economic, social and cultural 
implications on the part of hill people’s traditional jhum common rights.116
The amendment of 1989 to the CHT Manual is another politically important event in 
the context of land settlement in CHT. In 1989, the government enacted a Local 
Council Bill for three hill districts in the CHT in order to establish local councils, a 
representative body, comprising different ethnic group to maintain and supervise 
local affairs, of which the most significant are land matters.117 Three district councils 
are still in operation today, but whether council has any authority on the land issue 
remains questionable.118 The crucial feature of 1989 local government bill is the 
redefinition of the relationship between the hill people and the state in terms of land 
settlement and local authority. During the enactment of 1989 legislation for the local 
District Councils, there was also legislation to amend the 1900 Regulations. In 1989 
District Council legislation, there were provisions for the new district councils to 
exercise authority on the issues of land settlement. According to the District Council 
Act (section 64):
No land within the boundaries of hill districts shall be given in settlement 
without the prior approval of the Council. Provided that this provision shall 
not be applicable to lands within the Protected and Reserve forest, lands 
transferred or settled in for government and public interests (sic).
Despite this legislative provision, in practice, the power and authority of the local 
councils on land matters is limited. To highlight this, the following facts are worth 
considering. Given the above provision, if one takes into account the amount of land 
already covered by the Protected and Reserve forests, and that transferred, settled or 
acquired by the government and public interest, out of a total area of 5,089 sq. miles, 
there is not much that remains. And from this amount if one excludes the private
1161 will discuss the khas land regime and local reality as an ethnographic in the following section.
117 The Hill District Council Acts of 19, 20 and 21 of 1989.
118 It is widely believed that the creation of district councils in 1989 with selective representation of 
different ethnic groups in dealing local matters was a design plan of the then military government in 
Bangladesh. It was also a significant time when the peace process between the PCJSS and the 
Bangladesh government was started. There were also widespread speculations that the then army 
government wanted to settle longstanding conflict between the government and hill people through 
establishment of local councils. Some critiques pointed out that "local government should be 
perceived as attempt to legitimise the government control over indigenous affairs under the guise of 
"local government" (Kalindi 2000; Roy 2000; Rovillos 2000).
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holdings of plough lands, there is not much land actually to be settled through the 
approval of the local councils. Even if there were some remaining, it is the jhum 
common lands which now government categorised as khas lands (state land).
The question of khas land settlements is, therefore, partly resolved through the 1979 
amendments. The 1989 amendments to the 1900 Regulations, particularly Rule 34, 
ends the systematic process of gradually removing the restrictions on settlement and 
ownership of CHT lands by non-indigenous persons. The 1989 amendments to Rule 
34 of the Regulations state: “lands for plantation purposes may be settled with 
deserving residents on long term basis by the Deputy commissioner ”.119 With this 
amendment there are no longer any restrictions on residency for land settlement by 
non-indigenous peoples or non-residents outside the CHT.
Under the new amendments, the simplification of the definition “resident” without 
referring to previous criteria, such as time of residency, hill or non-hill men 
category, clearly calls for attention. The new definition is very much tied-up with 
District Administration’s authority to issue a CHT residency certificate to deserving 
persons. The CHT residency certificate is one of the prescribed criteria to be 
considered for the khas land lease. With such provisions, non-resident influential 
Bengali can now easily apply for khas land lease directly to the DC.120
In this context, the District Council’s authority in relation to khas land lease 
regulation is certainly limited under the new legal framework. In practice, the real 
authority lies with the district administration. In an informal discussion with the 
Banderban District Council Chairman I questioned the practical authority of District 
Council particularly in dealing with present khas land issue. The chairman explained 
to me that:
According to District Council Act 1989, there is an authority over land 
settlement issues in the CHT, but considering the government’s practical 
policy on the ground District Council’s power is simply limited to 
administrative and personal matters. It is up to the civil administration, 
mainly the DC, who takes all the decisions in relation to regulating,
119 The amendment of Rule 34 (d) (I) 1989.
1201 will discuss this point in relation to khas land lease beneficiaries in the next section.
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restricting and granting the land leases. The present khas land lease is 
entirely done by the district administration.
When I questioned him further as to whether he received any approval request from 
the district administration with regard to lease settlement as per the District Council 
Act, he frankly admitted to me that “no request of approval whatsoever has been 
sought from the District Council in relation to khas land lease”. The chairman’s 
account tells us not only the weakness of the District Council legislation on the 
ground in relation to land settlement but also reveals the power and authority of the 
khas land regime in the CHT.
My discussion with Banderban Sadar Upzilla UNO (Upzilla Executive Officer) 
regarding the applicability of the 1900 Regulations within the present official-legal 
framework presents another dimension to the power of khas land regime at the local 
level. The UNO states that:
The 1900 Regulations remains the administrative and legal source of 
authority for the District administration in the CHT. The Deputy 
Commissioner is still a District Magistrate with jurisdiction of civil and 
criminal matters as well as chief executive representing the central 
government according to the 1900 Regulations.
From this official account, one may get an impression that the 1900 Regulations are 
strictly followed in legal and administrative practices in the CHT. Of course, it is 
true that the 1900 Regulations have never been entirely repealed but they have been 
dysfunctional through gradual amendments in order to accommodate the 
government’s various political goals and policies. Thus, the legal status of the 1900 
Regulations remains unclear. For example, in the context of khas land lease, the 
administrative and judicial role of the DC is contradictory as he maintains, on the 
one hand, the procedural responsibility over lease settlements, on the other hand, he 
exercises the judicial authority over dispute settlement. Devashis Roy rightly points 
out that “Bangladesh state authority is reluctant to implement the original 1900 
Regulations but manipulates them whenever it suits the interests of the regime” 
(1998: 37).
It is quite ironic that amongst the government officials I talked to in Banderban 
about the khas land issues they always take to the 1900 Regulations as their
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reference point. As I mentioned in the previous chapter, the official perspective 
always maintained that the CHT hill lands are state lands, according to 1900 
Regulations. Therefore, khas lands are government’s “unclassed state forest lands”. 
Officials referring to the 1900 Regulations is in practice an articulation to legitimate 
government claims on khas lands as ‘state lands’, so that they have the right, as 
government representatives, to handle these lands according to government policy. 
What it demonstrates is that the Government’s recent policy on khas land lease to 
the non-resident Bengali is justified in accordance with the present legal status of the 
1900 Regulations.
Government land officials in the CHT suggest a view that jhum cultivators do not 
have any ownership or rights to the lands because they do not have titles for the 
fixed lands. The statist perspective claims that land used for jhum cultivation is 
‘unoccupied’govemment land unless a document of title or lease has been issued or 
produced. It is not clear, however, from the official-legal point of view whether the 
traditional rights of hill people to jhum land is legally ended through the 
amendments of the Regulations. The new dimensions of individual lease 
procurement under the khas land policy clearly suggest a process of privatisation of 
the jhum common lands.
As I mentioned earlier, local Pahari in Roangchari, in contrast, assert that the rights 
to jhum are embedded in shared collective rights and jhum common land belongs to 
the village community. For the Pahari the rights to jhum land and resources is by 
virtue of their ‘common ownership’ within the framework of ‘traditional 
institutions’. The 1900 regulation acknowledged these collective rights of the hill 
people.
My discussion with Devashis Roy about the customary rights and the 1900 
Regulations is important to mention here. Devashish Roy mentions that “the 1900 
Regulations contain the provisions in relation to control and regulate the already 
existing rights and remain the principle regulatory instrument in identifying, 
defining, and declaring various customary rights and privileges of Pahari to lands in 
the CHT. The Government does not formally recognise the rights of the indigenous 
people to the common land as collective right. It regards these lands are the state
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owned khas lands. Now for all practical purposes these fall within the judicial 
regime of private property rights under the khas land regime”.
From the above analysis it is clear that in recent years the most important 
development concerning land settlement policy in the CHT is the amendments to the 
1900 Regulations. The amendments of 1979 and 1989 can be seen as an attempt at 
rationalisation of the CHT land, particularly the jhum lands. Through the enactment 
of new amendments to the 1900 Regulations, the government tends to create a 
framework of how to control the jhum lands in the name of proper ‘rational’ 
utilization. The amendments to the 1900 Regulations thus created the legal provision 
for the state administration to lease the CHT hill lands (unclassed state forest in 
government terms) to the non-hill residents under newly defined category of khas 
land lease.
The changes in the 1900 Regulations are perceived by the government as a means to 
ratify the anomalies in accordance with the basic principle of the national 
constitution of ‘citizen’s rights’. The amendments to the 1900 Regulations thus 
reinforced the statist conception of CHT land, with the government as the ultimate 
owner of the khas lands (jhum lands). Under the present politico-legal framework, 
the government possesses the right to allocate any part of khas land to individuals 
and to institutions (government, non-government, forest and military purposes) on 
the basis of need assessments.
New Entitlements and Khas Land Lease
Since the early 1980s, under the new legal provisions the government continues to 
pursue a policy of khas land settlement. Individuals, hill or non-hill resident, are 
asked to apply for the hill land lease in order to have legal entitlement to the lands. 
According to khas land policy, the government also fixed a ceiling of 5 acres of hilly 
lands for ordinary local lease applicants. A household is only entitled to apply for 5 
acres of khas bondobasti (lease). The district administration, particularly the DC is 
given the authority to regulate these so-called khas land bondobasti. The DC is 
empowered to grant a ceiling of a minimum one to five acres of khas lands to 
ordinary local lease applicants, but as many as twenty five to one hundred acres to
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“deserving persons”. Leases, for example, more than the DC’s ceiling of 100 acres, 
require the approval of the Land Ministry.
In CHT, this khas land lease is undertaken in the name of bagan unnaya (forest 
development). This new policy is thus bringing major changes in traditional jhum 
land use under the management of the hcadman-karbari system, which has until now 
operated as mouza commons. The government’s new khas land lease policy is 
directed towards changing the common tenurial practices of jhum. The introduction 
of 5 acres of khas land lease for CHT “residents” can be seen as the government’s 
strategy to establish private rights over the CHT lands. The 5 acres of jhum land 
lease to individuals means they acquire definite rights over a piece of land, thus not 
only encouraging the individualisation of jhum land but also taking away the very 
essence of traditional ‘common rights’ and the notion of ‘collective ownership’.
Leasing five acres of khas land to every household has other implications. In many 
cases, Bengali settlers mostly based in urban centres in the CHT seek khas 
bondobasti under different names for the same household using different means. As 
a result a single household can lease lands over and above the prescribed ceiling. On 
the other hand, for the ordinary Pahari this rule stands as for “one household one 
lease”. I have observed that even when ordinary Pahari attempt to imitate the 
example of their Bengali counterpart, they fail to get the same response because of 
the indifferent attitudes of land officials at the district administration. There is no 
provision in the policy framework to deal with this issue. Officials are aware of this 
matter but simply ignore it for other reasons. As a result, a greater portion of these 
khas land lease are going disproportionately to the Bengali under this ‘ceiling’ 
policy. I have collected the names of the leaseholder households in Roangchari, 
which show that only a very small number of Pahari have more than 10 acres of 
khas bondobasti (lease). In the following section I discuss detailed official 
procedures of khas bondobasti.
Official Mechanisms and Bureaucratic Procedures of Khas Bondobasti
The section discusses the operational procedures of the khas land regime in the CHT 
based on ethnographic experience of the steps and mechanisms involved in
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procurement of a khas land bondobasti (lease) in the official setting. During 
fieldwork I observed, documented and followed up each level of the khas land lease 
procedures in lease cases of ordinary Pahari and outsider Bengali. In addition, to 
supplement data on the entire khas land lease procedure, additional information was 
obtained from informants who are directly involved in the lease procedures as well 
as local level functionaries of the DC office who prepare the lease documents.
The processes of khas bondobasti in the CHT involves many steps. The allocation 
procedure ranges from the lower level district administration to higher ministerial 
level depending on the size of lease cases. The official-bureaucratic procedures in 
this process are quite elaborate and complex but apply differently depending on 
whose cases are dealt with. The first step to khas bondobasti process is eligibility.
The eligibility of khas bondobasti
Theoretically under the present khas land lease policy, all the inhabitants of the 
CHT, Pahari or Bengali, are eligible to apply for a long-term lease of hilly lands 
(state lands) for baggan (forest) development provided that certain criteria are met. 
Within the present official-legal framework, there are four general conditions to be 
fulfilled in order to apply for a khas land lease in the CHT. The lease applicant must 
be (a) a Bangladeshi national, (b) a CHT resident, (c) a projojhata jachai (need 
assessment) of the lease must be made, and (d) the recommendation of the headman 
must be given.
However, all these official conditions for khas land lease application require a little
interpretation because they underline the political objectives and purposes of the
entire khas land regime in the CHT. Firstly, to qualify for the criteria of Bangladeshi
national the applicant must produce a nationality certificate which can be obtained
from either the local Union Parishod121 chairman or Municipality ward
commissioner depending on the applicant’s place of birth. From the official point of
view, the first condition implies the constitutional obligation to the citizen’s rights of
100Bangladesh in access to any resource within the state boundary. However, from
121 Union Parishod is the lower level administrative unit in rural areas of Bangladesh.
122 This point I explained in the previous section as to why 1900 regulations were amended in 
accordance with this policy.
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the Pahari point of view, this condition is set only to benefit the dominant Bengali 
in the name of ‘citizen rights’. For them, it gives the legal entitlement to any non- 
indigenous person to occupy the CHT lands. The citizen rights formula, in practice, 
only applies to the Bengali interests. There is no room for customary rights of the 
Pahari in consideration of the very concept of citizen rights.
The most important criteria for khas land lease is the second condition, the CHT 
residency certificate. The official definition of residency in CHT is determined on 
the basis of a written certificate from the DC. The DC is the only authority who is 
able to issue the residency certificate. According to khas land lease policy, a resident 
of CHT is qualified on the ground that he/she possesses some lands or homestead in 
the CHT either by gift or purchase following the 1989 amendments to the 1900 
Regulations. In this official qualification, one need not necessarily have to be bom in 
the CHT or a long time resident such as fifteen years. The implication of defining 
the CHT residency in this way leaves scope for manipulation because any person 
can now easily obtain a residency certificate through influence or any other means. 
The government residency certification in relation to khas bondobasti thus favours 
the non-resident Bengali outside CHT. In many recent cases into which I personally 
enquired, most of the non-resident khas lease holders, in one way or another, 
managed to secure this so-called residency certificate from the district 
administration. Such measures have proven detrimental to the interests of the 
ordinary Pahari, as the outsiders are continuously dispossessing them of their 
common jhum lands.
The third and fourth conditions to the khas bondobasti can also be seen as politically 
motivated. According to present khas land policy, the condition of the headman’s 
recommendation only applies to the mouza residents, particularly for the jhum 
cultivators if they apply for a lease of five to ten acres of their ‘common lands’ as 
per lease ceiling. The headman’s recommendation is not a required condition for the 
big leases even though these are mostly granted within the mouza common lands. In 
fact, the headman’s recommendation for the mouza jhum lands is to make an official 
justification of the khas land lease for the Pahari.
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The criterion of projojhata jachai (need assessment) has always been on the basis of 
baggan development (forest development) in the CHT for almost every lease 
applicant. The big lease applicants submit a well-prepared project proposal for the 
baggan development in the CHT. For the ordinary Pahari the notion projojhata 
jachai is a question of livelihood. According to khas land lease policy guidelines, the 
notion of projojhata jachai is perceived as being based on private initiatives of 
forest development of ‘state lands’. In this context, the criteria of “need assessment” 
can be seen as an official justification of government privatisation policy of the khas 
lands//7zwm lands.
As per the official policy, once all the above conditionalities have been met the 
applicants, whether Pahari or other “CHT resident”, are supposedly legally eligible 
to apply for a long-term lease of hilly khas lands (state lands). In practice, this is not 
so straightforward for ordinary Pahari. The different procedural steps involved in 
obtaining even five acres of khas bondobasti is an awesome task due to what I term 
a process of ‘procedural obstruction’. The entire khas land regime has been 
established for a politically motivated purpose. The legal-bureaucratic procedures 
involved in khas bondobasti processes can be interpreted as overt manifestations of 
political manoeuvring on the one hand and making difficulties for the ordinary 
Pahari on the other. There are several ‘important steps’ to be followed before one 
finally applies for khas bondobasti to the DC.
Preparing khas bondobasti
At the second step to khas bondobasti, the applicants go through a crucial stage of 
preparing relevant papers, including drafting a petition addressed to the DC. At this 
point, firstly the lease applicant has to find ‘unallocated khas land’. Officially 
finding ‘unallocated khas land’ involves merely choosing a piece of vacant ‘state 
land’ waiting to be leased out. For the ordinary Pahari, however, the notion of 
‘unallocated khas land’ is altogether a more complicated matter. For them, what is 
‘unallocated khas lands’ is their jhum common lands. In practice, the officially 
‘unallocated khas land’ is still under possession and operated by the local Pahari as 
their mouza commons. Where to find ‘unallocated khas lands’ then?
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Unallocated khas lands
In essence, ‘unallocated khas lands’ is a statist myth. The way in which the whole 
story of ‘unallocated khas land’ is dealt with in the process of khas bondobasti 
clearly reflects a state of paradox. In actuality, the only straight way to find this so- 
called ‘unallocated khas land’ is from the DC Office. The revenue section of the 
District administration, particularly the kanango (official land surveyor) maintains a 
book called balam khatian no-1, which contains the names of leaseholders, 
individuals and institutions, in different mouzas of the district with an attested trace 
map of the eye-estimated geographical boundary of the leased lands. From the 
Balam khatain nol, one may get an idea of ‘allocated khas lands’ but there is no 
record for undistributed or ‘unallocated khas land’ in the CHT. By default, all land if 
not officially allocated becomes “unallocated”. But access to the register is subject 
to manipulation.
Alternatively, there is another way of getting this ‘secret information’ from the jhum 
tazi (register list) supplied by the headmen of each mouza to the DC for jhum land 
distribution and the collection of jhum tax each year. The jhum tazi roughly 
demarcates the area where jhumia farm, without any legal entitlement or lease. The 
tazi also contains information of jhum plots with an eye-estimated geographical 
boundary on a household basis. This certainly gives some clues to the big lease 
seekers, of course with the help of district administration, as to where an area of 
‘unallocated khas lands’ lies!
It is not difficult for the influential lease seekers to obtain this information as money 
and power play a vital role in the process. The authority of finding an ‘unallocated 
khas land’ for lease seekers has made the DC office a centre for manipulation. The 
lease applicants are required to offer cash, locally known as nojor salami, to get this 
magic information regarding ‘unallocated khas land’. In most lease cases, the 
officials of the revenue department, the Kanongo in particular, play an important 
role in the entire process of khas bondobasti.
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Drafting an application
The next stage of khas bondobasti preparation is drafting a lease application that the 
applicant has an ‘unallocated khas land’ to apply for. For the majority of ordinary 
Pahari, however, the whole process of khas bondobasti (lease) preparation is a 
daunting experience. Firstly, with few exceptions, the majority of the ordinary 
Pahari are illiterate and have little knowledge of the technicalities of administrative 
procedures such as legal titles, deeds and court proceedings. Moreover, the linguistic 
barrier is one of the key factors putting them in a disadvantaged position in official 
dealings. Given the fact that by and large ordinary Pahari are ignorant about petition 
writing, under the present khas land regime they are now increasingly being caught 
up in a vicious circle, particularly with regard to dependence on Bengali middlemen. 
In present day CHT, the middlemen and the lower level officials at the district 
administration have locally formed a vested interest group to exploit the situation of 
ordinary Pahari.
There is a visibly growing number of Bengali professional petition writers in the 
market places and near the premises of DC and UNO (Upzilla executive officer) 
offices in Banderban and Roangchari. These petition writers offer their services at 
different levels including writing khas bondobasti application as well as a 
negotiation of the lease cases with the lower level officials of the DC office. They 
act like the agent or brokers of the khas land enterprise. I have seen a handful of 
such Bengali middlemen (brokers) earn their daily necessities by negotiating 
between khas bondobasti seekers and the officials at Upzilla and DC office. Every 
day, they wait in the office corridor of DC and UNO for the moakkel (party); when 
they see ordinary Pahari coming to the office for some purpose they immediately 
catch them up for their service.
In general, writing a single khas bondobasti petition costs around two hundred to
three hundred taka but with negotiation fees included it amounts to between one to 
1two thousand taka. In many cases, I observed they even charge more simply 
showing how busy they were with workload at the desk. These middlemen always 
look busy at the service of ‘big party’ (locally used phrase), preparing the
256
applications, collecting certificates, and mobilising an interest group at the DC 
office. For an outside lease seeker, financial strength almost ensures the khas 
bondobasti preparation. However, for helpless ordinary Pahari the situation is 
different. They succumb to the middlemen’s demands in consideration of urgency 
and professional expertise of khas bondobasti application writings. The cost 
involved in khas bondobasti petition writing and ‘negotiation service’ fees 
sometimes requires an ordinary Pahari to spend an entire month’s earnings.124
In the following paragraphs, I give an example of the harsh reality faced by an 
ordinary Pahari woman in khas bondobasti preparation which I encountered in 
December 1999 at Roangchari Bazar (market). Soci Rani Tanchanga aged around 
60, was an old inhabitant of Bogachare para (village) of Roangchari. The village is 
only four miles away from the Roangchari Bazar but coming from the Bagachara 
one has to walk hours on a rugged, uneven narrow hilly path. Soci Rani Tanchanga 
came along with her nephew to find a professional petition writer to draft an 
application on her behalf for a khas bondobasti of her homestead. She was virtually 
forced to put an application to the UNO as one of her relatives found that her 
homestead area, including three surrounding hills has already been under process of 
khas bondobasti by a Bengali businessman in Banderban. She was told by her 
relative to prepare an application quickly to the UNO because the Bengali 
businessman had already filed petition to the ADC (revenue) with a ‘trace map’ 
from the Kanongo. With that urgency the old Tanchanga woman literally cried and 
confessed to me that she had to sell all her chicken to bear the cost of petition 
writings and other official formalities. The Soci Rani Tanchanga had literally 
compelled me to get involved with her application writing. Later I heard that she 
managed to save her homestead area but the surrounding three hills were leased out 
to the promising Bengali leaseholder.
Soci Rani’s case is perhaps a clear manifestation of the situation faced by ordinary 
Pahari under the present khas land regime. The Marma, Bawm and Tanchanga of
123 £1 =60 Taka conversion during my fieldwork time in 1999-2000.
124 The monthly earnings are calculated on the basis of a modest yearly earning of 18000.00 Tk per 
household in the CHT. That means per month income of a household is around 1500.00 TK.
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Roangchari and Banderban are no exception to this exploitative system of 
government’s khas land lease preparation.
Submitting a khas bondobasti application
At the final stage of khas bondobasti, the recommended applications usually only 
come to the DC office for approval or sanction. Firstly, the prepared lease 
application is lodged with the respective UNO at the Upzilla level where the actual 
lease is sought. The UNO initiates the first action on lease cases after reviewing all 
the relevant documents such as a residency certificate, nationality certificate, the 
headman’s recommendation, projojhata jachai (the need assessment) of the 
applicant and so forth. The UNO then forward the case to the ADC (revenue) at the 
district level, if the application is found genuine. However, none of the cases would 
be found genuine without cash. The file is forwarded by the UNO and only moves 
upward to the ADC (revenue) after fulfilment of the demands. If the demand at the 
Upzilla level is not met “properly”, the application file would be held up and remain 
ineffective for months.
Once the forwarded file reaches to the ADC office, the ADC (revenue) after 
verifying the genuineness of the case, forwards it to the DC. The DC then 
recommends to the Kanongo for field survey and report to the ADC (revenue) with a 
trace map of the lease lands in question. According to khas bondobasti policy, it is 
almost mandatory for the Kanongo (surveyor) to physically visit the lease site and 
prepare a field survey report on whether the ‘would be leased land’ is under dispute. 
In practice, this hardly ever occurs because this is the same office which prepares the 
groundwork for the khas bondobasti case by providing the vital information of 
‘unallocated khas lands’.
The Kanongo prepares a trace map of this so-called ‘unallocated khas land’ for the 
lease applicants in exchange for handsome returns. Nowadays, Kanongo make a 
straightforward demand of the nojor salami for making a trace map with an 
imaginary report delineating the demarcation of proposed khas bondobasti (lease). A 
trace map is drawn by the Kanongo, for example, locating a geographical boundary
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such as to the south Boro Bod Gas (big banian tree), to the north Mora Khal (dead 
canal) in favour of lease application.125
As I mentioned in the previous chapter, there is no cadastral survey and land map 
with plot numbers for leased lands in the CHT. The approval of khas land lease is 
therefore, arbitrarily demarcated with a trace map based on an eye-estimated 
geographical boundary. However, there are some recurrent problems with this trace 
map of khas bondobasti. Most often, Kanongo produce as imaginary trace map 
without having a clear knowledge of boundary demarcation of the so-called 
‘unallocated’ khas lands. Often this leads to conflict between the Pahari and the 
Bengali lease-holders. The trace map prepared by the Kanongo based on his own 
estimation sometimes includes the homestead of the Pahari, as we have seen in the 
case of Soci Rani Tanchanga. In other cases, problems with this imaginary trace map 
arise between leaseholders claiming the rights on the same demarcated lands.
However, despite these limitations, the positive field report of the Kanongo on khas 
bondobasti depends to a large extent on attractive cash payments ranging between 
three thousand to ten thousand taka depending on the size of lease cases. This has 
now become almost an unwritten official practice in the CHT. All the higher level 
officials in the district administration including the DC and ADC (revenue) share the 
amount charged by the Kanongo for the purpose.
I asked one of my informants in Roangchari, Anil Tanchanga who was about to get 
ten acres of khas bondobasti in 2000 why he had to pay so much money to a simple 
Kanongo as he had already paid a substantial amount to the UNO of Roangchari. He 
told me that “Kanongo is not a simple man; he is very powerful because he is the 
one who makes the lease application strong”. Anil Tanchanga further jokingly 
commented, Tia charafile ‘kanongo office a gomai thikibo (the file will remain 
asleep at Kanongo's table without money).
1251 take this example of a trace map from my informant Anil Tanchanga’s khas bondobasti 
application.
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Granting khas bondobasti
The final step towards khas bondobasti involves the official sanction by the DC after 
the field report from Kanongo has been forwarded by the ADC (revenue). According 
to khas land lease policy, the call for a hearing is to investigate whether there is any 
dispute or claim by any person over the proposed bondobasti. However, the hearing 
procedure itself is of a dubious nature. In fact the entire hearing procedure is only 
organised to legally justify the khas land lease to the ‘prospective’ bondobasti 
seekers. Even if there are disputes over the proposed bondobasti the complainants 
never receive any notice to appear before the hearings. Although it is often shown in 
the letter delivery book that notices are served to the complainants on time. The 
ADC (revenue) office set the hearing date in accordance with prospective 
beneficiaries’ interests.
I had the opportunity to attend two such hearings at the ADC (revenue) office at 
Banderban. On one occasion in June 2000,1 observed a Bengali ‘prospective’ 
bondobasti seeker accompanied by two local lawyers waiting at the ADC (revenue) 
office for a hearing. There were no other persons present at the office. The 
hearing was about a hundred acres of hilly khas bondobasti in Aloykhong mouza 
under Banderban sadar Upzilla by a Bengali lease seeker from Satkania Upzilla of 
Chittagong district. The proposed leased lands were actually under occupation of 
Dulu para (village) jhum cultivators. Interestingly there were several complaints 
from Dulu para villagers against the proposed khas bondobasti.
After about an hour when the ADC (revenue) finally started the hearing procedures, 
he first told his Ardali (assistant) to call the complainant before the hearing. The 
Ardali immediately went out of the office and started calling one after another by 
name of each complainants but none of them responded and appeared at the hearing. 
The ADC (revenue) then asked his Ardali, “why did the complainants did not appear 
to the hearing”. The Ardali showing a letter registry book replied, “sir, we have 
issued the notices to both parties much earlier to appear on the hearing day”. Then
1261 happened to be in the DC office on the day of the hearing. When I knew from one my informants 
at the DC office that there would be a hearing in the afternoon I immediately seized the opportunity 
and approached to the ADC (revenue) to have permission to observe the hearing procedures.
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one of the lawyers of bondobasti seeker stood up and defending the Ardali told the 
ADC “sir, as per law we have appeared before the hearing but our makkal (client) 
can not wait for years for the complainants to come”. After some minutes of silence 
the ADC (revenue) concluded the hearing, “As no complainants appeared before the 
hearing all the complaints against this khas bondobasti case are dismissed and the 
bondobasti application is declared valid and should be forwarded for approval”.127 
The whole hearing procedure seemed to me arranged by the ADC (revenue) office 
on behalf of the Bengali lease seeker. The conversations in the hearing also looked 
very precise for the justification of the lease case. Thus the hearing procedures of 
khas bondobasti only represent the interests of the khas land regime in pursuing 
lease policy for the ‘prospective’ beneficiaries.
Finally, with post-hearing recommendation by the ADC (revenue), the proposed 
lease case is again placed before the DC for sanction. The successful outcome of the 
khas bondobasti ends up with an issuance of a kabiliat (a lease document), of course 
with a final round of financial inducement. Thus for a wealthy and influential lease 
seeker the entire process of khas bondobasti requires minimal time as money and 
power play a crucial role at each stage of decision-making and the whole procedure 
is done at the higher level. Whereas for the ordinary Pahari the process of khas 
bondobasti, even for five to ten acres, represents procedural bureaucratic 
obstruction, longer waiting times and endless loitering in the corridors of the DC and 
UNO office. In most cases the ordinary Pahari give up the desire to obtain khas 
bondobasti in the middle of the process due to the financial burden and 
discriminatory, indifferent attitudes of the khas land regime at the district 
administration.
Nowadays, different sections such as influential local leaders, Bengali businessmen, 
government officials and military personnel are all engaged in occupying hill lands 
in the name of khas bondobasti. The entire cadre of functionaries of the DC and 
UNO office have now become active partners in making the khas land regime an 
economic enterprise. Apart from individuals khas bondobasti there are also instances 
of manipulations and fraudulent practices at institutional bondobasti cases.
127 The conversations of the hearing are translated from my Bengali transcript. The whole hearing
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As and when the DC office learned in advance about government schemes of land 
acquisition for a particular department or institution in the CHT, the officials of the 
District Administration initiate a process to mobilise an interest group of 
middlemen. These middlemen, mainly from the settler Bengali, are mischievously 
engaged with the DC office in making some forged documents relating to proposed 
khas bondobasti with a view of getting compensation. The district administration 
help them to prepare back- dated khas bondobasti papers in order to settle 
compensation cases before government acquisition is made the proposed scheme. 
When the particular government institution finally proposes for the lease or 
acquisition of lands in question, the middlemen in collaboration with the district 
administration launch a compensation case against the proposed lease with fake 
documents made earlier. As and when the compensation money is released from the 
government exchequer all parties involved i.e. middlemen and officials of the 
district administration become equal beneficiaries of the misappropriated money.
It seems that government khas land lease policy is designed to pave the way for 
Bengali establishment in the CHT. A Bengali commercial interest group has 
emerged out of this policy whereas the majority of ordinary Pahari are in the 
process of losing their traditional rights and becoming landless and marginalised. 
Under the new official-legal policy, any resident of the CHT, irrespective of 
ethnicity is entitled to khas land lease from any part of the CHT but, in practice, this 
is not the case. Some recent examples of khas land lease owners in Roangchari and 
Banderban area reveal the underlying motives of government khas land policy.
Khas Bondobasti and Prospective Beneficiaries128
Mr Nur Alam,129 a former minister and influential political figure at present in the 
BNP government, is one of the ‘deserving persons’ in the lists of present khas land 
settlements. Mr Alam was granted a sum of five hundred acres of khas land for
procedure was recorded.
28 The names of the beneficiaries and size of the leased lands are collected from my personal 
engagement with the local level employees of the DC office, and personally visiting the lease sites.
129 In this section I am not using the real names of the beneficiaries rather using pseudonymous 
names.
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baggan development in the Chemi mouza of Banderban sadar Upazilla (central sub­
district) under his wife’s name. Mr Alam’s younger brother Mr. Younus is another 
‘deserving person’, perhaps as the brother of the former minister, who was also 
granted 100 acres of khas lands in the same mouza. These so-called khas lands of 
Chemi mouza were under the possession of three villages: namely Bag Guna, Hati 
Bhaga and Zadi Mura para, as jhum common lands until leases are granted to 
Alam’s family members. The Chemi mouza headman told me that he maintained the 
jhum tazi for jhumia of these three villages in terms of collecting jhum tax and 
distributing mouza common lands. The headman also showed me the complaint 
applications lodged by the villagers to the DC against this khas land lease but ended 
up with no results after three official-legal hearings.130 When I visited the lease site I 
found many of the jhum cultivators in these villages became sub-lease holders of 
Alam’s family providing they carry out jhum cultivation in certain areas and plant 
trees in other areas every year.
Another prospective beneficiary of the khas land lease is Mr. Ali, the BNP MP of 
Khagrachri District from northern CHT, who is also the present chairman of CHT 
Development Board with the rank of a deputy minister. Mr Ali has an allotment of 
500 acres of khas land under Koykong mouza of Roangchari in the name of baggan 
development. This khas land lease to Mr. Ali forced the Tanchanga jhumia of 
Kutubchari para to leave their traditional village jhum common lands. Local 
Tanchanga people of Kutubchari para told me that there were instances of police 
harassment due to local resistance against the lease.
Apart from these big leaseholders, there are also local Bengali businessmen and 
politicians, high-level government officials and army personnel based in Dhaka who 
altogether accounted for 90% of the total khas land leases granted in the year 
between 1999 and 2000. The size of the leases ranged from fifty to two hundred 
acres in different mouzas of Banderban and Roangchari UpazilaP1 Besides these
130 As I have mentioned in the previous section, one such official-legal hearing procedures I attended 
in Banderban ADC (revenue) office was incredibly dubious in a manner that it was all just arranged 
for the purpose of verifying the leases.
1311 have here consulted the khas lands leases only in two Upazillas. I have had opportunity to access 
to some of the official lists of lease documents through my local informants, who are district 
administration employees involved in khas land lease process. On the ground of maintaining privacy, 
I will not put in their names in this text due to sensitivity of the information.
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political personalities, during my fieldwork in 1999-2000,1 also came across some 
senior government officials in the District administration of Banderban, who, by dint 
of their superior bureaucratic status, appropriated a share of khas land leases. In the 
years between 1999-2000 alone, the DC, ADC (revenue) of Banderban, and the 
UNO of Banderban and Roangchari all secured khas lands of different sizes ranging 
from fifty to a hundred acres under the names of their kin and family members. 
Officially, as government officers, they are barred from registering any khas lands 
with their own names. There are also a few local Pahari on the list of khas land 
lease settlements such as the present local Awami League MP of Banderban, two of 
the King’s brothers, and some government employees in Banderban district.
Besides individual leases, there are also substantial amounts of institutional leases 
for the Forest Department and Military establishments in Banderban. I do not have 
actual data for these institutional leases but the daily newspapers reports and some 
NGO publications suggest that “around 3000 acres of khas lands are granted to the 
Forest Department for the development of reserve forest, and around 1500 acres to 
Roangchari cantonment for the establishment of a firing training centre” (Protom 
Alo, 17 June 2000; Raviloo 2000).
These are the few examples of direct beneficiaries by the government’s new khas 
land lease policy in the CHT. It is quite ironic that the so-called khas land lease 
policy is envisaged with a view to rational baggan unnayan (forest development), as 
jhum practice by the Pahari is seen as contrary to forest development in the CHT. 
The concept of ‘rational’ land use by leasing khas land to individuals appears to be 
closely associated with government’s favoured policy of privatisation. Within the 
framework of the government’s current khas land policy there is a greater need for 
modes of revenue generation in the CHT. The concept of khas land management in 
this new policy can be seen as the privatisation of jhum common lands to individual 
entrepreneurs and government establishments. The khas land policy is directed to 
promote the aims of powerful interests in the commercial usage of jhum common 
lands.
As a result, in recent years thousands of acres of so-called khas bondobasti are now 
in the possession of only a handful of the urban elite. In fact, under the khas land
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policy in cases of such lease (bondobasti) to affluent and influential persons for 
bagan development, no attention is given to local traditional rights of the Pahari. In 
almost all the cases I investigated leases were given on jhum common lands, which 
are traditionally under the possession of the village community.
Moreover, the leaseholders carried out minimal plantation just to protect their rights 
on the leased-lands. In many cases, there are instances of subleasing to original 
Pahari users. A large number of outside khas land leaseholders have subleased out 
their lands to the local jhum cultivators. The contract of these sub leases maintains 
that the local jhumia could use the lands either by payment of fixed amount of 
money annually to the leaseholders or plantation of tress for baggan development on 
one side of the leased-lands each year. Once the lands are filled with plantations the 
contract of sub-lease is over.132 The leaseholders then make a big profit it by selling 
trees with high market values in cooperation with the forest department.133
One of my informants, Sodaram Tanchanga of Bagua mouza in Roangchari, told me 
that he is now contractually using a leased plot of a Bengali businessman of 
Banderban town named Sanjib Das on agreement of baggan development. This 
means that the Pahari have become day labourers and sharecroppers on their own 
lands. The fact is that in the long run under the khas land regime the entire jhum 
common lands in the CHT would come under different entitlements of individual 
ownership and commercial interests. The big leases to the influential Bengali 
perhaps become part of this envisaged goal.
However, there are also many instances of legal battles between leaseholders and 
original local users, such as the case between local jhum land users of Chemi mouza 
and Ali’s family.134 Most of the legal battles, however, ended up with the outcome 
that ordinary Pahari were unable to pursue the lengthy procedure of litigation
1321 have learned this process talking to some of the sub-lease holders in Roangchari and Banderban.
133 In the CHT, it is quite difficult for the ordinary Pahari to sell their own grown trees without the
forest department permit whereas for the big lease holders permit is not an issue.
134 I have documented a few cases between individual leaseholders and local inhabitants, and 
between the Forest Department and locals. However, I only mention the cases here because it is too 
elaborate to discuss in this text.
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against the powerful elements, which requires money and power. Giving up the legal 
battle left the Pahari with few options. Firstly, they could move into the deep 
interior region of the CHT hills in search of jhum lands that are yet to be leased out. 
This option is obviously strenuous because of the remoteness of the sites from the 
place of residence and there is no certainty for not being leased out again. Secondly, 
they take a sub-lease on an annual basis from the ‘legal’ leaseholders. The final 
option is the organised resistance movement against government policy.
The increasing trend of land dispossession and consequent economic alienation has 
forced upon all the ethnic groups a sense of unity for collective survival articulating 
a common shared deprivation and common resistance against the state land policy. 
Today the political mobilisation of all ethnic groups as Pahari is taking a new shape 
in the form of indigenous land rights movements against khas land lease in the CHT.
A Case of Pahari Resistance and Khas Land Lease
It was the first week of June 2000.1 had just returned from a short break in Dhaka 
with my family and immediately noticed how everywhere in the Banderban town 
area was covered with a poster of an up-coming protest rally organised by Vomi O 
Vomi Adikhar Shangrogkon Committee (Land and Land Rights Protection 
Committee), a newly formed organisation against the government khas land lease 
policy. The main issue of the protest rally was the government’s recent acquisition 
of 2000 acres of khas land for a sub-military base in Roangchari evicting Soanloo 
para Bwam inhabitants from their jhum common lands. While initially talking to 
some of the key figures of Vomi Odikhar Committee and some of my local 
informants about the whole episode of the organised rally in Banderban, I came to 
know that there had been stiff local resistance against the government’s khas land 
acquisition in Roangchari. The proposed project was the establishment of a firing 
training centre in the hills near Soanloo para . I was told that the way in which the 
military personnel took control of the project area by arresting, beating and abusing 
local Bawm people of Soanloo para had created serious repercussions among all the 
Pahari people in the CHT including the regional political party PCJSS. The 
formation of Vomi Odikhar Committee and the up-coming protest rally on 30th June
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2000 was thus part of wider social movement against the government’s khas land 
lease policy in the CHT.
In the following days, I wanted to focus on the events around the up-coming protest 
rally and local responses to military acquisition of khas lands at Soanloo para, 
spending substantial time observing organised activities both at Roangchari and 
Banderban. Firstly, in order to collect first hand information about local responses to 
khas land lease, I began talking to the victims and protest organisers in the Soanloo 
para. Mr. Dan Doha Bawm is one of the victim of Soanloo para and a member of 
newly formed Vomi Odikhar Committee against the establishment of a firing centre 
on jhum common lands, gave me a vivid account of the background of the khas land 
lease by the military. He explained to me how local Bawm people of Soanloo para 
were evicted by the military personnel from their traditional jhum lands. He 
explained:
The disputed leased land is only one mile from the Soanloo para. We have 
been using these lands as village common since we settled in this area. When 
we first knew about the acquirement of these common lands by Roangchari 
military camp we went to the UNO along with local headman to request him 
not to issue the proposed khas lease for military firing centre. We explained 
to him that khas land lease to firing centre would cause the livelihood 
situation of entire Bawm people at Soanloo para. The UNO pretended that 
he did not know anything about it but promised that he would look into this 
matter. But in the last month, suddenly military people came in and built 
their security post over the lands and restricted the Bawm people not to move 
into the area. The news immediately sparked the whole Soanloo Para.
People were waiting for the rain to begin the jhum after cutting, clearing and 
burning the jungle. In the next morning all the villagers at Soanloo para 
decided to go to the lands but many of them were beaten and physically 
mishandled including myself and the Soanloo para karbari by the military 
personnel. We again met the UNO and briefed him on the whole matter but 
he only advised us not take law on our hands. He betrayed us. The whole 
process of khas land acquirement was done secretly among the top officials 
of the administration. There were even no hearings for the lease. People are 
now very desperate about their lands and livelihood. It is now illegal for us to 
go to the lands. The Soanloo para Bawm will now be facing a great hardship 
in their everyday life. As Pahari we have now only option left to make a 
bigger andolon (movement) against the government khas land lease (my 
translation from the Bengali transcriptions).
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Besides talking to Dan Doha Bawm, I also talked to the local Marma headman 
Mong La Sing about the issue of khas land lease to the Roangchari military sub-base 
and the local responses. He explains to me that:
I went to the UNO many times to explain him about the Soanloo para mouza 
common lands but the government has taken such harsh decision even 
without consulting the local headman and karbari. The headman and karbari 
are traditionally distributing these jhum common lands to the villagers. We 
are now helpless. The government’s khas land lease policy does not 
recognise headmen’s authority. Government is now allocating these lands to 
anybody without considering Pahari people’s odikhar (rights). The 
implications of khas land lease have been a profound impact on the life of 
Pahari people in the CHT. Now you can see every where in the CHT the 
land rights protest movements against the government khas land lease.
Both Dan Doha Bawm’s and the headman’s account indicate a new dimension to the 
khas land lease policy in the CHT - organised collective movement as the only 
alternative. The ordinary people in Roangchari including the Bawm of Soanloo para 
that I talked to are visibly being motivated and mobilised in that direction. The event 
of khas land lease to the Military base in Roangchari and subsequent military assault 
on the local Bawm have had a serious repercussion among all ethnic groups in the 
CHT. The event has also sensitised the PCJSS, the only regional political party in 
the CHT questioning the government’s sincerity to the peace treaty.
Responding to the popular demand against the government khas land policy, in 2000 
a committee was formed in the name of Vomi O Vomi Adikar Shangrogkon 
Committee (Land and land Rights Protection Committee) mainly with PCJSS 
initiatives. The committee is comprised of elderly personalities from different ethnic 
groups, headmen and karbari with Z. R. Larma, the PCJSS Chief, as its head. From 
the inception Vomi Odikhar Committee launched its organisational activities 
focusing on the land problems of the Pahari. At the local level, it organises small 
consultation meetings involving local headmen, karbari, and ordinary Pahari. In 
such consultation meetings, I participated in Roangchari and Banderban, I observed 
a dynamic process of interaction taking place between the leaderships of the land 
rights movement and the ordinary Pahari.
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Listening to the local jhumia about their day-to-day land related problems, taking 
new information and engaging with them actively in the political process of 
resistance against the state policies the Vomi Odikhar Committee emerged as a 
Pahari ‘justice’ organisation. Building on shared experiences of Pahari land 
dispossession the movement brought together people from various ethnic 
backgrounds. The main aim of the resistance movement is to protect jhum lands 
from leasing in the name of khas lands. The question of restoring traditional land 
rights became the core issue of the movement demanding the cancellation of all 
leases. The activities of Vomi Odikhar Committee thus involve not only the 
mobilisation of Pahari on the basis of common land dispossession appealing to local 
sentiments but also challenging the statist ideology of land policy in the CHT. The 
formation of the multi-ethnic Vomi Odikhar Committee has generated a new spirit of 
cooperation among all ethnic groups in the CHT.
On 30 June 2000, the Vomi Odikar Committee with quick mobilisation organised a 
grand rally in Banderban Rajbari Moidan presided over by a Roangchari Bawm 
leader Mr. Amlay Bawm. Mr. Z. R. Larma was present as the chief guest. It was the 
largest rally of this kind I have ever seen during my two years stay in Banderban. On 
30th June the whole Banderban town area was transformed into a city of protest. 
From early morning, Pahari people of all categories, men, women, youth and 
elderly, started coming towards the main venue for the protest rally, Rajbari Moidan 
(King’s field), where a big stage was erected for the speakers and hundreds of 
volunteers bearing arm band of Vomi Odikar Committee stood by to help the 
participants in the rally. Pahari people coming from different Upzilla moved 
towards Rajbari Moidan with small groups chanting slogans, showing banners with 
sheer discontent against the government khas land policy. The Rajbari Moidan was 
full of people by noon. People were even standing on the rickshaws, climbing up the 
trees and waiting on the house balconies around Rajbari Moidan to listen to the 
speakers. At around 1.00 PM the meeting finally started with the local speakers and 
the chief guest at the end. The substance of all the speeches in reality carried an 
identical message:
Amara shobai pahari zati. Ai zaiga Amader. Ai Matir shate amadrer sodo 
porosher jiban jarit. Amader shkale milit vhabe Ai zaiga, Ameder shanskrti 
abanig aitizza rokka kaorte hobe.(we are all Pahari. This land belongs to us.
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Our ancestors are linked to this land. We have to be united to protect our 
land, culture and tradition.)
The chief speaker, Mr. Z. R. Lamia, in his concluding speech remarked upon even 
withdrawing from the peace deal if further leases were made at any levels. He 
demanded immediate cancellation of khas land lease to the army base in Roangchari. 
In an emotionally charged speech he urged all Pahari to get ready to sacrifice blood 
for the CHT lands. He comments: Amra astra joma diachi kinto training ioma di nai 
(we surrendered arms but not the training).
The Vomi Odikar Committee by organising this grand rally had orchestrated a sense 
of shared deprivation and common jhum  land dispossession of the Pahari, on the 
one hand, and a protest against the government land lease policy in the CHT, on the 
other. The other aspect that Vomi Odikar Committee had brought a radical change in 
is involving men and women in the protest movement. The overwhelming 
participation of women in the protest rallies of this kind is not generally seen 
elsewhere in Bangladesh, particularly outside the capital city.
Figure 9 The leaders of the Vomi Odikar Rally in 30 June, 2000
It is important to note here that in the CHT women along with men are directly 
involved in both types of farming, jhum  and paddy, a complete contrast to the 
Bengali culture in the plains where women are restricted to work in farming because
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of the value of seclusion due to the concept of purdha (shame). In Bangladesh, the 
general anthropological debate on the distinction between “public” and “private” 
sphere as gendered space is culturally meaningful given the centrality of patriarchal 
ideology that assigns women to a domestic role.135 However, in the context of CHT 
this generalisation is irrelevant from cross-cultural point of view. Although, the 
patriarchal family structure is common in the CHT, the particular construction of 
women’s role in the domestic sphere associated with the jhum  has special 
significance. Many authors interpret the women’s role in the domestic sphere as 
providing them with some power to influence the men in public life because of equal 
engagement in the farming such as jhum.136
Figure 10 Pahari women participation in Vomi Odhikar Rally
Thus, in the Vomi Odikhar movement women are drawn into public meetings and 
protest rallies aimed at defending the rights of the jhum  lands, forcing the state to 
prevent the khas land lease to the Bengali. This political development generated by 
Vomi Odikhar Committee activities is surely towards redefinition of the stereotyped 
image of women’s domestic role in the CHT. I suggest that the Vomi Odikhar 
Committee ’by involving women in land rights movements is not only denouncing 
the state policy of khas land lease which affecting the life and livelihood of the
135 See the detailed discussion on the subject in Gardner (1995).
136 See the discussion on failure of many NGO programmes in the CHT adopting similar strategy as
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Pahari, but is also articulating a distinct cultural value in which both men and 
women are an integral part of jhum practice. A value of co-operation embedded in 
jhum farming can be seen as a distinct ethos of Pahari social life in CHT. The land 
rights movement is thus not only the voice of restoration of that shared social ethos 
but is as well a challenge to the threat against it.
Conclusion
The land rights resistance movement in fact underpinned the emergence of 
alternative models of development for the Pahari. This new organisation has also 
promoted the idea of collective Pahari identity in the form of protest rallies against 
the state policy of khas land lease. The Vomi Odikhar Committee is, in fact, an 
example of how different ethnic groups can forge their common political interests 
for alternative modernities. This Vomi Odikhar movement necessarily stresses the 
unity of the indigenous population as Pahari over their specific ethnic identities, 
such as Chakma, Marina and so on. The general argument here is that 
indigenousness is becoming central to this movement as indigenous land rights 
politics is becoming increasingly diffused through “cultural globalization”.137
The leadership of the Vomi Odhikar movement are now emphasising that the 
question of land for Pahari cannot be reduced to a question of economic resource, 
since they have a distinct, cultural, social and cosmological relationship to the 
landscape in which they live. For Vomi Odikhar Committee, once land is lost,
Pahari survival is no longer an individual matter since the CHT jhum lands are 
shared lands in physical terms. Regaining jhum lands thus requires collective 
endeavours and protests. The Vomi Odikhar movement illustrate the way in which 
protest are expressed against the government khas land policy is, in other word, a 
process of collective mobilisation of Pahari in the CHT. In the next chapter I discuss 
the dimensions of Pahari mobilisation through the local political process.
practice in the plains (Ahamed 2000).
37 See detailed discussions of recent trends in indigenous rights movements in Hodgson (2002), 
Brosius (1999), and also Kailash Aggarwal (1999) for the North-East Indian context.
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Chapter Seven
Negotiating Collective Identity: Election as P ahari M obilisation  
Introduction
In the previous chapter I discussed the issues of khas land, the ways in which local 
peoples are marginalised by Bengali and state institutions, and how they respond to 
this process. This chapter mainly deals with the formation of collective identities 
through ethnic mobilisation among different groups in the CHT. The aim of this 
chapter is to primarily reveal the political dynamics of identity formation within the 
present context of the ‘state-tribal’ or Bengali-Pahari relationships in Bangladesh. In 
contemporary ethno-political discourse, the relationship between the ethnic peoples 
of CHT and the state of Bangladesh has largely been orchestrated as an opposition 
of Pahari vs. Bengali respectively. The notion of a Pahari identity is central to the 
construction of collective identity among diverse ethnic groups of CHT.
Within this political discourse, there are some other parallel categories, such as 
Jhumma, Adivashi which are also used in different contexts (see Chapters Four and 
Five). However, these terms are contested from the statist perspective as they 
challenge the Bengali hegemony and emphasise the CHT’s claim to special rights. 
The official designation of these people (collectively) is upazati (‘sub-nation’ in the 
Bengali literary sense), a term which undermines their claims to equal social and 
cultural status in relation to the dominant Bengali.
This chapter examines the way in which these categories are constructed by the 
people themselves and also by dominant ‘others’ - i. e the ways in which the people 
of CHT represent themselves and are represented by others. To unfold the 
discussion, I begin with some specific questions related to the ongoing process of 
ethnic mobilisation and collective identity formation. Why do people choose these 
new constructions and reject the stereotyped official categorisation? Where is 
collective or shared identity expressed? In order to answer these questions, I have 
examined different meanings, forms and expression of collective idioms used in the 
political discourse of identity formation and ethnic mobilisation in the CHT. I have 
examined this process through the analysis of Banderban puroshava (municipality)
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election as an extended case study, in which dimensions of collective mobilisation 
among diverse ethnic communities are explicitly revealed.
In the CHT, however, there are various forms, mechanisms, and organisations of 
collective expression. It emerged from my fieldwork that land issues and local 
politics are inseparable in many contexts. Land issues are a dominant arena in which 
many of these collective expressions come to play an anchor role and become 
solidified in the process of active ethnic mobilisation. I have discussed land and 
other aspects of shared identity in Chapters Four, Five, and Six, by examining the 
relationships between local-level institutions and state regime.
In this chapter, the case of the Banderban puroshava election can be seen as a 
process of identity formation in the local political context, a case where an 
expression of collective assertion is overtly played out. I suggest that recent 
articulations of Pahari, Adivashi and Jhumma are, in fact, part of a process of 
broader ethnic mobilisation. These common collective terms are used at different 
levels and in different contexts in order to draw out cultural and social 
distinctiveness between the people of CHT and the dominant Bengali, what Philip 
Burnham (1996) calls the “politics of cultural difference”.
I argue that the politics of Pahari identity can be seen at different levels of everyday 
interactions between the Bengali and diverse ethnic groups in general, but, more 
importantly that it exists situational contexts, in relation to Bengali and the 
Bangladesh state. It only comes into ‘being’ through practice. The chapter analyses 
the development of these processes by taking a broader perspective as well as 
following on ethnographic case study of the Banderban puroshava election. Thus, 
the chapter is divided into two parts. The first discusses processes of collective 
identity and the second is based on the analysis of the Banderban puroshava election 
and Pahari mobilisation. I begin with a discussion of the wider meaning of Pahari- 
ness.
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Who are the Paharil
If an outsider, for example, goes to CHT and asks anyone, irrespective of social 
background, ‘who is Pahari’1 There will perhaps be no single answer or even 
couple of answers. The answers could be either: ‘I am Marma, Chakma, Tripura’ 
and so on, or ‘I am PaharV, or ‘I am Marma and PaharV. One might also ask ‘what 
language do you speak’? or ‘what religion do you practice’? Obviously, there will be 
possible straight answers; ‘I speak Marma, and I am Buddhist’, and so on. Then, if 
one asks ‘what language do Pahari speak’? The conversation might end up in a big 
confusion or perhaps a puzzling answer: ‘the language of politics’! I wish to leave 
this puzzle of overlapping identities for the moment, though I will return to it later 
on.
What, then, does this Pahari category stand for? What is the basis for Pahari-ness? I 
faced a similar puzzle when I first arrived in CHT. I was initially struck by the way 
in which local people used the term strategically. My confusion also arose from the 
reading literature about the CHT written mainly by social scientists and development 
experts giving the impression that the category Pahari has been used by the hill 
people in their everyday life for a long time. I decided, therefore, to try and 
understand this from below. What does the term Pahari mean to ordinary people? Is 
Pahari a categorisation used only by politicians? How is Pahari-ness expressed in 
everyday situations among diverse ethnic groups?
Two personal encounters can be used to show that Pahari-ness can mean different 
things in different contexts. This will eventually lead us to a discussion of the wider 
meanings and practices of Pahari-ness. The first event was, in fact, a turning point 
allowing me to reach a deeper understanding of the issue, and of the way in which I 
have experienced Pahari culture within an institutional setting. During the initial 
stages of my fieldwork, I attended a cultural competition between ‘tribal’ children 
organised by the TCI. Children representing different ‘tribal’ groups performed their 
traditional dances, songs and music, and were judged by a panel of local artists. This 
was followed by a prize distribution ceremony. Cha Tuai Pru, cultural officer of 
TCI, sat next to me, explaining how the Mru shing niritta (hom dance), the Bawm 
bash niritta (bamboo dance), and Marma thala niritta (plate dance) have
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significantly different meanings within each culture for life cycle events such as 
mortuaries ceremony and marriage customs.
Figure 11 jhum  harvesting dance by Tanchanga girls at TCI cultural festival
I instantly asked him ‘is there anything called Pahari niritta (Pahari dancej? His 
initial reaction suggested that this was a stupid question. However, a follow-up 
conversation with Cha Tuai Pru (CTP) gives a good example of the institutional 
perspective on Pahari culture.138
CTP: (hurriedly replied to me): agoli tu pahari niritta (these are Pahari 
dances).
FUA: As you said these are Marma, Bawm and Mru?
CTP: It is also Pahari.
FUA: Could you explain this bit?
CTP: When we perform these for broader audience we present this as part of 
Pahari culture. (Translated from the Bengali text)
At that point, at least one of my questions was answered: the Pahari speak Bengali 
or Chittagonian. CTP’s interpretation of what constitutes Pahari culture can be seen 
as partly true as it is visibly reflected in TCI institutional policies within the 
framework of ‘state-tribal’ interactions (discussed in Chapter Four). I will return to 
this point later on. Conversations with CTP, however, tell us about the cultural 
politics of Pahari-ness. CTP’s interpretation of Pahari culture is about ‘unity within
138 Although a detailed discussion o f this subject in relation to language is offered in Chapter Four.
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1 ^ 0diversity’. One can point out enormous cultural similarities to show collectiveness 
in relation to ‘others’. How the way people explain culture depends upon the 
context. In fact, in the CHT, significant cultural practices are shared among the 
different ethnic groups, as for instance of nappi (pest dry fish -a common ingredient 
used by all ethnic communities in CHT), on the prevalence of masang gor (house 
type), jhum cultivation and so on. All these are important ingredients for cultural and 
political activists in the construction of broader Pahari ethnicity.
This cultural interpretation of Pahari-ness is also visible in everyday life situations 
when it is reified into political meaning. This point was more clearly drawn out from 
my second encounter with the issue, during a land protest in Roangchari. I have 
discussed the protest movement of local jhum cultivators against the army land 
acquisition scheme in Chapter Six. Anil Tanchanga, an activist of the protest 
movement, along with fellow Bawm protesters, was arrested allegedly for assaulting 
a Bengali police officer in Roangchari, and was later released on bail. I asked him 
why he had joined the protest movement. Anil Tanchanga told me,
Aajke bawm re utisa, kalke ameder utibe, amre tu a shobi phare akshete 
jhum kori, Amra shobi Jhumma (Today the Bawm are evicted, tomorrow 
Tanchanga and the next day other groups will be evicted. We are Jhumma, 
we together do jhum in the hills).
Anil Tanchanga’s perspective offers us another dimension of Pahari-ness. His 
construction of Pahari-ness relates to everyday survival in the CHT land. In this 
context, common jhum culture becomes an element of making solidarity. His 
construction of Jhumma is intertwined with that of Pahari-ness which includes the 
shared experiences of deprivation, land dispossession and marginalisation by the 
Bengali and state institutions. CTP’s construction of Pahari-ness is much more 
visible in Anil Tanchanga’s participation in protest movement. Thus both the 
cultural competition and protest movement certainly come to life when “culture 
becomes politics and politics become culture” (Escobar 1992). This suggests that the 
construction of Pahari-ness must be understood within a wider perspective.
139 See the discussion of dynamics of identity and inter group relations in North-East India, Kailash 
Aggarwal (1999).
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Pahari in the wider socio-political context
Pahari is the symbolic representational term used collectively by the diverse ethnic 
peoples of the CHT mainly in the political arena. The term Pahari, as a noun, is 
derived from the Bengali word pahar (hill). In the lexicographical sense the English 
translation of Pahari is ‘the inhabitants of hills’ or ‘the hill people’. The concept 
Pahari thus encompasses the ecological, territorial and geographic dimensions of 
place and identity. However, from within a wider context, the categorisation of 
Pahari as simply ‘the inhabitants of the hills’ is rather problematic. In Bangladesh, 
social, political, and cultural relevance of the category Pahari is territorial and 
regional in nature. In order to understand the fluidity and context -  related process of 
Pahari categorisation, one needs to be aware of its manifold, politically contested, 
and culturally meaningful connotations.
Firstly, not everyone living in the hilly areas of Bangladesh is a Pahari. For 
example, there are at present a large number of Bengali populations, including 
recent immigrants, who live in the CHT but are excluded from the broader Pahari 
categorisation because of their cultural difference. Indeed, the term Bengali is used 
to refer to people of the plains culture in Bangladesh. So, in this sense, the term 
Pahari denotes a people with a distinctive cultural background in the hills.
However, it is not the only cultural criteria to be considered a Pahari. For example, 
there are also ethnic minorities such as the Garu, Manipuri, and Santal living in the 
hilly northern districts of Bangladesh. Their physical appearance is close to the 
Mongolian type and the traditional cultural practice of jhum, though no longer 
practiced now, is identical to that of the CHT peoples. Moreover, to a large extent, 
they also face the same social and cultural predicaments as of the Pahari in CHT in 
their relation to Bengali and the Bangladesh State. Despite social and cultural 
similarity these ethnic peoples are also excluded from the broader categorisation of 
Pahari in the CHT. In this exclusionary process of broader categorisation, 
regionally and territoriality become fundamental elements in the construction of 
Pahari-ness in the CHT.
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The way in which the term Pahari is constructed socially, culturally, regionally and 
politically, is related to its local meaning, interpretations and implications. The 
usage of the term Pahari bears its own inclusive mechanism of cultural and 
geographic boundary maintenance specific to CHT. I suggest that Pahari identity 
only makes sense in its political ecological dimensions. The process of inclusion and 
exclusion to Pahari categorisation is shaped by the political ecology of the CHT. 
Ethnicity and territoriality are intertwined in the conceptualisation of Pahari-ness. 
Within this construction, the two cultural logics - one exclusivist, the other 
inclusivist140- are inextricably interwoven but limited to the CHT only. The 
coexistence of these two cultural tendencies, i. e, ‘us’ and ‘them’, is expressed 
through the social process of marginalisation by the state. Pahari-ness as a category, 
thus, continues to generate a tendency of broader supra identity in relation to the 
state.
The construction of the term Pahari also has another meaning linked to its political 
connotations. It replaces and challenges various statist-stereotyped categories, such 
as ‘tribal’ and upazati (sub-nation), which are now unacceptable in ethnic political 
discourse. The recent debate on the issue of upazati in Bangladesh requires a 
discussion because it is directly related to the present construction of Pahari-ness in 
the CHT. I will return to this discussion later on in this chapter. At this point, it is 
also important to highlight some of the debates about the colonial origin of Pahari 
ethnicity.
It is argued that the establishment of a colonial administration in CHT had profound 
implications in the construction of Pahari ethnicity in the area. Prashanta Tripura 
(1993), a local anthropologist, argues, from a historical perspective, that the 
foundation of Pahari ethnicity was primarily laid down by the British colonialists. 
He points out that the colonial categorisations of “hill men”, “hill tribe” and “tribal 
people” as a single category to designate the diverse ethnic peoples of CHT 
attributed a dichotomised ethnic relations of boundary maintenance between “hills 
vs. Plains”, “Tribal vs. non-tribal” and “Bengali vs. PaharV.
140 These terms were originally used by Philip Burnham (1996).
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Pranshanta Tripura suggests that the broader hill ethnic category has been solidified 
in the course of colonial administration in the CHT, and that the present construction 
of Pahari-ness is largely the result of that historical process. Before the colonial 
period, as Tripura argues, the heterogeneity of ethnic groups as well as their social 
and cultural isolation left little scope for traditional social groups’ identities to take 
on meaning in social interactions between different groups.
I do not entirely agree with Tripura’s colonial model of Pahari ethnicity. 
Colonialism naturally had a profound impact on the people of many hill regions.
This was not unique to CHT alone; it has been a common feature throughout the 
frontier regions of South and Southeast Asia. It is true that colonial administration, 
for the first time, categorised these diverse peoples collectively as ‘hill men or hill 
tribes’ (Lewin 1869,1870). However, it should bear in mind that the category of 
‘tribal’ or ‘hill people’ was, to a large extent, guided by colonial administrative 
policy on how to administer the CHT as an area separate from the plains.
Part of the problem with Tripura’s argument seems to be his sources; too much 
information has been drawn from colonial ethnography. Lewin, who was 
commissioned by the colonial administration for specific purposes and objectives 
was Tripura’s main reference. Tripura’s analysis also contains no ethnographic 
account whatsoever of how Pahari ethnicity is expressed in ordinary discourses in 
present day situations in the CHT. Secondly, there is also no evidence of collective 
ethnic mobilisation of any sort during colonial times in the CHT as far as the 
historical literature is concerned.
I suggest that Pahari mobilisation is a fairly new trend in political discourses within 
the CHT. The phenomena of Pahari-ness as political identity has come to life in the 
process of ethnic mobilisation in recent years. The construction of the Kaptai dam 
and its subsequent impact on the life of the hill people has been regarded as the root 
of Pahari mobilisation in the CHT (Mohsin 1997; Schendel 1992). In recent times, 
land dispossession, marginalisation, military oppression by the state and the 
response to these realities transformed small resistance into a broad ethnic 
movement with the formation of multi-ethnic representation. The notion of Pahari- 
ness is also used as an umbrella symbol for a multi-ethnic political movement.
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Therefore, departing from Tripura’s colonial model, I argue that the colonial 
categorisations of ‘hill men’ and ‘hill tribe’ were largely used by colonial 
administrators for the purpose of ‘territorializing’ diverse groups in order to 
maintain smooth revenue collection in the CHT. The creation of colonial local 
administration functions such as the circle chief, mouza level headman, and the 
village level karbari are all part of this process of categorisation, which aimed to 
bring diverse groups into a single set-up.
However, along with its integration into the post-colonial state, the colonial 
categorisation has now been reified into a new meaning. Ethnic peoples now employ 
the colonial categorisation to designate themselves collectively as distinct Pahari 
people, as opposed to the Bengali. The development of a Pahari collective 
formation is, by and large, a post-colonial situation linked to the everyday 
experience of antagonistic relationships with the dominant Bengali, and the way in 
which ethnic groups seek to establish control over the land and resources in the 
CHT. The notion of Jhumma is another construction to represent these collective 
experiences, especially in relation to land, land rights and regional autonomy.
The notion of Jhumma identity
The political construction of Jhumma has a special relation to jhum agriculture and 
land rights in the CHT. The term Jhumma literally translates as ‘territory of the 
Jhumma\  It emphasises that CHT land is Jhumma land, and excludes non -Jhumma 
people in the area. The term has largely been popularised by the local regional party 
(PCJSS) in order to achieve a greater regional autonomy in the CHT on the basis of 
what Van Schendel calls “Jhumma nationalism”(1992: 1). In the present political 
discourse, jhum is an institution through which a common CHT identity can be 
expressed. The symbolic use of traditional agricultural practices (jhum) as collective 
ethnic marker is a process of displaying a shared history of common past and 
present, in which all ethnic groups are intimately related and attached to CHT land.
The use of Jhumma is, in fact, an effort to uphold a common cultural identity. The 
current political and land rights movement in CHT, led by the PCJSS attempts to
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forge a unified collective identity on the basis of jhum cultivation. In the 
construction of Jhumma identity, the historical past is shaped by present political 
realities in the CHT. Therefore, in practical terms, Pahari and Jhumma supplement 
each other in the form of collective mobilisation in the CHT. Both Pahari and 
Jhumma are used in the process of ethnic mobilisation as an alternative to the statist 
discourse concerning upazati. Aware of the political charge which the terms carry, 
the state has chosen to deny these categorisations and created its own category.
Upazati - A Statist discourse
In Bangladesh, the terms, ‘tribal’ and upazati, in one way or another, seem to be 
ever present in the statist discourse, and aim to distinguish the people of CHT from 
majority Bengali populations. In the official classification there are elements 
denoting unequal relationships, dependence, and domination between the Bengali 
and non-Bengali hill populations. In many ways, this can be seen as a 
systematisation of hierarchical relationships actuated by linguistic, social and 
cultural differences.
Moreover, this is in many ways a systematic hierarchical relationship. Andrew 
Turton’s recent work on Civility and Savagery in Thai political context gives a new 
dimension to the analysis of hierarchical classification of what he calls the “pair” 
model of relationships (2000: 1). A similar classificatory scheme is also seen in the 
statist discourse in Bangladesh. These classifications are the ‘pairs’ of Bengali: 
upazati and Bengali: tribal, where upazati stands for non-Bengali CHT populations, 
a generic social status of inferior people not up to the standard of the nation; and the 
‘tribal’ is the forest dwelling ‘primitive’ people. The relationships between the two 
are often of a binary kind. This forms the basis of hierarchies in terms of political 
domination. The interlocked destinies of Bengali and upazati are inscribed in texts 
and in the history of Bangladesh. In the following paragraphs, I offer an analysis of 
the term with its wider meaning and implications.
In Bangladesh, the term upazati is an officially designated category to refer to 
collectively diverse ethnic peoples in the CHT. In recent times, since the birth of the 
Bangladesh nation state in 1971, the notion of upazati has been at the centre of the 
debate among the hill people of the CHT and the state in the context of ‘state-tribal’
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or ‘Bengali-tribal’ relationships. The contemporary process of Pahari mobilisation 
in CHT has added a new dimension to this debate. In order to understand the 
dynamics of official discourse and the nature of the collective identity making 
process in the CHT, the term upazati requires a discussion from both an ideological 
and empirical point of view highlighting the ways in which it operates in both 
mental and in real situations on the ground.
The literary English translation of upazati is ‘sub-nation’. The term upazati is 
primarily derived from the Bengali word zati (nation), with the added prefix upa 
(sub). In Bengali, upa is only used as a prefix to designate something ‘subordinate’, 
‘under’, and so on. From the semantic point of view, it thus appears that the term 
denotes a hierarchical relationship when applied to the ideological level, for 
example, ‘high: low culture’, ‘nation: sub-nation’, etc, as far as official 
categorisations are concerned. Among mainstream Bengali culture and at the official 
level the word ‘tribal’ has been used as the English translation of upazati. The 
Bangla Academy’s most popular Bengali-English dictionary translates upazati as 
‘tribal’, a division of a nation, a set of people of common descent, a sub-caste".
Therefore, in the statist discourse, the replacement of ‘tribal’ by a category like the 
upazati is rather a social construction similar to other construction in South Asia. As 
discussed in Chapter One, the official categorisation of upazati has been heavily 
influenced by the literature produced by earlier ethnographers as well as 
contemporary historians and social scientists. F. G. Bailey’s (1960) book, entitled 
Tribe, Caste and Nation, is one of the examples of this genre which clearly sets out 
the agenda of classification. South Asian anthropology in particular has long been 
blamed for working on nation-tribe-caste models eventually reinforcing the statist 
advantage in manipulating the issue in later form state-tribal/upazati discourses 
(Spencer 1997). The post-colonial Bangladesh state is very much identical to the 
colonial construction, as it now even influences the public perception about ethnic 
minorities of CHT. There are not so many changes in perception and attitudes of 
dominant Bengali view towards upazati or ‘tribal’. Barrie Sharpe has critically 
explained the same reality in the Nigerian context, suggesting that “the state-tribal 
dichotomy is a historical construction, and as part of colonial mental map” (1986: 
58) examining both history and contemporary ethnography.
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Recently, however, a number of local writers in Bangladesh have also started 
questioning the statist discourse about the Bcngali-upazati relationship (Mahammad 
1997; Ball 1999; Mohsin 1997; Schendel 2000, 1996; Ahamed 1993, 2001). 
Drawing from cultural pluralist perspectives, they argue that upazati is an 
unsophisticated term to refer to the ethnic minority peoples of CHT. They argue that 
the way in which the term upazati is adopted in the constitution and in the official 
designation is, in fact, an extension of the colonial category of ‘tribal’, a simple 
replacement of the term. In the official classification the upazati are the “tribal 
people”; they are not up to the equivalence of nation like the Bengali. They suggest 
that the term upazati should be debunked from all legal, constitutional and official 
documents. This perspective emphasises that cultural pluralism should be the 
guiding principle of the Bangladesh state in order to accommodate other minority 
nationals with equal status in relation to the Bengali.
I do not intend to discuss the full details of this perspective within the purview of 
this study. However, I argue that it certainly opens up the debate around 
“citizenship” and “nationality” issues in Bangladesh, because the contradiction of 
the zati - upazati dichotomy partly lies in the very creation of the nation state of 
Bangladesh. In mainstream political history, the Bangladesh state and the Bengali 
nation are seen as intertwined, leaving no space for other minority nationals. For 
example, the 1972 constitution, the first constitution of Bangladesh, states that “all 
citizens of Bangladesh are Bengali” (1972:2). Non - Bengali inhabitants are not 
recognised in their own cultural right in this context, and are seen as ‘different’. This 
difference is a distinction between a mainstream Bengali population and the ‘tribal’ 
or upazati population. There is no recognition of ethnic plurality and equivalence 
between groups such as Bengali, Chakma and Marma etc. There is very little 
sophistication in the statist categorisation of upazati in relation to national identity 
(see Chapter One).
I agree with the cultural pluralist’s view in the sense that citizenship and nationality 
are two separate entities and should not be seen as equivalent to each other in the 
present political context. In Bangladesh, by definition, every person irrespective of 
language, religion and culture has an equal right to claim Bangladeshi citizenship by
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virtue of birth. Whereas a nation can be formed having common language, culture, 
religion, and so on, or there can be many nations within the same territory (Ahamed 
1993).
From this perspective, it can be argued that ethnic groups in the CHT should have 
similar rights to be considered as minority nationals like Bengali, whatever their size 
or culture may be. It is argued by many critics that the present nationalist view of the 
state has enormous implications for the socio-cultural relationship between different 
nationalities, leading to an antagonistic relation of dominant majority vs. minority 
(Mohsin 1997; Ball 1999; Mahammad 1997). The recent political history of 
Bangladesh suggests that present Bengali and Bangladeshi nationalism,141 by and 
large, has been the statist ideology in dealing with ethnic peoples in the CHT.
Thus, in recent political discourses, the term upazati has been a sensitive issue 
among the ethnic communities in the CHT. They reject the statist categorisation for 
its derogatory connotations. The other factors that have become crucial to 
understanding this discourse are the internationalisation of minority issues and the 
widespread activities of numerous national and international NGOs, which 
significantly shaped the cultural identity politics among marginalised people in 
peripheral regions like the CHT (see Hodgson 2002; Nicholas 2000; Kailash 1999; 
Winzeler 1997; Gray 1997). Awareness of ‘cultural identity’ has reinforced ethnic 
mobilisation and given it new meaning in terms of regionally, territoriality and 
cultural survival. Indigenousness, native lands rights, and autonomy all have 
emerged as the new idioms of identity politics.
In the CHT, ethnic political activists are now redefining their official designation of 
upazati from cultural pluralism that every ethnic group belongs to zati (nation), like 
the Bengali and have similar cultural background, a language, religion, history 
etc.142 There are now concerted campaigns across ethnic boundaries against the
141 At present there are two trends in the nationalist ideology prevalent in mainstream politics of 
Bangladesh. The first, Bengali nationalism emphasises Bengali language and culture as identity 
markers, and is mainly supported by liberal and left wing parties. On the other hand, Bangladeshi 
nationalism is based on territoriality, and is supported by right wing political parties.
142 In Bangladesh, the Bengali have always been characterised as nation rather than a cultural group, 
in contrast to the Bengalis in West Bengal, where Bengali are treated as a cultural group in the Indian 
context. The portrayal of Bengalis as nation is vivid in Bengali literature and history. For example the 
popular quotation that is often used by politicians, and academics alike: bangali zatir hitihash hazar 
bosorere itihash (The History of the Bengali nation is a thousand years old) justifying nationalist
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upazati categorisation. For the activists, it is not only a derogatory term, it also 
undermines their social and cultural status vis-a-vis the Bengalis. In Chapter Four I 
have discussed how TCI explicitly and implicitly challenges the statist 
categorisation through various programmes and activities. I argue that TCI response 
to statist discourse is an indirect resistance in the form of indigenous Pahari 
mobilisation.
Apart from institutional activities, there is also a growing sense of awareness about 
this discourse, particularly among the younger generations. The recently launched 
Pahari student forum for the hill students is a testimony to this.143 The students’ 
assertion of Pahari identity and their rejection of the upazati categorisation can 
largely be seen as a process of ethnic mobilisation.
The trend of Pahari politics gives a new dimension to sidXe-upazati relationship. As 
I mentioned earlier on, the notion of Pahari-ness is an embodiment of regionally, 
territoriality, and cultural separateness which as distinguishes people of the CHT. 
The assertion of Pahari identity displays a notion of a ‘united hill people’ as the sole 
guardian of the CHT lands. Pahari-ness has become the core of collective identity 
projects. The expression of Pahari-ness can be seen in a number of domains such as 
land and local politics. The Banderban puroshava election, which I will now 
proceed to analyse, is a political arena in which Pahari identity is explicitly 
revealed.
Pahari Identity and Banderban Puroshava Election
In the first part of this chapter, I have discussed various notions and processes for 
collective identity formation. I argue that processes of collective mobilisation in the 
CHT are only expressed in particular situations and events. The case of the 
Banderban puroshava election can be seen as an ‘event’ in which Pahari collective 
expression is played out in a vivid way. I will describe Banderban puroshava
ideology. Jonathan Spencer explains this discourse as "nationalist cultural production" in the 
Sinhalese political context. For Spencer, "nationalism is a style of political imagination". He argues 
that "a force in the politics of the past two centuries, nationalism has been a style of cultural 
production: there are nationalist writers, nationalist artists, nationalist composers, all of whom are 
concerned to uncover, create, protect, or restore the true culture of the nation" (Spencer 1990: 283).
1431 discussed this issue in detail in Chapter Four.
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election as an ethnographic example of this local level reality in which I personally 
engaged in. I argue that Pahari mobilisation is transformed into the politics of 
collective identity through events like election. The analysis of the Banderban 
puroshava election as a case of Pahari representation is thus significant for a 
number of reasons.
Firstly, for the first time in the CHT, the puroshava election is held in a manner of 
peace situation without any military interference or any kind of fear of being 
labelled as a collaborator by the PCJSS {Partyta Chattagram Jono Shonghati 
Samity, People’s United Society of CHT), for supporting the government. In the 
past, the PCJSS, since their armed conflict began against the Bangladesh army in 
1995, opposed participation of any military - backed elections.144 Recently the 
PCJSS has also openly emerged as the hill regional party in the electoral arena, with 
the specific agenda of autonomy. In this mere favourable political situation, it was 
possible to observe how the election process becomes the vehicle for broader-level 
Pahari mobilisation.
Secondly, in Bangladesh, it is widely viewed by many academics and media that 
lack of awareness about democratic political organisation among the ‘tribal’ people 
is one of the main reasons for their reluctant participation in the electoral process 
(Ahmed 1993; Mullick 2001). As a point of reference, they always justify their 
views on the basis of electoral turn-out in the CHT, which has always been recorded 
as the lowest in all previous national elections compared to the rest of Bangladesh. 
However, this perspective completely fails to address the most intriguing question of 
all: “why ‘tribal’ people feel discouraged in participating in mainstream political 
processes, such as elections?”
I argue that the degree of participation and willingness to engage in the electoral 
process depends on how the hill people view participation in terms of their own 
interests. Since the fall of the military regime in 1990, the restoration of democracy 
is considered to be successful as there have been three subsequent elections held
144
After the peace treaty signed in 1997 between the government of Bangladesh and the PCJSS. It is 
indeed visible that a relatively peaceful situations prevails in the CHT.
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under neutral caretaker governments in Bangladesh. During the military rule in the 
CHT, there was no true representation in the local institutions. Representation had 
never been decided through elections. The choice of representation had always been 
the central government’s affairs either through nomination, or selection. The local 
people were only expected to endorse the government’s proposal. They had never 
been consulted in a manner of open participation. The ways in which Pahari people 
engage in the electoral process is therefore of special interest considering the recent 
changes in local-national politics.
Considering these factors, the Banderban puroshava election turned out to be an 
“arena” or “political field” (Bailey 1960: 243). There has been a common realisation 
among the locals that if they act together as single Pahari collective, they would be 
a formidable political force against the Bengali. In other words, if they were able to 
win the puroshava election, they would not only control political power, but also be 
able to play a crucial role in benefiting Pahari at the local level. In this context, the 
election seen as a political arena, offers an opportunity for diverse ethnic groups to 
assert collective strength as Pahari. The Banderban puroshava (municipality) 
election, as I have witnessed it, became a process in which Pahari representation 
was seen as instrumental in the context of collective mobilisation against the Bengali 
candidate. Pahari-ness as political force, thus, can be seen as a manifestation of the 
politics of collective identity.
Before I present the Banderban puroshava election as an extensive ethnographic 
case study I wish to begin with a very brief discussion of the election culture in 
Bangladesh. This political outline, in a way, sets the background for the case study 
in the context of local-national level election and party politics.
The Nature of Election Culture: National vs. Local
The election culture on Bangladesh has always displayed elements of festivity, 
engagement and counter-engagement (boycott). Mukulika Baneijee (2003), in her 
recent study on democracy and electoral politics in India, observed a similar form of 
election culture in the villages of West Bengal. Indeed, festivity, mood and 
engagement in local level elections are somewhat different from those in national
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elections in Bangladesh. In theory, at least, there are structural differences between 
the local and national level elections.
In Bangladesh, the national election is held under the party system, similar to that of 
Western democratic systems, whereas the local election is considered to be a non- 
party election. In local elections, candidates officially contest as individuals 
(independent). They are sometimes supported by non-political socio-cultural 
organisations as far as election posters and other election related documents are 
concerned. The election symbols of different parties are not used in local elections, 
and this is meant to contribute to their non-partisan character. There are no official 
clarifications whatsoever why local elections should be treated as non-partisan in 
Bangladesh.
In reality, however, the local elections have never been held in a non-partisan 
manner. Candidates label themselves as party men in order to ensure their 
organisational support of the respective parties, and the local party leadership selects 
the candidature to contest the local level poll on behalf of the party organisation. 
Central and district level leaders actively participate in the campaigning process for 
the party candidates to win the elections. It is partly because central party leaders, 
such as MPs (members of parliament) of the respective constituencies rely heavily 
on their local support base, therefore supporting party candidates at the local level 
ultimately strengthens their own political stronghold in the area.
So, in theory, though local elections are characterised as non-party elections in 
practice, this is evidently not the case in Bangladesh. For example, even the national 
dailies publish full details of the election results, highlighting the strength of each 
particular party in a particular district on the basis of electoral performances (see 
Protom Alo September 23,1999). One can thus obviously say that non-partisan local 
election is a myth.
The Banderban puroshava election is not exceptional in that sense, but it has another 
dimension that seems typical to the CHT only. Party politics do matter here, but only 
at the surface level. Local politics in Banderban are divided on ethnic lines at the 
deeper level. Political activists very subtly balance the relationship and draw a line
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between party politics and ethnic politics. All the major political parties in 
Bangladesh, such as the Awami league (AL), Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), 
Jamate Islami (JI) and the Communist Party of Bangladesh (CPB), have their own 
organisational structures in Banderban, and their party politics are organised in 
accordance with their own respective ideological stances on local and national 
issues.
However, party ideology, democracy and issues of politics are become different 
matters altogether when it comes to selecting the leadership to represent the party. 
The hardcore element of ‘ethnic politics’ is central at the leadership level 
representing party organisation in Banderban. The top leaderships posts, especially 
the post of President and Secretary, are chosen from a negotiated framework of 
Bengali-Pa/wzn combination. For example, if the President is selected from among 
the Bengali, the obvious choice for the Secretary would be from the Pahari, 
irrespective of whether they are efficient for the post. The present Banderban 
puroshava chairman Ayub Chowdury is also the Secretary General of the puroshava 
unit of the ruling party (AL), is a Bengali, while the President, Prashanna 
Tanchanga, is a Pahari. These ethnic politics are expressed explicitly the political 
processes that take place in Banderban. The party politics and democratic 
representation all turned out to be the ‘politics of ethnicity’. The Banderban 
puroshava election exemplifies this picture.
Banderban Puroshava Election as Politics of Ethnicity
In early September 1999, as soon as the election commission in Dhaka announced 
the date of the local puroshava election throughout the country, local politics in 
Banderban accelerated in a significant manner. The news quickly engrossed every 
aspects of public life. In every public place, such as local tea stalls, the incoming 
puroshava poll emerged as the main subject of daily talk among people from all 
walks of life; ‘who is contesting for the post of chairman?’ ‘Who is supporting 
whom?’ The mood of everyday life in the Banderban puroshava area and to some 
extent even beyond, for example, nearby Upzilla Roangchari, was transformed like 
changes of the seasons, from winter to summer, from cold to hot.
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Almost immediately after the date announcement, local inhabitants of Madyam and 
Uzani para (villages) in Banderban, the two largest concentration of ethnic peoples, 
started to say that, this time they would not support a non -pahari candidate. Indeed 
some of them told me that “they would select a Pahari Sa (‘regional son’) to contest 
for the puroshava chairmanship. The phrase Pahari Sa is used in reference to a 
member of any ethnic community in the CHT other than the Bengali. The 
articulation of Pahari Sa (Sa means in Marma, son) mainly by political activists 
initially got a huge support across ethnic communities during the election.
Choosing Candidate as Pahari Sa
The PCJSS was initially reported as the driving force behind this campaign but later, 
other ethnic community leaders, such as Raiaglai Mru of the Mru community, Dr. 
William Lusia of the Lusia community and Anil Tanchanga of the Vomi Odikar 
Committee joined in this movement. It was agreed amongst them that the candidate 
would be selected under the banner of Pahari OkJca Parishad (The hill people unity 
forum). The carefully coined organisation name Pahari Okka Parishad was perhaps 
chosen to accommodate other political players such as Prashanna Tanchanga, (AL 
president), on the one hand, and more importantly to successfully unite all ethnic 
peoples in one platform.
The candidate selected for the puroshava election was a young timber merchant 
named Kessy Marma, a PCJSS supporter. Kessy’s popular support among the 
youths gave him an extra asset as the potential candidate over other older generation 
candidates. Kessy, in his 30s, is not completely new to the political scene in the 
CHT. During his student life, he was an active member of Pahari Chatra Parishod 
and is still proactive against the government policy and military oppression in the 
CHT. Kessy identifies himself as one of the distant grandsons of the Bhomang King 
Aungshey Pru Choudhury. However, some elderly Marma in Uzani para think that 
there is no direct kin relation between Kessy and the King’s family. Kessy’s 
business fortune, which allowed him to become an established timber merchant 
within a short period of time, is related to the influence of his ‘political uncle’ Zeri, 
the eldest son of the King.
291
Kessy’s selection as Pahari Okka Parishod candidate, however, surprised some of
the Marma elderly. For example, U Saw Nue’s father, ex-accountant of late
Bhomang chief, and his father in law, a retired officer of Kamafhully paper mill,
145both of whom said: “Kessy is too young for the post” and speculate that “he could
not even able to handle the tricky election politics of Ayub Chowdhury whose 
family they knew for long time being hostile to the Pahari ” (my own translation 
from Chittagonian dialect).
In contrast, however, this view was sharply rejected by the younger generations. The 
selection of Kessy as the chairman candidate for the puroshava election was 
enthusiastically received by the youths. Many youths like Mong Saw Nue, the 
younger brother of my host U Saw Nue, held a firm view that “Kessy maintains a 
good relation with local Pahari people and is supportive to youths’ welfare activities 
which earned him a very respectable image among the younger generation”. Kessy’s 
political distance from mainstream politics such as AL/BNP was also considered 
another positive criteria that enabled him to become the champion of Pahari people.
Other youths also said that, in the past, they had never seen a situation where both 
young and elderly people of all ethnic groups unitedly supported a single Pahari 
candidate: “this time Tanchanga youth under Nilla Don Tanchanga, Bawm youth 
under Dr. William are all campaigning for Kessy and everybody’s feeling like 
Pahari ”. Rather, they wanted to project the popular support of Kessy as a common 
ethno-nationalistic feeling of Pahari-ness across the ethnic boundary. Dr. William 
Lusia, a local physician and one of the key members of the Pahari Okka Parishad, 
justified the participation in a Puroshava election of a Pahari candidate as part of 
the need “to demonstrate the capacity of indigenous collectivities as a practical 
alternative to ethnic development”. In this context, Pahari representation can be 
seen as an opportunity to consolidate local power in the process of collective 
mobilisation.
1451 knew him quite well, partly because during my stay in Banderban I lived with these families for 
a significant amount of time.
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Pahari Okka Parishad: a Multi-ethnic Organisation
As part of the election strategy, in order to have a common platform, a new 
organisation called Pahari Okka Parishad (Hill People Unity Forum) was launched 
with a multi-ethnic steering committee having representatives of different ethnic 
groups, such as Tanchanga, Bawm and Mru. Marma lead the committee. The name 
of the organisation itself is an inclusionary formula cutting across the ethnic barriers 
of different groups. The strategy of uniting different ethnic groups under one banner 
has been an overt expression of collective mobilisation against the Bengali. Thus, 
the formation of the Pahari Okka Parishad with a multi-ethnic steering committee 
can be seen as an example of the public display of collective identity.
Election Agenda: Throughout the election campaign, Pahari Okka Porishad chose 
to pursue a pvo-Pahari line. In some of the public rallies Okka Parishad leaders 
were highly critical of the government’s policy, particularly the khas land lease. 
Kessy himself took up the issues that related to local people’s concerns, such as the 
recognition of the Pahari as deprived peoples in order to receive free services from 
puroshava. He also raised some domestic issues such as the importance of constant 
electric and water supply, and the development of a sewerage system in Madyam 
and Uzani para. The most attractive package he offered was to a minimum holding 
tax for the Pahari on the basis of earnings, which pleased most of the ethnic 
communities but irritated local administration and the Bengali. The election agenda 
in fact set the basis for broader Pahari mobilisation.
Election Slogan: The Okka Porishad has also been very selective in the use of 
language for election campaigns. Most noticeably, they selected catchy slogans in 
order to make common interests among the ethnic communities in CHT more 
apparent. For example, one of these self-asserting slogans was Amara shobi pahari, 
pahar moder gor bari (we are all hill people and the hills are our home and 
homeland). Put in this context, pahar symbolises the special distinction of territorial 
and cultural boundary between Pahari and Bengali people, and highlights the only 
authentic home and place for the Pahari. In this process, “we” implies the political 
unity of heterogeneous ethnicities, and the CHT appear to be the territory of Pahari, 
seen as cultural area and destiny. Their unique lifestyle in CHT has become part of
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their pride and sense of belonging, which as understood by them, necessarily refutes 
cultural diversity among them. “We” also relates politics of CHT land, signifying 
their rights and access to it.
This gives a sense of their collective distinctiveness in relation to the non-Pahari, 
who are Bengali (for obvious reasons), and their collective bond can be seen as 
being attached to the CHT hills. Attachment to CHT land has been symbolised as the 
most important aspect of their collective cultural identity. Others are important too, 
but only meaningful within the context of inner level interactions of particular 
groups. Of course, the Okka Parishad may have politically chosen this kind of 
rhetorical strategy to win the hearts and minds of ethnic voters but it has, 
nonetheless, had profound impact on creating a common identity against Bengali, 
which is vividly expressed in the election results.
Figure 12 Pahari Okka Parishod 
procession during puroshova election
Campaigning Process: Throughout the campaign, Kessy was projected as Pahari 
candidate {Pahari Sa) by Okka Parishad, rather than as a Marma. It was rather 
easier for them to label Kessy as a Marma candidate, because in the Banderban
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puroshava area Marma population itself form about 80-85% out of total ethnic 
population. But labelling Kessy as a Marma candidate could lead to a situation in 
which other 10% ethnic voters might feel that they have been left out and ignored. 
Despite small numbers, it was still crucially important for Okka Parishad to ensure 
full support from other ethnic communities. Pahari Okka Parishad emphasise that 
although, numerically the Marma are the dominant group among ethnic 
communities, they could not achieve anything without united efforts.
The other reason to establish the Okka Parishad was that if Kessy was portrayed as 
the Marma candidate, there would have been a possibility for the AL candidate to 
manipulate others as non-Marma voters. Okka Parishad envisaged that Pahari 
politics should emphasise multi-ethnic factor because of the population composition. 
Only with multi-ethnic support could a local Pahari candidate have a chance to win. 
So, strategically, choosing the phrase Pahari Sa would not only satisfy all ethnic 
groups as ‘common people with common aspirations’, it would also cut-cross the 
internal ethnic boundary by emphasising ‘shared socio-cultural feelings’.
The point whether Pahari mobilisation is an elite construction remains to be 
discussed. I would argue that the articulation of Pahari Sa by Okka Parishad is in 
fact a political construction. It emerged as a form of ‘umbrella politics’ between 
ethnic groups in the CHT but, in many ways, it is inspired by ordinary local voices. 
There are significant ordinary responses to this construction, and I will discuss this 
further on. I suggest that the construction of Pahari Sa can be seen as a 
‘negotiational identity’ transcending all kinds of local voices. As an example, local 
AL president Prashanna Tanchanga’s reservation toward Ayub Chowdhury 
(chairman candidate), and the PCJSS frustration with the AL policy all became 
motives for unification. The selection of Kessy as Pahari sa not only satisfied 
political activists but also inspired ordinary people, by heightening their everyday 
frustrations towards Bengalis and state policies.
Collective local responses to this Pahari mobilisation thus come from the fact that, 
if Pahari did not unite it would have been difficult for them to retain their rights in 
the face of Bengali domination. They feared losing their land rights as well as their 
cultural identity. Thus ‘fear’ and an ‘aspiration to the future’ were intertwined in
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choosing a Pahari Sa in order to create a stronger unity. As for the Pahari Okka 
Parishad, it was an effective mechanism to unite all ethnic communities. The 
construction of Pahari Sa is, in fact, the symbolic expression of this process. The 
selection of a ‘regional son’ as the candidate in Banderban puroshava election 
provides a new alternative path to assert indigenous representation in the process of 
ethnic mobilisation.
The Other Side of the Story
Ayub Chowdhury had been in the post of Banderban puroshava chairman for the 
last five years. He had previously been elected as an opposition candidate under the 
BNP government in 1994.146 Local people told me that Ayub Chowdhury’s winning 
asset in the previous election against the ruling party candidate was the full support 
from local Pahari people.147 In the previous election, Ayub Chowdury’s candidature 
as an AL man was thought to be what won the party the election. Indeed it is partly 
true that, among the mainstream political parties in Bangladesh, the AL’s image has 
to a large extent been seen as sympathetic to the Pahari people’s cause. Since the 
1991 general election, the AL has been committed to having a political solution of 
the CHT conflict.148 This is perhaps one of the main reasons why the then 
underground PCJSS and ordinary Pahari people overwhelmingly supported the AL 
in all previous elections.
However, departing from the party image, Ayub Chowdury has largely seen as a 
controversial for his dubious role in dealing with the Pahari in Banderban. The local 
Marmas of Madyam and Uzani para offered some reasons as to why they rejected 
him; they called him “a man of nepotism” and showed a lack of interests on the 
welfare of the Pahari (my own translation). They also blamed him for harbouring 
Bengali communal feelings towards the Pahari. Many believe that in the 1995 riot,
146 The BNP have now back to power again in the 2001 general election, after being the main force of 
opposition since 1996.
I am using the word Pahari here to refer to all ethnic communities residing in the Banderban 
puroshava area.
148 See the 1991 AL election manifesto; It is also worth to mentioning here that, in 1997, during AL’s 
tenure a historic peace treaty was signed between the government of Bangladesh and the PCJSS, 
ending two decades of bloody conflict in the CHT.
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when many Pahari houses were burnt down in the Uzani and Madyam para, as a 
chairman he in fact did very little, but instead favoured fellow Bengali activist.
There was much mistrust regarding Ayub Chowdhury’s leadership on the part of the 
Pahari people in Banderban. Local Pahari AL supporters were not happy either 
because they thought that he treated the local puroshava office as if his personal 
firm, and accused him of abusing the power given to him for his own interests. 
Seeing the selection process, even within the party circles, there was growing 
resentment about the fact that he would be renewing his candidacy for another term. 
A large number of local AL leaders, including AL president Prashannna Tanchanga, 
begun to oppose his selection further. Many new faces, mainly Bengali 
businessmen, were openly showing their interest to contest in the election.
Nevertheless, local level AL leadership, in spite of hostile criticism from inside
party circles finally decided to propose the incumbent chairman Ayub Chowdhury as
their candidate again, invoking what they called ‘for strategic reasons’. There was,
however, another rebel candidate from the AL who eventually submitted the
nomination paper after failing to get the party ticket, but was finally disqualified
149because his nomination paper was rejected as a “defaulter” case. Hardcore 
supporters of Ayub Chowdhury, however, argue that the reason Chowdhury was 
chosen for another term was because he had the potential and strength to mobilise all 
Bengali voters across party lines. It is not difficult to understand what so-called 
‘strategic selection’ measure: it was to target the ‘Bengali vote bank through 
politicisation of Bengali ethnicity’.
It is noteworthy to mention here that all major political parties boycotted the 1999 
local elections countrywide, though some of their members contesting as 
independent candidates. In Banderban there were no such candidates against Ayub 
Chowdhury. Surprisingly, all political parties, such as the BNP, CPB, and the 
Islamic fundamentalist Jamate Islami, were unofficially united to support Ayub 
Chowdhury as the Bengali candidate.
149 According to election regulations, one must submit a bank certificate of non-loan defaulter along 
with the nomination paper. However, this, sometimes, has been used as political tool to disqualify 
candidates.
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Set against the broader backdrop ‘Bengali politics’, the enthusiasm supporting the 
candidature of AL candidate Ayub Chowdhury was phenomenal. Almost everyday 
there were rallies; there were slogans and house campaigns as the polling date 
approached. Some central ministers, the Chittagong City Corporation Mayor and 
prominent AL leaders visited Banderban at different times during election. During 
the election campaign, people were saying that “Banderban became the mini 
capital”. According to the election commission code of conduct government, VIP 
(very important person) officials are barred from participating in any sort of election 
campaigns. However, ministerial visits were made in the name of CHT official 
tours, and several public rallies were organised in order to seek support from the 
Pahari. There were many election projection meetings held in Uzani para and 
Madyam para. Along with Ayub Choudhury, the CHT minister, who, incidentally, is 
a Chakma recently selected by the AL, promised to increases the CHT hill’s 
allowances for government employees, and to effect substantial improvements in 
access to safe drinking water and sewerage system in the area after the election.
Figure 13 Ayub Chowdhury’s election meeting with a minister’s visit
During the minister’s visits, government officials and especially the DC (deputy 
commissioner) office organised different consultation meetings with the residents in 
different wards of Banderban puroshava, in the name of local problems. However,
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local Marma people in Uzani para, whom I talked to, claimed that this was all part of 
the campaign for Ayub Chowdhury. In the Bazar area, particularly at night, I saw 
movies and various entertainments provided to different youth clubs as part of the 
campaign. A number of youth clubs mushroomed overnight in order to take 
advantage of the election season in Banderban. Another feature was the distribution 
of all types of gifts, for example cash money and saris for the female voters. There 
were also promises to build roads and other forms of infrastructure in the area.
There is no doubt that the politics of development played an important factor that 
helped the AL candidate perform well among the Bengali community. During the 
election campaign issues linked to the ‘politics of development’ were included quite 
successfully by the AL candidate as part of their central election message. Under the 
pretext of development, large amounts of state funds were commissioned for 
development projects or disbursed before and during the election in order to ensure 
support from voters, largely Bengali voters. This form of ‘money politics’ or 
‘politics of patronage’ was widely used in the Banderban puroshava election in 
order to ensure full support for the ruling party candidate.
The entire campaigning process behind the puroshava election thus appeared to be 
about Bengali vs. Pahari rather than the AL winning over an independent candidate, 
which was mostly a common feature throughout the country during the 1999 local 
election. The Okka Parishad candidate, Kessy, appeared to be the candidate for the 
Pahari people, while the AL candidate represented the Bengalis. The Puroshava 
election had become a stage for each group to demonstrate its ethnic identity.
The Banderban puroshava election therefore became a part of broader process of 
identity-making, which can be characterised as a process of ethnic mobilisation. The 
election process was largely been informed by ethnicity. The ethnic card of the 
Pahari and Bengali played the anchor role throughout the Banderban puroshava 
election. A collective Pahari ethnicity was explicitly expressed among ethnic groups 
in Banderban. On the other hand, Bengali hegemonic counter-identity was also seen 
at work in the response to Pahari constructions.
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Identity Making, Voices of Cultural Difference: Some Inside Stories
In order to give ordinary voices, both Pahari and Bengali, a fair hearing, and to get a 
rounded picture of the Banderban puroshava election, I conducted some informal 
interviews aside from my routine observation of the event. During the election 
period, I spent much time in the Madyam and Uzani para, the two areas most with 
the highest concentration of Pahari, talking to local peoples and participating in 
many election related activities. I also frequently visited the Barishal para, one of the 
Bengali settlements in Banderban.
One of the things which motivated me to get some inside views about the puroshava 
election, was that, although I could see lot of election related events in public places 
such as tea stalls and Bazar areas, I felt that most of these activities only involved 
political activists. Ordinary voices were not heard in this public arena, and women in 
particular were invisible. Therefore, my intention was to assess how ordinary 
people, in general, reacted to this election process as whole.
Talking to a cross section of peoples in Madyam para, Uzani para and Barishal para, 
I came across a revealing manifestation of ‘political ethnicity’ based on the cultural 
differences between Pahari and Bengali. My impression was that both ordinary 
Pahari and Bengali chose their candidates not by virtue of political consciousness, 
rather under the influences of relatives, local political leaders and also with respect 
of cultural affinity. The narrative accounts of Usi Mong Marina, Hara Don 
Tanchanga, Lila Mru, Thing Ley Bawm, Mariam Bibi and Mugib Contractor may 
tell us more appropriately about this phenomenon.
Madyam Para and Uzani Para
Despite popular support from all ethnic communities in Madyam para and Uzani 
para, there were individuals who had some reservations or even opposition to 
Kessy’s candidature. As I mentioned earlier, U Saw Nue’s father-in-law refused to 
join Kessy’s campaign, but also did not support the AL candidate. However, 
opposition from anyone within the ethnic community had been severely dealt with. 
They had been labelled as betrayers and anti -Pahari elements, and blamed for taking
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bribes from the other side. During election time, U Saw Nue’s father-in-law had had 
to face social harassment: stones were thrown on his tin roof at night, and members 
of his family were verbally abused and physically threatened. However, many 
people in Madyam and Uzani para thought that U Saw Nue’s father-in-law deserved 
harassment and considered it legitimate because he had received cash money from 
Ayub Chowdhury for anti-Pahari activities. In Madyam and Uzani para, the election 
process became the element of Pahari identity making, whereas anything said 
against Kessy or the Pahari Sa was considered anti-Pahari.
I also encountered another dimension to Pahari participation in the Madyam and 
Uzani para. There were some local Marmas, who worked for the government and the 
municipality office, who were seen to be working for Ayub Chowdhury. I talked 
with Usi Mong Marma, a junior level officer at the DC office, who was given the 
responsibility to distribute polling cards in Uzani and Maydam para for Ayub 
Chowdhury. I asked him why he was working for Ayub Chowdhury instead of a 
Pahari candidate. He replied,
Whether I support Ayub Chowdhury or not our activities as Pahari would be 
scrutinised after the election if the AL candidate failed to win. There would 
be lots of issues raised against the Pahari employees and our jobs might be 
hampered in several ways, (inserted from interview transcripts: Usi Mong 
Marma).
What Usi Mong Marma tells us here is that whatever they perform publicly for the 
sake of mundane needs, at heart they are all Pahari. In his approach, the notion 
‘ours’ translates as Pahari solidarity rather than his personal interests. Throughout 
the election campaign, many known faces like Usi Mong Marma were reluctant to 
participate in Okka Parishad activities openly because they feared negative 
consequences after the election for example losing jobs, government contracts etc. 
Although I found that strategically, they had all decided not to show up publicly, in 
practice, they extended their support to Kessy undercover. On the election day, I 
discovered that Usi Mong Marma was very active in Madyam para’s polling centre, 
helping Pahari women voters by showing them where to stamp on Kessy’s election 
symbol on the ballot paper.
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Apart from government employees, I also tried to investigate what Pahari-ness 
meant to the ordinary people. Was Pahari mobilisation only a political construction 
for election by politicians? How was Pahari-ness expressed in everyday situations? 
The following are some selected interviews with reasonably edited versions.
Niru Chakma (an NGO health worker): Ami Kessy ke Poshada Kori na baikti 
gotebhabe, kintu ami okka parishod ar dharona poshnda kori, tara pahari 
shomaoyshaer kata bayshe ai zonna take vote debo (I don’t like Kessy personally, 
but I like Okka Parishod’s idea; they are speaking for Pahari problem; that is why I 
vote for him.)
Mayma Sing Marma (woman shopkeeper): Amra Anek harisi, Amra Mano shobi akk 
hoe, Amara pahare shobi pahari, abar Pahari Sa hobo, (We lost everything; we are 
all united now; we are Pahari in the hills; this time our Pahari Sa will win.)
Haradon Tanchanga (A day labourer): Ami tu shob shomai Auami legue ke vote disi, 
kinto tara shob shomai bangali ke dheke, kessy tu hegar heleo pahari bhai, bi pode 
pahse darabe. (I always voted for AL but they always favour Bengali; after all 
Kessy Pahari brother, he will stand by us in a crisis)
Tinkh La Bawm (farmer): Ami rajniti boji na; Okka parishod amogo mono koise ak 
hote, ek hole amago ziga onnara nite parbe na; Kessy hole ameder shommoshar 
somada hobe, he is pahai sa; amago pahar military dokhle gabe na (I don’t 
understand politics; Okka parishod said to us, we have to be united, if we are united 
nobody can take our land, the military can not acquire our hills; Kessy will see our 
problem; he is a Pahari sa.)
Lila Mru (a school teacher): Pahari der para keno shodo shommysha; cele der 
prikkar shomaio light pahi na, cerag galate hai, Kessy tu amader pahari shomadan 
zane (Why are all problems in the Pahari area; we don’t get electricity during 
children’s exam time, we support Kessy, he understands Pahari problems.)
For them, the meaning of Pahari-ness may be different from how it is defined by the 
TCI cultural officer, political activist K S Mong, or Okka Parishod member Dr. 
William Lusia, but they also voice Pahari-ness in a different way. Their expression 
of Pahari-ness rather comes from everyday problems. They also share the same 
feelings of deprivation and marginalisation by the Bengali. In the Madyam and 
Uzani para, these ordinary voices translate into a spontaneous feeling of Pahari-ness 
against the Bengali. Thus, Pahari ethnicity only makes sense in a particular 
situation, if there is a comparison made with the Bengali. Pahari ethnicity gains 
substance through ethnic mobilisation in the election. The expression of this process 
can only be seen in the context of a relative to the Bengali ‘other’.
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Barishal Para
Barishal para is one of the Bengali migrants’ settlements in the Banderban 
puroshava area. The Barishal para is named after the Barishal district from which 
many of the present inhabitants have migrated. By naming the Barishal para, people 
of this village keep their district identity as a way to remember their ancestral home 
district. However, for the Pahari people in Banderban, the Barishal para symbolises 
the ‘government Bengali settlement program’ in the heart of CHT land. The Brishal 
para is located at the south side of Banderban puroshava area, close to the bus 
station at Banderban’s entry point.
Mariam Bibi’s family is one of the oldest families of settlers in the Barishal para. 
Mariam Bibi came to Banderban along with some other twenty families from the 
same area in 1980 under General Zia’s bhomiheen (landless people) settlement 
programme in the CHT (See Roy 1997, for Bengali settlement programme). Mariam 
Bibi (50), a widow of two sons, live with her eldest son, who is a rickshaw puller. 
Mariam Bibi’s main job is to look after two grandchildren, but she also does some 
handicraft work when she has a free time. Her husband died two years later when 
they moved to Banderban from the Brishal district.
I wanted to know whether Mariam Bibi was aware of the upcoming Banderban 
puroshava election. I asked her whether she would be going to the polling centre. 
She replied quite firmly, “I will definitely vote; if I don’t vote, the Pahari will win”. 
I was initially surprised about her sharp reaction. Mariam Bibi had a clear 
understanding of why she wanted to vote. However, it seemed to me that this was 
not entirely a firm belief that she should exercise her voting rights, but rather an 
ethnic sentiment deeply rooted in the social condition of the Bengali settlers in the 
CHT. I was further surprised when Mariam Bibi explained to me “I support 
dhanershiss (a paddy - the election symbol of BNP) but this time, I would vote for 
nouka (a boat - the AL’s election symbol)”.150
150 "Paddy" and "Boat" are the arch-rival election symbols of two main political parties, the BNP and 
the AL. These two political parties by and large control mainstream ’Bangladeshi’ or ’Bengali’ 
politics. Ideologically, they also represent two polarised views: central liberalism and the right wing. 
Though both claim to be nationalist, one emphasises "Bengali nationalism" based on language and
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It was sensible for Mariam Bibi to say that the ‘settlers Bengali* were supporters of 
dhanershiss because the BNP had brought them to the CHT, and awarded them so- 
called khas lands to settle in. I already knew that, by that time, the Barishal para was 
the BNP stronghold in Banderban. However, she really surprised me by saying that 
she would be supporting nouka, which she did not like in the first place. 
Interestingly, she was not even aware of the Ayub Chowdhury‘s election symbol in 
the puroshava poll151 but she knew Ayub Chowdhury as an AL man, so that election 
symbol would obviously be nouka. When I asked Mariam Bibi why she wanted to 
vote for nooaka, she explained:
jodi pahari zite tobe amogo shobere khedia dibo. eta amago kortobo 
bangalire bhot dya (If Pahari wins they will kick us from here, it is now our 
duty to vote for Bengali).
Mariam Bibi‘s account suggests that support for Ayub Chowdhury was not entirely 
motivated by democratic obligations, but that her participation in the puroshava 
election is rather a result of Bengali settlers politics against the Pahari. Mariam Bibi 
is clearly demarcating an ethnic line and creating boundary between the Bengali and 
Pahari. For Mariam Bibi, the puroshava election is more than a way of expressing 
Bengali identity. Mariam Bibi‘s expression of Bengali-ness is not simply limited to 
election politics, it is deeply rooted in the recurrent politics of CHT land and Bengali 
settlement/migration. My personal engagement with Mogib Contractor further 
exemplifies how the Bengali construction of politicised identity challenges the 
Pahari construction.
Mogib Contractor, the secretary of the BNP - backed pribhan sromick union 
(transport labour union), is a key figure in the Barishal para. He virtually controls 
every aspect of political and social affairs in the village. Mogib Contractor is known 
to be the wealthiest and most politically influential person in the village. A big brick 
house with a tin roof and a huge compound symbolises Mogib Contractor's
culture, the other asserts "Bangladeshi nationalism" based on territoriality and a majority religion, 
Islam. In rural Bangladesh, their politics are valued on the basis of traditional election symbol more 
than ideology, individual leadership and so on. People are familiar with these party politics through 
election symbols. During election time, there are different parody/slogan coined in the name of 
election symbols. These two parties are largely signified with their election symbols.
151 Which is an umbrella by the way.
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prominence in the village. Outside the Barishal para, however, people have different 
stories about Mogib Contractor’s wealth and power. A popular one is that Mogib 
Contractor symbolically uses the name “Contractor” (meaning bus ticket-checker in 
Bengali literary sense) as if was his personal name, but that in reality, he uses it 
intentionally to rouse the sympathy of transport workers. In the voter list, Mogib 
Contractor is officially registered as Mogibur Rahman, and he has never worked in 
transport sector. Since his childhood, Mogib Contractor has been involved in BNP- 
backed workers politics in the bus station area, and eventually became a controller 
of the area, locally called chandabaz (toll collectors in Bengali).
Mogib Contractor has no visible source of income, but most of his income is 
believed to be come from transport donations (tolls). These ‘donations’, however, 
are made in the name of the workers union. However, these ‘donations’ are not 
voluntarily given. Mogib Contractor maintains a strong network of cadres who are 
responsible for collecting an already fixed amount of ‘donations’ from all kinds of 
transports. Bus and truck owners associations are increasingly furious about this but 
seem to be incapacitated in the hands of chandabaz. The owner of the porobi bus 
service, Shanti Dey, the only local bus owner in Banderban, said, with utter 
dissatisfaction “these are not donations, these are tolls”. I have learnt that trucks with 
heavy logs are the main targets of Mogib Contractor’s ‘donations service’ 
amounting about Tk. 200-300 per truck, followed by daily passenger buses and mini 
buses at Tk. 50 and 25 per trip respectively.
Mogib Contractor spends a substantial amount of these donations for his cadres and 
followers in order to keep his supreme authority over the ‘donation business’ by 
controlling the important bus station area. The local police department is another 
potential partner of Mogib Contractor’s ‘donation business’ as they regularly receive 
monthly fixed payments for their honest and sincere co-operation for non-action 
against illegal toll collection. Mogib Contractor’s wealth and influence have allowed 
him to become an influential political figure in Banderban.
In recent times, especially following the peace treaty, Mogib Contractor has 
emerged as a very popular politician among the ‘settler’s Bengali’ in Banderban and 
elsewhere in the CHT for his anti-peace treaty campaign. During my fieldwork in
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1999-2000,1 have seen Mogib Contractor organise a number of anti-peace 
demonstrations mainly mobilising ‘settlers Bengali’ under the banner of Bengali 
Shongram Parishod (Bengali United Movement) to challenge the Pahari. Mogib 
Contractor’s active involvement with the Bengali Shongram Parishod allowed him 
to become a key player in the politics of Bangali-Adi-Bangali.
It is noteworthy to mention that although, in the broader sense, the category Bengali 
represents the opposite pole to the Pahari in everyday life, in the CHT, after the 
peace treaty, there has been a new development in Pahari politics in terms of 
defining Bengaliness. The PCJSS leadership now put forward a different definition 
of Bengaliness on the basis of settlement history. Adi Bangali (original Bengali), 
who migrated to the CHT before 1947 (before partition) are considered acceptable to 
the Pahari, because as they claim, there were no major conflicts between Bengali 
and Pahari. On the other hand, settler Bangali who came to the CHT under military 
sponsored population transfer programmes, especially after 1971, are not considered 
to be accommodated in the CHT. This has already proven to be the worst episode in
1 5 2an ever-deteriorating Pahari-Bengali relationship in the CHT.
In recent times, this debate has generated a widespread tension among the ‘Bengali 
settlers’. After the peace treaty there has been a growing sense that the ‘Bengali 
settlers’ would be rehabilitated outside the CHT. In August 1999, a news item was 
published in a daily newspaper reporting that “donor countries are willing to help 
Bangladesh to rehabilitate Bengali settlers elsewhere outside the CHT” (Daily 
Protom Alo, 16 August 2000).
In Banderban, Mogib Contractor immediately seized upon the news item as the issue 
of ‘settlers’ mobilisation to denounce the proposed rehabilitation plan. In a hurried 
organised protest rally at the front gate of the DC office, activists of Bengali 
Shongram Parishod chanted slogans such as settlers bangali mani na, bangalider 
bebhed nhai (we don’t agree with Bengali settlers, there is no difference among the 
Bengalis). Mogib Contractor’s protest rally was largely orchestrated to mobilise 
greater Bengali unity against the Pahari. During the Banderban puroshava election,
152 This information is collected from talking to many local PCJSS leaders such as K. S. Mong.
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‘settler’s issue was repeatedly intertwined in the construction of Bengali-ness 
against the Pahari.
I met Mogib Contractor personally on a few occasions but never had any 
opportunity to talk to him privately as he was always surrounded by his followers. 
During the election period, I decided to talk to Mogib Contractor to have a fuller 
picture of how Bengali settlers’ leader like him viewed the puroshava election. I 
chose to interview Mogib Contractor at his home rather than in a public place. It was 
midday, the ideal time to catch someone when they come home for lunch. Indeed, 
when I reached Mogib Contractor’s house at Barishal para he was having lunch. I 
was cordially welcomed to have lunch with the phrase apne to amader atiti (you are 
our guest in Banderban).
Initially, when I started to talk about the general political situation in Banderban, 
Mogib Contractor was a little formal because his understanding of my presence in 
Banderban was rather limited to being in the university. When I explained to him the 
purpose of my research in anthropology and reason to stay in Banderban, he seemed 
to portray himself as an ‘objective politician’. I asked him why he, as a BNP leader, 
had joined the AL candidate in Banderban, while other political parities and the 
BNP were boycotting the local puroshava election everywhere else in Bangladesh.
Mogib Contractor cleverly replied,
Politically I support BNP’s stand not to join in any election under the AL 
government. But I think it is dangerous in CHT. Politics is different here. 
Besides party politics, there is another politics here Pahari vs Bengali. If 
BNP strongly resist Banderban puroshava poll, the Pahari candidate will 
win. We don’t want to make this happen. So, politically we are not 
contesting but encouraging people to cast their votes. (My translation from 
Bengali transcripts).
What Mogib Contractor tells us here is that party politics is one thing but that, in the 
CHT everything else revolves around the politics of Pahari vs. Bengali. On the 
election day, I noticed Mogib Contractor standing right outside the Bazar polling 
centre with Ayub Chowdhury’s election symbol umbrella stuck on his shirt asking 
election workers to bring women voters in the centre. In fact, Mogib Contractor was
307
Ayub Chowdhury’s official election agent in the Barishal para: he was responsible 
for distributing the burkha (Muslim women’s black veil covering the body and face), 
and arranging rickshaws to bring them to the polling centre. Some local people told 
me that Mogib Contractor was given handsome money to mobilise Bengali voters in 
Barishal para.
Nonetheless, Mogib Contractor’s account tell us that his expression of Bengali-ness 
and support of Ayub Chowdhury was more than just electoral support (for money), 
that it was directly related to Bengali settler issues. Thus, Mariam Bibi’s enthusiasm 
for nouka, is not different from Mogib Contractor’s support to Ayub Chowdhry. For 
both Mariam Bibi and Mogib Contractor, Bengali Ayub Chowdhury’s political 
power at the local level was more important than the party identity. Because they 
needed Ayub Chowdhury’s support with regard to settlers issues. Other things had 
become less important for them, at least in this time of election.
I also talked to some other ordinary Bengali, such as shop owners, rickshaw pullers 
etc. Some of them did not even like AL but would vote for Ayub Chowdhury.
Anisur Rahman (a rickshaw puller) said to me that “why do we vote for Mog (a 
derogatory term spoken by local Bengali for Marma. Ayub Chowdhury gave my son 
a job as a cleaner in municipality office”.
Primal Datta, (a shop-keeper) “I would vote for Chowdhury because my business 
would be saved under his chairmanship; I don’t have to fear closing my shop here”.
All these voices, whether that of the Bengali ‘settlers’ such as Mariam Bibi, of 
politician Mogib Contractor, or of the ordinary rickshaw puller express different 
reasons to support Ayub Chowdhury, but all express one common interest. Kessy is 
Mog, and Pahari, while Ayub Chowdhury is Bengali. The Banderban puroshava 
election is a clear manifestation of ‘ethnic politics’ rather than an ‘electoral politics’ 
in which a collective Pahari identity emerged to challenge the dominant Bengali. At 
the same time, in response, the Bengali, through electoral alliance, counter­
challenged the Pahari discourse. The voting results were the direct reflection of this 
politics of ethnic mobilisation.
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Analysing Results, Analysing Ethnicity
In a recent article, Mukulika Baneijee (2003) described how, in West Bengal 
villages, people would hate politicians and the way in which recent political trend 
has engulfed every aspect of village life, but would still overwhelmingly participate 
in the election process with a strong sense of moral obligation. This kind of political 
reality is almost identical elsewhere in Bangladesh but in the CHT, people, both 
Pahari and Bengali, have a clear rationale to explain why should they be voting. It 
is, by and large, not the democratic value of moral obligation that impels their 
enthusiasm and generates overwhelming participation. It is, rather, a ‘politicised 
ethnicity’ which provides, and to some extent even dictates, a sense of obligation to 
act as Pahari or Bengali for greater political gain. Both Bengali and Pahari 
ethnicity, as a politico-ideological tools, provided the basis for high voter turnout in 
the Banderban puroshava election.
As I mentioned earlier, in the case of the Pahari, the level of participation in the 
electoral process largely depends on how much voters engage in it with their own 
interests. My experience of the Banderban puroshava election, and also of the 
results data demonstrate a reverse rationale to Pahari participation, a rationale which 
is generally thought to be “negative” to the mainstream political process.
Large-scale voters’ turnout marks the polling process as significant as any other 
elections in Bangladesh. My understanding is that the way in which local ethnic 
people in the Maydam and Uzani para have voted in such numbers for the Okka 
Parishod candidate, exhibited a united voice of ‘cultural otherness’. High turn out 
and participation in the puroshava election can thus be seen as a collective 
mobilisation of Pahari-ness. For them, despite all its shortcomings, the election is an 
effective alternative arena through which their political opinion can be expressed as 
a collective voice. The overwhelming support for Kessy was largely been 
orchestrated in the process of Pahari mobilisation.
In a changed political situation, and with the emergence of the regional political 
party PCJSS, the importance of Pahari representation in electoral politics has 
significantly shaped local politics. K S Mong Marma, a PCJSS leader, holds that
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In the past, people never felt wholeheartedly to cast their votes; sometimes 
they were pressured by government and military personals. An abnormal 
percentage of polling results were shown in the media, which is mainly the 
handi work of the army and civil servants.
However, in the Banderban puroshava election, high voter turnout (around 87%) 
compared to previous general elections clearly revealed a great interest, commitment 
and enthusiasm among the Pahari in particularly. Understanding the main 
motivation for high voter turnout particularly at Uzani para and Modyam para 
centres (around 88%) is evidently important for some crucial reasons. Firstly, high 
voter turnout must be understood within the context of the antagonistic relationship 
between Pahari and Bengali. Secondly, high electoral turnout and overwhelming 
participation can also be seen as a process of collective mobilisation based on anger 
and mistrust against the Bengali, which, in turn, transformed into renewed hope 
through Okka Parishad's construction of Pahari Sa. Analyses of the Banderban 
Puroshava election results highlight this trend.
Analysis of Voting Behaviour and Trends
As I mentioned in the introduction, the population figure of the CHT has always 
been a sensitive issue in Bangladesh. It has been a “term of reference” in CHT 
politics as far as issues of Bengali migration and ‘tribal’ populations are concerned 
(Ahamed 2001). The exact population figure of CHT is always somewhat 
misleading. Census reports in Bangladesh do not provide district-wise breakdown by 
‘tribal’ and Bengali population in the CHT.
According to the recently published 2001 census report, the total population of the 
Banderban puroshava is 31,806. However, unofficial sources suggest that the total 
population of Banderban puroshava is in fact 33,401 of which ethnic populations 
altogether form about 47%, while the Bengali makes up about 53% (Rovillos 2000). 
It appears that the population composition of Banderban puroshava area is very 
finely balanced. On the basis of population concentration, the entire Banderban 
puroshava area can be divided into two zones: Pahari and Bengali core zones. The 
purpose of this categorisation is to reveal whether electoral behaviour is determined
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by ethnicity or party politics. What are the guiding principles? This may certainly 
helps us understand the role of ethnicity as well as the nature of electoral politics in 
the CHT.
There are three wards in the Banderban puroshava area. Ward One is constituted of 
the Uzani and Madyam para with substantial ethnic populations, among which the 
Marma predominate about 80%, while other ethnic groups, such as the Tanchanga, 
Bawm, Chakma and a few Mru families altogether form 10%, and the rest are 
Bengali around 10%. Ward One could be referred to as the core of the Pahari area. 
Ward Two consists of the Bazar area, bus station area and court building area. The 
Ward Two is the Bengali majority area, constituting 85% of the Bengali population, 
and the rest is the composition of different ethnic groups. Ward Two can be referred 
to as the core Bengali area. Ward Three is relatively smaller in size. It consists of the 
hospital area and of Kayang (temple) area. In Ward Three, Bengalis constitute about 
73% of the populations and the rest is composed of different ethnic groups. Table 1 
shows ward basis population composition.
Table 4: Population Composition in Banderban
Ward Population Total
Bengali Pahari (all groups)
Ward 1 1353 12174 13527
Ward 2 13272 2342 15614
Ward 3 3158 1102 4260
Total 17783 15618 33401
Based on fieldwork materials and consulting local NGO sources
Analysis of Voting Pattern
The election results of the Banderban puroshava revealed a clearly uneven voting 
behaviour pattern, particularly on the part of Pahari voters. Since the introduction of 
the Banderban puroshava in 1984, AL candidates have remained powerful and have 
won all previous elections. Banderban district, as a whole, is considered one of the 
strongholds of the ruling party the AL. In the 1991 and 1996 general elections, AL
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won all three seats in CHT, but in the October 2001 general election AL lost two of 
these to the BNP-led alliance: the seat of northern Khagrachari district was lost to a 
Bengali candidate, and, in the centre, to a PCJSS backed Chakma candidate at 
Rangamati. However, AL kept the Banderban seat. There are many post election 
interpretations about the AL debacle.153
However, as far as the previous general elections results are concerned, AL was still 
the politically dominant force in Banderban. In the puroshava election, the AL 
candidate Ayub Chowdhury faced a stiff challenge from the Pahari Okka Parishod 
candidate Kessy. Kessy, though, securing almost 90% of Pahari core zone votes, 
lost the election because he did not get enough votes from the Bengali core zone.
According to the official government voter list, the total numbers of voters in the 
Banderban puroshava area is 13,676, out of total population of 31,806.154 Among 
the six polling centres in the puroshova area, there are two polling centres in Ward 
Two, Unazi and Madyam para. Kessy received overwhelming majority votes in 
these two centres. Out of the total number of voters (5060) registered on election 
day, Kessy got 4554 votes (90%) whereas Ayub Chowdhury received only 506 
votes (10%). On the other hand, in Ward One combining all three polling centres, 
Court building polling centre, Bazar centre and Goner para polling centre, Ayub 
Chowdhury received 5156 (about 88%) votes out of total registered votes 5841 on 
the election day. In contrast, Kessy got only 685 votes (12%). In Ward Three, there
153 There were different versions and interpretations of AL election debacles put forward by the 
PCJSS leaders, local Pahari, Bengali settlers and in the media after the election. Most of these views 
were published in the daily newspapers and in other media. Although the 2001 general election was 
held after my fieldwork, I have reviewed the post-election situation by reading newspapers in Internet 
and also maintaining my contacts in CHT. It has been argued by many local commentators and 
PCJSS leadership that "AL dual policy and insincerity to implement peace accord pledges frustrated 
many Pahari people who ultimately sought alternative solution" (Zonokhontaa 3 Oct. 2001). Buddah 
Zuti Chakma, the local correspondent of the national daily Protom Alo, well known for his vocal 
journalism on hill issues, opined that sudden fundamentalist political upheaval in the CHT was a 
result of the AL’s narrow party interests towards over all CHT policy. He believes that the AL, in the 
last five years of their tenure, adopted a policy of slow implementation of peace accord conditions, 
and ignored the settler’s problem, non-functioning of land commission, politicisation of hill district’s 
councils by appointing the party men (Protom Alo 29 Sept. 2001). Like Buddah Zuti, many others 
also think that all these processes together frustrated pro-peace people in the CHT. Many political 
commentators even argued that the change of political landscape in the 2001 general election made 
little inroad for the BNP and its right wing allies into the AL support base in die CHT (The Daily 
Star, 5 Oct. 2001).
154According to election regulations, only people aged 18 and above are eligible to vote.
312
was only one polling centre, the Kayang para centre, where Ayub Chowdhury 
secured almost twice as much as Kessy, 1053 (64%) votes out of total registered 
votes 1593 on the election day, emerged as victorious by a total margin of 901 votes. 
Table 2 shows the votes received by the candidates for each polling centre.
Table 5: Break down of the result
Candidate Court/Bazar/Gonar 
Para centres 
(Ward 1)
Maydam/Uzani Para
centres
(Ward 2)
Kayang Para centre 
(ward 3)
Total
voters
6714
Total 
registered 
on the day 
5841
Total
voters
5817
Total 
registered 
on the day 
5060
Total
voters
1832
Total registered on
the day
1593
Ayub
C h o w d h u r y
5156 506 1035
( t o t a l  r e c e i v e d  6 6 9 7
Kessy 685 4554 557
( t o t a l  r e c e i v e d = 5 7 9 6 )
Result 901 (margin)
Source: On the basis of official results on e ection day
The figures of the total votes received by each candidate in a specific ward visibly 
demonstrates the importance of an ethnic politics. A Pahari voting pattern emerges 
in the Pahari core area, on the other hand, a Bengali voting pattern also appears on 
the same principle. The pattern of voting results demonstrate a particular loyalty to 
ethnic line: Bengali vs Pahari. Ethnicity has thus played a key role in the Banderban 
puroshava election.
One important development in CHT recent politics is that ethnic voters have shifted 
their allegiance from the AL to Pahari candidates for many reasons. The result of 
the Banderban puroshava election was clearly a reflection of a broad level collective 
mobilisation of the Pahari against the Bengali. In fact, many interesting 
observations can be made about the puroshava election. Firstly, in all previous local 
puroshava elections, the AL dominated the poll with the support of locals. In this 
puroshava election the same people went against the AL candidate (secured only 
10%). I suggest that Pahari voters are, by and large, influenced by the Okka
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Parishod’s mobilisation on the basis of ethnic solidarity rather than on the nature of 
party politics.
The Banderban puroshava election results can be interpreted as clear manifestation 
of politicised ethnicity: Pahari vs. Bengali. In the case of Pahari, regional issues 
and interests, shared deprivations and exploitation by Bengali have all been 
identified as reasons for Pahari mobilisation, and played a determining role in the 
election.
Conclusion
Many reasons have been put forward by critics for the failure of Okka Porishad 
candidate Kessy. For example, it has been argued that an ultra-ethnic propaganda, 
including slogans such as “if Pahari win settler Bengali would be in danger to leave 
the CHT” by Ayub Chowdhury camp has largely been successful against Kessy.
This campaign is believed to have significantly influenced the majority Bengali 
voters in Banderban.
However, there are other crucial aspects which also played a significant role in 
defeating the Okka Parishod candidate. Firstly, despite the boycott of the election by 
the major opposition political parities elsewhere in Bangladesh, Ayub Chowdhury 
still enjoyed the support of all as Bengali candidate in the Banderban puroshava 
election. Secondly, non-partisan local election turned out to be a party election 
involving the government machinery, such as government ministers, MPs and senior 
civil servants, who appeared a key factors in Kessy’s election debacle. Many local 
Marmas, like Hla Pru master, said that government party interests had crippled the 
Banderban puroshava election. They thought that the overwhelming electoral 
support to Pahari Okka candidate Kessy had been undermined by cash money, 
contracts, and promise of public positions. Some Bengali Hindu minority voters, 
who were initially sympathetic to Kessy, were warned by threats in order to ensure 
the victory of the government party candidate.
Another point must be made here: in the previous elections, the ruling party AL had 
always tried to win the support of Pahari voters, especially at times when Pahari
314
voters were considered very crucial. During the puroshava election the government 
went out of its way to win over the Pahari candidate because Kessy was a local 
Okka Parishod nominee and was also involved in many activities related to CHT 
causes, such as the recently launched “movement for the land rights of indigenous 
people”. Moreover, all ethnic groups supported him because of his vocal attitude 
against government policy, and also for his role in upholding hill tradition and 
culture, which enabled him to become a very popular figure among the youth.
Thus, as I realised, the election process itself, and not the result had been the vivid 
outcome of the opening chapter of Pahari expression, an attempt to mobilise 
collective identity against the Bengali.
Multi-ethnic mobilisation as Pahari is a vehicle to challenge the Bengali hegemony. 
The forces related to their shared beliefs and values become part of their common 
political and economic interests. The politics of collective identity, in the form of 
Pahari-ness represent an alternative aspiration to politically challenge Bengali 
domination. In south Asia or in other so-called ‘tribal’ areas, bullets have become 
the weapons of ethnic politics. There are armed struggles still being waged by 
indigenous peoples to liberate themselves and to create their own separate states or 
to establish autonomous regions as a part of the existing one (Kailash 1999). There 
are also extra-legal forms of resistance, planned or spontaneous, to fight against the 
political and economic measures taken by the government that affects the livelihood 
of the indigenous people and their cultural identity (Mullick 2001).
At the same time, indigenous peoples have the experience of political process that 
involve election and ethnic mobilisation. The Banderban puroshava election has 
certainly become an arena in which Pahari collective mobilisation is vividly 
expressed against the Bengali and Bangladesh State hegemony.
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Conclusion
In this final chapter my aim is to follow up the main arguments and ideas that I have 
presented so far. Instead of summarising the findings of each chapter, I will develop 
these into a condensed concluding discussion. The processes I have referred to as 
‘ethnic mobilisation’ makes a good point of departure.
Ethnic mobilisation is commonly understood as “the process by which an ethnic 
community becomes politicised” (Esman 1994: 28). It is a matter of an existing 
collectivity, or people bound together by cultural and experiential core, whom, 
according to Esman, are turned into political competitor (ibid.: 16, 27). Such 
reasoning remains within an essentialist understanding of ethnicity and identity 
formation. The argument I have developed in this thesis is largely in opposition to 
such a position. One of the basic points I have dwelt on is that the very making of an 
ethnic community/people is itself produced in the process of ethnic mobilisation.
In other words, the ethnic community cannot be taken as given or existing prior to 
the mobilisation (just waiting to be politicised). There are shared historical 
experiences, cultural forms, collective attachments and community solidarities on 
which ethnic communities are built; the point is that there is no built-in teleology in 
such attachments, and they can constitute different projects of ethnic mobilisation. 
Ethnic mobilisation, I would say, refers to the process in which a particular project 
of ethnic identity is constituted (discarding, or at the expense of, other possible 
cultural identities such as in the case of CHT).
Cultural identity, and its variants ethnic and collective identities, is central in this 
thesis. I regard these as modem reflexive projects aimed at demarcating distinct 
collective selves, an identity that separate ‘us from them’, ‘those who belong’ from 
‘those who do not belong’. In the CHT, the processes of identity construction are 
intimately connected to the historical experiences of the statists categorisation and 
classificatory grid of colonial and post-colonial subjects. In contemporary times, the 
newly constructed Pahari ethnicity/identity occupies an interesting structural 
position within the larger context of Bangladesh society.
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The category Pahari is an exonym, from a Bengali word pahar (hill), once used by 
the colonial administrators to refer to diverse ethnic groups of CHT into a single 
term ‘hill tribes’. In the colonial discourse, the word ‘hill tribe’ had negative 
connotations being portrayed as primitive and backward people. In the post-colonial 
Bangladesh state the newly constructed category upazati bears the similar meaning. 
The notion upazati is usually translated as sub-nation, and can also mean stereotyped 
isolated tribal people of Bangladesh in official discourse. Among the mainstream 
Bengali, the category upazati denotes undeveloped people, socially looked down 
upon because of their mode of customary lifestyles, such as jhum, nappai, (dry fish 
powder - a common ingredient used by all ethnic communities in the CHT) and 
masang gor (house types). Thus, the statist category upazati is perceived to be used 
for undeveloped primitive people, who are in need of state intervention to allow 
them to develop as ‘proper’ Bangladeshi citizens.
In contrast to this perception, at the present day, discourses of ethnic politics in the 
CHT, the state’s negative connotations regarding this categorisation become the 
positive meaning in the processes of collective ethnic mobilisation. The common use 
of the term Pahari and the rejection of stereotyped notions, upazatiltnbdX, has 
gained a new dimension in recreating a broader community and collective identity. 
The notion Pahari is turned into a form of political identification opening up a space 
for diverse ethnic groups in the CHT. In this process construction of Pahari identity 
can be seen as ‘othering’. I qualify this argument by emphasising the fluid and 
therefore changing processes of ethnic identity formation in the CHT.
In the case of Pahari, I have referred to this as the shifting boundaries of ethnicity, 
which on the most general level includes all ethnic groups of CHT in opposition to 
the dominant Bengali. At this level, there are bonds of solidarity and cultural 
overlapping between the indigenous communities, such as Marma, Bawm, 
Tanchanga and so on, which they often say, they are part of shared history in the 
CHT and face a common reality of shared deprivation and marginalisation by the 
dominant Bengali and the State. Below this level of shared identity, there is another 
level where Marma, Bawm and Tanchanga, who see themselves locally as distinct 
ethnic groups. At this level, socio-cultural practices, such as marriage organisation,
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inheritance and language have been the salient feature of ethnic boundary 
maintenance.
I call this dynamic process ‘negotiating identity’. Among ethnic groups in the CHT, 
identity construction is a constant process of negotiation, a negotiation of self and 
collectivities. The phrase ‘negotiating identity’ is mainly derived from the reading of 
Anne Schiller’s (1997) discussion on indigenous identity construction in Malaysia, a 
similar ethnographic reality to CHT. Anne Schiller explains how construction of 
“Ngaju” and “Badhay” identities is a process of “negotiation”, by which they deal 
with their ethnic and cultural status between “indigenous society” and the present 
Malaysian State (ibid.: 183).
In the case of CHT, following Anne Schiller’s model, identity construction can also 
be seen as a process of negotiation and fluidity. The notion of fluid ethnicity is of 
paramount importance in any understanding of CHT society. Being a Marma, 
Chakma, Bawm and others is related to the processes of groups’ ethnic identity 
based mainly on linguistic or socio-organisational criteria. But at another level, 
being a Pahari, Jhumma or Adivashi is directly related to the processes of broader 
collectivities, and the politics of constructing a supra-community based on CHT land 
and resource rights in opposition to the Bengali. This supra collectivity is clearly 
defined in terms of a ‘recreated community’ with the development of common 
historical experiences of marginalisation and deprivation and the territorial space of 
CHT.
I argue that this spiral and fluid nature of identity construction is a process of 
‘negotiating identity’ embedded in everyday day life experiences among the diverse 
ethnic groups in the CHT. For example, Marma people in Roangchari, in a localised 
form, identify themselves as Regesa based on particular settlement and habitual 
attachment in relation to other Marma groups elsewhere in the CHT. And again in 
the context of inter-ethnic relationships, the category Regesa becomes the expression 
of Marma identity as opposed to other ethnic groups, such as Tanchanga and Bawm, 
around them in Roangchari (I have discussed this point in Chapter Three). Yet at 
another broader collective level, the same Marma people assert being Pahari along 
with other ethnic groups invoking a sense of common CHT history, tradition and
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belonging, and a sense of lived experiences of shared deprivation by the state 
regimes in Bangladesh.
Thus, one must be aware of the processes of identity construction in terms of layers 
such as, PaharifMarma., Pahari!Bawm or PaharifTanchanga and so on. In the 
context of CHT, I suggest that analytical notions, ‘unity’, ‘diversity’, ‘multi­
ethnicity’, ‘ethnic mobilisation’ and ‘social movement’ must be understood in the 
processes of ‘negotiating identity’. In this thesis, I position myself in this line with 
the argument that the question of ethnicity is not a question of fixed static, bounded 
‘tribal’ people in the CHT as most of ethnographers have been monotonously 
reporting for so long. From my ethnographic experience it is very pervasive that 
contemporary CHT society is dynamic and fluid, constantly shaping or being shaped 
by both internal and external forces.
Multi-ethnicity in CHT as Diversity in Unity
The notion of ‘multi-ethnicity’ is seen as one of the unique characteristics of CHT in 
contemporary literature. Loffler rightly pointed out that “within one and same mouza 
in the CHT, one may find four groups speaking completely different languages, 
building different types of houses, wearing different clothes, believing in different 
customs and religions” (1990: 36). He further observed that the multi-ethnic nature 
of CHT is not analogous to the situation elsewhere in South Asia.
Nevertheless, Loffler’s ethnography remains close to the colonial stereotypical 
model which emphasises that cultural diversity among the groups is fixed and stable 
that forms the CHT society. This is clearly a very idealistic view. Loffler’s analysis 
of inter-ethnic relationships is symbiotic. He describes the CHT groups as 
independent and isolated units without exploring the processes of interaction 
between the Bengali surround them. His study lacks an interpretation of internal 
dynamics; what kinds of inter relationships exists among the groups that constitute 
multi-ethnic society in CHT. I argue that Loffler’s conceptions of “stability”, 
“equilibrium” and “symbiosis” are poorly suited to the analysis of inter-ethnic 
relationships and the political situation in the CHT.
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There is another trend of arguments that again completely ignores the internal 
dynamics of the groups. This perspective suggests that internal ethnic divisions are 
increasingly irrelevant to the common struggle of cultural politics against the state 
(Schendel 1996, 2001; Mohsin 1997; Tripura 1992; Dewan 1990). Of course this 
political analysis is obviously relevant in the context of contemporary ethnicisation 
and the processes of collective social movements but the diversity aspects of their 
ethnicity has been fully ignored.
I hold the view against some of the prevalent opinions that broader collective 
identity formation is the only issue in the CHT. I argue that this view clearly 
undermines the potential sources of multi-ethnic relationships in the discourse of 
identity construction. Of course, Pahari, Adivashi and Jhumma are social 
movements of ethnic mobilisation as a common struggle against the state policy, 
which is crucially important to peoples’ lives and livelihood. Nevertheless, it is also 
equally important to understand the internal dynamics at local level because in such 
politically contested situations like CHT ethnic groups negotiate their social 
relationships in everyday life in both a contextual and fluid manner. The fact is that 
ethnic groups in CHT primarily emphasise their distinctiveness as a prime source of 
ethnic marker but simultaneously they manipulate these into a broader level of 
identification in particular situations and contexts.
Anthropologists working in multi-ethnic areas opine that the subtle interplay of 
group formation practices is central, and in most cases give an impression that inter­
ethnic marriage is one of the bonding factors for the constitution of multi-ethnic 
society. Philip Burnham, in the context of Northern Cameroonian group “Mbororo”, 
suggest that inter-marriage, residential propinquity and pattern of leaderships all 
combine as elements in the constitution of local groups and multi-ethnic society 
(1996: 97). Oddvar Hollup (2000) also suggests the similar view that inter-ethnic 
marriage is catalyst to the formation of multi-ethnic society of different Indian 
migrants’ groups in Mauritius.
In the CHT, however, this is not the case. Among ethnic groups, inter-ethnic 
marriage practices still seem rigid and less tolerated. Ethnic endogamy is a common 
form of marriage practice. The prevalent nature of this marriage practice is, in fact, a
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mechanism of ethnic boundary maintenance. The local level socio-organisational 
data shows, as we have seen in Chapter Three, how ethnic groups maintain their 
cultural diversity and group identity within a multi-ethnic locality. Some of these 
testimonies illustrate the clear consciousness of maintaining distinct group identities.
Let me explain this further, cultural diversity maintenance among the groups is still 
perceived as protecting and preserving one’s tradition and culture. As I have 
explained in Chapter Four, language has been the idiom of ethno-linguistic identity 
of the groups, which in turns key to maintenance of cultural diversity. Both 
Tanchanga and Marma are Buddhist by religion, and have separate temples side by 
side practicing Buddhism in linguistic ways leaving religious identity aside. 
Religious practices are expressed in linguistic terms making cultural boundary 
operational among the Buddhist Marma and Tanchanga. The same is true for the 
Christian Bawm and Tripura. In addition, taking ethno-names as part of proper 
names is also a mechanism of diversity maintenance as being Marma, Bawm or 
Tanchanga.
Nonetheless, I suggest that cultural boundary maintenance is apparently active 
among the groups in CHT but they are not fixed bounded categories. In fact, ethnic 
diversity can also be seen as sources of unity at the broader level. For example, 
development of script movements by different socio-cultural organisations is not 
only an expression of one’s distinctive ethnic identity but also assertion of 
indigenousness in the CHT as a whole, as opposed to Bengali. Recent development 
of indigenous language movements, as an organised discourse, in relation to the 
present education system in the CHT transforms ethnic diversity into unity.
Furthermore, in the process of celebrating the traditional Biashabi festival, ethnic 
groups become ritualised in the form of a collective body through gathering and 
activities. Dances and music of different ethnic groups display the fragmentation of 
cultural elements in a singular body of indigenous Pahari culture. Each group 
express as different ethnicity but also blends into a panoramic view of common 
cultural unity in the form of a collective festival, Baishabi. In the political discourse, 
metaphorical representation of this diversity become the source of inspiration in 
collective mobilisation as the phrase reads “We Are Ten Flowers in One Garden”
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(discussed in Chapter Four). In this articulation, the CHT multi-ethnic society can be 
seen as ‘diversity in unity’.
The notion ‘diversity in unity’ is also reflected in other forms of collective 
development. For example, formation of a steering committee for the Banderban 
puroshava election and land rights movement with multi-ethnic representation is a 
political process of broader identity construction in which ‘diversity in unity’ is 
publicly displayed. Composition of the Pahari Okka Parishod and Vomi Odikhar 
protest movements, in terms of membership, is one glaring examples of the politics 
of ‘unity within diversity’. The underlying emphasis on the inclusion of each ethnic 
representation in this social movement is clearly a part of collective mobilisation of 
diverse entity in the CHT. I argue that the notion ‘diversity in unity’ is, more 
precisely, a question of multi-ethnicity which is, in fact, the basic structural principle 
of CHT society. Within this relationship ethnic groups are organised both in cultural 
and political terms on the basis of priority, and in the face of external force and also 
to challenge the state policy towards the CHT.
I argue that identities are constructed or manufactured, not given entities. It is 
important to deconstruct identity in the context of CHT because these groups are not 
neatly bounded ‘tribes’ but actually part of the much bigger political field. In terms 
of contemporary politics in the CHT, diverse ethnic groups find it strategically easier 
to merge together to form a bigger category of hill people. This merging of groups is 
reflected in the range of vocabulary regarding ethnic identification such as Pahari, 
Jhumma, Adivashi and so on.
Pahari Movement/Mobilisation
In the contemporary politics of CHT, construction of Pahari identity is more 
inclusive encompassing all ethnic communities other than Bengali. Nowadays, the 
popular slogan in CHT Amra shobi Pahari, pahar moder ghor-bari (we are all 
Pahari, the Hill Tracts is our homeland) is orchestrated to demonstrate hill groups 
are actually ‘one people’ and arguably the sole steward of CHT land: challenging 
present ‘Bengali settlers’ and the state regimes (see Chapter Six).
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It is also an ethnic mobilisation by focusing on the necessity for uniting all the 
ethnic groups as Pahari working together for the cultural right and access to CHT 
resources, and preservation and development of common ‘indigenous’ culture. To 
ethnic organisations such as Pahari Okka Parishod, Vomi Odikhar Committee, for 
example, jhum is a matter of social and cultural right; right to preserve this tradition 
is crucial to Pahari. From this perspective, one could clearly foresee the 
identification of Pahari would appear to be a politically more appropriate to broader 
level ethnic mobilisation.
Two components in the construction of a unified Pahari identity include its shared 
historical past and its present day marginalisation by the State. The appeal of shared 
CHT history is not precisely that of an historical past, but the present-day 
construction of the past. In this sense, for their part, ordinary people hold their own 
model of significance and actual experiences of Pahari community: as locality, as 
present construction of the past, as empowerment, and as a means of recovering 
CHT land. The elements of marginalisation, shared deprivation and land 
dispossession are all embedded in Pahari collective ideology. The tension between 
communal ideology and individual expectations are also of paramount importance. 
The question of survival has greatly motivated Pahari to resist khas land lease.
The process of identity formation, I argue, does not take place separate from 
people’s everyday lives. For the ethnic peoples in the CHT, their assertion of Pahari 
identity is in most cases directly related to their survival or struggle for land and 
livelihood. In this context, the notion collective Pahari becomes the meaning of 
lived experiences. Lived experiences are the conditions that Pahari, in general, face 
in day-to-day activities with the Bengali and state institutions.
As discussed in Chapters Five and Six, in recent times Pahari have experienced the 
serious threat of losing their land by government expansion policies through khas 
land lease, reserve forests and new establishments such as cantonments. In each case 
Pahari access is heavily restricted to their traditional land. Their traditional jhum 
cultivation is becoming politically contested. Jhum cultivation is considered by the 
state as problematic and not conducive to modernity, an obstacle to successful forest 
conservation. In this process, Pahari firmly believe that they are increasingly being
323
alienated from the land and forest in the CHT. These feelings of shared lived 
experiences are articulated in the politics of indigenous language movements, 
election processes, and the khas land protest movement (discussed in Chapters Four, 
Seven and Eight).
Pahari mobilisation and opposition to their marginalisation take place in the domain 
of what I refer to as ‘collective resistance’. Examples of such resistance movements 
are their overwhelming participation in collective activities in order to challenge the 
present Bengali state policy towards the CHT. Their organised activities are also 
expressed in defence of their rights to CHT land and forests. Therefore, Pahari 
social movements are not simply concerned with the acquisition of land but also a 
question of survival, a ‘common problem of collective realities’. In political 
discourse, being a Pahari, offers a dignified alternative to the hardship imposed on 
these people by the State.
I argue that the assertion of Pahari identity is intertwined with shared deprivations 
and increased marginalisation of diverse ethnic peoples in the CHT. It is arguable 
that this contemporary development mainly concerns the recreation and construction 
of collective identity in the form of ethnic mobilisation. This study promotes a 
deeper understanding of the multi-ethnic nature of the Bangladeshi State and 
provides an assessment of the relationship between ethnicity, environment, 
development and the State. It also contributes to the wider anthropology of forest- 
dwelling peoples of South Asia. Furthermore, it challenges the political use of 
environmentalism and anthropological knowledge in national and regional disputes 
over the control and use of natural resources.
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Appendix - 1
There is very little information about the ethno-linguistic knowledge of these people 
before the colonial period. During the early part of the 20th century G. A. Grierson 
conducted a linguistic survey of different tribes of the GHT including the Bawm but 
excluding the Marina and Tanchanga. Long after that European anthropologists, 
such as Lucian Bemot, Pierre Bessaignet and Loffler, carried out anthropological 
studies on the CHT, which give scant information on their languages.
Among them only, the linguist Bemot (1959) classified the languages of the ethnic 
groups of the CHT as being of Tibeto-Burman origin. A few researchers, however, 
differ from the above views regarding the categorisation of the language family 
(Khaleque 1998; Moniruzzaman 1984). Moniruzzaman (1984), in particular 
studying the phonological system of Tanchanga and Chakma languages concluded 
that they are of Indo-European family origin. Unfortunately, these studies are not in- 
depth ethnographic studies, and provide only limited data on language. Their 
findings in this regard are not yet conclusive on the classification and genetic 
relationship of these languages. However, their works, though overlapping views 
exist, suggest some hypothetical family tree to which the ethnic languages can be 
related.
This study thus demands a careful scrutiny of the linguistic behaviour of diverse 
ethnic groups in the CHT with a view to find their genetic and historical 
relationship. On the basis of the findings of other research and application of a 
lexical reconstruction method permitted me an identification of differences in the 
cognitive and semantic realms of the three ethnic communities, Marma, Bawm and 
Tanchanga in Roangchari. Firstly, in order to trace out historical relationship with 
broader language families I focused on comparative data using published research 
works of Grierson (1903), Hutchinson (1909), Lewin (1869), Bemot (1959), 
Bessaignet (1958), Loffler (1990), Moniruzzaman (1984), Islam (1984) and 
Khaleque (1998). Secondly, with the use of the glottochronological method155 for
155Glottochronological method is a linguistic technique used for measuring the relationship of 
languages on the basis of similarity and diversity among the phones and morphemes of the languages
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lexical construction among these groups my immediate purpose is to examine the 
diversities that exist in the phonemic, morphemic and syntactical levels of their 
languages, which are observable today.
On the basis of available information and comprehensive structural analysis of 
Marma, Bawm and Tanchanga languages the following relationship can be held to 
be tenable.
Classification of the eleven languages/dialects in the CHT
Linguistic family Languages sub-family Ethnic groups
Indo-European family Indo-Aryan sub-family Bengali, Chakma 
Tanchanga
Sino-Tibetan family Tibeto-Burman sub-family 
(1) Burmese family 
2) Bodo (kok-borok)
(3) Kuki-Chin group
(1) Marma. Chak and Mru
(2) Tripura
(3) Bawm. Lusai. Pankau. 
Khyang and Khumi
Source: Based on the secondary ethno-historical sources and personal investigation on linguistic 
aspects
From the above chart, all the present dialects and languages of eleven ethnic groups 
in the CHT belong to only two major family groups. It seems most likely that the 
Tanchanga language descended from the major linguistic group of Indo-European 
linguistic family which bears close resembles and similarity both in phones and 
morphemes with neighbouring Chakma and Chittagonian languages. On the other 
hand, Marma and Bawm descended from another major family group namely Sino- 
Tibetan family but in course of time they split into two distinct lines within this 
language family. The Burmese family language group comprises of Marma, Mru 
and Chak, while Bawm, Lusia and Pankhu and Khang share many similarity in their 
dialects derived from chin-chin group of Sino-Tibetan language family.156
in questions.
156 This analysis is based on the linguistic data derived mainly from the Marma, Bawm and 
Tanchanga ethnic groups: the degree of similarity and dissimilarity that exits at the phonemic and 
morphemic level of the three languages.
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It appears from my own enquiry as well as writings of the scholars that the supposed 
genetic and historical relationship of the Marma, Bawm and Tanchanga language 
can be presented in the following genealogical language tree diagram.
Proto Language
Semitic Bantu
Centum
(western
Europe,
Indo-European
language
Shatam (Asia 
and Eastern 
Europe)
Indo-Aryan 
Language (subfamily)
Indo-Iranian group (Persian, 
Beluch, Pushto)
Ancient 
Indian Aryan 
Language
Sino-Tibetan 
Chines
North-American 
Malayo-Polynesian
Siamese Chinese 
(Thai, indo-chin
and lao)
Tibeto-Burmeselse group
Tibetan
Bodo Kuki-chin
Burmese
(Marma)
Bawm
These languages subsequently split into several regional dialects (Punjabi, 
Assami, Sanskrit and Bengali
Chittagonian
Chakma and 
Tanchanga
From the foregoing diagram, among the three languages/dialects in question we can 
directly relate the Tanchanga dialect to the broader sub-family of Indo-Aryan 
language. On the other hand, Marma and Bawm languages are variants of Tibeto- 
Burman sub-family within the Sino-Tibetan broader language family. Evidences in 
support of this observation have been further obtained from the analysis of phonetic 
feature of the three languages. Although I have done a detailed structural analysis of 
phonemes and morphemes of Marma, Bawm and Tanchanga languages through
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application of lexical reconstruction method, space does not permit me to present 
them in full length.
However, these findings clearly show the relationship of Tanchanga and Chakma 
dialects with Bengali and Chittagonian dialects in particular. It is important to note 
at this point that the entire CHT region and the neighbouring Chittagong district was 
under Arakanese rule before the Mogul period. Aryan languages have penetrated 
into CHT from western direction (Bangladesh, India and Assam). On the other hand, 
the languages of Bawm, Lusia, Khumi, which belong to Sino-Tibetan family, are 
derivations of Kuki-Chin group of Tibeto-Burman sub-family from the eastern 
direction while Marma language is related to Burmese group of the same Tibeto- 
Burmese sub-family. These two branches, however, share many linguistic features 
of Sino-Tibetan language family which infiltrated into CHT from the eastern 
direction (Burma).
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